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Me~randum of MR. JusTCE PowELL. 
Cf- /U.#X-~is m orandum is submitted pursuant to the sug-· 
~ gestion of Byron, following our discussion at the Con-
' ference, that I outline my thoughts as to a possible 
((remedies approach" to this case. 
.. ... .... - ~- ... .. 
It seems to me that the Copyright Law, enacted long-
before photocopying was dreamed of, compels us by its 
explicit language to hold photocopying to be an infringe-· 
ment. There is little doubt, however, that such a hold-
ing- without more-would seriously and adversely affect 
the public interest in dissemination of knowledge in the 
inexpensive, convenient form that photocopying allows. 
This public harm would result without, in my opinion , 
any significant compensating increase in the amount of 
new work published. This effect would be most severe 
if an infringement holding led to the development of a 
royalties system like that existing in the music publish-
ing and recording industries, in which transaction costs 
are extremely high. But this effect would be significantly 
reduced if publishers were restricted to charging a reason-
able licensing fee for noncommercial photocopyinO' ri!Thts. 
Even a modest licensing fee system probablY would have 
some effect on the amount of photocopying. But such a 
system also would accord due recognition to the rights of 
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authors and publishers and to the purpose of the Copy-
right Law. 
I would deal with the problem by recognizing that 
photocopying constitutes an infrin ement and by limit-
mg e reme ies av · for noncommercial hotoco ) -
~ uch a remedy approac would be essentially 
consistent with nguage and established 
copyright principles. Also it would allow relath·e flexi-
bility in dealing with the cluster of problems that this 
case promises to bring in its wake, absent a comprehen-
sive legislative solution. 
But before elaborating on a remedies solution. perhaps 
I should state my reasons for disagreein~ with the Court 
of Claims in its reliance upon "fair use" as the solution. 
~'Fair Use" 
Apart from the fair use defense, photocopying all, or 
a substantial portion of a copyrighted work (here, incH-
vidual journal articles) is an infringement of the copy-
right holder's exclusive right "ft]o print. reprint, publish, 
copy and vend the copyrighted work." A fair reading 
of the language and purpose of the statute does not seem 
to me to allow the contrary conclusion. '1To secure the 
author the right to multiply copies of his work may be 
said to have been the main purpose of the copyright 
statutes." Bobbs-M errill Co. Y. Straus, 210 U. S. 339. 
In a sense, however. many works copy or use works 
that went before. employing them as a necessary predi-
cate for an original contribution. If, therefore, an 
author could extend his copyright interest to all works 
that used or included elements of his own, the Copyright 
Law's central purpose-the encouragement of the pro-
duction of new works-would be hampered rather than 
enhanced. This observation is the basis of the fair use 
defense. Although courts and commentators disagree 
widely as to the outer edges of the 'doctrine, there is 
I 
( 
..... ___ ,.. .. ,...,.._._ 
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general agreement. as t~.Gntral meanin;;t ~a~ 
co ri hted work is fair when i is for the 'tr )ose of 
creating something cssentiall the eco-
nmmc value of the new 'vork 
rom Its incorporatina secti~Ou,l ~W--J.il't<.l.uu. 
The Court of Claims opinion in this case applied many 
of the criteria that traditionally have been taken into 
account in determining 'vhether a use is fair. I believel, 
however. it applied two of these criteria quite errone-
ously. First, lack of demonstrable loss to the copyright 
holder as a result of the infringing act has never been 
thought to establish fair use. It can serve only as evi-
dence that the infringing work is not the practical. eco-
nomic equivalent of the copyrighted work. Second, the 
Court of Claims found relevant the motiYe of the libraries, 
that their photocopying was not done for profit. but f01· 
the advancement of research. But motive in this sense 
has never been deemed relevant in fair use cases. Courts 
have looked to purpose, but only in the sense of whether 
the alleged infringer in.!_ended to create somethi11gile\v, 
or to appropriate fOr his o'm benefit the copyright 
holder's work. 
However justifiable and socially beneficial the libraries~ I 
photocopying practices may be, they cannot be charac-
. terized as a "fair use" within the established meaning of 
that term. The sole value of the photocopies derives 
1 precisely from theoriginal co ri(J'hted work. The copy J adc s not ling new an as no economic value independ-
-
ent of the work of the copyright holder. ~ ~ 
The Remedies Approa.ch 
· While the motive for and public benefit derived from· 
(2 ~ photocopying are irrelevant in determining the infring-
ment and fair use issues, they may be highly relevant to 
~~ 
{~::;;;e que: ofremedies. 
z::~ 
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17 U. S. C. § 101 provides: 
"If any person shall infringe the copyright in any 
work protected under the copyright laws .. . such 
person shall be liable 
"(a) To an injunction restraining such infringe-
ment 
"(b) To pay to the copyright proprietor such 
damages as the copyright proprietor may have 
suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the 
profits which the infringer shall have made from 
such infringement . .. or in lieu of actual damages 
and profits, such damages as to the court shall ap~~---\. r/_ 
to be just .. . and such fin lieu] damages shal~be ~ /YIO ~ C~ 
less than the sum of $250, and shall not be regarded A~~ ~ ~ 
as a penalty." 
1 
, ....., trr' 
!"",040 ,,. 
Petitioner brought this action under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1498 (b) , which provides that the copyright proprietor 
may bring an action in the Court of Claims for ((reason-
able and entire compensation" when the United States 
has infringed his copyright. Since no injunctive relief 
is available under this section, I turn first to § 101 (b)'s 
damages provisions. 
If petitioner were restricted to a remedy of damages 
for actual lost profits and profits gained by the infringer/ 
the problem presented in this case would be largely 
eliminated. As to individuals who photocopy for their 
own use a single item in a larger work, it would be nearly 
impossible for the proprietor to establish loss, and of 
course the infringer would have made no profit. With 
respect to library photocopying for patrons, the copy------1 Most courts have held that the proprietor is entitled to either-
hi:; damages or to the infringer's profits, whichever are grca ter. See· 
2 Nimmer on Copyright , at 667. The Second Circuit hns held, how-
ever, that the proprietor is entitled to both. See Peter Pan Fabrics, 
Inc. Y. Jobela Fabrics, Inc., 329 F. 2d 194 {CA2 1964) . This Court 
hns never ruled on the question. 
... _,. 
"-"\' __ ""1_. ,.., .. __ _ 
' . ' ' 
( 
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right holder might in some cases be able to demonstrate 
that he did lose a modest amount. since the library (or its 
patrons) might have purchased additional copies. More-
over, the library might have purchased a photocopying 
license. But the library would have made no profits. 
Allowing the proprietor to recover for these slight losses, 
plus costs of the suit (as required by 17 U. S. C. § 116) 
and possibly attorney's fees, would probably lead to the 
institution of a system of modest license fees added 
to the subscription rates of those subscribers-mostly 
libraries--that plan to xerox. 
The same damage rules would discourage unlicemed 
commercial xeroxing, since the copyright holder could 
recover, under the Second Circuit's rule, both his damages 
and the commercial xeroxer's profits, plus costs of suit 
and in some cases attorney's fees. The rules would also· 
tend to discourage the copying of whole works or journal 
issues, rather than parts, since it would be somewhat 
easier to establish reduced demand for the work as pub- · 
lished. Thus, the damage rules would give the copy-
right holder substantial returns for commercial exploita-· 
tion of his work, without unduly discouraging single copy, 
not-for-profit xeroxing by libraries or their patrons. 
The "in lieu" damages provisions of § 101 introduce 
a complicating element but do not necessarily change· 
this result. The cases are inconsistent as to when these 
in lieu provisions may or must be invoked. There is 
a fair amount of agreement, however, as to the follo·wing 
general rules: (i) When both the infringer's profits and 
the proprietor's losses can fairly be determined and are· 
higher than the statutory in lieu maximum, the in lieu 
provisions generally are not invoked; and (ii) when there· 
is lack of adequate proof as to either actual damages or 
the infringer's profits, the in lieu provisions may be 
invoked in the trial court's discretion. . This is the hold-
ing in F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc.~. 
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344 U. S. · 228, this Court's most recent decision on 
the subject. In that case, the Court discussed the 
policy considerations governing invocation of the in lieu 
provisions: 
"A rule of liability which merely takes a.wa.y the 
profits from an infringement. would offer little dis-
couragement to infringers. It would fall short of 
an effective sanction for the enforcement of the copy-
right policy. The statutory rule, formulated after 
long experience ... is designed to discourage wrong-
ful conduct. The discretion of the court is wide 
enough to permit resort to statutory damages for 
such purposes. Even for uninjurious and unprofit-
a.hle invasions of copyright the court may, if it 
deems it just. impose a liability within statutory 
limits to sanction and vindicate the statutory 
policy." 1 d., at 233. 
Much of this is dictum. Even so. it says only that the 
court may, in the interest of justice. invoke the in lieu 
provisions when there is lack of adequate proof of dam-
ages or profits, or even when such damages and profits 
are nonexistent. No decision of this Court or any court~ 
says that in the absence of any evidence of injury, the 
in lieu provisions are mandatory. 
In short. I see no obstacle to our formulating a rule 
along the following lines to govern the trial court'~­
cretion in determining whether it is just to allow in lieu 
damages: In the case of noncommercial photoduplication 
for personal use by private parties or by libraries for their 
patrons:t""he in lieu provisions ""should rarely be used. 
The statutory minimum would almost always grossly 
exceed any possible damage the proprietor has suffered. 
It would, therefore, take on a punitive aspect unjustified 
2 At lc:~st I h:~w found nonE' .. 
·~ -- _...,_ .... ..,_.. ____ .... - _ .. , -·---·.,.. ' 
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by the purposes of the copyright law, in light of the 
great public interest that noncommercial xeroxing serves. 
Normally, therefore, the trial court should require the 
best evidence of the proprietor's actual losses, and may 
award the proprietor's normal photoduplication licensing 
fee if found to be reasonable. This rule would leave the 
result as to noncommercial xcroxers substantially un-
changed. while allowing use of the in lieu provisions 
against commercial xeroxers. In would , however, allow 
awards of in lieu damages in particularly egregious cases 
of noncommercial use-where. for example, a library re-
fuses to pay a reasonable licrnsing fee and instead chooses 
to engage in large-scale infringement . 
This damagr analysis satisfies . in large measure, the 
public interest considerations so evident in this case. 
The availability of an injunctive remedy, however, could 
substantially alter the situation. If the copyright pro-
prietor can obtain an injunction , he may be able to 
compel the photocopier to agree to pay royalties rather 
than a reasonable licensing fee. The payment of royal-
ties could be prohibitive. It certainly would be more 
likely to discourage noncommercial xeroxing th an '"ould 
. a fixed fee licensing system. 
I would avoid this result by allowing an unconditional \ 
injunctive remedy only with respect to commercial 
photocopiers. It has been said that, once infringment 
is established, irreparable injury from continued infring-
ment is assumed because of the difficulty in determining 
damages precisely. But nothing in the statute nor in 
the case law necessarily precludes the court from engag-
ing in the normal balancing of equities and public interest 
considerations in determining whether to issue an injunc-
tion in a particular case. On the contrary, § 101 states 
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not that an injunction must issue in every case. And 
§ 112 provides that: 
"Any court mentioned in [28 U. S. C. § 1338] ... 
shall have power ... to grant injunctions to prevent 
and restrain the violation of any right secured by 
this title, according to the course and principles of 
courts of equity, on such terms as said court or 
judge may deem reasonable." 
Finally, limitations on normal equity power to decide 
whether an injunction should issue are not lightly im-
plied. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321. 
I think it is possible to formulate along the foregoing 
lines an equitable rule to deal with noncommercial 
photocopying infringers, a rule derived from the pub-
lic interest considerations in prom<n!ng noncommercial 
ph~ one side and in protecting the 
reasonable interests of the copyright proprietor on the 
other. As in other areas of property law, see Ham:Son-
ville v. W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U. S. 334, the 
public interest can be held to require that the injunction 
be denied, conditional on the infringing, noncommercial 
user agreeing to pay a. reasonable license fee for the privi-
lege of photocopying in the future. In the absence of 
agreement between the parties as to what fee is reason-
able, the amount would be set by the court. See 2 Nim-
mer on Copyright, at 656.4-656.5 (1974 ed.). 
The injunction problem is not directly presented in 
this case, but it would be desirable to address the problem . . . 
m our opmwn . 
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o:F~erica, ~ ~Cert to CA9 (Kilkenny, Canby, 
 and East [Sr DJ]) 
v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 
and Walt Disney Productions Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: This is the famous Betamax case, in which the 
CA9 held that manufacturers of videotaping devices violate the 
copyright laws. Petrs argue (1) that videotaping for private use 
of free off-the-air television programming does not violate the 
copyright statute; (2) that even if it does violate the copyright 
laws, manufacture, sale, and advertisement of home videotape 
JA,r I( 4'fl 1-f<-.ICJ/fa.,r t'ufE J ~ur 1: woulc( Jljt.J tor 
/1() w a{ f t -t {/?Nr J ":( l fo4 n / !(? -f/,_ e M d 11e r 
-bL 
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recorders is not contributory infringement; (3) that home 
vi~ng of such programming constitutes a "fair use" of a 
copyrighted work; (4) that the CA erred in suggesting that the DC 
on remand might impose a compulsory license on the copyright 
owner and continuing royalties on the infringer; and (5) that the 
CA improperly ignored the DC's findings of fact. 
FACTS and DECISIONS BELOW: Respondents Universal City 
Studios and Walt Disney Productions own copyrighted productions 
that are broadcast over television. Petr Sony Corp. manufactures 
Betamax, a videotape recorder (VTR). Resps sued Sony, four 
retailers that sell Betamax, Sony's advertising agency, and one 
individual owner of a Betamax for copyright infringement. (The 
individual Betamax owner was sued as a nominal defendant and is 
~ not a petr.) The CDCal (Ferguson) ruled in favor of petrs, 
~ 
finding that noncommercial videotaping is i~liedly excepted from 
the copyright statute; that, in any event, noncommercial 
videotaping is permitted by the fair use doctrine; that, even if 
the videotaping constitutes infringement, petrs are not liable 
because Betamax is a staple item of commerce; and that even if 
petrs are liable, resps are entitled to no relief because resps 
did not interfere with petrs' business relations. 
The~9 reversed. Title 17 u.s.c. §106 of the Copyright Act 
of 1976 grants the copyright holder exclusive rights in the 
copyrighted material. Those rights are subject to exceptions in 
§§107-118. The critical question, reasoned theCA, is not 
whether Congress intended to protect copyrighted material against 
~ videotaping but whether Congress intended to withdraw the broad 
- 3 -
protection granted by §106 in the case of videotaping. The CA 
found no such congressional intent. The statute shows special 
solicitation for audiovisual materials; §108 (h) excludes all 
audiovisual materials except those dealing with the news from the 
§108 exemption. Also, in 1971 Congress permitted home recording 
of sound recordings, but it made no mention of home video 
recording. Importantly, nothing in the statutory language 
suggests an exemption for videotaping from the broad protection 
of §106. The legislative history contains some isolated comments 
about video recording, but they do not constitute a considered 
congressional vie~ the issue. 
Nor does the fair use doctrine excuse home video recording. 
The fair use doctrine concerns the productive use of an author's 
~ 
work by a second author, not the mere reproduction of a work to 
use it for its intrinsic purpose. The DC relied upon Williams & 
Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct Cl 1973), aff'd 
by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975), but that case 
is distinguishable and unpersuasive. There, the Ct Cl permitted 
the National Institute of Health to copy entire articles 
published in medical journals. The Ct Cl was concerned about the 
damage to medical science if the journals could not be copied, 
and there is no corresponding societal benefit on the side of 
petrs in this case. The Ct Cl's decision is unpersuasive because 
it permitted mere photocopying under the rubric of fair use. 
Application of Williams & Wilkins is especially inappropriate in 
the context of new technology, which permits the mass 
~ reproduction of copyrighted material. 
r 
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In addition, §107 of the 1976 Act specifies four factors to 
be considered when applying the fair use doctrine, and they 
indicate that the doctrine does not apply. (1) "The purpose and 
character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes" 
The copyrighted material is not used for a nonprofit educational 
purpose, even though it is used in the home. (2) "The nature of 
the copyrighted work" -- The movies are creative rather than 
informational works. (3) "The amount and substantiality of the 
portions used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole" 
This factor also cuts against finding fair use, since Betamax 
owners typically videotape the entire work. (4) "The effect of 
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work" -- Resps did not have to show actual damages; they showed 
enough by demonstrating that home videotaping tends to diminish 
the potential sale of their work. It is extremely difficult for 
a copyright plaintiff to prove harm from the activities of 
specific defendants. The DC should have paid more attention to 
the cumulative effect of videotaping on resps' copyrighted works. 
After finding that home-use videotaping was an infringement 
of resps' copyrights, theCA held Sony, the retailers, and the 
advertising agency liable. Betamax machines do not fall within 
the "staple item of commerce" theory, as do typewriters or tape 
recorders. They are manufactured, advertfsed, and sold primarily 
for reproducing television programming, virtually all of which is 
copyrighted material. The DC relied upon the fact that before 
this law suit, petrs could not know that they were violating the 
( 
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copyright laws. TheCA concluded that petrs' mistake might 
affect the relief granted (such as the amount of statutory 
damages), but that, to be held liable, petrs need only have had 
knowledge of the infringing activity. Petrs of course know that 
Betamax will be used to reproduce copyrighted material, and there 
is no doubt that marketing Betamax induced others (Betamax 
owners) to infringe resps' copyrights. 
The CA remanded for the DC to formulate relief, advising 
that a copyright plaintiff is generally entitled to a permanent 
injunction when there is a threat of continuing infringement and 
that the DC should not be overly concerned about prospective harm 
to petrs. The CA also noted that the DC might consider awarding 
resps a continuing royalty instead of an injunction against 
production of Betamax. On remand, the DC will also consider 
petrs' defenses: (1) laches and estoppel; (2) copyright 
invalidity; (3) unclean hands/copyright enforceability. 
CONTENTIONS: Petrs underscore the importance of this 
case, claiming that it will have a greater impact than any prior 
copyright decision. Sales of VTR's and tapes will exceed $1 
billion in 1982, and VTR's are used in over 3 million American 
homes. Petrs also emphasize the importance of the question 
whether private noncommercial recording of material broadcast 
over the public airwaves is a copyright infringement. And petrs 
note that the Court has never examined the fair use doctrine. 
Petrs insist that there is no reason for the Court to wait 
for the conclusion of the remand. The CA has decided the 
critical copyright issues; the defenses to be raised on remand 
- 6 -
are factual and unique to petrs. The CA decision has left the 
important VTR industry unsettled, and postponing decision by this 
Court will exacerbate the uncertainty. Although Congress has 
reacted to the CA's decision, only this Court can settle the 
application of the 1976 Act to VTR's. 
On the merits, petrs insist that videotape recording of free 
television broadcasts is not copyright infringement. The CA did 
not examine the legislative history of the 1976 Act, insisting 
that the statutory language was conclusive. The legislative 
history shows that Congress intended home video recording to be 
fair use within the meaning of §107. Revision of the 1909 Act 
began in 1955. In 1961, the Register of Copyrights reported to 
Congress that the private use of home reproductions of televised 
motion pictures should not be precluded by the copyright laws. A 
House Report on the 1971 Amendment to the 1909 Act stated that 
the committee did not intend to restrain home recording for 
private use of recorded performances. And Rep. Kastenmeier, the 
subcommittee chairman, stated on the House floor in 1971 that 
home recording of a television program would not be banned by the 
copyright laws. Nothing in the legislative history of the 1976 
Act itself is to the contrary. 
Furthermore, the equitable doctrine of "fair use" should 
permit home videotaping for private use. It is a necessary step 
between free off-the-air TV broadcasts and home viewing for which 
the program owners have been paid. In addition, "fair use" is 
inherently a factual question, and the CA should not have 
disturbed the DC's finding of fair use, since the DC did not act 
; . 
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clearly erroneously. When the §107 "fair use" factors are 
applied, a finding of fair use is compelled. (1) As to the 
purpose of the use, the CA held that since the copies are used 
for the same purpose as the original, fair use could not be 
found. This conclusion alone presents a certworthy issue. (2) 
As to the nature of the copyrighted work, the DC correctly noted 
that resps had voluntarily chosen to have their productions 
telecast over public air waves to individual homes free of 
charge. (3) As to the amount copied, this factor is inextricably 
bound up with the issue of harm, and resps suffered no harm. (4) 
As to the effect of the copying on the potential market, the DC 
found no harm. The CA assumed that copying diminished the 
,- potential market for resps' works. Any "mass reproduction" would 
~ merely be the cumulative effect of home viewing intended when the 
production was broadcast. 
? The ~ decision conflicts with the Ct Cl 's decision in 
' Williams & Wilkins Co. In that case, the Ct Cl found fair use 
when medical journal articles were reproduced for the same 
purpose as the original articles. The CA expressly rejected the 
underlying rationale of the Ct Cl. Furthermore, the CA decision 
conflicts with decisions of this Court, because the CA held that 
the suppliers of a staple item of commerce (an item suitable for 
substantial non-infringing use) were contributory infringers. 
See Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 u.s. 55 (1911); see also 
Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Covertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 
476 (1964); Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), overruled 
on other grounds, Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film 
( ' 
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Mfg. Co., 243 u.s. 502 (1917). TheCA disregarded the DC's 
conclusion that VTR's have varied uses. The DC found that there 
was no evidence that petrs induced the copying of copyrighted 
productions, and the CA discarded that finding. 
Petrs also object to the suggestion in the CA's opinion that 
the DC might impose a compulsory license on resps and a 
continuing royalty on petrs instead of enjoining the production 
of VTR's. There is no precedent for such a judicially-created 
license. Finally, petrs urge the Court to correct the improper 
fashion in which the CA dismissed many of the DC's findings of 
fact. 
Resps present several reasons why the Court should not hear 
the case now. The CA remanded the case for consideration of 
unresolved affirmative defenses and for the DC to fashion a 
remedy. Thus, petrs may yet win the case on remand; and even if 
petrs lose, the remedy may satisfy all parties. Nor is there any 
l 
urgency that would cause the Court to hear the case before the 
completion of trial. VTR production has continued unhindered 
during the six-year history of the litigation. Petrs continue to 
market VTR's, and if an injunction ever issues against them, it 
can be stayed pending appeal and review by this Court. And if 
the DC orders only payments, petrs can of course continue 
production. 
Moreover, Congress will likely dispose of the issue in the 
near future. A number of bills have been introduced to deal with 
the problem of VTR's. The Senate has concluded hearings, and the 
House hearings are expected to end in June 1982. By the 
- 9 -
conclusion of the trial on remand and a second appeal, Congress 
will probably have amended the copyright law to deal explicitly 
with this problem, and the Court will not have to consider the 
issue. 
On the merits, resps defend the CA decision. On their face, 
the 1909 and 1976 Acts unambiguously proscribe home video 
recording of copyrighted motion pictures. None of the exemptions 
in §§107-118 of the 1976 Act apply to uncompensated reproduction 
of copyrighted works for private use. Indeed, there is only one 
narrow exception for any reproduction of copyrighted motion 
pictures, an exception for offshore cable systems for temporary 
use outside the continental U.S., §111 (e). Contrary to petrs' 
/- suggestion, the CA did examine the legislative history, and it 
~ supports the clear import of the statutory language. Petrs rely 
upon the legislative history of an entirely different Act, the 
Sound Recording Act of 1971. Petrs also cite comments by the 
Register of Copyrights and others, but those were casual 
statements made during discussion of matters unrelated to VTR 
copying. 
There is no conflict with the CA's fair use decision. The 
CA criticized the Ct Cl's Williams & Wilkins decision, but it 
also found the decision clearly distinguishable. In that case, 
the federal government copied medical journals to advance medical 
research; this copying was thus a variety of productive use 
required by the fair use doctrine. VTR copying, in contrast, 
does not further scholarship or scientific research. Moreover, 
Williams & Wilkins was decided under the 1909, not the 1976, Act. 
I 
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In the 1976 Act, Congress included a specific provision, 17 
u.s.c. §108, for library photocopying. Petrs also challenge the 
CA's application of the four fair use criteria in §107. There is 
no reason for this Court to grant cert in order to apply the 
established principles of §107 to the facts of this case. Resps 
of course agree with the CA's analysis of the four factors. 
Nor did theCA's decision conflict with this Court's 
decisions when the CA found that petrs were contributory 
infringers. Under Kalem and Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., supra, a 
seller of an article capable of both infringing and noninfringing 
uses is liable for contributory infringement if he "intends and 
expects" the article to be used for infringing, especially when 
the infringing use is the "most conspicuous use." As theCA 
determined, Betamax is manufactured and sold for the primary 
purpose of reproducing copyrighted television programming. Thus, 
contrary to petrs' arguments, the CA did not hold petrs liable as 
contributory infringers for manufacturing a mere staple article 
of commerce. The Betamax is something quite different. 
Petrs object to the CA's reference to a possible mandatory 
license and continuing royalty, but it would be premature for the 
Court to consider that question until the DC decides whether to 
impose such a royalty. And petrs' challenge to the CA's 
consideration of the DC's factual findings is not worth review by 
this Court. 
There are twenty amicus briefs. Briefs by retailers, VTR 
manufacturers, and suppliers of VTR accessories of course urge 
the Court to grant. They emphasize the importance of the case 
I 
- 11 -
for the VTR industry. In addition, there is a brief from a group 
of consumer organizations (Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, 
et al.) contending that the First Amendment interests of 
television viewers are at stake. (This brief is particularly 
interesting because it contains a number of political cartoons 
inspired by the Betamax decision.) And an amicus brief has been 
submitted on behalf of several states supporting petrs. There 
are a few amicus briefs in opposition, from CBS, distributors and 
producers of motion pictures, associations of writers, and the 
Motion Picture Association. 
Some of the amicus briefs add a few helpful points. The Ad 
Hoc Committee on Copyright Law explains that VTR's are used to 
record programs for educational issues by teachers and 
librarians. The Consumer Electronics Group emphasizes that VTR's 
have seemingly unobjectionable uses besides reproducing 
copyrighted material, such as time shifting (to permit a viewer 
to see a program at a different time), composition of home 
movies, and playing prerecorded programming on sale in various 
stores. Finally, the states (Missouri, et al.) emphasize that 
·much of television programming is unlike the productions 
copyrighted by resps. VTR owners record sports broadcasts; 
religious programming; educational programming; and local 
programming, which is often not copyrighted. 
DISCUSSION: There can be no doubt that this is a very 
important case. The size of the VTR industry, the use of VTR's 
by millions of Americans, and the threat of the CA's decision to 
the industry make this a case that the Court might want to grant. 
( 
- 12 -
In addition, it is debatable whether the CA was correct in 
concluding that home videotaping for private use is not a fair 
use of copyrighted materials broadcast over the public airways. 
On the other hand~ th~ase does not satisfy some of the 
usual tests for granting. There is no square conflict that 
demands resolution. The CA did reject the Williams & Wilkins Ct 
Cl decision. But the CA also distinguished that decision: it 
dealt with photocopying for medical research, and Betamax use 
does not fall so clearly into the category of 
educational/scientific use. Also, the CA's decision in some ways 
does not seem unreasonable. Section 106 does grant the copyright 
------------holder broad rights, and none of the subsequent exceptions apply. 
There are some passages in the legislative history that support 
petrs, but the CA appears to have reached a defensible conclusion 
when it decided that those passages were isolated comments that 
~ 
would not support a copyright exception. Finally, the CA was not 
clearly wrong when it held that the Betamax was not a staple item 
of commerce, since an important function of VTR's is to record 
copyrighted programming. 
The strongest argument against granting this case is that 
~ongress is considering legislation to solve the problem. If the 
Court denied the case, it would retain the option of reviewing 
the CA's decision after remand. By thus postponing review, the 
j Court would give Congress a chance to pass legislation aimed 
( directly at VTR's. 
On balance, the Court might well deny at this point, in the 
- 13 -
hope that Congress will amend the copyright law before the 
conclusion of the remand of the case to the DC. At the same 
time, the Court would be justified in granting the case because 
of its importance.! 
There is a response and twenty amicus briefs. 
May 19, 1982 Holleman Opn in petn 
1rf the Court does decide to grant, it might consider 
eliminating question 4 from the scope of the grant, because the 
proper scope of relief need not be resolved at this point. The 
Court might also consider eliminating question 5, since it deals 
with the facts of the case; but because the facts are intertwined 
with the legal issues, the Court should probably grant question 5 
also, if it grants the first three questions. 
Court ................... . ·voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
SONY CORP. OF AM. 
vs. 







G 0 II N PO~ DI S AIJF' ~ AFF G 0 
No. 81-1687 
ABSENT NOT VOTI NG 
Court ................... . li'oted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned . . ................ , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
SONY CORP. OF AM. 
VB. 







N POST DIS AFF 
MERITS 
REV AF.F 
Burger, Ch. J . ....... .. .... .. . . .f. .
1 
....... ... ... ..... .. . 
Brennan, J.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .· / ... 1!. .. ....... · ... · .· .· .· ... · .· .· .· .· 
White, J . . ................... . 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V . . . . . . . . . . ..... . 
Blackmun, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . ............... . 
v Powell, J ............................................ . 
Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11 
./. ................ . 
Stevens, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 'K . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . 
O'Connor, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. -~~ .. ?7. . ...... . 
• • • • ~ ••••• 0 •••• 
MOTION 
G D 
June 3, 1982 
No. 81-1687 
ABSENT NOT YOTING 
Court ................... . 'Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 .. . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
SONY CORP. OF AM. 
vs. 







N POST DI S AFF 
MERITS 
REV AFF 
v" Burger, Ch. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . \./"1--. . . . . . . . . . ......... . . 
Brennan, J .......................................... . 
White, J ..................... . ... · ~v ............... .. 
/ .v ......... ..... .. 
Blackmun, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI,; ............... . 
=::~~i:~. ~: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : > il : : : : : : : : : . : : : : : : 
Stevens, J ....................................... . 
O'Connor, J .................... /.. . . . . . .......... . 









Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 
Michael F. Sturley January 14, 1983 
Questions Presented 
(1) Is home videotape recording of free off-the-air 
television programming solely for home use a copyright infringe-
ment, or is such recording protected by the "fair use" doctrine? 
( 2) If such recording is a copyright infringement, do 
petrs' actions in manufacturing, selling, and advertising home 
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I. Background 
A. The Statute 
Under the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, the owner of a 
copyright, subject to certain exceptions, "has the exclusive 
rights to do and to authorize" certain activities, including the 
"reproduc[tion of] the copyrighted work in copies." 17 u.s.c. 
§106(1). The exceptions are found at §§107-118. 
~ ----""- - -....,......., Of particular 
relevance here is the "fair use" exception: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sect ion 106, the 
fair use of a copyrighted work, including such u_9e by 
reproduction in copies ... for purposes such asvcriti-
cism, Vcomment,Vnews reporting,vteaching (including mul-
tiple copies for classroom use) , v scholarship, or vfe-
search, is not an infringement of copyright. In deter-
mining whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall 
include--
( 1) the purpose and character / of the use, in- ~ c:;.-
cluding whether such use is of a commercial nature  
or is for 'fionprof it educational purposes; <'1f(lit. 
- (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;-~0 f..e~ 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portio~'~.=~~~~ 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as ~--~~-·· 1 
whole; and ~-~­
( 4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
17 u.s.c. §107. In enacting this fair use exception, Congress's 
intention was to codify the existing judicial doctrine . ..______ -----
B. Facts 
Petr Sony Corporation of America is the manufacturer of 
the "Betamax," a videotape recorder (VTR) designed for home use. 
A VTR has the capacity to record television programming as it is 
being broadcast, and replay it at a later time. VTR owners com-
bench memo: Sor·· v. Universal page 3. 
monly use the off-the-air recording capacity for two purposes: 
(1) "time shifting," i.e., automatically recording a program when 
t --- ... _.. 
it is broadcast in order to watch it once at a later time, and 
(2) "librarying," i.e., recording a program while viewing it in 
order to watch it a second time, or recording a program and 
watching the tape two or more times. 
The remaining petrs are stores that sell the Betamax and 
the agency that advertises the Betamax. Resps are film studios 
holding copyrights on works that are broadcast on television. 
C. Decisions Below 
Resps initiated the present copyright infringement ac-
tion against petrs and a nominal Betamax owner in DC (CD Cal; 
Ferguson) . The DC held that VTR recording for home use was not 
covered by the copyright laws. Although there is no express ex-
IJ-C::. emption, Congress did not intend to cover audio recording for 
~~home use (e.g., off-the-air recording of radio broadcasts). The 
 f(. 'I 
same Congressional intent excludes VTR ~e_:- use recording. In 
VL-, 1 ~ any event, VTR home-use recording is "fair use." It was protect-
~·· ed before 1976 by the judicial fair use doctrine. It is now pro-
tected by 17 u.s.c. §107. 
The DC went on to conclude that, even if VTR recording -violates the copyright laws, Sony is not liable under any of the 
three theories advanced by plaintiffs: direct infringement, con-
tributory infringement, or vicarious liability. The contributory 
infringement claim failed for several reasons. The VTR is "a 
staple i tern of commerce," with varied uses, so Sony cannot be 
II, •• ._ 
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held liable if the owner uses the VTR for an infringing activity. 
Sony was not aware of any specific recording. Even if Sony had 
"constructive knowledge" of the recording of copyrighted work, it 
did not know that such recording was an infringing activity. 
Furthermore, Sony did not induce or materially contribute to any 
infringing activity. There was no proof that any of Sony's 
Betamax advertisements contributed to any of the recording proved 
at trial. 
Finally, the DC held that injunctive relief would be 
inappropriate even if VTR home-use recording violated the copy-
right laws and Sony could be held liable for such infringing ac-----
tivity. An injunction is an equitable remedy, and it would be 
inequitable to issue one here. Plaintiffs proved no irreparable 
harm, and an injunction would deprive the public of new techno!-
ogy capable of noninfringing activity. 
/ On appeal, CA9 (Kilkenny, Canby, East [DJ, D.Ore.]) 
remanded. The CA firs{0found that VTR home-use 
re-
re-~~ersed and 
~ cording was an infringing activity. Such recording is prohibited 
~ .yoA by the unambiguous language of §106, and none of the statutory 
)- exemptions saves it. This is beyond the fair use doctrine--both 
the judicial and statutory versions--despite the fact that its 
purpose is noncommercial. It does not satisfy any of the crite-
ria of §107. 
CA9 found Sony liable for the recording of Betamax own-
~'' . . . ,, . " . f ers as a contr1butory 1nfr1nger. A VTR 1s not a staple 1tem o 
commerce," since it does not have a substantial noninfr inging 
use. It is irrelevant that Sony did not know that home-use re-
II T fl. LA----~~~a.~ 
/,vU.- ~ ~h ~~ 
bench memo: Sorw v. Universal 
cording was an infringing activity. 
page 5. 
9r~ 
/ u~~e~ / 
Sony did "know" that the 
Betamax would be used to record copyrighted matierials, since 
"[t)hat use is intended, expected, encouraged, and the source of 
the product's consumer appeal." 
e A 4 . u_)- CA9 remanded to the 
~~pr iate relief. The CA noted 
DC for consideration of the appro-
several possibilities, including a 
~ ~~ continuing royalty. 
~ 
II. Discussion 
I find this a close and difficult case, raising inter-
esting questions about the application of traditional copyright 
law to rapidly developing new technologies. Perhaps the most 
interesting (and difficult) question, however, is the one that is 
not before the Court: formulation of an appropriate remedy. Un-
fortunately, the nature of the remedy is closely bound to the 
extent of the infringement, so it might have been better to wait 
on this case until the DC had fashioned a remedy. ~ 
A. Fair Use 
Petrs rely on the fair use doctrine in arguing that VTR 
~ recording of free off-the-air programming for 
~oes not violate the copyright laws. I think 
under traditional fair use analysis and under 
statute. 
private home use 
this claim fails 
§107 of the new 
This Cour~es not seem to have passed on the fair use ___,_ 
doctrine, save in a meaningless one-sentence decision: Williams & 
Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420 u.s. 376 (1975) (per curiam) 
bench memo: Sor·· v. Universal page 6. 
(aff'g 203 Ct. Cl. 74, by an equally divided -----Court) . But & Wilkins a lengthy memorandum 
(essentially 
in~
an outline of a draft opinion) in which you summa-
rized fair use: 
Although courts and commentators disagree widely as to 
the outer edges of the doctrine, there is general 
agreement as to its central meaning: use of a copy-
righted work is fair when it is for the purpose of cre-
atLng somethin~ssentially~ new, and when the economic 
value OI the new worK aces not derive primarily from 
incorporating sections of the old. 
Memorandum in Williams & Wilkins, No. 73-1279, at 2-3. It is 
clear that VTR copies do not satisfy this test, for they are not 
"essentially new" and they derive their economic value solely 
from being copies of the origina1. 1 I see no reason to retreat 
from your earlier (albeit unpublished) views on fair use, for ______ ___, 
they are well supported by the lower courts and commentators. 
The glaring exception in the lower courts is Williams & Wilkins 
itself, which you voted to reverse. Whatever precedential value 
1My conclusion that VTR copies do not satisfy the fair use test 
should be limited to the type of copying actually proven in this 
case (and most frequently discussed by the parties), i.e., re-
cording of entertainment programs for later viewing at the user's 
convenience. There certainly are circumstances where VTR record-
ing could be fair use. A few examples come readily to mind: An 
English literature specialist may wish to record one of the BBC 
Shakespeare productions to help him in writing a scholarly arti-
' ~le. A sociologist may wish to record selected programs to as-
r~ist her in her research into modern American culture. A busi-
~ ness school student may wish to record certain commercials to 
~ assist her in writing a marketing report. And a grade school 
~ teacher may wish to record an educational program to show to his 
class as a basis for further discussion. In each of these cases, 
the use made of the copy would be fair under the test you pro-
pose. (These cases also demonstrate potential noninfringing uses 
that could be relevant on the contributory infringement issue. 
See section II.B., infra.) 
bench memo: Sor" v. Universal page 7. 
that case may have, it can easily be limited to its peculiar 
facts. The most respectable secondary source to the contrary 
seems to be Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and 
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 
Colum. L. Rev. 1600 (1982). This article relies heavily on Wil-
liams & Wilkins, and seems more concerned with reforming the fair 
use doctrine than with applying it. 




all, the legislative history is clear that §107 is intended to be . 
~-
nothing more than a codification of the preexisting judicial doc-  
trine. Second, the statute speaks of using a work "for purposes 
~
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ... , schol-
arship, or research." Although these examples are illustrative 
~her than exhaustive, they all represent cases where a person 
A ••• ~~~ .,,_, uses a work to "creat [e) something essentially new [where] the 
vV~ -- -a . economic value of the new work does not derive primarily from 
bJ~ of the old." Finally, the statute sets 
o illustrate the considerations that a court 
should apply in resolving a fair use issue. I agree with CA9 
that all four of these factors tend to cut against a finding of 
fair use, petn app 19-25, despite the DC's arguments to the con-
trary, petn app 75-87. 
Petrs' strongest argument is that traditional fair use 
alysis is poorly suited to a case involving rapidly developing 
VTR technology. Here, for example, they can argue that s YJ!Ple 
./ 
"l . . . ~ t1me sh1ft1ng (without librarying) is fair use because the VTR 
owner obtains only what the copyright owner intended him to have: 
bench memo: Sor" v. Universal page 8. 
a single viewing of the television broadcast. Time shifting has 
a very different purpose than traditional copying, §107(1), and 
the time shift does not have a significant effect on "the poten-
tial market for or value of the copyrighted work," §107(4). Al-
though time shifting technically involves copying the entire 
work, §107(3), the copy is viewed only once. It thus may be 
viewed as a "temporal slice" of the entire work that constitutes 
only a portion of the whole, 
that is kept permanently. 
unlike a traditional infringing copy 
7lllrz... 
This argument is appealing in some 
-1 
ways, but ultimately unconvincing. It fails the traditional re-
--------------------~~ 
quirement that the user "creat[e] something essentially new 
[whose] economic value ..• does not derive primarily from incor-
porating sections of the old." This requirement may be a bad 
policy decision, but that is a matter for Congress to decide. As 
long as we have the traditional fair use doctrine, VTR recording 
remains an infringement. Se~Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists 
Television, Inc., 392 u.s. 390, 404 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissent--
ing) ("[T]he fact that the [1909] Copyright Act was written in a 
different day, for different factual situations, should lead us e 
Our major object, I suggest, should be ~ to tread cautiously here. 
~~to do as little damage as possible to traditional copyright prin-
~- ciples and to business relationships, until the Congress legis-
lates and relieves the embarrassment which we and the interested 
parties face.") 
bench memo: Sorm v. Universal page 9. 
B. Contributory Infringement { f1A.L 2~ {9) 
Working on the assumption that VTR recording is an in-
fr ingemen t, there remains the di ff icul t quest ion whether petr s 
are liable as contributory infringers. The accepted definition 
of contributory infringement was enunciated by Judge Anderson of 
the Second Circuit: ~~ 
~~ 
[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activ~y
induces, causes or materially contributes to the in-~ 
fringing conduct of another, may be held 1 iable as a _ 4u J . _ 
1 "contributory" infringer. ·~ 
' -
Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 
443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (cA2 1971) (footnote omitted). 
The strongest argument against applying this definition • 
is that such an application would represent a significant r here 
-------------------------------------------------------------expansion of the contributory infringement doctrine. Those pre-
viously held liable as contributory infringers had participated 
in the infringement far more directly than Sony is alleged to 
have done here. In Gershwin Publishing, for example, the defen-
dant was a concert manager that organized local organizations to 
sponsor concert series in their respective communities. It 
worked closely with these local groups in planning the series, 
helping them with the finances and the selection of performing 
artists. The artists then paid a large commission (up to 25% of 
their gross fee) to the defendant for this organizational work 
(in addition to the regular management fee). Once an artist's 
schedule was arranged, the defendant would contact him or her to 
learn the works that he or she would perform at these concerts. 
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(prominently featuring its own name) which it sold to the local 
organizations. On these facts, CA2 concluded that the defendant 
was liable for the infringement that occurred when an artist per-
formed a copyrighted work without permission from the copyright 
owner. The defendant specifically organized each infringement, 
was specifically aware of each infringement, and earned a profit 
on the basis of each specific infringement. Its "pervasive par-
ticipation" in the activity supported the conclusion that it 
caused the infringement. 443 F.2d, at 1163. Although Sony may 
fall within the definition articulated by Gershwin Publishing, 
its actions are a far cry from those condemned in prior contribu-
tory infringement cases. The considerations that counsel the 
Court against expanding the fair use doctrine beyond its tradi-
tional boundaries to accommodate developing VTR technology, see 
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., supra, at 
404 (Fortas, J., dissenting), also counsel against expanding the 
contributory infringement doctrine. 
After considerable reflection, however, I am unconvinced 
/ by the argument I make in the preceding paragraph. If CA9's fac-
~~ tual assumptions are correct, I think Sony probably has gone far 
~ ~enough to be a contributory infringer. It sells an item that was 
designed essentially to infringe copyrights. "That use is in-
tended r expected r enCOUraged r and the SOUrCe Of the prOdUCt IS r 
consumer appeal." Petn app 27. Sony may not organize any spe-
cific infringement, but its making the VTR available encourages 
and enables the infringement. Similarly, it may not be aware of 
any specific act of infringement, but it must know that the VTR 
bench memo: Sor" v. Universal page 11. 
is frequently used for infringing recording. Finally, it may not 
make a profit from any specific infringement, but the VTR's abil-
ity to infringe is the source of its profitability. Under CA9's 
view of the facts, a VTR is less like a photocopying machine than 
like one of the infamous "black boxes" that enable telephone 
callers to avoid the payment of long distance tolls. 
The problem here is that there is no clear indication in --
the record that CA9's factual assumptions are correct. The DC -suggested in four different places that VTRs (like photocopiers 
and unlike black boxes) are suitable for noninfringing uses, petn 
app 92, 104, 106-107, 114, but CA9 dismissed this possibility 
virtually without discussion, id., at 26, and certainly without 
addressing Sony's suggested possibilities. On the actual case 
tl 
before the Court, there is very little evidence of any contribu-
. f . \;\ tory 1n r1ngement. Resps proved the existence o 
heir copyrighted work, and with respect to these copies there 
no finding that Sony contributed to the infringement I am 
hesitant to rely on this lack of evidence (or at least lack of 
factual findings) as a ground for reversal, however, since I feel 
certain that much (if not most) of what CA9 says is true. It 
would be improper to rely on such extra-record feelings, but I 
think the Court would look like an ostrich with its head in the 
sand to ignore what almost everyone must suspect is true. 
~ My recommendation to resolve these difficulties is a 
and to the DC. On remand, the DC can give resps the opportu-
nity of proving (and take for itself the opportunity of finding) 
that there has been substantial infringement of resps' copy-
rights, and that Sony has contributed to this infringement. More 
importantly, the DC can review the possible noninfr inging uses 
and make detailed findings on the issue. Sony's claims have con-
siderable appeal, but in the absence of specific findings by the 
DC it is very difficult for an appellate court to evaluate them. 
C. The Remedy 
The most interesting issue in this case is probably the 
formulation of a remedy, but at the moment that issue is not be--
fore the Court. 
~ 
It might nevertheless be helpful to offer some 
broad guidance here. For example, I would not think that a total 
would be appropriate if there are realistic 
noninfringing uses. In my view, even the continuing royalty sug-
gested by CA9 would not be justified unless the DC could develop 
a means to correlate the royalty to the frequency and severity of 
infringement. This may well mean that no 
s ible, but e.~ again Jus ~~For tas' s 
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc. 
judicial remedy is pos-
wa~n1n 1n Fortnightly ~ . 
is appropriate: "[T]he 
fact that the Copyright Act was written in a different day, for 
different factual situations, should lead us to tread cautiously 
here. Our major object, I suggest, should be to do as little 
damage as possible to traditional copyright principles and to 
business relationships, until the Congress legislates and re-
lieves the embarrassment which we and the interested parties 
face." 392 u.s., at 404 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
'· 
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III. Conclusion 
The copying specifically at issue here is not protected 
by the fair use doctrine (although some types of copying would be 
protected}. If CA9's view of the facts is correct Sony is liable 
for contributory infringement, but the record is inadequate to 
evaluate this issue properly. Accordingly, the decision below 
should be affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. 
. . ' 
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
• "1. 1.::; ., 
January 20, 1983 
Menorandum to the File 
Re: 81-1687 - Sony Corp. v. Universal City 
Studios 
These are thoughts based on a review of the 1976 
Copyright Act (90 Stat. 2541) and the House Report. 
1. First, some general comments: Some subjects, 
such as cable television a~d various aspects of library 
use and the rest are treated in extraordinary detail, 
yet there is no specific consideration of the problem 
of taping (either music tapes or video tapes) even . 
though that problem was obviously one that Congress was 
well aware of. 
2. Unlike the patent statute, there is no 
provision covering the problem of . contributory 
infringement. 
3. Throughout the statute there is repeated _ 
emphasis on commercial factors, public performances and 
distributions, and almost no reference to private use. 
4. Most significantly, a careful reading of §106 
itself indicates that the private reproduction .of a 
single copy of a copyrighted work would not violate any 
of the five exclusive rights granted by the statute. · 
First, it is noteworthy that subparagraph 1 refers only 
to multiple copies, subparagraph 2 refers to the 
preparation of derivative works, subparagraph 3 refers 
to the commercial distribution of copies, subparagraph 
4 refers to public performance, and subparagraph 5 to 
public display of the copyrighted work. In sum, there 
simply is no prohibition against the reproduction of a 
single copy for the private use of the person making 
the reproduction • 
.. 
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5. It is also noteworthy that §107, the fair use 
exception, also talks only about the reproduction of 
multiple copies. (In this connection it is noteworthy 
that the House Report at page 65 points out that the 
fair use doctrine is "an equitable rule of reason" for 
which no generally applicable definition is possible 
and each case raising the question must be decided on 
its own facts. 
6. Then, on page 66, the report states that the 
reference to copies of phono records and so forth was 
intended to make clear that the doctrine has as much 
application to photocopying and taping as to older 
forms of use. The second paragraph on page 66, though 
not quite explicit, certainly emphasizes the 
significance of the question whether the reproduction 
is for commercial or noncommercial purposes. At page 
66, the report also emphasizes the latitude that should 
be given to the Court in making a case-by-case 
application of the doctrine. 
7. It is noteworthy that in §108, Congress 
demonstrated that it was able to differentiate between 
multiple copies and single copies because it 
specifically referred in the library exception to 
reproducing "no more than one copy." Again, in §l08g 
the statute differentiates betw~en - "the isolated and 
unrelated reproduction or distribution of a single copy 
or phono record" as opposed to the reproduction of 
multiple copies. 
8. If the manufacturer of reproduction equipment, 
such as a xerox machine or a tape machine, could 
reasonably believe (a) that purchasers of the equipment 
would use it primarily for single copy reproduction for 
private use; and also (b) that the statute would not 
regard such single copy reproduction as infringements 
since it does not literally violate the statute, is it 
appropriate to impose vicarious liability on the seller 
of the equipment, particulary when the statute contains 
no contributory infringement prohibition and when the 
authors of the statute were well aware of the problem 
presented by such equipment manufacturers? 
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9. Although I am not sure I understand the 
library provisions completely, I get the impression 
that they basically adopt the Government's position in 
the Williams and Wilkens case. 
10. At page 73 of the House Report, it is noted 
that the making of multiple copies or phono records of 
a work for general circulation requires permission of 
the copyright owner, but "the making of a single copy 
or phonograph by an individual as a free service for a 
blind person would properly be considered a fair use 
under §107." Although this comment obviously does not 
extend to single copy reproduction for the copier's own 
private use, it does seem significant that there is 
such a plain difference between that kind of use and 
multiple copy commercial reproduction. 
11. Section 109 preserves the rule that the owner 
of a particular copy of a copyrighted work has the 
right to sell or otherwise dispose of it without the 
permission of the copyright owner. Literally, this . 
section would not apply. 
12. The remedies for infringement are spelled out 
in §504. As I read subsection c, statutory damages 
must be granted to the copyright owner if he so elects. 
Although the normal amount is $250 or more, if the 
infringer proves that he had no reason to believe that 
his acts constitute an infring ement, the award may be 
reduced to a sum of "not less than $100." There are 
specific provisions for remitting any statutory damages 
for employees of nonprofit educational institutions or 
public broadcasting entities, but not simply for the 
private home user. Thus, an affirmance would seem to 
mandate a damage award of at least $100 for each 
provable copying of any one of the respondent's 
programs. 
13. It is important to keep in mind the 
distinction between the exclusive rights granted by the 
Patent Act--namely, to make, use; and to vend - -and the 
five exclusive rights granted by the Copyright Act, 
when analyzing a contributory infringement problem. In 
general, the contributory infringement doctrine in 
patent law applies to the supplying of an essential 
·' 
' . " . ,. ·. 
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element to a combination patent, a situation which 
really is not duplicated in the copyright area. The 
Ben-Hur case on which the plaintiffs rely so heavily is 
one that involved an infringement of the copyright 
owner's performance rights and the holding, in essence, 
was that the producer of the performance, as well as 
the actual performers, should be held to have violated 
that right. That seems only sensible since they 
actually directed the infringement itself. That 
holding is quite a long distance away from a holding 
that the supplier of a piece of equipment that enables 
a person to make a single copy of a copyrighted work is 
equally responsible for the conduct of his customer. 
14. In the Government's brief in Williams and 
Wilkins, No. 73-1279 O.T. 1974, at pages 16-17, n. 26, 
the Government argues that the Copyright Act was never 
intended to cover the copying of printed works for 
private use. Among other things, the Government cites 
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555; the pre-
1909 case of Harper v. Shappell, 26 Fed. 519, and 
argues that the existence of a solid doubt with regard 
to copying for private use strongly supported the 
notion that as long as there was no commercial element, 
it should be considered a fair use rather than an 
infringing use. 
.- .• 
15. On page 21, n. 30, tbe Government cites a 
statement by Cohen in an ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium 
stating: "Anyone may copy copyrighted materials for 
purposes of private study and review." 
16. The amicus curiae brief (in the Wilkins case) 
of the American Library Association argued at some 
length that library photocopying for private use was 
not a violation of the 1909 Act, or the pre-1909 
statute, relying heavily on the practices of Dr. 
Herbert Putnam, who served as Librarian of Congress 
during that period. 
17. In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 
u.s. 390, the question was whether the lead . 
transmission of a copyrighted motion picture over cable 
TV systems was an infringement of the copyright owner's 
exclusive right to perform the copyrighted work 
t ' 
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publicly. In holding that there was no infringement, 
Justice Stewart, writing for the Court first noted that 
the exclusive rights of the holder are those 
specifically enumerated in the statute, later expressed 
concern about extending liability to various persons 
who participated in the total process of television 
broadcasting, included that cable TV was to be placed 
on the viewer's side of the line that divided the 
broadcaster (performer) from the viewer (audience). 
The Court held that the CATV operators, like viewers 
and unlike broadcasters, do not perform the programs 
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Dear Chief: 
Harry Blackmun has agreed to do the opinion in the 
above case. 
The Chief Justice 







JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.§llltutnt QJtmrlo-f fltt> ~u?t ~hrll'.tr 
. ~1Ul'1pnghltt. ~. OJ. 20,?J!~ 
January 24, 1983 
Re: 81-1687 - Sony Corp. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc. 
Dear Harry: 
Because the point that most strongly supports a 
reversal was not adequately developed during the 
argument, and because I expect to emphasize it in 
dissent, it occurs to me that it may be helpful to you 
in the preparation of your opinion--and conceivably 
might persuade one of your adherents to reconsider the 
matter before positions have become absolutely firm--
for me to put the basic outline of my argument on 
paper. 
The central question is whether the making of a 
single copy of any copyrighted work for a private, 
noncommercial use is a copyright infringement. The 
separate question of whether the vendor of copying 
equipment should be held vicariously liable for the 
activities of the purchaser of - the equipment depends 
largely, I believe, on the extent to which it is fair 
to presume that the vendor either knew or should have 
known that the purchaser's private use of the equipment 
would be unlawful (because the Copyright Act, unlike 
the patent statute, does not expressly prohibit 
contributory infringement). 
It is my understanding that the question whether 
the making of a single copy of a copyrighted written 
work for private use could be an infringement was never 
decided under the 1909 Act. The fact that Dr. Herbert 
Putnam who served as the Librarian of Congress in 1909, 
had developed a practice of allowing single copies of 
copyrighted works to be made at the Library, and that 







activity was thought to be a fair, noninfringing use, 
even if it might have literally violated the exclusive 
rights granted by the Act. 
Even though the practice of copying written works 
on microfilm and later xerox duplicating equipment was 
fairly common, the issue apparently did not become 
important to the Copyright Bar until the practice of 
recording or taping musical compositions developed. In 
1955, at one of the frequent symposia on copyright law 
sponsored by ASCAP, the subject was discussed and 
Professor Saul Cohen, who I believe was counsel to 
ASCAP, remarked: 
"Anyone may copy copyrighted materials for 
purposes of private study and review." 
The problem of private taping of copyrighted songs 
was, of course, well known to the Bar and to Congress 
in 1971 when they considered the broad subject of 
record piracy and enacted detailed legislation to 
control that commercial activity. As you know, there 
were several comments during the 1971 legislative 
history expressing the understanding that a child who 
taped a copyrighted song for his own use would not be 
committing an unlawful act, and apparently no one 
expressed a contrary opinion at that time. 
Again, in 1976, when the entire copyright law was 
finally revised, both the Copyright Bar and Congress 
were obviously well aware of the actual use of copying 
equipment by private individuals for sound recordings 
and also the potential use of similar equipment for 
copying television programs, but quite remarkably, in 
the detailed revision of the entire law, Congress 
studiously avoided any direct comment on the single-
copy-private-use question. Neither in the lengthy 
statute itself, nor in the committee reports, did 
Congress directly confront the issue. 
Indeed, even in the text of §106 itself, there is 
a curious choice of langauge. As you know, the section 
defines the five exclusive privileges that the owner of 
a copyright may enjoy. Four of those privileges (2, 3, 




commercial use of a copyrighted work. The first 
privilege is not expressly so limited, but it is 
interesting to note that literally it only grants the 
copyright holder the exclusive right to make multiple 
copies. It reads: 
"Subject to sections 107 through 118, the 
owner of copyright under this title has the 
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the 
following: 
"(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work 
in copies or phonorecords: •••• " 
I have tried to find a comment in the Committee 
Reports on the narrow question whether a single-copy-
for-private-use would be an infringement, and have not 
yet found anything directly in point. I have found a 
reference to thl making of a single copy of a song for 
a blind person. The report states unequivocally that 
such an act would be a "fair use," which may imply that 
it would be prohibited if not protected by the fair use 
criteria in §107. I do not believe, however, that the 
fair use concept developed in §107 was intended to 
operate as an exemption or affirmative defense, but 
rather as a guide to construing the scope of the 
express rights granted by §106. Indeed, the House 
Repo2t seems to describe the fa~r use concept in this 
way. 
"The making of a single copy or phonograph by an individual 
as a free service for a blind person would properly be 
considered a fair use under §107." 
"Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the 
fair use doctrine over and over again, no real definition of 
the concept has ever emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is 
an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable 
definition is possible, and each case raising the question 
must be decided on its own facts. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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If I am correct in my view that the single-copy-
for-private-use issue was an unanswered question in 
1976, and that Congress deliberately refused to 
confront it when it revised the entire statute, it 
becomes appropriate to ask where the burden of 
persuasion should lie when a court is asked to pass on 
the legality of this private conduct. There are three 
important values that seem to me to point in the same 
direction: (1) the privacy interests implicated 
* * * 
"The Committee has amended the first of the criteria to 
be considered--'the purpose and character of the use'--to 
state explicitly that this factor includes a consideration 
of 'whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
non-profit educational purposes.' This amendment is not 
intended to be interpreted as any sort of not-for-profit 
limitation on educational uses of copyrighted works. It is 
an express recognition that, as under the present law, the 
commercial or non-profit character of an activity, while not 
conclusive with respect to fair use, can and should be 
weighed along with other factors in fair use decisions. 
"General intention behind the provision 
"The statement of the fair -use doctrine in section 107 
offers some guidance to users in determining when the 
principles of the doctrine apply. However, the endless 
variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that 
can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of 
exact rules in the statute. The bill endorses the purpose 
and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but 
there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the 
statute, especially during a period of rapid technological 
change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what 
fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the 
courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular 
situations on a case-by-case basis." House Report 1476, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess. pp. 65-66. 
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whenever the law seeks to control conduct within the 
home~ (2) the principle of fair warning that should 
counsel hesitation in branding literally millions of 
persons as lawbreakers; and (3) the economic interest 
in not imposing a substantial retroactive penalty on an 
entrepreneur who has successfully developed and 
marketed a new and useful product, particularly when 
the evidence as found by the District Court indicates 
that the copyright holders have not yet suffered any 
actual harm. 
I go not _bel i eye I would read the first 
s b ara raph of 106 so literal)3L fhat I would 
forec ose the possibility tha t the making of a single 
copy for a commercial purpose, or for the purpose of 
conducting a public performance, would be an 
infringement, but I believe I would read §106 and §107 
together to conclude that the making of a single copy 
for a purely private use would not constitute an 
infringement. If we take this course, Congress can 
confront the problem in the same way that it has 
confronted and resolved the whole subject of cable 
television transmissions of copyrighted works. On the 
other hand, if we affirm, I am afraid the courts will 
be required to undertake the responsibility of 
fashioning a detailed series of remedies that can be 
much better handled by the legislature. 
Finally, I would note that ~ven though we put the 
remedy entirely to one side at this time, I do not 
believe we can in good conscience overlook the fact 
that the statute does create an absolute liability of 
at least $100 per infringment if the act of making a 
single copy for personal use is indeed an infringement. 
This is potentially a truly staggering liability both 
for the manufacturers of copying equipment, and for the 
millions of persons who have actually been engaging in 
this practice during recent years. We would hardly 
encourage respect for the law if we were to announce, 
in effect: "Anyone who time shifts a single copy of a 
sportscast owes the copyright holder either $250 or 
$100, but fear not because this law will never be 
enforced." 
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I feel very strongly that the consequences of an 
affirmance would be most unfortunate both to the public 
at large and to the courts that will have to confront 
these problems, whereas a reversal would not preclude a 
congressional solution that would fairly protect the 
various competing interests at stake. 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
P.S. For what it is worth, I also enclose a copy 
of the memorandum that I dictated for my own use on the 
day before Conference. As will _be obvious to you, it 
is pretty rough but it will at ~east identify some of 
the concerns that motivated my vote. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.J USTICE HARRY A. BLAC KMUN 
.h:pt-mtt <lJouri of ut~ ~b 5tatte 
Jrulfi:ugton. ~. OJ. 20~'1~ 
v 
February 3, 1983 
Re: No. 81-1687 - Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you for your letter of today. This, of course, is a 
difficult case. I suspect that the difficulties we all encoun-
ter will wash out one way or another in the writing. It may be 
that the case will have to be reassigned, but, for now, I would 




cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.§nprttttt Clfltnrlltf tqt ~tb .§tatts 
-a:sJringhm. [B. <!f. 20~~~ 
February 3, 1983 
/ 
Re: No. 81-1687, Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc. 
Dear Lewis: 
When we spoke about this case over lunch I had some 
doubts about John's argument that the use of the word 
"copies" indicates that anyone is permitted to make one copy 
of a copyrighted work. Although I am no more informed about 
the details of the Copyright Act now than I was then, it 
does occur to me that 1 u.s.c. §l has some bearing on the 
case. That statute provides: 
"In determining the meaning of any Act of 
Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise--
words importing the singular include and 
apply to several persons, ~arties or things; 
words importing theplural include the 
singular." 
I am not now prepared to claim that this statute is 
conclusive, but I do think that it presents a significant 




cc: Justice Blackmun 
February 3, 1983 
81-1687 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 
Dear Harry: 
I voted with you at Conference, being then persuaded 
that CA9 had correctly applied Copvriqht Law. This also was 
in accord with the view I held when Williams and Wilkins was 
here. 
~he "sinqle copy" arqument that John advance~ at Con-
ference was new to me. At least, I had not thought there 
was any suhstance to it. I have now had an opportunity to 
read carefully John's letter memorandum to you of January 
24, and I must sav that it makes the question more difficult 
for me. 
I write at this time merely to sav that J am not at 
rest, and need to qo back to the "books". In anv event, I 
will await your writing and John's. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
LFP/vde 
Studios In and alt Disne Productions 
~. ?"Ju!_' 7 (, k ~ ~- ~d.u-4.;.4~ ?"Lf~ .,v c/,r ~-Is- \ 
~ ~~ '-'%--~- /S"; ~ (l 1()6, .u.f~4/JX.)'Is-) 
-::? MEJ.'1.0~NmfM OF JUSTICE STEVENS. ~ . . __ :,., .  
~--r~., ... ~~5r~~ ~ ,_.-~7 ... ;7 
1· 7.Ju_ ~au~~~~~~--~ t, s /t!)~ 
~~~'"J4:, M§S/.o?-119- IF 1-P.S ~~ 3lo? (~ 
9' • .s~~ It> 7 "[I] t is not the intention of the Committee to U-:~L'- g 
{ ~ £U_ restrain the home recording, from broadcasts or from :I 1 ~..zo 
~~A~~~~/-~ tapes or records, of recorded performances, where the 
~7JV~~~ home recording is for private use and with no purpose 
~~~.A of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing commercially 
on it. This practice is common and unrestrained today. 
~ ~lic.t ... " H.Rep. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 [1971]. 
tlr~ ~~~"":UA.L-''- 19~zo 
- ~~ ' ,, ~d~'' ~~ '\ 
q. j f'S ~P ~ c~ 6f Appeals decision i~2t~ is case, no ~-,~ 
t~.  had ever held that the act of making a single copy of a 
\"-
~'~opyri2hted work for a private, noncommercia f use constituted 
 ~7U4,~C!P~\\~~~ -2.2-. 
copyright ~fringement. In a variety of contexts scholars and 
(a.-)~ /rl.j~ -2.z.. 
legislators have expressed the opinion that "anyone may copy 
H-) ?U'.I ~~ ~- 2-2. 
· hted material for the purpose of private study and review, 
/t:.). u-t-.-A.Ll~.J-a..tj~.a.,..,~'~~~ ~~".: 
~ and th~at_~~ :is complE;tely a utside the -sc6 pe cfnd in t ent 'Z.lf 
( ~ <::(..1 ~~'.J,.4C1 '~,.,.~ ... ?- '2..,s-' 
of the restriction by copyright."! This caseequ Yres- the Court 
to decide whether that opinion is correct. 
1Holland, The Audio Visual Package: Handle With Care, 22 
Bull. Copyright Society, 104, 124 (1974). 
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The Court of Appeals held that companies that manufacture 
and distribute copying equipment can be held liable as 
contributory infringers. The validity of that holding depends on 
whether the primary use of that sort of equipment is an 
infringing use. The District Court found that the primary use of 
the video tape recording equipment involved in this case was for 
"home use recording." Its explanation of that use 2 makes it 
clear that it satisfies three critical criteria: (1) the alleged 
2 
"'Home-use' recording as used in this op1n1on is 
the operation of the Betamax in a private home to 
r~cord a pro9ram for subsequent nome Viewing: T1ie 
programs involved in this lawsuit are broadcast free to 
the public over public airwaves. The court heard LJ C; 
extensive testimony from defendant William Griffiths ~­
and four non-defendant individuals about this activity, , 
and the court's ,peclaration of no~~infringement is 
limited to this home use-situation. ~ ~ 
"It is important to note the limits of this holding. 
Neither pay nor cable television stations are 
plaintiffs in this suit and no defendant recordeg the 
signals from either. The court is not ruling on ~ape 
swapping; organized or informal. The court is~t 
ruling no 1ape duplicatioN within the home or outside, 
by inaiv~ua!s, groups ~corporations. Nor is the 
court ruling on off-the-air recordi~ for use outside 
the home. e.g., by teachers for classrooms, 
corporations for employees, etc. No defendant engaged 
in any of these activities and the facts necessary to 
determine their legality are not before this court. 
"The ramifications of this new technology are 
greater than the boundaries of this lawsuit. A court 
reviewing the limited claims of specified parties in a 
particular factual setting cannot and should not 
undertake the role of a government commission or 
legislative body exploring and evaluating all the uses 
and consequences of the videotape recorder." App. to 
Pet. for Cert. 55-56. 
NO. I:H-.161:H 
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did not make more than one copy of any copyrighted 
he made no public performance or other public use of 
the copy; and {3) he made no commercial use of it. In my 
opinion, conduct that meets these three conditions is not 
prohibited by the statute. Before commenting specifically on the 
home use of video tape recorders, however, I shall briefly review 
a series of other innovations that led to revisions in the 
statutory protection Congress has provided for the authors of 
original compositions pursuant to Article I, clause 8 of the 
Constitution. This history reveals a remarkable consistency in 
the way that two themes have reoccurred. First, the Court has 
repeatedly declined to extend copyright protection until after 
Congress has evaluated the new development and enacted amendatory 
legislation; second, no interested party has ever seriously 
suggested that a penalty, or any form of statutory liability, 
should be imposed upon an individual for making a single copy of 
any copyrighted work for his own private use. 3 
3Both of these themes are reflected in the press release 
issued by one of the respondents after its victory in the Court 





"Millions of families in the United States and 
around the world are now involved in videotaping 
programming in their own homes for their own private 
use. We have no intention, in this or any other 
litigation, of pursuing individuals to interfere with 
this practice. 
"We first initiated this case in 1976, more than 
five years ago, when there were relatively few tape 
recorders in homes. Since that time we have come to 
realize that the interests of all concerned can be 
better accommodated by passage of new laws." Excerpt 







Long before the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909, 35 
Stat. 1075, it was settled that the protection given to 
copyrights in this country is wholly statutory. Wheaton v. 
Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Peters) 591, 661-662 (1834). The remedies for 
infringement "are only those prescribed by Congress." Thompson 
v. Hubbard, 131 U.S. 123, 151 (1889). 
In 1831 Congress extended copyright protection to musical 
compositions. 4 Stat. 436. This extension did not, of course, 
interfere with the individual's right to play or sing copyrighted 
songs for his own gratification, even though he thereby made an 
"intrinsic use" of the copyrighted material. 4 The copyright 
statute has never required a license "to sing a copyrighted lyric 
in the shower." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 
from statement by E. Cardon Walker, Chairman of Walt 
Disney Productions, on November 2, 1981. 
4 
"Singing for one's own gratification without 
intending thereby to represent anything, or to amuse 
any one else, would not, I think, be either a 
representation or performance, according to the 
ordinary meaning of those terms, nor would the fact of 
some other person being in the room at the time of such 
singing make it so. " Wall v. Taylor, 11 Q.B.D. 
102, 106-107 (1883) (Brett, M.R.). 
We quoted that passage with approval in Twentieth Century 




The development and marketing of player pianos and 
perforated rolls of music at the turn of the century gave rise to 
litigation raising the question whether the use of such rolls 
infringed the copyrights owned by composers and music publishers. 
The sale of well over a million rolls in 1902 made it evident 
that the economic issue was significant. Adopting a construction 
of the pre-1909 version of the Copyright Act that, as Justice 
Holmes acknowledged, gave to the music "copyright less scope than 
its rational significance", the Court held that the piano rolls 
were not copies of copyrighted songs within the meaning of the 
Act. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 
(see Holmes, J., concurring, at 19). Quoting from an English 
case considering a similar question, the Court noted that the 
copyright on the sheet music did not involve any exclusive right 
"to the performance in private of the music indicated by such 
sheets", id., at 13. The Court assumed that Congress was aware 
of the prevailing view, reflected in an international convention 
to which the United States was not a party, that "the manufacture 
and sale of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the 
[copyrighted music] are not considered as constituting musical 
infringement." Id., at 14-15. It held that the policy 
considerations at stake "properly addressed themselves to the 
legislative, and not to the judicial, branch of the government." 
Id., at 18. The following year Congress enacted the Copyright 
Act of 1909. 
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When the 1909 Act was passed, the Librarian of Congress, Dr. 
Herbert Putnam, was following a practice of allowing single 
copies of copyrighted works to be made at the Library. 5 
Presumably Congress was familiar with this practice. Even though 
the 1909 Act might have been construed literally to prescribe the 
practice, no one seems ~ have~Je;ychallenged the activity of 
individuals who merely made single copies for their own use. The 
matter did not seem to merit serious attention until innovations 
in copying techniques made it relatively easy to reproduce entire 
articles or to make multiple copies. When the National Institute 
of Health and the National Library of Medicine adopted the 
practice of photocopying entire articles from medical journals 
and supplying them to researchers, litigation did ensue. 
~ Williams and Wilkins v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct.Cl. 
1973) affirmed by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). 
In that litigation it was expressly assumed that the making 
of a single copy of a copyrighted article by a scholar for his 
5That practice was described at page 6 in the 1913 edition 
of the Library of Congress Rules and Practice governing the use 
and issue of books as follows: 
"Photo-duplicates of books, newspapers, maps, etc., can 
be furnished at a reasonable rate by means of the 
photostat, installed in the Chief Clerk's Office. 
Apply to the Chief Clerk for a schedule of charges." 
Dr. Putnam, of course, made an important contribution to the 




own use was immune from liability--even if literally covered by 
the statute--and that it was the development of the capacity to 
make photocopies that made the issue significant. 6 In his brief 
in this Court, the Solicitor General of the United States 
stated: 7 
6 
"The congressional understanding, as well as the 
longstanding library custom, is that the making of a 
single copy of an entire article for private use is a 
fair use, even if the copy is made purely for personal 
pleasure." 
brief appended the following footnote at that point: 
"'Anyone may copy copyrighted materials for purposes of 
private study and review.' Cohen, 'Fair Use in the Law 
of Copyright,' ~SCAP, Copyright Law SYmposium (No. 6, 
1955), 43, 58." 
"Some forms of copying, at the very least of portions 
of a work, are universally deemed immune from 
liability, although the very words are reproduced in 
more than de minimis quantity. Furthermore, it is 
almost unan1mously accepted that a scholar can make a 
handwritten copy of an entire copyrighted article for 
his own use, and in the era before photoduplication it 
was not uncommon (and not seriously questioned) that he 
could have his secretary make a typed copy for his 
personal use and files. These customary facts of 
copyright-life are among our givens. The issue we now 
have is the complex one of whether photocopying, in the 
form done by NIH and NLM, should be accorded the same 
treatment--not the ministerial lexicographic task of 
deciding that photoduplication necessarily involves 
'copying' (as of course it does in dictionary terms)." 
487 F.2d at 1350. 
7see Brief for the United States, No. 73-1279, October Term, 
1974, pp. 20-21. 
8 Id., at 21, n. 30. Earlier in his brief, the Solicitor 
General had stated: 
"Prior to the 1909 Copyright Act, the exclusive 
Footnote continued on next page. 
NO. H~-~b~/ 
- 8 -
The issue, however, was not resolved by the litigation which 
terminated in 1975, but rather was later addressed by Congress 
when it revised the Copyright Act in the following year. In §108 
of the 1976 revision, Congress enacted a ~ecial statutory 
exemption for library copying. That exemption twice draws an 
explicit distinction between the reproduction of multiple copies 
and the "reproduction or distribution of a single copy." 9 
rights granted to the author of a published work did 
not include the right to copy the work. Har~er v. 
Shappell, 26 Fed. 519 (C.Ct., S.D. N.Y.). T e 1909 Act 
reorganized the provisions of the prior law, but was 
not intended to expand its coverage (H.Rep. No. 2222, 
60th Cong., 2d Sess., 4). 
"It was assumed, both before and after the enactment 
of the Copyright Act of 1909, that the exclusive rights 
of the copyright owner did not include the right to 
control the copying of the copyrighted material for 
personal use. " Id., at 16-17, n. 26. 
9§108 provides, in pertinent part: 
"(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, 
it is not an infringement of copyright for a library or 
archives, or any of its employees acting within the 
scope of their employment, to reproduce no more than 
one co~y or phonorecord of a work, or to distribute 
such copy or phonorecord, under the conditions 
specified by this section, if-- ~ 
(1) the reproduction or aTstriijUtion is made without 
any purpose of direct or indirectAcommercial adva~tage; 
(2) the collections of the library or archives are 
(i) open to the public, or (ii) available not only to 
researchers affiliated with the library or archives or 
with the institution of which it is a part, but also to 
other persons doing research in a specialized field; 
and 
(3) the reproduction or distribution of the work 
includes a notice of copyright. 
*** 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Nothing in that amendment implies that Congress intended to 
proscribe the reproduction of "no more than one copy" for an 
individual's private noncommercial use. 
A similar sequence of events followed the development of 
technology that made it possible to retransmit television 
programs by cable or by microwave systems. In 1960, United 
Artists Television, Inc., the owner of a number of copyrights on 
motion pictures, sought to enjoin the operator of a community 
antenna television system (CATV} from intercepting and 
retransmitting signals carrying its copyrighted productions. The 
Court held that the CATV operator did not "perform" the 
copyrighted works in the "manner envisioned by the Congress that 
"(g) The rights of reproduction and distribution under this 
section extend to the isolated and unrelated reproduction or 
distribution of a single copy or phonorecord of the same material 
on separate occasions, but do not extend to cases where the 
library or archives, or its employee--
(!} is aware or has substantial reason to believe 
that it is engaging in the related or concerted 
reproduction or distribution of multiple copies or 
phonorecords of the same material, whether made on one 
occasion or over a period of time, and whether intended 
for aggregate use by one or more individuals or for 
separate use by the individual members of a group~ or 
(2} engages in the systematic reproduction or 
distribution of single or multiple copies of 
phonorecords of material described in subsection (d)~ 
Provided, That nothing in this cause prevents a library 
or arch1ves from participating in interlibrary 
arrangements that do not have, as their purpose or 
effect that the library or archives receiving such 
copies or phonorecords for distribution does so in such 
aggregate quantities as to substitute for a 
subscription to or purchase of such work." 
;l_' 
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enacted the law in 1909." Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 
392 U.S. 390, 395 (1968}. Although the Court was sharply divided 
on the question whether that was a fair reading of the statutory 
language, there was complete agreement on the proposition that 
Congress was far better equipped than the Court to fashion a fair 
resolution of the problems presented by the sophisticated 
technological developments that had occurred in recent years. 10 
The Fortnightly case was followed by Teleprompter Corp. v. 
CBS, 415 U.S. 394, in which the Court considered the copyright 
10 
"We have been invited by the Solicitor General in an 
amicus curiae brief to render a compromise decision in 
this case that would, it is said, accommodate various 
competing considerations of copyright, communications, 
and antitrust policy. We decline the invitation. That 
job is for Congress." [footnotes omitted] 392 U.S. at 
401. 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Fortas wrote: 
"Our major object, I suggest, should be to do as little 
damage as possible to traditional copyright principles 
and to business relationships, until the Congress 
legislates and relieves the embarrassment which we and 
the interested parties face." Id., at 404. 
At the end of his opinion, he added: 
"The task of caring for CATV is one for the Congress. 
Our ax, being a rule of law, must cut straight, sharp, 
and deep; and perhaps this is a situation that calls 
for the compromise of theory and for the architectural 
improvisation which only legislation can accomplish." 
Id. , at 408. 
- 11 -
holders' argument that CATV systems diluted the commercial value 
of the market for licensed television programs. Recognizing that 
the re-transmissions by CATV systems would augment the size of 
the potential audience for a broadcast--much as would the video 
tape recording of programs for later home viewing--the Court 
concluded: 
"These shifts in current business and commercial 
relationships, while of significance with respect to 
the organization and growth of the communications 
industry, simply cannot be controlled by means of 
litigation based on copyright legislation enacted more 
than half a century ago, when neither broadcast 
television nor CATV was yet conceived. Detailed 
regulation of these relationships, and any ultimate 
resolution of the many sensitive and important problems 
in this field, must be left to Congress." Id., at 414. 
In due course Congress did enact legislation that regulates 
the complex relationships among copyright holders, commercial 
television stations, and CATV system operators in a comprehensive 
and detailed way that could not possibly have been fashioned by a 
court. 11 
11The statutory prov1s1ons themselves, see 17 U.S.C. §111, 
are much too long to quote in full, but their complexity is 
indicated in the following paragraph from Judge Markey's opinion 
in Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F.2d 
12 5 , 12 9 { CA2 19 8 2) : 
"Under the congressionally mandated scheme, 
television broadcast stations like WOR-TV continue to 
pay license or royalty fees directly to copyright 
owners like Doubleday, while CATV systems pay license 
fees under their compulsory licenses to the United 
States Copyright Office in accord with formulae 
provided in 17 U.S.C. §lll{d){2){B). The fees paid by 
CATV systems are distributed to copyright owners like 
Doubleday by Copyright Royalty Tribunal {Tribunal), as 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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The technological change that most closely parallels the 
innovation that gave rise to this litigation was the development 
of the audio tape recorder. That device made it simple for any 
individual to make copies of copyrighted songs played on the 
radio. Because the practice that became known as "record piracy" 
became so widespread, the recording industry persuaded Congress 
to enact a special statute extending copyr} ght prote~to 
....... 
sound recordings. The legislative history of the Sound Recording 
Amendment of 1971, 85 Stat. 391, makes it perfectly clear that 
Congress did not then believe that taping a single copy of a 
copyrighted song for private use was an infringement, and did not 
intend to proscribe that sort of copying. 
The House Report is unambiguous: 
"In approving the creation of a limited copyright in 
sound recordings it is the intention of the Committee 
that this limited copyright not grant any broader 
rights than are accorded to other copyright proprietors 
under the existing title 17. Specifically, it is not 
the intention of the Committee to restrain the home 
recording, from broadcasts or from tapes or records, of 
recorded performances, where the home recording is for 
private use and with no purpose of reproducing or 
otherwise capitalizing commercially on it. This 
practice is common and unrestrained today, and the 
record producers and performers would be in no 
different position from that of the owners of copyright 
in recorded musical compositions over the past 20 
provided for in 17 u.s.c. §lll(d)(5). The 
Congressional scheme thus provided for compensation 
from CATV systems to copyright owners measured by the 
number of cable viewers or potential viewers, and 
placed the responsibility for payment of that 
compensation on the CATV systems." (footnotes omitted) 
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years." H.Rep. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 
re~rinted in [1971] U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 
15 6, 1572. 
This subject had been expressly considered during the House 
Committee hearings. As the District Court noted in this case, 
Representative Beister of Pennsylvania engaged in the following 
dialogue about off-the-air recording with Ms. Barbara Ringer, 
then Assistant Register of Copyrights: 
"Mr. Beister. I do not know that I can add very 
much to the questions which you have been asked so far. 
"I can tell you I must have a small pirate in my own 
home. 
"My son has a cassette tape recorder, and as a 
particular record becomes a hit, he will retrieve it 
onto his little set. 
"Now, he may retrieve in addition something else 
onto his recording, but nonetheless, he does retrieve 
the basic sound, and this legislation, of course, would 
not point to his activities, would it? 
"Miss Ringer. I think the answer is clearly, 'No, 
it would not.' 
"I have spoken at a couple of seminars on video 
cassettes lately, and this question is usually asked: 
'What about the home recorders?' 
"The answer I have given and will give again is that 
this is something you cannot control. You simply 
cannot control it." Hearings on S. 646 before the 
Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong., 
1st Sess. 22 (June 9 and 10, 1971). 
That this was the opinion of the sponsors of the legislation is 
confirmed by the following colloquy when the 1971 amendment was 
being discussed on the floor of the House of Representatives. 
"Mr. Kazen. Am I correct in assuming that the bill 
protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for 
commercial purposes only? 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Yes. 
"Mr. Kazen. In other words, if your child were to 
record off of a program which comes through the air on 
the radio or television, and then used it for her own 
personal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this would 
not be included under the penalties of this bill? 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. This is not included in the bill. 
No. 81-1687 
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I am glad the gentleman raises the point. 
"On page 7 of the report, under 'Home Recordings,' 
Members will note that under the bill the same practice 
which prevails today is called for; namely, this is 
considered both presently and under the proposed law to 
be fair use. The child does not do this for commercial 
purposes. This is made clear in the report." 117 
Cong. Rec. 34, 748 (1971). 
In its periodic revisions of the copyright laws, Congress 
has confronted one technological innovation after another, but it 
has never expressed any specific intent to treat the reproduction 
,~ of a copyrighted work as an infringement if these three 
~~ are met: (1) the user made no more than one copy; (2) 
~ __ j he made no public use of the copy; and (3) he made no commercial 
~~se of it. What is perhaps most remarkable about the overview of 
responses to technological changes in the copyright 
- ").{..t> 
complete absence of any-specific consideration of 
~~gislative 
~~ield is the 
fe the problems generated by the development of the video tape 
~~ 
recorder. Is there reason to believe Congress intended the non-
commercial, home use of such recorders to have different legal 
consequences than the private use of audio tape recorders? 
Congress has never expressed any such intent. Moreover, an 
examination of the statutory language is entirely consistent with 
the conclusion that such home use should not be regarded as an 
infringement unless and until Congress expressly so directs. 
II 
The~is whether the 1976 Congress intended to prohibit 
the home use of a videocassette recorder. The 1976 Copyright Act 
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does not purport to do so explicitly; the Court of Appeals rested 
its conclusion on the belief that such conduct violates one of 
the "exclusive rights" of a copyright holder. The language of 
the statute does not compel that conclusion, and a host of 
common-sense concerns make me think that Congress did not want 
the judiciary to draw it. 
A 
The Copyright Act does not give a copyright holder control ~ 
over all possible uses of his copyrighted work. An unlicensed 
use of the copyright is not an infringement unless it conflicts 
with one of the specific exclusive rights conferred by the 
statute. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 
154-155. In order to determine whether the copying of a 
television program constitutes an infringement, it is therefore 
necessary to examine the specific exclusive rights granted to the 
owner of a copyright. 
1~7t 
Section 106 of the Act provides: 
-1 
~ "Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of 
~~b~ . copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to 
. do an~o authorize any of the following: 
~ to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or 
~ phonorecords; 
~-·~ (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the 
if,..- '; vv copyrighted work; 
~ (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the 
{ ~~~ copyrighted work to the public by sale or other 
~ transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
1 ~~ ~ (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, /~---~ A~ and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion 
tl~~- ~ pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the 





(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, 
and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual 
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, 
to display the copyrighted work publicly." 
It is immediately apparent that subparagraphs (2) and (3) 
have no application to the home use of videotape recorders, 
although they, of course, would preclude the commercial 
exploitation of taped copies, and subparagraph (3) would appear 
to prohibit trading or lending of copies. Subparagraphs (4) and 
(5) both explicitly apply to motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works, but both of those sections merely grant the 
right "to perform" or "to display the copyrighted work publicly." 
Thus, the only subparagraph that is even arguably applicable is 
the first. It gives the owner the exclusive right "to reproduce 
the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords." (Emphasis 
added) Although the use of the plural word "copies" obviously 
encompasses the singular as well, see 1 U.S.C. §1, the fact that 
Congress did select the plural form repeatedly, not only in the 
Act itself, but also in the Committee Reports, does tend to 
identify the problem that they were most concerned about--namely 
the reproduction of a copyrighted work for commercial purposes 
which, of course, would normally be in multiple copies. 
What is especially significant about the text of §106 is 
that it provides no basis for distinguishing between the taping 
of a copyrighted song broadcast over the radio and the taping of - -
a copyrighted television program. If the House Committee Report 
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on the 1971 amendment was correct in expressing the opinion that 
the private use of an audio tape recorder is not infringement, 12 
that opinion applies equally to the private use of a video tape 
recorder. 13 
12contrary to the op1n1on expressed in the House Committee 
Report, Professor Nimmer takes the rather surprising position 
that audio fiome recording for private use does violate the 
statute. He argues, inter alia, that the Committee Report is 
simply wrong: 
"Although the House report offers the opinion that home 
recording does not infringe the copyright in underlying 
works, this statement is nothing more than the House's 
view in 1971 of the meaning of the 1909 Act. The 
observation does not have the force of a statement of 
legislative intent." Nimmer, Copyright Liability for 
Audio Home Recording: Dispelling the Betamax Myth, 68 
Va. L.Rev. 1505, 1509-1510 } . ..__ 
Later he added: 
"No one has claimed that the pre-1971 copyright 
statutes contained any provision other than the 
doctrine of fair use for exempting home recording from 
copyright infringement of the musical works thereby 
produced. Since the House report states that the 
purpose of the Amendment is to extend the same 
protection to sound recordings, it is clear that the 
!
Amendment did not create a new exemption for home 
recording. The most one can fairly attribute to the 
House report, then, is an opinion that home recording 
constitutes fair use." Id., at 1511, 
13Even Professor Nimmer, the scholar taking the most extreme 
position concerning the scope of copyright protection for sound 
recordings, see n. 12, ante, agrees with this proposition: 
~t !' 
"Although the Betamax case involved video home 
recording, the finding of contributory infringement and 
the imposition of a continuing royalty would apply 
equally well to the manufacturers and sellers of audio 
home recording equipment." Id., at 1526. 




It is not necessary, however, to insist upon a literalist 
reading of § 106 in order to interpret the statute in light of 
its historic purpose--to prohibit unfair commercial exploitation 
of the monopoly rights granted to the author, composer, or 
publisher. 14 For the definition of the exclusive rights in § 106 
------------~-----------------~--------~ is prefaced by the words "subject to sections 107 through 118." 
Those sections describe a variety of uses of copyrighted material 
that "are not infringements of copyright notwithstanding the 
provisions of § 106. 15 One of the more illuminating of those 
14 
"An author who possesses an unlimited copyright may 
preclude others from copying his creation for 
commercial purposes without permission. In other 
words, to encourage people to devote themselves to 
intellectual and artistic creation, Congress may 
guarantee to authors and inventors a reward in the form 
of control over the sale or commercial use of copies of 
their works." Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 
555. 
15Thus, for example, §110 provides in part: 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the 
following are not infringements of copyright: 
*** 
(5) communication of a transmission embodying a 
performance or display of a work by the public 
reception of the transmission on a single receiving 
apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes, 
unless--
(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear the 
transmission; or 
(B) the transmission thus received is further 
transmitted to the public;" 





sections is § 107, the legislative endorsement of the doctrine of 
"fair use." 
The 1909 Act did not have a "fair use" provision. Moreover, 
that Act's compendium of exclusive rights--"to print, reprint, 
publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work" 16--was plainly 
broad enough to encompass the making of a single copy for purely 
private use. Yet the statute was never so construed. The courts 
simply refused to read the statute literally in every situation. 
I 
When Congress amended the statute i.p 1976, i_t indicated that it 
--------~~--------· ~ 
"intended to restate the present "ju<!ic~l doctrine of fair use, 
not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." House Report 
No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 66. Congress therefore 
codified § 107 in a form that does not set forth categorical ( 
defenses, such as for example those found in the provisions of 
the Robinson-Patman Act. Rather, it identifies factors that 
And §lll(a) provides, in part: 
•' 
• i · ••. 1(l.: 
"The secondary transmission of a primary 
transmission embodying a performance or display of a 
work is not an infringement of copyright if--
(1) the secondary transmission is not made by a 
cable system, and consists entirely of the relaying, by 
the management of a hotel, apartment house, or similar 
establishment, of signals transmitted by a broadcast 
station licensed by the Federal Communications 
Commission, within the local service area of such 
station, to the private lodgings of guests or residents 
of such establishment, and no direct charge is made to 
see or hear the secondary transmission~" 
17 u.s.c. §111. 
16copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075. 
... 
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-rather than any belief that an infringing act has been 
these comments 
"Although the courts have considered and 
the fair use doctrine over an~~~~&9~~~UL~~· 
definition of the conce as ever emerged. In e d, 
since the doctrine is n equitable rule of _reason, no 
generally applicable efinitfon is possi61e, and ach 
case raising the quest'on must be decided on i 
facts. . .. 
"The Committee has amended the first of the criteria 
to be considered--'the purpose and character of the 
use'--to state explicitly that this factor includes a 
consideration of 'whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for non-profit educational purposes.' 
I 
This amendment is not intended to be interpreted as any 
sort of not-for-profit limitation on educational uses 
of copyrighted works. It is an express recognition 
that, as under the present law, the commercial or non-
profit character of an activity, while not conclusive 
with respect to fair use, can and should be weighed 
along with other factors in fair use decisions. 
General intention behind the provision 
I 
"The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 
107 offers some guidance to users in determining when 
the principles of the doctrine apply. However, the 
endless variety of situations and combinations of 
circumstances that can rise in particular cases 
precludes the formulation of exact rules in the 
statute. The bill endorses the purpose and general 
scope of the judlciai aoctr1ne of:fair use, ~but there 
is 1 o o reeze oc r1ne in the 
statute, especially during a period of rapid 
technological change. Beyond a very broad statutory 
explanation of what fair use is and some of the 
criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to 
adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-
by-case basis." House Report No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 
2d Sess., pp. 65-66. 
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neutralized by an affirmative defense--that would defeat a 
suggestion that singing a copyrighted song in the shower is an 
infringing use. 
The fair use prov1s1on ratifies the judicial understanding 
~
that courts should not push the copyright monopoly to its logical 
extreme. Congress has asked the courts to exercise judgment, 
restraint, and common sense. I believe the Court of Appeals in 
this case failed to do so. 
B 
It would be most surprising if the 1976 Congress would have 
found the Court of Appeals' conclusion reasonable. Three serious 
concerns point directly in the opposite direction. 
First is the fact that this case concerns a noncommercial 
activity performed within the privacy of the home. Special 
constitutional values are implicated whenever the government 
seeks to regulate such an activity. 1 8 It would plainly be 
18 
"Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes 
regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into 
the privacy of one's own home. If the First Amendment 
means anything, it means that a State has no business 
telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what 
books he may read or what films he may watch. Our 
whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of 
giving government the power to control men's minds." 
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 u.s. 557, 565-566 (1969). 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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unconstitutional to prohibit a person from singing a copyrighted 
song in the shower or jotting down a copyrighted poem he hears 
over the radio. Although making a videotape of a TV program may 
be constitutionally distinguishable, an important canon of 
statutory construction calls upon us to presume that Congress 
steers clear of constitutional boundaries. And in this 
particular statute, the dialogue between Representative Beister 
and Assistant Register Ringer, supra at ___ , hardly reveals any 
interest in unloading the canon. 
~)This :oncern o~ ~riv~cy is magnified by the nature of the 
activity at issue in this case. A television program is beamed 
into the living rooms of millions of viewers at no charge, and a 
citizen uses a timer and a Betamax simply to watch it at a more 
convenient time. It is unlikely that the average voter would see 
any moral or economic distinction between watching the program 
"live" and watching it later with the assistance of a new 
technology. Surely the citizen should be entitled to more notice 
than this statute has provided before such a distinction is made 
the basis for a judicial determination that he has trampled on 
the federally protected rights of a fellow citizen. 
~~) My second concern relates to the most common response to the 
first--the admission that, of course, nor ne would ever prosecute 
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the citizen for making a single copy at horne. See n. 3, supra. 
This response implies that Congress intended to prohibit certain 
conduct, expected that the prohibition would not be enforced 
against the primary violator, all for the purpose of allowing 
lawsuits against the corporation that created the technological 
means for this conduct. We should not lightly stretch an 
ambiguous statute on the assumption that Congress intended to 
make behavior that is engaged in by millions of citizens into a 
violation of federal law, all the while intending the violation 
to go unpunished. Such laws have an enormous potential to breed 
- -=:----= --~~-__,.,. 
disrespect for fundamental societal institutions. Congress should -not be assumed to create them on the sly. 
It is significant that the Act does not purport to create 
"safe" violations. It plainly provides that every act of 
infringement--even if performed in complete good faith--gives 
rise to a minimum statutory liability of $100. 19 That command 
cannot simply be transformed into a matter of indifference 
because the copyright owners do not intend to collect the pounds 
of flesh--! should say the tons of flesh--that are their due. 
19section 504(c) (2) provides, in part: 
"In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of 
proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was 
not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her 
acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the 
court in its discretion may reduce the award of 
statutory damages to a sum of not less than $100." 
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The problem of remedying the supposed violation by the 
primary infringer leads directly to m~ the 
problem of remedying the supposed contributory infringement. As 
--------------------------------I have noted, the respondents do not seek a declaration that home 
taping violates the law for the purpose of collecting $100 from 
the home taper. Rather, they seek such a declaration in order to 
obtain relief from petitioner, the alleged contributory 
infringer. Putting aside some troubling conceptual questions, I 
will assume, as the respondents suggest, that a finding that home 
use violates the copyright law gives rise to remedies against the 
petitioner. Before making that finding, one surely must wonder 
about what those remedies are. 
In their complaint, respondents prayed for an injunction 
against the further manufacture or sale of video cassette 
recorders. They do so despite the fact that they have suffered 
no tangible harm. 20 They claim the injunction is required by the 
20 
"Plaintiffs admitted that at the time of trial, no 
existing contract, license or advantageous business 
relationship of either Universal or Disney had been 
injured, interfered with or disrupted by the sale or 
use of Betamax and Betamax tapes or by any other 
activity of any defendant. This includes without 
limitation plaintiffs' theatrical, television, 8 or 16 
mm, and video-disc products. 
"In addition, plaintiffs conceded that neither the 
sale nor the use of Betamax and Betamax tapes had by 
the time of trial caused Universal or Disney any 
measurable monetary damage, economic loss or revenue 
loss. 1978 was a very successful year for both 
Universal and Disney. It was Disney's eleventh 
Footnote continued on next page. 
No. 81-1687 
- 25 -
potential future impact of this innovation. Surely that impact 
can be more precisely gauged by legislators than by this Court, 
on this record. 
Not surprisingly, neither scholars nor the Court of Appeals 
take the prayer for an injunction against manufacture and sale 
very seriously. Instead, it is widely suggested that a trial 
court, exercising equitable powers, can establish a "compulsory 
~ ~----------------
licensing" system. The details of such a system are never 
spelled out clearly. It would, of necessity, require every 
manufacturer of videocassette recorders and every manufacturer of 
videocassettes to be joined as defendants in a single lawsuit and 
assessed some arbitrary tax on their sales. The proceeds of the 
"equitable excise tax" would then have to be allocated by the 
court--equitably, to be sure--among the untold numbers of 
copyright holders who license works for broadcast over the public 
airwaves. Each would join as a co-plaintiff. Nielsen would be 
appointed as a special master. 
Volume 451 of the United States Reports contains two 
consecutive year of increased profit and the most 
profitable year in history for Universal Pictures' 
Theatrical Division. Universal's television revenues 
had increased steadily over the three years prior to 
trial and Disney received its highest television income 




unanimous opinions of this Court about whether it is proper for 
the federal judiciary to fashion a new remedial structure to 
supplement the remedial structure established by Congress. In 
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 
451 u.s. 77 (1981}, we stated: 
"In almost any statutory scheme, there may be a need 
for judicial interpretation of ambiguous or incomplete 
provisions. But the authority to construe a statute is 
fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a;~ 
new rule or to provide a new remedy which Congres has 
decided not to adopt." Id., at 97. 
And in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 
U.S. 630 (1981}, we concluded: 
"The policy questions presented by petitioner's 
claimed right ... are far-reaching. In declining to 
provide [that] right .•. ,we neither reject the 
validity of those arguments nor adopt the views of 
those opposing ..•• Rather, we recognize that, 
regardless of the merits of the conflicting arguments, 
this is a matter for Congress, not the courts, to 
resolve. 
"The range of factors to be weighed in deciding 
whether a right to contribution should exist 
demonstrates the inappropriateness of judicial 
resolution of this complex issue. Ascertaining what is 
'fair' in this setting calls for inquiry into the 
entire spectrum of antitrust law, not simply the 
elements of a particular case or category of cases." 
Id., at 647. 
We concluded that case with a quotation from Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980}: 
.· 
"The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high 
policy for resolution within the legislative process 
after the kind of investigation, examination, and study 
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that legislative bodies can provide and courts cannot. 
That process involves the balancing of competing values 
and interests, which in our democratic system is the 
business of elected representatives. Whatever their 
validity, the contentions now pressed on us should be 
addressed to the political branches of the Government, 
the Congress and the Executive, and not to the courts." 
III 
Respondents argue in this Court that an abstract 
theoretician's view of the essence of the copyright monopoly 
allows them to control the way a private citizen watches 
television. In the name of that abstract vision, they ask the 
federal courts to establish a bureaucracy more complex than 
anything Congress has established in the field of copyright to 
date, in order that they may levy an excise tax on a burgeoning 
new industry. 
The issue posed by this innovative new technology is similar 
to the question that was presented by the development of player 
pianos, sophisticated copying machines, cable television systems 
and audio tape recorders. In each of those situations the Court 
read the relevant statutory language in a way that allowed 
Congress to accommodate the competing interests of all parties. 
We should follow a similar course here. The judgment of the 
Court of Appeals should be reversed. 
mfs 06/04/83 
To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Michael 
Re: Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., No. 81-1687 
I have not studied JUSTICE STEVENS's memorandum in de-
tail, but I think he makes a strong case. Of course I am a sym-
pathetic audience. I have thought all along that he should be 
right, even if the law is against him. When JUSTICE BLACKMUN 
circulates his draft, I will study both positions more carefully. 
In the meantime, I have two thoughts on the memorandum. 
~ it was not clear to me on first reading which analytic 
framework JUSTICE STEVENS is adopting. At some points he seems 
J 
to think that home use is acceptable because Congress did not 
intend the Copyrights Act to cover it at all. Despite the broad 
language of the Act, it is not broad enough to include home-use 
video-taping. At other points he seems to think that home-use ---
video-taping falls within the "fair use" exception. In other 
----------------------~----~-words, the general language of the Act includes it, but a narrow-
er provision excludes it. I do not think that the latter posi-
tion can be correct. Fair use is a narrow doctr} ne that does not 
apply here. (JUSTICE STEVENS's reliance on Williams and Wilkins 
v. United States is particularly troublesome. When that case was 
here, you fought very hard to have it reversed.) I think he 
makes a much more convincing case on the former position. 
Second, I am not sure that JUSTICE STEVENS can get a 
Court for his views even if you join him. JUSTICE BRENNAN, at 
I. 
:· 
least, would distinguish between "time shifting" and "library 
building." JUSTICE STEVENS does not mention library building, 
but I do not see how his analysis could fail to apply to it. If 
a majority of the Court {JUSTICE BRENNAN and the rest of JUSTICE 
BLACKMUN's supporters) continues to believe that library building 
is illegal, it presumably would be necessary to remand the case 
to determine if Sony is liable on that account. 
·,, .. t ~. 
Personal 
81-1687 Sony Corp. v. Univers~l City Studios 
I have enioved reading vour draft of June 3. It is 
clear, well written, and persuasive. 
I have no sp~cific suqqestiona. You make two basic 
arguments: {i) the 1976 Act does not cover home video copy-
ing ~xclusively for hom~ use, and (ii) in anv event this 
would come within thP "fair use" judicial do~trine that at 
least arquably was adopte~ hv CongrAss in Section 107. 
Subject to further consideration, I am inclinPd to 
think that the former i.s a more solic'l analytical fr."lmet..tork. 
As you note, thf> Vmquage of Sf>ct ion 106 does not compel the 
reading given it hv CAQ, and the leqislative history of. the 
Copyright Act {incluoing numerous expressions in Congressio-
nal Committee reports) fairlv can bP sai.n to provide E-vi-
dence of no Congressional int~ntion to proscribf> single 
copyi.nq for home u.se only. This readinq of Congressional 
intent may be buttressed by the judicial doctrine of "fair 
use", althouqh that ha~ been construed rather narrrowlv (as 
T recall). 
I do not believe you mentioned "lihrarv builr=tinq". I 
suppose your three "critical criteria" \~oul0 not oreclune 
this so lonq as the only pur.pose was home use. 
My unpublished oninion in Wilkins v. United qtates re-
flect the view I held at that time. Perhapfi that case is 
distinquishahle on its facts, as Nlti not only was copying 
but was making rather wide oistribution to scholars and re-
searchers. 
T will, of course, reserve a final decision until I see 
what Harry writes. The case always has been a close one for 
me. It is another example of Congressional "passinq of the 
buck" - a practice I would like to check although as lonq as 
"this r.ourt sits" it probahly expects too much to think that 
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 13, 1983 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 81-1687 - Sony Corp. v. Universal 
Studios, Inc. 
The attached printed memorandum was prepared 
before receiving Harry's draft opinion. On Saturday, 
Harry kindly made a typed copy available to me, and ·I 
delivered this memorandum to his office. Having 
studied his opinion, I expect to circulate a few 
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.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 13, 1983 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 81-1687 - Sony Corp. v. Universal 
Studios, Inc. 
Now that Harry and I have each circulated our 
views, I offer the following additjonal comments. 
First, as a general matter I note that Harry 
agrees that this is a case of first impression on the -
question whether the making of a single copy for a 
noncommercial, nonpublic use is an infringement. 
Similarly, he does not question the central thesis of 
Part I of my memorandum--Congress has always taken the 
lead in responding to major technological changes that 
affected the copyright system. Indeed, it is 
significant that he concludes his opinion with a 
quotation from the dissenting opinion in Fortnightly. 
As for the specific question presented, I 
read Harry's opinion as agreeing with Professor Nimmer 
and me that there is C9 legal disti ~ytion under present 
law between the 1~~did tap e recor q ing of a broad~ast 
(§..§} <l!l9 ~eo'' taQ.e recording of a televised 
program. For that reason, the 1971 SQund- Recording 
Amendments, discussed at pp. 9-11 of my memorandum and 
pp. 14-18 of Harry's opinion, are critical. The legal 
argument can be stated in a three part syllogism: 
I •' (a) Under the 1909 Act, the ~riter of a 
song that was played over the radio was given 
protection identical to that given the writer of a 
movie screenpt ay that was broadcast on television. 
The 'fperforme r of the song, however, was given no 
protection. The 1971 Amendments were intended to 
bring the song performer into the same position as 
the song writer and the movie writer. 
(b) A literalist reading of the 1909 Act 
would have made home recording for private use an 
infringement of the song writer's rights. But the 
~ 1971 House Report explicitly declares that such a 
literalist reading of the 1909 Act would have been 
wrong. It states tha~ after the 1971 Amendment, 
"the record producers and performers would be in 
no different position from that of the owners of 
copyright in recorded musical compositions over 
the past 20 years." 1971 House Report 7. And it 
states that "it is not the intention of the 
Committee to restrain the home recording, from 
broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded 
performances, where the home recording is for 
private use and with no purpose of reproducing or 
otherwise capitalizing commercially on it." Thus, 
the House Report on the Sound Recording Amendments -
of 1971 indicates that a literalist reading of the 
1909 Act was wrong. Noncommercial home taping was 
exempt. 
(c) The 1976 Act was not intended to 
change the rules on private home recording. As 
Harry concedes in n. 5, "the controlling legal 
principles under the [1976 and 1909] Acts are the 
same." Thus, noncommercial home taping is still 
exempt. 
I believe the releva nt q uestion is thus whether 
the intent of Congre ss is more accurately reflected by 
the 1971 House Report and the colloquy with 
Representative Kastenmeier--as I cont~nd-~or by the 
negative inferences Harry draws from certain explicit 
exem2 tions in the 1~~6 Act. See Harry's opinion, at 
12-14. I disagree with Harry's view that my reading of ~~ 
l 
the Act would make these exellrptions "s 1;1perfluous"; al y 
,of them concern copying that is either 'p ublic "or 
commercia l or ~oth . 
My aRproach does not separate "infringement" 
analysis ana "rair use" analysis 1nto separate 
compartments in the context of this case. I base my 
Q PS 5 'on_ the facts that Congress has never exp licitly sought r \ conclusion that there is no infringement in this case 
~ to regu t a £e pr i va t e noncommercia l copy i ng, t hat 
-3-
- ~ongress has recognized that such activity is exempt 
in the audio recording context, and that the courts 
fashioned the "fair use" exception long before it was a 
statutory term in order to avoid extending the 
copyright monopoly to activities literally covered by 
the statute but unforeseen by Congress. Because "fair 
use" lies at the core of Harry's analysis, however, I 
shall comment on his approach. 
On the one hand, Harry appears to agree with 
me that fair use was not historically understood as a 
rigid four-factor test. On the other hand, he proposes 
a new synthesis of that history that tur~ on tliQ · 
fact~rs: whether the copying activi~~socially 
la~le," p. 23-, and whether it wo~'affect the 
value of, or the rn_grket .Jgr, the author's work," p. 26. 
My problem with the first factor derives from this -
case. Harry's opinion suggests that "VTR recording _ 
creates no public benefits sufficient to justify 
[allowing it]," p. 24, and that horne use of a VTR 
"creates no benefit to the public at large," p. 27. 
, ~ But t i me shifting makes television p r p grarnrning 
q p S . .J .. J< avai l abl~ t_g- v :Lewe_J s wn o would otherwise miss it, 
J ~rr·/ thereo y- 13erV1 ng a public i n Eerest that we unanimously 
~ recognized in our vtottfried opinion earlier this year, 
~ slip op. at 9-10, id., at 6 (dissenting opinion). My 
problem with the second factor is that it does not 
enter the analysis until too late: it is irrelevant -
I 
"unless the user can demonstrate affirmatively that 
permitting the use would have no tendency to harm the 
market for or the value of the copyrighteg work," p. 
26. Although Harry's opinion suggests- that a citizen 
"photocopying a newspaper clipping to send to a friend" 
may be able to carry that burden, I find that somewhat 
doubtful. 
I should also comment specifically on a 
statement in the ~975 Senate Report that is quoted at 
pages 25-26 in Harry's opinion and that can easily be 
misunderstood. The sentence appears in a paragraph in 
which the Senate Committee gave an illustration of off-
the-air recording in orde~ to enable the program to be 
seen at a more convenient time, and states that the 
r.articular example of time shifting would constitute 
'fair use." The Committee then added a comment that it 
----------------~-4-
-~id not intend to suggest that every recording for 
convenience should be considered fair use. The 
complete paragraph reads as - follows, with the sentence 
in question italicized: 
"The committee's attention has been 
directed to the special problems involved in the 
reception of instructional television programs in 
remote areas of the country. In certain areas it 
is currently impossible to transmit such programs 
by any means other than communications satellites. 
A particular difficulty exists when such 
transmissions extend over several time zones : 
within the same state, such as- in Alaska. Unless 
individual schools in such states may make an off-
air recording of such transmissions, the programs _ 
may not be received by the students during the 
school's daily schedule. The committee believe~ 
that the making by a school located in such a 
remote area of an off-the-air recording of an 
instructional television transmission for the 
purpose of a delayed viewing of the program by 
students for the same school constitutes a 'fair 
use.' The committee does not intend to suggest, 
however, that off-the-air recording for 
convenience would under any circumstances, be 
considered 'fair use.' To meet the requirement of 
temporary use the school may retain the recording-
for only a limited period of time after the 
broadcast." S. Rep. 94-473, pp. 65-66. 
A hasty reading of the itali~ized sentence--
especially the phrase "under any circumstances"--might 
suggest that the committee intended to prohibit~ 
time-shifting. But the sentence preceding the 
italicized one proves that reading impossible, since it 
expressly authorizes certain time-shifting for public 
display. In context, the italicized sentence merely 
ensures that the preceding sentence not be read too 
broadly. The Committee wanted to make sure that its 
approval of one form of time shifting for public 
display (instructional television for students in 
remote areas) , not be read as suggesting that all time 
shifting for public display is permissible. In brief, 
the words "under any circumstances" obviously mean 
. ' 
-~-
- ~always." There is no reason to believe that the 
sentence was intended to re?ch beyond the context of 
the paragraph (public displays), and to bring horne 
taping for non-public viewing within the scope of the 
Act's coverage. 
Finally, Harry and I agree that the 
prospective harms of which respondents complain "are 
speculative at present," p. 29, that "there can be no 
really satisfactory solution of the problem presented 
here, until Congress acts," p. 37, and that in the 
meantime fashioning judicial relief "might require 
bringing other copyright owners into court," p. 37, 
n.48. There can be no doubt concerning the enormous 
complexity of the remedy issues. Although Harry does 
not believe that these factors affect the likelihood 
that Congress intended the underlying conduct to be 
covered by the statute, I would not read congressio~al 
silence as commanding the Judiciary to take the lead in _ 
resolving issues comparable to those presented by cable 
TV and the compulsory licensing of sound recordings. 
Respectfully, 
CHAMBERS Or 
.JUSTICE WM . ..J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
No. 81-1687 
wf/3~~ 
June 14, 1983 ~ wf_~ 
f.t>_~\ 
Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
It is only with some trepidation that I add to the pile of 
material we are all studying in this case, but I think it will be 
difficult for me to join either Harry's or John's opinion as 
written, and I would like to put a third alternative on the ta-
ble. At Conference, I expressed the view that CA9 should be af-
firmed in part only, on the ground that "library building" was 
infringement but that "timeshifting" was fair use. I continue to 
believe that for purposes of fair use a distinction can be drawn 
between the two, but I doubt an all-encompassing definition of 
either can or should be framed, and I now agree with John that 
CA9 should be reversed outright and that this litigation should 
end here. In brief, here are my reasons. 
I cannot agree with John that Congress has implicitly en-
acted a broad exemption from the Copyright Act for all cases of 
private, noncommercial, single-copy reproduction. See JPS Memo-
randum 12. At most, one might interpret the 1971 Act as embody-
ing an exemption for home audio recording of that nature, al-.._ 
though Harry's opinion demonstrates that if a case were to put 
that directly in issue the answer would not be clear. The home-
use audio exemption, if it exists, was the product of a specific 
political compromise, and it cannot provide a theoretical basis 
for a broader exemption. Under my view, however, it is unneces-
I 
sary to address this question. 
What I now consider dispositive are questions of the rela-
tionships between fair use and contributory infringement, and 
between contributory infringement and remedy. As Harry explains, 
Sony can be liable for contributory infringement only if the 
Betamax's "most conspicuous purpose" .or "primary use" is an in-
fringing use. Opinion 35. I understand Harry to suggest that 
all unauthorized recording of copyrighted material for "ordinary" 
use is infringment. I, however, think that a good deal of 
timeshifting is fair use. Like John, see JPS Memorandum to the 
Conference 3, I question whether the "ordinary"/"productive" dis-
tinction can be used to shift the burden of proving or disproving 
economic harm in a broad class of cases, see HAB Opinion 25-27, 
although it describes a relevant "sliding scale" that could be 
used in case-by-case fair use determinations. The prospect of 
economic harm to the copyright holder is relevant to a fair use 
determination, especially where--as here--considerations of pri-
vacy and the public interest in maximizing use of the video spec-
trum are involved. In my view, the Studios' allegations of po-
tential harm, which Harry discusses at 27-28 of his Opinion, are 
simply empty when applied to most timeshifting. Unless the bur-
den is shifted, there is no need for a remand to determine that a 
substantial amount of timeshifting is fair use. And if that is 
true, then I cannot agree that the Betamax's "primary use" is 
infringement or that Sony's advertisements evince a purpose to 
profit from infringement. 
Given that conclusion, I do not think that the Copyright Act 
authorizes the sort of complex, multiparty proceeding that 
Harry's opinion contemplates to frame an appropriate remedy. If 
a court could enjoin sales of the Betamax altogether under §502 
of the Act, it might be able to impose a half-measure like com-
pulsory royalties instead of a ban. But I do not think there is 
authority to ban the Betamax if its primary use is not infringe-
ment, and therefore I find no legislative authority for an inter-
mediate solution other than statutory damages for each infringe-
ment. Bear in mind that in enacting the Copyright Act Congress 
carefully specified those areas in which a tax-like compulsory 
license was appropriate, and it created a specialized legislative 
tribunal to administer those areas. Not only does the Copyright 
Royalty Tribunal have precise directions from Congress on such 
issues as the size of the royalty, the parties who should be re-
sponsible for payment, and how the royalty should be divided 
among copyright owners, it also has special procedures for han-
dling disputes like this, whiCh involve everyone in several in-
dustries at once. In Harry's view, as I understand it, see HAB 
Opinion 36-37, the District Court may proceed to do much the same 
thing in this case without specific legislative authorization. I 
just can't go that far--it would require writing "ghost" legisla-
tion as complex as the actual Copyright Act or the treaties Harry 
cites in his n. 48. 
.. ~ . 
In sum, I think that much home video recording is infringe-
ment, but that muCh is not infringement. I would not attempt to 
define precisely the line between fair use timeshifting and in-
fringing library building, because that would be unnecessary to 
. I 
this case. As long as the Betamax has substantial noninfringing 
use, and Sony did not promote it specifically for infringing 
uses, the Copyright Act cannot be read to authorize the kind of 
complex proceedings and delicate remedy this case would seem to 
require. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand with instruc-
tions to dismiss. Copyright owners can, if they wish, seek dam-.....----------
ages for specific acts of infringement, and Congress can and 
should amend the Act, as it has in the past, to provide some more 
efficient method for compensating copyright owners. 
In due course, I shall put these views in o~orm. 
Given the date, however, I am content to express them only in 
"bare bones" fashion, unless a substantial number of others agree 
with me. 
Since~ely, 
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JU S TICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN June 14, 1983 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 81-1687 - Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 
The circulating opinions in this case must speak for them-
selves, of course, but I think a few comments are in order in re-
sponse to John's detailed memorandum of June 13. 
(1) John is correct in noting that Congress previously has 
"taken the lead in responding to major technological changes that 
affected the copyright system." Congress has done so, however, 
---~ 
only because this Court consistently had refused to apply copyright 
-------------
statutes to technologies that were not specifically considered by 
Congress at the time the statutes were passed. I see nothing in ~ 
; '"· 
the 1976 Act to indicate that Congress approved of this state of 
affairs or intended to preserve it. To the contrary, Congress' 
reaction· to this Court's limiting decisions in the copyrigh~ area 
. ! 
was hostile. See, e.g., 1975 Senate Report 51 (broad language of 
§102 "is intended to avoid the artificial and largely unjustifiable 
distinctions, derived from cases such as White-Smith Publishing Co. 
v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908), under which statutory copyrighta-
bility has been made to depend upon the form or medium in which the 
work is fixed"); 1976 House Report 52 (same); 1976 House Report 87 
("The majority of the Supreme Court . in [Twentieth Century Music 
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 u.s. 151 (1975)] based its decision on a narrow 
construction of the word 'perform' in the 1909 statute. This basis 
·."i'· 
I . ' 
Page 2. 
for the decision is completely overturned by the present bill and 
its broad definition of 'perform' in section 101"). 
The legislative history of the 1976 Act makes clear to me that ----------· --------------Congress wanted the 1976 Act, unlike its predecessors, to cover all 
technologies and all uses whether or not they were specifically 
contemplated or even known at the time the Act was passed. In 
other words, Congress wanted to free itself of the need to amend 
the statute to accommodate each technological change -- as this 
Court's restrictive decisions had forced it to do in the past. 
See, e.g., 1975 Senate Report 60 ("performance" may be accomplished 
by "all kinds of equipment for reproducing or amplifying sounds or 
visual images, any sort of transmitting apparatus, any type of 
electronic retrieval system, and any other techniques and systems ~ 
not yet in use or even invented") ; 19 76 House Report 6 3 (same) ; 
1975 Senate Report 61 (definition of "transmit" is "broad enough to 
include all conceivable forms and combinations of wired or~wireless 
• . 
communications media, including but by no means limited to radio 
and television broadcasting as we know them"); 1976 House Report 64 
(same); 1975 House Hearings 115 (remarks of Representative Kasten-
meier) ("the operation of the bill does apply whether or not we 
specifically deal with a subject or not"); see also 17 u.s.c. §101, 
~7 (protection extends to copying "by any method now known or later 
developed"). 
(2) I do not believe John is correct in asserting that 
"[u]nder the 1909 Act, the writer of a song that was played over 
Page 3. 
the radio was given protection identical to that given the writer 
of a movie screenplay that was broadcast on television." In White-
Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 u.s. 1 (1908), this Court 
had held that a mechanical r eproduction of a song wa s not a "copy" 
of the song and therefore was not infringement of the song writer's 
copyright. The 1909 Act gave song write rs protection against the 
making of unauthorized me chanical reproductions, but the protection 
was not complete. Mechanical reproductions still were not consid-
ered "copies" of the song. Reproduction still was permissible 
without authorization, although the reproducer was required to pay 
a statutory royalty. This lirni ted mechanical-reproduction right 
was an odd hybrid that did not fit neatly into the pattern of copy7 
right law, and the nature of the right was never fully explo~ed by 
the case law. 
\ \ It 
1
1 
Horne reproduction of sound recordings .did not infri:ge the 
sound recording copyright ~r to 1976, because the sound record-
ing copyright was limited to protection against commercial piracy. 
Whether horne reproduction technically infringed the songwriter's 
copyright was, as Congress knew, a meaningless question; the penny-
wise limitation of damages made the right unenforceable and conse-
quently no "right" at all. The 1976 Act did change the nature of l 
the sound recording copyright, and it may well be that horne repro-
duction of sound recordings is now an infringement of co ---
(Footnote 5 of my opinion states that the legal principles concern-
' i \l 





other aspects of copyright law, of course, changed significantly.) 
The question of home reproduction of sound recordings is not raised 
in this case, and my opinion does not reach it. I have tried to 
make clear, however, that the principles governing mechanical re-
production of songs prior to 1976 bear very little relationship to 
the legal principles governing reproduction of motion pictures at 
a ny time. 
(3) There is nothing particularly startling about the fact that 
no recovery is being sought from individual Betamax users in this 
case. It is frequently impossible to recover from individu 1 in-
fringers, and it is precisely this fact that gave rise to the doc-
..... 
trine of contributory infringement. This was explained recently in 
Daw s on Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 u.s. 176, 188 (19~.0), a .. 
patent case; after describing an early case in which liability was 
imposed on a manufacturer whose product enabled purchasers to in-
fringe, we stated: 
• . 
"The court permitted the patentee to enforce his rights 
against the [manufacturer] who brought about the in-
fringement, rather than requiring the patentee to under-
take the almost insuperable task of finding and suing all 
the innocent purchasers who technically were responsible 
for completing the infringement •••. 
"[This early case] demonstrates, in a readily com-
prehensible setting, the reason for the contributory 
infringement doctrine. It exists to protect patent 
,, 
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rights from subversion by those who, without directly 
infringing the patent themselves, engage in acts designed 
to facilitate infringement by others. This protection is 
of particular importance in situations ... where e nforce-
ment against direct infringers would be difficult, and 
where the technicalities of patent law make it relatively 
easy to profit from another's invention without ri s king a 
charge of direct infringement." 
Similar concerns were expressed by Barbara Ringer, the Register of 
Copyrights, in explaining to Congress the need for contributory 
copyright liability in the "dance hall" context. See 1975 House 
Hearings 1813. 
(4) I agree with John that the remedy problem is a difficult .. -one, but I see no reason to assume, prior to briefing and prior to 
exploration of the problem by the District Court, that it will be 
insuperable. Complex class litigation is a familiar part,of our .. 
modern judicial system, and it should be fairly simple for plain- I ' 
tiff and defendant classes to be joined in this litigation on re-
' ··· 
mand. With respect to the royalty and licensing schemes discussed 
by the parties, the Copyright Royalty Tribunal is already in place 
and authors' collecting societies have successfully issued blanket 
licenses for years; these institutions may well be able to aid in 
the collection and distribution of any agreed-upon fees. On re-
mand, of course, the District Court may decide that fashioning 
relief of this kind is not possible. The Studios then would be 
Page 6. 
relegated to statutory damages for particular instances of copying 
that they could prove. But the possibility that complete relief 
may be unavailable should not, I believe, affect our interpretation 
of the statute. Our job, at the moment, is to determine whether 
home VTR recording violates the 1976 Act. I am not aware of any 
doctrine of statutory interpretation that should lead us to find no 
violation simply because relief is uncertain. 
(5) Finally, I might note that the single-copy exemptions list-
ed in the House and Senate reports do not all "concern copying that 
is either public or commercial or both." The making of a single, 
free recording of a work for a blind person, and the copying of a 
brief excerpt of a work by a student calligrapher, are perhaps the 
be st examples. 
I repeat that the opinions circulating must speak for them-











Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., No. 81-1687 
The principal dispute between JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUS-
TICE STEVENS is on the 1971 legislative history. JUSTICE STEVENS 
relies almost exclusively on this legislative history for his 
legal argument. See JPS draft, at 9-11, and 11-12 n. 12. JUS-
TICE BLACKMUN has a full section explaining why the 1971 legisla-
tive history is simply inapplicable in the Betamax context. See 
HAB draft, at 14-19. As a legal matter, I think JUSTICE BLACKMUN 
has the better of the argument. 
The secondary dispute revolves around the fair use doc-
trine. JUSTICE STEVENS believes that home use video-taping is 
"fair use," either under the statutory "fair use" exception or 
because Congress never intended to cover it. JUSTICE BLACKMUN 
argues that home use video-taping is not "fair use." On a clean 
slate, I could see this argument being resolved either way. But 
if you still adhere to your unpublished views in Williams and 
Wilkins v. United States, I think you must agree with JUSTICE 
BLACKMUN. 
Last winter you voted with JUSTICE BLACKMUN at Confer-
ence. Shortly thereafter JUSTICE STEVENS circulated a memo sug-
gesting that he had a new theory supporting reversal. The dis-
putes I discuss here, however, are the same arguments that were 
stressed by the parties. Although JUSTICE STEVENS may express 
·-
.. 
the arguments better, I do not think he has added anything funda-
mentally new. His discussion of "copy" versus "copies" may sup-
port his legislative history argument, but I do not think it can 
stand alone. And his other arguments seem more appropriately 
addressed to Congress. In short, I do see any reason to change 
your Conference vote that was not already before you at Confer-
ence. 
I should add that this memo is limited the basic ques-
tion: which way to vote? If you decide to join JUSTICE BLACKMUN, 







Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., No. 81-1687 
This memo addresses two points: your unpublished opinion 
in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, No. 73-1279, and the 
damages problem. 
I 
I should preface my discussion by noting that there are 
at least two reasons why you should not feel compelled to follow 
your unpublished opinion in Williams & Wilkins. The first, and 
most obvious, is that it was an unpublished memorandum. The sec-
ond is that the case arose under the 1909 Act. Neither of these 
factors require you to abandon your earlier views. Opinions can 
be correct without being published in the United States Reports--
and vice versa. Although the 1976 Act incorporated the judicial 
doctrine of "fair use" without change (and Congress clearly said 
that this is what it was doing), Congress carefully left open the 
question of whether the court of claims view in Williams & Wil-
kins was a correct statement of the doctrine. But if you have 
changed your mind, these two factors can give you an "out." 
The factual setting in Williams & Wilkins is signifi-
cant. Petr was a publisher of medical journals and books. It 
charged that the Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare--
operating through the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the 
National Library of Medicine (NLM)--was infringing its copyrights 
in certain medical journals. In particular, NIH regularly made 
photocopies of journal articles for the benefit of NIH research 
workers. NLM provided photocopies of difficult-to-obtain journal 
articles to other libraries and similar "research-and-education-
oriented institutions." Both NIH and NLM would provide only a 
single copy of an article pursuant to a given request. And on 
the record before the court of claims, all copies were made for 
researchers "in connection with their professional work and were 
used solely for those purposes." 487 F.2d 1345, 1349 {Ct. Cl. 
1973). 
~ 
If we focus on JUSTICE STEVENS's three factors {single 
../'" 
copy, private, ·~ncommercial use), therefore, we find that all 
three are present, at least to some extent, in Williams & Wil-
-----------.... -------------
kins. {i) Although NIH and NLM might copy a given article more 
than once over the course of time, they would make only a single 
copy for a single researcher. The court of claims relied on the 
single-copy aspect of the case. See, e.g., 487 F.2d, at 1351, 
1354. {ii) The NIH and NLM photocopying was not so private as 
home-use video-taping, which is generally done in the privacy of 
one's living room. But it was not public, either. The photo-
copying was available only to a narrow class of people and insti-
tutions who had some continuing tie to NIH and NLM. See id., at 
1354-1355. {iii) Finally, the photocopying was clearly noncom-
mercial. The court of claims relied on this fact, see, e.g., 
id., at 1354, and you noted it in your memorandum, see, e.g., p. 
1. Indeed, the facts in Williams & Wilkins are about as sympa-
thetic as one could imagine, for the photocopies were being used 
to advance medical research. 
In this context, you still concluded that the "fair use" 
exception did not apply. You wrote: 
Although courts and commentators disagree widely as to 
the outer edges of the doctrine, there is general 
agreement as to its central meaning: use of a copy-
righted work is fair when it is for the purpose of cre-
ating something essentially new, and when the economic 
value of the new work does not derive primarily from 
incorporating sections of the old. 
Memorandum in Williams & Wilkins, No. 73-1279, at 2-3. In my 
view, the application of this test in Williams & Wilkins itself 
was a close case. In the stereotypical Betamax situation (video-
taping an episode of M*A*S*H or Masterpiece Thatre for later 
viewing), the answer is much clearer. There is no question of 
the viewers creating something new, and the sole economic value 
of the copy is derived from the prior work. If NIH and NLM are 
copyright infringers, Betamax users must be infringers in the 
stereotypical situation. 
II 
In my bench memo I did not discuss the remedy issue in 
any detail, since the question is not before the Court. I said 
then, and I continue to believe, that a total sales ban would be 
inappropriate if there are realistic noninfringing uses. I also 
suggested that the continuing royalty proposed by CA9 might be 
unjustified if the DC were unable to correlate the royalty to the 
frequency and severity of infringement. In light of these prob-
.. ' 
lems, I noted that a judicial remedy might be infeasible. I as-
sume that you are now interested in the argument advanced by JUS-
TICE STEVENS (with some indirect support from JUSTICE BRENNAN) 
that the lack of an effective remedy counsels the Court to con-
clude that there has been no infringement. 
I do not agree completely with JUSTICE BLACKMUN's treat-
ment of this problem in his opinion. As I mentioned in my last 
memo, "[i]f you decide to join JUSTICE BLACKMUN, I will have sev-
eral more specific points to raise." One of these is to suggest 
some changes in this section. For example, the opinion should 
make clear that the DC is free to reject CA9's continuing royalty 
approach if it is impossible to implement in a judicial proceed-
·~
ing. (I understand that JUSTICE BLACKMUN is willing to make this 
change.) Nevertheless, I essentially agree with JUSTICE BLACK-
MUN's treatment. The choice of a remedy is a difficult one, but 
that difficulty should not prevent us from recognizing the exist-
ence of infringement. 
I do not know if the continuing royalty solution would 
be possible. Since no one has taken the time to study the prob-
lem in detail, we have very little to guide us. (I have long 
thought that it was a mistake to grant this case in its interloc-
utory posture.) As a matter of approach, I note that CA9's pro-
posal is not all that different from your suggestion in Williams 
& Wilkins. See pp. 3-8 of your memorandum. The specifics of 
that suggestion do not survive the passage of the 1976 Act, but 
you at least indicated a willingness to consider an equitable 
solution to the problem. Even if the continuing royalty solution 
would be impossible, however, the DC would have other remedies 
available. For example, it clearly could award statutory damages 
in individual cases of proven infringement. It might also re-
quire Sony to include copyright warnings in its advertising, 
rather than buried in its owners' manuals. 
In sum, it would be a mistake to remand this case with 
instructions to the DC to impose a continuing royalty system. 
But that is not the only option available. It is clear that 
there are some feasible remedies available. Those remedies may 
not be what the studios hoped to win, but they do not prevent the 
Court from deciding whether home-use video-taping can be a copy-
right infringement. 
III 
Once again, I add that this memo is limited in scope. 
If you decide to join JUSTICE BLACKMUN, I will have several more 
specific points to raise. I am sure he will be receptive to any 
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June 14, 1983 ~ 
Re: No. 81-1687 So:11y -corp. v. Universal City Studios 
Dear Harry: 
The fourth part of your memorandum of today, dealing 
with the remedy in this case, satisfies my previously 
expressed concerns about that aspect of it. If you can 
see your way clear to put a few of the observations presently 
contained in your memo into the last part of your opinion, 
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Re: No. 81-1687 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc. 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me in your second draft. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
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June 16, 1983 
Re: No. 81-1687, Sony Corporation v. Universal City Studios 
Dear Sandra: . 
Thank you for your letter of today. I do think it is im-
portant that we have an opinion for the Court in this case, and 
I hope to be able to accommodate your concerns. I have some 
difficulty with the solution you propose, but I believe a com-
promise might be possible. 
Upon a close re-reading of the District Court's opinion, I 
cannot agree that the District Court held the possibility ot 
harm to be too speculative for purposes of ~ fair use inquiry. 
The court recognized that the issue of harm was relevant in 
making three separate determinations: whether the use was fair 
use, whether an injunction was appropriate, and the amount of 
damages that should be awarded. 480 F. Supp., at 451. The 
court did not discuss the third of these, since statutory dam-
ages are available under the 1976 Act, but it discussed the 
other two in separate portions of its opinion. 
The court's discussion of harm as it relates to fair use is· 
fairly short. See 480 F. Supp., at 451-452. The court n.9ted 
that no actual harm had yet occurred; that plaintiffs' experts 
had not been able to predict the year in which harm would occur 
or the number of Betamax sales that would cause the harm; and 
that plaintiffs' claims of harm were based on a series of rela-
tively speculative assumptions. The court then said that it was 
"hesitant to identify 'probable effects' of home-use co~ying," 
and rather than identify those effects, it concluded that · "even 
if this factor of the fair use analysis were determined in 
plaintiffs' favor, it would not render the use unfair." Id., at 
452 (emphasis added). The court also noted that plaintiffs were 
claiming a harm that would reduce their profits, rather than a 
harm that would keep them from producing new works altogether. 
This ended the discussion of harm as it related to fair use. 
The District Court returned to the question of harm when it 
discussed the propriety of injunctive relief. The court cor-
rectly noted that injunctive relief ordinarily is proper only 
when irreparable harm to the plaintiff is shown. Id., at 464. 
The court then went on to "weigh the evidence of harm offered at 
trial .•. in the context of the effect of an injunction in this 
case." Id., at 465. In its subsequent discussion, id., at 465-
468, the court concluded that because each of the harms advanced 
by plaintiffs was somewhat speculative, injunctive relief was 
. ...-
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not warranted. The court did not find that such harms would not 
occur. It simply concluded that, in the absence of direct evi-
dence that the harms would occur, plaintiffs had not shown a 
"likelihood of harm" sufficient to justify an injunction. Id., 
at 468. ---
I read the District Court's opinion as finding that at this 
stage of technological development, it is impossible to say 
whether or not harm will occur. For the reasons given on page 
26 of my opinion, I believe this finding requires a conclusion 
that home VTR use is infringement; otherwise, we run the risk of 
holding that new uses of copyrighted works are permissible only 
to find later that the harm to the copyright owner has been 
substantial. 
I recognize, however, that the District Court's findings 
are subject to more than one interpretation; you read the Dis-
trict Court as making an affirmative finding of no potential for 
harm. In light of our differing r eadings of the opinion, what 
would you think of remanding to the District Court for further 
consideration of the issue of harm? If you could accept this 
compromise, I would alter Part IV B of the opinion simply to set 
out the relevant standards, and leave it to the District Court 
to apply them. 
Your l e tter also expressed concern about the relevant 
standard for determining harm, and particularly about the burden 
of proof. The burden of proof becomes particularly important, 
it seems to me, when we are dealing with a new technology where 
predictions of harm are necessarily based on assumptions and 
opinions. I do not mean to suggest, in Part IV B, tha~plain­
tiffs can shift the burden of proof merely by alleging a poten-
tial for harm. Yet I question whether the burden of proof can 
be placed on the plaintiffs; requiring affirmative "proof" of a 
potential or possibility of harm is somewhat of a contradiction 
in terms. Would it satisfy your concerns if the opinion made 
clear that the plaintiffs' burden of production is a substantial 
one, and that unsubstantiated speculation is not enough? I 
would be glad to consider any suggestions you might have regard-
ing specific language changes, of course. 
Sincerely, 
~ 
Justice O'Connor ....________ 





Re: Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., No. 81-1687 
This memo focuses on questions of proof: which side has 
the burden of proof, what is the standard of proof, has that 
standard been met here, etc. I write this in response to the 
exchange between JUSTICES BLACKMUN and O'CONNOR, and I comment on 
her draft opinion. 
I 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR's draft opinion is not so clear as it 
might be. I think that her analysis is essentially as follows: 
(i) individual Betamax users violate §106 when they video-tape 
copyrighted programs: 
(ii) these §106 violations do not constitute "infringements" if 
they are "fair use" under §107~ 
(iii) one aspect of fair use is "the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work," 
§107(4)~ 
(iv) where there is no harm (or potential for any harm), the 
use must be "fair": and 
(v) the studios did not prove any harm (or potential for any 
harm) in this case. 
She concedes that the individual users fall within §106. Once 
she makes that concession, I think the statutory scheme requires 
a finding of "infringement" unless one of the statutory excep-
v 
tions applies. The only exception that is even arguably relevant 
is §107--fair use. And within the "fair use" exception, only 
§107{4} seems to fit. She thus errs in saying that there is not 
"fair use" but there is nevertheless no "infringement." 
An alternative analysis that she could make, but that 
seems less likely from her opinion, is that §106 does not encom-
pass de minimis violations of the copyright holder's rights. 
Where there is no harm {or potential for any harm} , the violation 
is de minimis. And the studios did not prove any harm {or poten-
tial for any harm} in this case. I find this analysis preferable 
if you want to follow one of the two. The statutory language of 
§107 seems to require that the potential fair use be a productive 
use before one even considers the four factors. But adopting 
this analysis means that JUSTICE O'CONNOR errs in admitting that 
there is a §106 violation. 
I note that JUSTICE BLACKMUN agrees with most of JUSTICE 
0' CONNOR's reasoning, although he is also unclear as to which 
route he takes. Indeed, her fuzziness may be the result of want-
ing to follow his draft to the extent possible. In any event, he 
is clear that there is no "infringement" when there is no harm 
{or potential for any harm} • 
The essential disagreement between JUSTICES BLACKMUN and 
0' CONNOR is on their readings of the District Court's opinion. 
She appears to read it as saying, "even if the studios are right 
on their other contentions, they have been unable to show any 
harm or potential for any harm." He appears to read it as fail-
ing to find any harm because it was operating under a mistaken 
legal impression. Since most of the District Court's discussion 
of harm was in the context of injunctive relief, I tend to think 
that he is right. At the very least, there is enough doubt that 
the District Court understood the proper standard that a remand 
would be appropriate. This is particularly true in the present 
context, where the potential for harm is obvious--even if it was 
not proven and even if it happens that the potential does not 
mature into actual harm. The Court will look like an ostrich 
with its head in the sand to say that it does not see any harm 
here because the District Court did not find any. 
If a majority of the Court wishes to reverse the case 
outright, I think it would be a mistake for the majority to dis-
cuss any more than is necessary. To be more specific, if JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR wants to reverse on her theory, there will probably be a 
majority to reverse outright (depending on whether JUSTICE WHITE 
adheres to his Conference vote) . In that case, it would be a 
mistake to have parts I-IVA of JUSTICE BLACKMUN' s draft as a 
Court opinion. It would be unnecessary dicta. There is no need 
for such guidance in an area that Congress will fix as soon as 
the Court finishes with it. There is simply a danger of the 
Court doing something best left to Congress in a case where there 
is no need to do it, and in a field where mistakes may come back 
to haunt us in unintended ways. 
In sum, I think the best course would be to remand the 
case for further fact-finding under clearer standards than JUS-
TICE BLACKMUN now provides. I hope this is a compromise that 
will be acceptable to JUSTICE O'CONNOR. If not, I do not think 
she should join parts I-IVA of JUSTICE BLACKMON's draft. 
II 
Assuming that a remand is appropriate, I think JUSTICE 
BLACKMON's draft needs some serious improvement on the standards 
that will apply on remand. In particular, I think the present 
burden-of-proof discussion is inadequate. JUSTICE BLACKMUN is 
right to conclude that it would be unfair to require the copy-
right holder to prove that he will be harmed by the infringer's 
use, but that does not mean that the infringer must prove that 
there will be no harm. I think the better course is to leave the 
burden on the copyright holder, but with a lower standard. 
The precise language could be a matter for discussion. 
I would prefer something along the lines of the current burden of 
production in JUSTICE BLACKMUN' s draft. The copyright holder 
should be required to prove that there is a real possibility of 
harm (or a reasonable likelihood, or something along such lines). 
He does not have to prove that the harm will occur, or that the 
harm is more likely than not. It should be enough if he outlines 
the way in which he foresees that the harm might occur, then 
shows that there is a reasonable possibility of its occurring in 
that way. 
Here, for example, Disney might argue that the use of 
Betamaxs will harm its market for prerecorded cassettes of Disney 
television programs. It would then have to show that there is a 
reasonable possibility that (i) such a market will exist: (ii) it 
would be economically feasible for Disney to enter that market 
with its own prerecorded cassettes: and (iii) the use of Betamaxs 
will harm Disney's sales in this market. I might add that Disney 
would have to show a reasonable possibility that all of the ele-
ments in its senario will be true, rather than showing a reason-
able possibility for each element. 
This would meet JUSTICE BLACKMUN's practical concern 
that copyright holders would be unable to defend themselves 
against new technologies. It would also meet JUSTICE O'CONNOR's 
concern that the Court is confusing the law of burdens of proof 
in an unprincipled way. (I, by the way, do not think that JUS-
TICE BLACKMUN's allocation of the burden of proof is unprinci-
pled. It seems entirely logical to view lack of harm as an af-
firmative defense that an infringer must prove once the copyright 
holder has proven a nonproductive use that violates §106. But to 
the extent JUSTICE O'CONNOR does, this should meet her concern.) 
It also seems more sensible to me. 
III 
To the extent you might be inclined to decide this case 
on a failure of proof theory, I would prefer to see it done on 
the contributory infringement issue. I have consistently found 
this aspect of the case to be the most troubling. Even on this 
issue, however, I think the appropriate course is to remand the 
case to the District Court. The District Court made no explicit 
findings about the relative proportions of infringing and 
noninfringing use, and if it had made such findings, they would 
have been colored by its failure to appreciate which was which in 
certain instances. 
This is another area where I think we should make sub-
stantial suggestions to JUSTICE BLACKMUN. I have the feeling 
that with proper instructions, the District Court will ultimately 
find that Sony is not liable as a contributory infringer. But I 
do not think that the Court should make that finding now. 
Sony Corporation v. Universal, No. 81-1687 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part and dissenting. 
I agree with the Court that the petitioners violated 
the respondents' exclusive right to make copies of their 
copyrighted material, 17 U.S.C. §106(1), and that the pe-
titioners' actions did not constitute a "fair use" of that 
material, 17 U.S.C. §107. Accordingly, I concur in Parts 
I-IVA of the opinion. However, I would defer to the Dis-
trict Court's finding that "the facts do not show harm to 
[respondents] " . , 480 F. Supp. 429, 469 (C.D. 
Cal.), and would find that the petitioners cannot be lia~ 
ble as infringers under the facts of this case. Because 
the petitioners cannot be infringers at all, they cannot 
be contributory infringers and I would not remand the case 
to determine whether "'virtually all television program-
ming is copyrighted material.'" Ante, at 35. · 
The Court acknowledges that "there are situations 
2. 
where permitting even an unproductive use would have no 
effect on the author's incentive to create, that is, where 
the use would not affect the value of, or the market for, 
the au thor's work." Id. at 2 5-26. Although the Court 
recognizes that an unproductive use may not amount to an 
infringement where the use causes no harm to the copyright 
owner, the Court inexplicably refuses to apply its rule to 
the facts as found by the District Court. 
The District Court determined that "in five weeks of 
trial, there was no concrete evidence to suggest that the 
Betamax will change the studios' financial picture." 480 
F.Supp., at 469 (1979). Further, the respondents "admit-
ted that no actual harm to their copyrights has occurred 
to date. [Respondents'] experts also admitted that they 
knew neither the year in which the predicted harm would 
occur nor the number of Betamax purchases which would 
cause the harm." Id., at 451. Although the respondents 
attempted to show potential or probable harm, the District 
Court held that these "prediction [s] of harm [are] based 
on so many assumptions and on a system of marketing which 
is rapidly changing, [and] this court is hesitant to iden-
tify 'probable effects' of home-use copying." Id., at 
452. 
3 • 
The Court rejects these findings, reasoning that the 
District Court "applied an incorrect substantive standard 
and misallocated the burden of proof" because it required 
the respondent to show that there was actual harm, rather 
than requiring the petitioner to show that there is no 
potential harm. Ante, at 28. In the Court's view, "when 
the proposed use is an unproductive one, a copyright owner 
need produce only evidence of a potential for harm. In-
fringement then will be found, unless the user can demon-
strate affirmatively that permitting the use would have no 
tendency to harm the market for or value of the copyright-
ed work." Id., at 26. 
Although the Court is not entirely clear in its anal-
ysis, it seems to suggest that the copyright owner has the 
burden of persuasion to show both that an exclusive right 
has been violated, and that the use is not a productive 
use. The owner also has the burden to produce evidence of 
potential harm caused by the alleged unproductive use. 
Once the copyright owner satisfies his burdens on these 
issues, the alleged infringer has the burden of persuasion 
to show that the the unproductive use is not potentially 
harmful to the value of the copyright. The only support 
that the Court offers for its view is that under §107(4), 
4 . 
the effect of a use on the "potential market" is a factor 
to consider in deciding whether a productive use is also a 
fair use. See id., at 26. 1 
Assuming arguendo that "Congress left burden of proof 
questions to the courts" in this area, id., at 27, n. 37, 
I see no reason to shift the burden of proof to the al-
leged infringer. Normally, it is the plaintiff who must 
show that the defendant's actions have caused harm. See 
e.g., Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 891, 894 
( CA 5 19 7 5 ) , c e r t . den i e d , 4 2 5 U . S • 9 9 3 ( 19 7 6 ) • Cf. New 
York v. Ransom, 64 U.S. 487, 488 (1859). The fact that 
damages or harm may be difficult to prove does not usually 
result in shifting the burden of persuasion to the defend-
ant, and, indeed, may result in the inability of the 
plaintiff to recover damages. "[I]t is hornbook law • 
1The two sources cited by the Court for its novel 
proposition of evidence law do not directly support its 
point; rather, these commentators argue that the alleged 
infringer ought to bear the burden of persuasion on the 
issue of lack of injury as a factor in the fair use inqui-
£Y• See 3M. Nimmer, Copyright§ 13.05[E] [4] [c], at 13-84 
(1982); Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural 
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Prede-
cessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1626 (1982). The Court 
has already determined in this case that there is no fair 
use. 
5. 
that even if injury and a cause of action have accrued as 
of a certain date, future damages that might arise from 
the conduct sued on are unrecoverable if the fact of their 
accrual is speculative or their amount and nature 
unprovable." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 
401 u.s. 321, 339 (1971) However, even if Court were 
correct to hold that the burden does shift to the alleged 
infringer once the copyright owner produces evidence of 
potential harm, it is clear that the District Court found 
that the respondents simply failed to produce ~ evidence 
of harm, potential or otherwise, and merely predicted harm 
based on "speculation about audience viewing patterns and 
ratings, a measurement system which Sidney Sheinberg, 
MCA 1 s president, calls a 1 black art. 1 " 480 F.Supp., at 
469. Respondent Universal is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
MCA. 2 
This Court 1 s holding reflects the analysis of the 
2Al though the Court acknowledges that the "evidence [of 
harm] is speculative at . present," ante, at 29, it con-
cludes that a mere recitation of speculative harms should 
be sufficient to shift to the alleged infringer the burden 
of showing that there are no harms, a burden that the 
Court admits may be "impossible in an area where the ef-
fect of a new technology is speculative." Id., at 27. 
6. 
Court of Appeals in this case. Although the Court of Ap-
peals characterized the District Court opinion as "elabo-
rate, painstaking, and thoughtful," 659 F.2d 963, 964 
(CA9 1981), the appellate court determined that the re-
spondents needed to prove only that the use tended to di-
minish the potential value of the copyright. See id., at 
974. What the Court of Appeals ignored is that the Dis-
trict Court found that no actual harm had occurred and 
that any prediction of future harm was "based on personal 
belief and speculation." 480 F.Supp., at 451 (emphasis , 
added) • In addition, the Court of Appeals held, without 
support, that the District Court "did not pay sufficient 
attention to the cumulative effect of mass reproduction of 
copyrighted works" for purposes of the allocation of bur-
den. 659 F. 2d, at 974. 
In my view, the Court of Appeals neglected the well-
settled principle that " [ i] n reviewing the factual find~ 
ings of the District Court, the Court of Appeals was bound 
by the "clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52(a), Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Because of the deference 
due the trial judge, unless an appellate court is left 
with the 'definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been committed,' United States v. United States Gypsum 
7. 
Co., 3334 U.S. 364, 395 (1948), it must accept the trial 
court's findings." In~ood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Lab-
oratories, u.s. __ , (1982) (footnote omitted). 
It is clear that the Court of Appeals failed to follow our 
holding in Inwood Laboratories by ignoring the District 
Court's finding that any harm to respondents was so specu-
lative that it could not even be identified as a 
"'probable effect' of home-use copying." 480 F. Supp., at 
452. We compound the error committed by the Court of Ap-
peals in holding, contrary to the findings of the District 
Court, that there was sufficient harm to make an unproduc-
tive use an infringing use. 
.... 
lfp/ss 06/24/83 SONY2 SALLY-POW 
81-1687 Sony 
Dear Harry: 
This will summarize my reaction to the exchange 
of views between Sandra and you in your respective letters 
of June 21 and June 23. 
May I say at the outset that I hope it is not 
"Pollyannaish" to think that the differences are not 
substantial enough to foreclose agreement. On this 
assumption I make the following comments with respect to 
the four points under discussion. 
1. You are willing to remove the sentence on p. 
24, and the addition you suggest to n. 45, p. 35, 
satisfactorily modifies the sentence in question. 
2. 
I agree with Sandra that it should be made clear 
that certain VTR copying may qualify as permissible 
unproductive use. The suggested sentence to be added to 
the end of the carryover paragraph on pp. 25-26 would be 
helpful. You are reluctant, however, to include the 
second sentence suggested by Sandra. Perhaps it would be 
acceptable if the words "including the advertisements" 
were omitted and a more general qualifier, such as "in 
some circumstances" were added. I think it rather 
important to emphasize that some time shifting may have no 
significant economic impact on the copyright. 
2. This deals with the burden of proof, a 
question important to all of us. I suggest as a 
compromise the following language, the underscoring 
reflecting changes in Harry's draft: 
i 
J 
We conclude that, at least when the 
use is an unproductive one, a copyright 
need prove only a reasonable likelihood of arm 
to the potential market for, or value of, the 
copyrighted work. Proof of actual harm often 
will be impossible in an area where the effect 
of a new technology is speculative, and 
requiring such proof would present the "real 
danger •.• of confining the scope of an 
author's rights on the basis of the present 
technology so that, as the years go by, his 
copyright loses much of its value because of 
unforeseen technical advances." Register's 
Supplementary Report 14. Infringement thus will 
be found if the copyright owner demonstrates 
that the proposed use reasonably may be expected 
to harm the potential market for, or the value 
of, the particular copyrighted work. In 
attempting to show that there is harm to a 
potential market, the plaintiff must offer more 
than mere speculation to carry its burden. When 
the use is one that creates no benefit to the 
public at large, however, copyright protection 
should not be denied on the basis that a new 
technology that appears likely to result in harm 
has not done so yet. 
3. 
3. Sandra has suggested substitute language, in 
place of the language on pp. 27-28. Your response, Harry, 
states that you would have no objection to including some 
of this language. 
I think it is important to limit the scope of 
the remand by identifying unanswered questions of 
importance. I approve, therefore, of Sandra's suggested 
4. 
language except for her last sentence. It is unnecessary 
to say we "in no way disapprove" of the DC's findings. 
We could add a note to the effect that we have no occasion 
to consider the correctness of particular findings of fact 
by the District Court. These should be reexamined in 
light of the standards we have approved. 
A footnote along the lines suggested by Sandra 
in the last two sentences of her discussion of point 3 
would be helpful. 
4. We all agree that contributory infringement 
may be found through either inducement or material 
contribution. If I induce someone to xerox a copyrighted 
book, I could be a contributory infringer -- even if I do 
not provide the book, the paper or the xerox machine. You 
will make the distinction clear but would prefer not to 
5. 
delete Part V{A) entirely. Perhaps it could be revised to 
provide guidance on the legal standards, leaving open for 
the District Court the question whether Sony induced 
infringement. 
As to the "dance hall" cases, I am essentially 
neutral. I would not object to leaving them out, but 
perhaps it would be preferable simply to make the 
distinctions clearer •• 
The standard for contributory infringement, of 
course, is an important point. I understand that you 
will accept language similar to that proposed by Sandra. 
* * * 
The foregoing was dictated late Thursday. It 
has now been read to Sandra this morning and I am 
·' 
6. 
authorized to say that, in order to reach an agreement and 
obtain a Court opinion, she is agreeable to the foregoing. 
I am grateful to you both, as I have in in 
serious doubt about this case. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Blackmun 
., ' .. 
CHAM B ERS OF 
.JU S TI C E S ANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.§u.vrtnu C!Joud cf fqt ~Utlt .;§taft% 
~rurltittghm, ~. "f. 2llgiJI.~ 
June 16, 1983 
Re: Sony Corporation v. Universal, No. 81-1687 
Dear Harry, 
I think that I can agree with your opinion that Sony 
violated the respondents' exclusive right to make copies and 
that the "fair use" exemption is not applicable in this 
case. However, I have considerable difficulty in rejecting 
the District Court's view that the respondents suffered no 
harm, actual or potential, as a result of Sony's use. Your 
approach to this rests on the notion that the District Court 
failed to allocate the burden of proof to Sony, and that the 
court incorrectly required proof of actual harm. I am not 
satisfied that the burden should shift to the unproductive 
user once the copyright owner shows that there has been a 
violation of an exclusive right, and that the use is not 
productive. However, even if I agreed with this burden 
shift, I read the District Court opinion as holding that the 
proof of potential harm was too speculative as well. 
Therefore, even under your framework, the respondents failed 
to carry their burden of producing evidence of potential 
harm. The District Court's findings are not clearly 
erroneous, and I think that we should live with them. 
In sum, I think that I can join parts I-IVA of your 
opinion, but if the opinion remains as it is, I cannot join 
the balance or the judgment. Is there any possibility that 
you could alter part IVB to reflect my concerns? 
Sincerely, 
Justice Blackmun 
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CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
... 
June 17, 1983 
Re: 81-1687 - Sony Corp. v. Universal City 
Studios 
Dear Byron: 
In response to what you and Bill Brennan have 
written, I would agree that failure of proof of 
contributory inrr1ngement, which rests in part on the 
total failure of any proof of any impairment of the 
copyright monopoly, either actual or prospective, is an 
adequate ground for reversing the judgment. 
There is nothing in either the statute itself or 
any of our prior cases that even remotely suggests that 
the manufacture of copying equipment, which has a 
variety of legitimate uses, can be held liable as a 
contributory infringer for advertising and selling the 
equipment to the general public. If there are five I 
votes for that approach, I will be more than happy to -





Copies to the Conference 
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' ' J ~ ( .. , . • 
CHAMB ERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
Re: 
~u:pumt <!fourt of tJrt ~tb ~hrlt.ll' 
~Jrin:gtrn. ~. <!f. 20 ~){. ~ 
June 17, 1983 
81-1687 - Sony Corporation of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc. 
-------------------------------------------------------~---------
Dear Bill, 
My vote in conference in this case was closer to yours than 
to either Harry's or John's, and after studying the interesting 
and thoughtful writings that are now in circulation, I am not at 
all convinced that Congress intended each home recorder of 
copyrighted works to be an infringer, whether he records sound or 
video. Before 1976 it is reasonably clear that the home sound 
recorder did not infringe, and I can't believe that Congress 
intended to change the law in that respect in 1976. By the same 
token, I seriously doubt that the 1976 Act made the video 
recorder of copyrighted works an infringer subject to the usual L" / __ ~ 
damages for infringement. Thus I cannot agree with Harry's draft ~
and am closer to John than to you with respect to the home k 
recorder. ~ 
h b h 'h ... ~~ W atever may e t e case wit respect to the Individual ~. 
~ viewer and recorder at home, I agree with you that relief against 
r;p n s nt ibutor · i er i rantea. John, of 
urse, would reverse the judgment against Sony for his own 
~ easons, but can't you two get together? Since no relief was 
~ sought against the homeowner, if in any event Sony is not a 
contributory infringer, need the status of the homeowner be 
decided at all? Harry must decide it to hold Sony, but if there 
were five votes to reverse as to Sony, t~ issue of~ the ho~owner 
is a ressin uestion. It would also seem that if the 
judgment should be reversed for failure of proof as to injury or 
damages, the status of the homeowner and that of Sony, for that 





Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
,.., ....,.. .... - ..,.-- ...... - · ....... 'H-~4' ~ ............... ,.,~ ...... 
~rurJri:nghm. ~. (!f. 2D~Jl.~ 
June 17, 1983 
No. 81-1687 Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios 
Dear Byron: 
John and I have had some communication, and I have 
every reason to think that we can get together on an 
opinion reversing on contributory infringement grounds 
without deciding the question of the homeowners. 
Sincerely, 
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CHAMBERS Qpr 
JUSTICE w ... J . BRENNAN, JR. 
/l-M 
.h.tue 18, 19 83 
No. 81-1687 Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios 
Dear Harry: 
The suggestions Sandra has made to you ·in this dif-
ficult case seem very constructive, and I shall be most 




Copies to the Conference 
CHA M BERS OF 
J U S TI CE SA ND R A DAY o ' CON NOR 
~uprtmt <!Jo-urt o-f tltt ~ttiftb ~taft%' 
1Ja.s'4ittgton,~. <q. 21lbl'-l>~ 
June 18, 1983 
Re: No. 81-1687: Sony Corporation v. Universal City 
Studios 
Dear Harry, 
Thank you for the response to my letter. I appreciate 
your efforts to satisfy my concerns. However, I am not 
entirely certain that a remand on the issue of harm would be 
fruitful. It appears clear that whatever standard we a sk 
the District Court to apply, the result is very likely to be 
the s ame given the court's strongly expressed view that the 
harm in this case was entirely too speculative to establish 
even "probable" harm. The District Court determined that "in 
five weeks of trial, there was no concrete evidence to 
suggest that the Betamax will change the studios' financial 
picture. " 4 8 0 F . S u pp. , at 4 6 9 ( 19 7 9 ) • Fur the r , the 
respondents "admitted that no actual har.m to their 
copyrights has occurred to date. [Respondents'] experts 
also admitted that they knew neither the year in which the 
predicted harm would occur nor the number of Betamax 
purchases which would cause the harm." Id., at 451. 
Although the respondents attempted to show--potential or 
probable harm, the District Court held that these 
"prediction [s] of harm [are] based on so many ass umptions 
and on a system of marketing which is rapidly ch a nging, 
[and] this court is hesitant to identify 'probable effects' 
of home-use copying." Id .. , at: 452. 
Nevertheless, I have not dismissed the possibility of a 
remand, but that disposition raises certain issues that I 
feel strongly about, but did not feel it nece s sary to 
mention before, given my preference to reverse outright. In 
the interests of achieving more of a consensus, let me 
mention some of the other aspects of copyright law that you 
discuss. 
Your draft discusses the relationship between the fair 
use doctrine and unproductive uses that entai 1 de minimis 
harm. I originally read your draft as holding that a fair 
use had to be a productive use, and that although an 
unproductive use could not be a fair use, it could 
neverthele ss qualify as "noninfringing" if the harm was de 
min1m1s. On further reflection, it seems to me that it 
might be better to approach the analysis entirely from the 
2. 
fair use perspective, rather than creating a nonstatutory 
exemption for certain unproductive uses. I would consider 
it essential that you state that fair use contemplates both 
productive and unproductive! uses. This would accord more 
with the flexibility that has historically been associated 
with the fair use doctrine. 
Second, if we were to remand to the District Court, I 
feel strongly that the burden of persuasion, as well as the 
burden of production, should stay with the plaintiff, who is 
the copyright owner, to show actual or potential harm. The 
burden of proof on harm and damages traditionally remains 
with the plaintiff, and I see no sufficient reason to shift 
it to the alleged infringer. In addition, it would be 
inappropriate in the light of the clearly erroneous standard 
to indicate disapproval of the factual findings that the 
District Court did make. Any remand should be solely for 
the purpose of permitting the court to apply the correct 
standard. 
Third, if we remand, rather than reverse outright, it 
would be necessary to provide the District Court with 
guidance on the issue of contributory infringement. As the 
opinion reads now, it is somewhat unclear as to what would 
constitute contributory infringement in the copyright area. 
My initial reaction here is that the District Court was 
correct to borrow the "staple article of commerce" doctrine 
from the patent law, and I am not entirely sure why you 
reject it. I agree that patent law and copyright law are 
dissimilar in important ways. Nevertheless, as you point 
out, these bodies of law derive from a common constitutional 
source. They both concern balances that are struc~ between 
the right of creators to enJOY~ monopoly over their work, 
and the so 'al concerns that arise when monopolists go too 
far. I ha ought that the s ap r 1c e" octrine 
developed in order to limit the atent holder f~om_depriving ~ 
society of the good that comes rom t e existence of other b~~~ 
en e se a nevertheless frustrate the patent holder's /~-A. - · 
monopoly to some degree. I see no reason why we should not 
be similarly concerned with what the copyright holder does ~ 
with his monopoly. If the videorecorder has substantial ~ 
noninfringing uses, we should be reluctant to find vicarious ~-~ 
liability. In addition, I think that the focus of the ~~~ --~ 
inquiry should not be whether virtually all of the copied~. _ - . ., 
material is copyrighted, but rather, whether virtually all ­
of the copying amounts to an infringement. Even if you do 
not wish to import the "staple article" doctrine directly to 
the copyright area, I fail to see why the same standard-- ~? 
-~~ 
3. 
whether the item is capable of substantial noninfringing 
use--should not be used. 
I will be interested to know whether you believe that 
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·I ' 
C HAM BERS Or 
.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
~uvrtmt <!Jonrf of tltt ~nittb .§taft% 
Jf a.s' ~in gt on, !D . <!J . 211,?)!. .;l 
June 18, 1983 
Re: No. 81-1687: Sony Corporation v. Univer~al City 
Studios 
Dear Harry, 
Thank you for the response to my letter. I appreciate 
your efforts to satisfy my concerns. However, I am not 
entirely certain that a remand on the issue of harm would be 
fruitful. It appears clear that \vhatever standard we ask 
the District Court to apply, the result is very likely to be 
the same given the court's strongly expressed view that the 
harm in this case was entirely too speculative to establish 
even "probable" harm. The District Court determined that "in 
five weeks of trial, there was no concrete evidence to 
suggest that the Betarnax will change the studios' financial 
picture • " 4 8 0 F • S u pp. , at 4 6 9 ( 19 7 9 ) • Further , the 
respondents "adrni tted that no actual harm to their 
copyrights has occurred to date. [Respondents'] experts 
also admitted that they knew neither the year in which the 
predicted harm would occur nor the number of Betarnax 
purchases which would cause the harm." Id., at 451. 
Although the respondents attempted to show--potential or 
probable harm, the District Court held that these 
"prediction[s] of harm [are] based on so many assumptions 
and on a system of marketing which is rapidly changing, 
[and] this court is hesitant to identify 'probable effects' 
of horne-use copying." Id., at 452. 
Nevertheless, I have not dismissed the possibility of a 
remand, but that disposition raises certain issues that I 
feel strongly about, but did not feel it necessary to 
mention before, given my preference to reverse outright. In 
the interests of achieving more of a consensus, let me 
mention some of the other aspects of copyright law that you 
discuss. 
Your draft discusses the relationship between the fair 
use doctrine and unproductive uses that entail de minimis 
harm. I originally read your draft as holding that a fair 
use had to be a productive use, and that although an 
unproductive use could not be a fair use, it could 
nevertheless qualify as "noninfringing" if the harm was de 
rnin1rn1s. On further reflection, it seems to me that it 
might be better to approach the analysis entirely from the 
.. 
2. 
fair use perspective, rather than creating a nonstatutory 
exemption for certain unproductive uses. I would consider I 
.~ it essential that you state that fair use contemplates both 
S'~l,A productive and unproductive uses. This would accord more 
wP-- with the flexibility that ' has historically been associated 
~ ~fair use _doctrine. 
~ ~ Second, if we were to remand to the D~rict Court, I 
1 ~~-~~e~ strongly tha(Ithe burden of persuasion~s well as the ~ en of production, should stay with the plaintiff, who is /~t-
•lA.~ the copyright owner, to s how act ual or EOtential harm. The 
'!~ ~- burden of proof on harm ana d amages traditionally remains ~ 
f..~' w,i);bl the plaintiff, and I see no sufficient reason to shift a..e:..~ 
. .• ~to the alleged infringer. In addition, it would be 
.. ~~ ~nappropriate in the light of the clearly erroneous standard ~ 
vv· AL'· to indicate disapproval of the factual findings that the J,., .~~  J " 
vv-~ District Court did make. Any remand should be solely for F- ~ 
, -.0 the purpose of permitting the court to apply the correct .... ~a 
9 ~ standard. ~" 
~ Third, if we remand, rather than reverse outright, it ~· 
~~uld be necessary to provide the District Court with , ~ 
. 1dance on the issue of contributor infringement. As the 
~ opiniOn _ reads now,--rt is somewhat unclear as to what would~ 
~~constitute contributory infringement in the copyright area. ~ ~ 
~ ;..-- .My initial reaction here is that the District Court was 
11,~orrect to borrow the "staple article of commerce" doctrine +- W ~ from the patent law, an I am not entire y sure why you 
reject it. I agree that patent law and copyright law are 
dissimilar in important ways. Nevertheless, as you point 
out, these bodies of law derive from a common constitutional 
source. They both concern balances that are struck between 
the right of creators to enjoy a monopoly over their work, 
and the social concerns that arise when monopolists go too 
far. I had thought that the "staple article" doctrine 
developed in order to limit the patent holder from depriving 
society of the good that comes from the existence of other 
enterprises that nevertheless frustrate the patent holder's 
monopoly to some degree. I see no reason why we should not 
be similarly concerned with what the copyright holder does 
with his monopoly. If the videorecorder has substantial 
noninfringing uses, we should be reluctant to find vicarious 
liability. In addition, I think that the focus of the 
inquiry should not be whether virtually all of the copied 
material is copyrighted, but rather, whether virtually all 
of the copying amounts to an infringement. Even if you do 
not wish to import the "staple article" doctrine dihectly to 
the copyright area, I fail to see why the same standard--
3 0 
whether the i tern is capable of substantial noninfr inging 
use--should not be used. 
I will be interested to know whether you believe that 








v. Universal City 
ii,.... i1 
Dea r' Ha,r ryh 1 "'~ 
.. ~·1;: '· \~ .·· ' 
:il'. ::'· •• ~,:; ~.J 
As you may have surmised I have had more than a 
littl~ diffiulty with this case. John's post-conference 
memorandum, and now his full memorandum, present ~ersuasive 
arguments for the view that Congress never intended to pro-
tect a copyright from the kind of home use involved in this 
case. And I do believ~ that the exchange of thoughtful 
memos from several Chambers has helped to bring us closer 
together. ~ _ . 
. ~ r> t 
.:\ ' ·~ • ' '. 1i • ' ' ' '·" ': ' 
"', . I am strongly tempted to do as Byron has suggest- ,;"· 
ed: ~ simply conclude on the basi.s of the findinqs made by 
the District Court that there can be no contributory 
infringement in this case. 
,r ~ ~ 
ii.l Ill• 
At least for now, however, I resist this tempta-
tion because such a resolut i.on would allo"' Congress to con-
tinue to defer ~plarifying the law. Also, we granted this 
case to address -the substantive statutory issue 
iii ~y·c :¥J.;: . ..,.~,.,_ ~v .,, "' .'"·· ~ 1. 
J:e,, ::?.- ·' ~,;'\~'' ~ 1 
,,·,., I wr1te now to say that the suggestions made in .. ' 
Sandra Is letter of ,June 18 appeal to me. . If you should re'.: 
vise your opinion generally along the lines of her letter, I 
:1. 
believe I could join you. As the case was assiqned to you - -~ 
in part I suppose - on the basis of my Conference vote, I 
feel some obligation to remain with you absent a genuine 
conviction to the contrary. I also think your opinion has 
the sounder argument with respect to the statutory language 
and the most relevant legislative history. 
i',;, ~ 
''lo'ilt· 
I do emphasize the i.mportance to me of the points ·""' 
made in Sandra's letter. First, that we must read enough 
flexibility into the fair use doctri.ne so that distinctions "' 
can be made between productive and unproductive uses. This • 
could become, in effect, a balancing process in which injury 
to the copyright owner would be weighed against the natu~~ 
of the home use. 




I also agree fully with S~ndra with respect to the 
burden of pPrsua~ion as well as the burden of Production on 
proof of actual and potential iniury. And whether. we ex-
pressly analogize to oatent law, I am in accord with her 
paragraph marked "third" as to the need to provide guidance 
on the issue of contributory infringement. The DC's reason-
ing on the issue has considerable merit. 
Sincerely ,o ' 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.$Sttprtmt <!fo-u.rt (t{ tllt ]tnitdt ~hrlc.s­
~~t.s-lri:ng-tM. !B. <!f. 2og;J!..;l / 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN June 20, 1983 
Re: No. 81-1687 - Sony Corporation of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc. 
Dear Sandra: 
Thank you for your detailed letter of June 18. Let me 
see what I can do. 
Justice O'Connor 





.hvrmtt <!fourl ltf tlft ~ttittb ~tatts 
._Mlfittgbm. ~. <q. 20,;1'!.~ 
June 21, 1983 
..JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKM U N 
Re: No. 81-1687 - Sony Corporation of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc. 
Dear Lewis and Sandra: 
Your respective letters of June 18 and 20 set forth your 
concerns about this complex case. Bill Brennan, by his note 
of June 18, has indicated interest in my response. Because 
Thurgood and Bill Rehnquist joined the recirculation of June 
15, whatever we do by way of compromise, of course, must be 





third draft being circulated is a sincere endeavor on 
to bring at least five of us, and perhaps six, to-
The changes appear from page 25 on and cover Parts 
and VII of the opinion. Specifically: 
1. I have no concern about the first point raised 
~~ ~ _~in $andra's letter. Indeed, I thought it was implicit 
~
even un roductive uses may be fair if they create 
no poten 1a or r . 1 , owever, is now made ex-
plicit in the new draft. 
fJ1I"" '~ 2. I still believe the ~den of persuasion is more 
~ properly aced on the ros ective user. Many commenta-
tors regard fa1r use as an a 1rma ive defense. The 
crucial point, however, is that the copyright owner 
should not be required to rove that harm has occurred 
or 1s mo e 1 ely_ t an not 1n uture. When 
a new-teCi1i10I.09y is - at issue, this is a burden that 
could not be met, and the legislative history of the 
1976 Act makes clear that copyright owners are not to be 
· e rived of protection simply because the effects of a 
ew technology are unknown. As I read Sandra's letter, 
she agrees that only potential harm need be shown. 
J/Thus, I am willing to compromise on the burden of per- / 
-~~ rv suasion issue. I do not-rornk it would be unreasonable 
pr · require th copyrigh t _ o~ner to show a cgotentiai' for 
~' and r I VB has been alter ed accordingly. 
3. I am reluctant to adopt the "staple article of 
commerce" doctrine "lock, stock, and barrel" into copy-
right law. I think we do well to avoid importing tech-
nical doctrine from one area of the law to another with-
out being fully aware of where this may lead. Further, 
I am not persuaded that the considerations underlying 
Page 2. 
the "staple article" doctrine in patent law are entirely 
analogous to the considerations in this case. The Beta-
max is a tool which can be used by the owner both for 
infringing purposes and for noninfringing purposes. It 
is fairly safe to say that most Betamax owners would not 
have bought the device if they were restricted to nonin-
fringing uses. This is not the case with the use of a 
"staple article" in patent law. 
I am willing, however, to adopt Sandra's proposed 
standard for contributory infringement, provided that an 
opinion for the Cour~hereby can be obtained. I agree 
l 
that the question of contributory infringement turns on 
the amount of VTR use that is infringing rather than the 
amount of television programming that is copyrighted. 
You will see what has been done in this draft. I feel it 
meets the concerns that have been expressed. Of course, I do 
not know whether Thurgood and Bill Rehnquist will go along. 
Justice Powell 
Justice O'Cormor 
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J U STICE SANDR A DAY o ' CO NNOR 
June 21, 1983 
Re: 81-1687: Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios 
Dear Harry, 
I appreciate your changes as reflected in the third 
draft. Although they partially meet the concerns expressed 
in my prior letters, the opinion is still inconsistent with 
portions of my views as previously set forth. 
~rsL> my purpose in wanting the notion of fair use to 
L /) C. enc both productive and unproductive use is to open up 
./ · the . possibility that certain VTR use, e.g., timeshifting 
/J...A~ with all advertisements preserved, may be fair use because 
~ l ge nerates de minimis harm. I understand this to be Bill 
en nan's concern as well. Although you now say that an 
, ~ . J- unproductive use may be a fair use, you use language that 
~\ ~uld ostensibly preclude a finding that any VTR copying 
_ ~ (other than that which could be characterized as "productive 
~l~ use") could be fair use. On p. 24, you state that "[a] VTR 
"P .~ recording creates no public benefits sufficient to justify 
~ .' limiting this right [to cut off access]. On page 35, inn. 
45, you, ~tpte that "[c] opying an unregistered work is still 
r ·n ri ~t." Perhaps you could delete these two 
;YP'- . 1.~- ements • .,, 
~ · ~ In addition, I would like to see a reference to VTR use 
~ included in your discussion of examples of unproductive fair 
use. This would make it clear to the lower courts that 
certain VTR copying ~ qualify as permissible unproductive 
use. Perhaps you could add the following sentences to the 
end of the carryover paragraph on pp. 25-26: "Indeed, it 
may even be the case that certain VTR use may cause no 
significant harm to the copyright holder. For instance, 
timeshifting of programs including the advertisements, may 
not have any significant economic impact on the potential 
market for, or value of, a copyrighted work." 
~, is my continuing concern about the burden of 
pro though that burden is now where I believe it 
belongs, I still have misgivings about the content of the 
burden. As you point out, the statute talks in terms of 
"potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." 
Rather than requiring the copyright owner/plaintiff to show 
...___ __ 
2. 
harm to the value of the copyright or to a potential market, 
you state that the burden is satisfied by showing "a 
reasonable possibility of harm." In my view, the content of 
burden of proof should follow the statute. Would you change 
the first sentence of the second paragraph on p. 26 to read: 
"In adhering to the statutory language, we conclude that the } 
copyright owner 1;must show harm" to the potential market for, 
or value of, the · copyr1ghted work." I suggest omitting "or 
even probable harm" from the next sentence, and changing the 
end of that paragraph to read: "Infringement thus will b~ 
found if_ the copyright owner demonstrates, · at a mfnimurn, 
tnet tJ"le use pf!I fiarm the potential marl<et tor, or the 
value Of, the pa r t1cu!ar copyrighted work. In attempting t 
show that there is harm to a potential market, the plaintiff 
must offer more than mere speculation to carry its burden. 
The plaintiff must prove harm to a potential market for, or 
the value of, the copyrighted work." I suggest omitting the 
last sentence from that paragraph as it now reads. 
Third, I am troubled by pp. 27-28, where you seem to 
suggest that the Studios have already demonstrated 
sufficient harm. I am not sure that the Studios ever made 
these arguments to the District Court, and if they did not, 
I see no reason to require the District Court to reopen the 
record in this case in order to give the Studios a "second 
chance." If the Studios did allege these harms before, then 
the District Court may evaluate them in an attempt to 
determine whether potential markets have been affected. In 
place of the language on pp. 27-28, would you substitute 
something along the following lines?: 
"It is not clear from the District 
Court opinion whether that court considered 
the effect on the potential market that the 
studios may have alleged. The District 
Court determined that "in five weeks of 
trial, there was no concrete evidence to 
suggest that the Betamax will change the 
studios' financial picture." 48 0 F. Supp. , 
at 469 (1979). Further, the respondents 
"admitted that no actual harm to their 
copyrights has occurred to date. 
[Respondents'] experts also admitted that 
they knew neither the year in which the 
predicted harm would occur nor the number of 
Betamax purchases which would cause the 
harm." Id., at 451. Although the District 
Court was "hesitant to identify 'probable 
effect' of home-use copying," id.,, at 52, 
we are unable to determine whether the court 
meant that there was no harm to potential 
markets, or whether it declined to apply the 
"potential harm" standard in expressing its 
hesitancy in finding "probable effects." We 
are also uncertain whether the court 
considered the ways in which VTR recording 
could af feet the value of copyrights. 
Therefore, we remand to the District Court 
for reconsideration of the issue of the 
effect on potential markets. Our remand is 
intended only to permit the District Court 
to apply the standard that we have approved, 
and we in no way disapprove of the findings 
that the District Court did make. 
3. 
You might add a footnote explaining that if the Studios did 
present evidence below that VTR recording injured them in 
the ways that you suggest, then the District Court might 
consider that evidence as it affects potential markets. 
However, I would not want to create the impression that we 
believe that the Studios have already satisfied their 
burden. 
Fourth, I see a certain tension between your discussion 
of contributory infringement in Part V(A) of inducement and 
your discussion in V (B) of substantial noninfringing use. 
Gershwin seems to indicate that there are two ways to engage 
in contributory ·infringement. First, one may induce the 
infringement. Second, one may materially contribute to 
infringement. In the context of this case, one would 
materially contribute to infringement for purposes of being 
a contributory infringer if one provided a device that is 
not capable of substantial noninfringing use. In any event, 
it seems that contributory infringement may result from 
either inducement or material contribution. 
It seems to me that we should accept the District 
Court's finding that Sony did not induce any infringement, 
and just remove Part V (A) from the opinion. I should add 
that I am uncomfortable with the reliance on the "dance 
hall" cases because they involved instances of . control by 
the party found to be the contributory infringer. Whatever 
else the VTR manufacturers may do, they certainly do not 
have any control over VTR users. Further, I remain 
convinced that the standard for contributory infringement 
should be the one that I articulated in my letter of June 
4. 
18: is the VTR capable of substantial noninfringing uses. 
Accordingly I suggest replacing the second paragraph on p. 
33 with the following: "We therefore conclude that there 
can be no contributory infringement if the VTR is capable of 
significant noninfringing uses. If a significant portion of 
what is available to copy on the VTR is either not 
copyrightable or is copyrighted but the owners have 
authorized copying, then the VTR must be deemed capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses irrespective of the actual 
uses to which the VTR' s are put. If virtually all of the 
rna ter ial available for copying is such that it may not be 
copied without infringement, then the VTR must be deemed to 
be incapable of substantial noninfringing use at present." 
To make the remainder of the opinion consistent with this, 
perhaps the third sentence in the first full paragraph on p. 
34 should be changed to read: "The key question is not the 
amount of television programming that is copyrighted, but 
the amount of programming the copying of which would amount 
to infringement." The fifth sentence in that paragraph 
should perhaps be changed to read: "The proportion of 
programming whose copying would be infringement is primarily 
a question of fact, n 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~u.p-rtm.t ~cmt qf fqt ~nittb ~ta.ftg 
1)t1Ulfri:ttg-t!llt. ~. ~· 2Ll.?.l!~ 
Re: No. 81-1687 - Sony Corp. of America 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 
Dear Sandra: 
June 23, 1983 
Your letter of June 21 raises four points. In general, if you 
would give way on the second, I believe (but am not certain) that I 
can satis f y you on tfi e o tfier three. Of course, there is no point in 
our sparring with each other until I know Lewis' position. If you 
and I cannot get together, or if he does not join, I probably shall 
revert to my original position. John then probably will take over 
the case. 
More specifically: 
1. On your ~ I have no objection to removing the sen-
tence on page 24 d sentence, in n. 45, is intended to make 
the point that infringement does not depend on whether the copyright-
ed work has been registered. I am willing to change the sentence to 
read "copying an unregistered work still can be infringement," but I 
otherwise wish to retain the concept. 
To give VTR use as an example of fair use in the introductory 
paragraph on page 25 seems to me to beg the question. We could put 
something like your proposed first sentence near the end of the dis-
cussion of harm. Your proposed second sentence, however, bothers me, , 
for it seems like a heavy suggestion as to how the District Court 
should decide the case on remand. - . ~ 
2. Your ~ expresses the fear that language on pages 
27-28 could b~a4·~uggest that the Studios already have demon-
strated sufficient harm. I feel that ~y language could be clarified 
somewhat, and I would have no objection to including some of the 
language ou suggest as well. 
3. In your fourth ' point, you distinguish between contributory 
infringement through inducement and contributory infringement through 
material contribution. This d~stinction is acceptable, and I would 
have no problem with eliminating the "inducement" portion of the 
discussion. I hesitate, however, to eliminate Part V-A altogether. 
I could rewrite that part to clarify its relationship to Part V-B. 
Frankly, I do not understand your objection to a description of the 
"dance hall" cases; the opinion does not rely on them but merely 
describes them to illustrate the type of "knowledge" found necessary 
in other cases. It seems to me to be somewhat counterproductive to 
take this reference out. 
Page 2. 
You now say that you want the ~tan~d for contributory in-
fringement to be whether the VTR is "capable of substantial infring-
ing uses." That is the patent standard. I read your prior letter to 
say that the question should be "whether virtually all of the copying 
amounts to an infringement." This latter standard was incorporated 
into the latest draft because I thought that was what you wanted. 
Although I think the standard in the current draft makes more sense, 
I believe I 5o~d_ live with lan~~ge similar to that which you now 
propose. - - -
4. Your ~~concerns the burden of proof. The statu-
tory language to wh+d ! you refer comes 1 n t:o p r ay wfi en a productive 
use is found. Under your proposal, the copyright owner would have to 
prove actual harm to the value of the copyright or to a potential 
market even for unproductive uses. The problem with this, as I have 
tried to point out, is that copyright owners would be deprived of 
protection when the technology is a new one and when predictions of 
harm are necessarily imprecise. I strongly feel that the standard 
articulated in the opinion -~ that the copyright owner must show a 
"reasonable possibility of harm11 -- is the correct one. 
· ~ Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 




,differences with .JPS may be summarized as fol-
lows: 
John emphasizes the "i~n0cencP.> of c:;ony" (t). J 7) • 
Harry's answer is persuasive: It must have been obvious to 
Sony that the Primary purpose of and market for Bet~max was 
for recording TV proqra111s. Most of this would be. done in 
homes, and this ·case. is limited to non-commercial home use. 
But dr~wing lines is difficult if not J?ractlcallv impossi-
ble. One home user may record only for his time ,shr1rinq 
personal , use. Others may "library", uqe for entettaininq 
guests at large or small Parties, etc. 
Harry would not have to find Sony wholly innocent. 
He would hold no contributory infringem~nt by apoJvinq to 
copyright law the concent of a "staple article of commerce" 
tha,t is fami lar to patent law. He reasons that Betamax is a 
staple~ article of commerce because it is capable of signifi-
cant non-infringing uses. (22, 2'3). 
Thus, for. John, the question is whether Betamax is 
in fact capable of non-infringing uses, and he is certainly 
right in saying that non-commercial, private time sharing in. 
tre home should not be viewed - despite the statutory lan-
guage - as an infringemPnt. 
My 0ifficulty with his theory is that it would 
relieve Sonv of llabi1ity for substantial non-home commer-
.! 





cial use simply because Betamax also has the capability of 





June 25, 19R3 
81-1687 Sony v. Universal 
Dear Harry: 
I have a copy of Sandra's letter of June 23. 
~a I wrote you on JunP 20, I was generally in ac-
cord with the changes suqqeste~ in her letter of the lRth. 
I also have, of course, followed the latest exchanges be-
tween the two of you. J. fi.nd her vi.ews genera1ly fn accor ·'1 
with my own. Her reframinq of the burden of. ?roof paragraph 
seems quite close to both yours and John's. 
I recognize, of course, that you are being ~ e­
quested - by both of us in effect - to m.lkc changes in an 
opinion on which you ha,re devoted a great deal of thought. 
For me, this is by far the most difficult case of the 'i'erm. 
The exchange of views between you and John has been Pduca-
tional - at l~ast for me. I must say that John's latest 
circulation (differing substantially from his first) is per-
suasive. Nevertheless, if you and Sandra can aqree - as I 
hope you can - I t.·'1ill ntay '~i.th you. 
1 suppose reargument is an ooti.on in vie\·l of the 
difficulty at this time of working out differences. I nor-
mallv am unsympathetic to rearguing a case adequately pre-
sented to the full Court. But we all have the problem of 
the lateness of the Term. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Blackmun 
cc: Justice O'Connor 
•, 
CHAM B ERS OF 
.:§uvrttttt <!J~d cf tqt ,nit.cb .:§taft% 
'J!rurlyingtlln, ~. <!J. 2llpJ!~ 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
June 25 
Re: No. 81-1687: Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios 
Dear Harry, 
Thank you for your June 23 letter exploring 
alternatives to the suggestions made in my letter of June 
21. It appears as though some of the differences that we 
have can be satisfactorily resolved, such as the sentence in 
n. 45, and perhaps other changes on pp. 27-28. Apparently, 
however, you are reluctant to change your treatment of the 
burden of proof standard. This issue is significant, 
because the burden will likely determine the outcome of not 
only this case, but most others in the future. I recognize 
the delicate balance we must make between protection of the 
copyright owner and encouragement of new technology. You 
may be right but I am not persuaded that we should impose a 
standard even for unproductive use that differs from the 
statutory language. 
I notice that in John's circulation of June 23, at p. 
31, he proposes the following burden of proof: 
"[A] ny plaintiff seeking to challenge 
the use of a copyrighted work should, as a 
threshold matter, prove that if the 
challenged use became widespread, it would 
be more likely than not that some non-
minimal damage would result to the potential 
market for, or the value of, his particular 
copyrighted work. Actual present harm need 
not be shown; such a requirement would leave 
the copyright holder with no defense against 
predictable damage." 
While it seems to me that the word "non-minimal" should be 
changed to "significant," I agree essentially with John's 
articulation of the burden and would be willing to accept 
such a standard. I have attached a copy of p. 31 · of John's 
June 23 draft. 
I see no reason not to include references to VTR 
timeshifting as a possible instance of fair use. I would 
feel uncomfortable with a mere allusion to VTR use in this 
context given the detailed findings by the District Court. 
2. 
I think that the point should be emphasized rather than made 
the subject of only a passing -reference to a possibility. 
With respect to the standard for contributory 
infringement, I think that the analogy to the patent cases 
is close enough that the "capable of substantial 
infringement" language is quite useful and appropriate. It 
does not differ from my earlier suggestion. I had thought 
that a copyright owner could establish liability of the 
contributory infringer under that standard by proving that 
virtually all of what was available to copy is such that its 
copying would amount to infringement. 
Perhaps a re-write of Part V-A would meet the concerns 
previously stated, but I would want to see it before 
approving it. I am uncertain that we even need to discuss 
anything but the "material contribution" issue if we affirm 
the District Court's finding that Sony did not induce 
infringement. 
In short, it appears we may still differ on burden of 
proof and contributory infringement and on specific 
language. Although I have requested a number of specific 
changes, I had been under the impression, perhap~ wrongly, 
that it could be helpful to you in getting a Court on this 
exceptionally challenging case. If you choose not to make 
the changes, I certainly understand. 
Sincerely, 
cc: Justice Powell 
I 
J. "' -• ....,....._ ~UV/ --------
~ - 31 -
----~ For that reason, any plaintiff seeking to challenge the use 
1 of a copyrighted work should, as a threshold matter, prove that 
if the challenged use became widespread, it would be more likely 
'S1 '3•'1 J II,,..,-\-
than not that some non mi~im~l damage would result to the 
\ potential market for, or the value of, his particular copyrighted 
work. Actual prese~t harm need not be shown; such a requirement 
Lwould leave the copyright holder with no defense against predictable _d_~~':.~_ · __ ) N~; is it necessary to show with certainty 
that future harm will result. All that is necessary is a showing 
by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful 
likelihood of future harm exists. 
In this case, respondents did not carry that burden with 
regard to home time-shifting. The district court explicitly 
found to the contrary. See 480 F.Supp., at 466; supra, at 
The nature of the evidence was described by the court as 
follows: 
"Plaintiffs' experts admitted at s everal points in 
the trial that the time-shifting without librarying 
would result in 'not a great deal of harm.' 
Plaintiffs' greatest concern about time -shifting is 
with 'a point of important philosophy that transcends 
even commercial judgment.' They fear that with any 
Betamax usage, 'invisible boundaries' are passed: 'the 
copyright owner has lost control over his program.' 
"These 'nuances,' 'perceptions,' and 'points of 
phiJosophy' are understandable, though not always 
logical. They do not, however, justify an injunction. 
Harm from time-shiftinq is speculative and, at . best, 
minimal." 480 F. Supp., at 467 (emphasis added). 
The District Court's conclusions that respondents "did not 




JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
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June 27, 1983 
No. 81-1687 Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
After reviewing both Harry's and John's most recent 
circulations in this case, it may be helpful to have me 
say that John's memorandum comes closer to expressing the 
views I expressed at Conference and in my memorandum of 
June 14. 
Sincerely, 
' I. - t I, ( 
WJB, Jr. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w ... J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.§u:ptmu Of curl of fire ~b .:%tate~ 
~asJrhtghm. ~. "f. 2ll&i'!~ 
June 27, 1983 
No. 81-1687 Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
After reviewing both Harry's and John's most recent 
circulations in this case, it may be helpful to have me 
say that John's memorandum comes closer to expressing the 
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WJB, Jr. 
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CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
June 28, 1983 
Re: No. 81-1687-Sony v. Universal City Studios 
Dear Harry: 
I am still with you. 
Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
--1 u I (..,....-/ ,/! ,. 
T.M. 
To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Michael 
Re: Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., No. 81-1687 
JUSTICE STEVENS' law clerk has given me a cut-and-paste 
version of their next circulation. The print shop informs him 
that a printed version should be ready by 6:00, so you should be 
able to take a copy home with you tonight. 
I 
If JUSTICE STEVENS wants to bring the op1n1on down in 
its present form, I sugge~do not join it--even in 
part. I recommend that you either stay with JUSTICE BLACKMON or 
write a separate opinion concurring in the judgment along the 
lines I suggested in my last memo. 
If JUSTICE STEVENS is willing to make major changes in 
the contributory infringement section, you probably could join 
that section. At the moment, there are two major problems. (1) 
He adopts the patent law standard for contributory infringement. 
This standard is ridiculously high, and would make it virtually 
impossible to find contributory infringement in all but the most 
extreme cases. Moreover, it is not necessary to adopt such a 
high standard here. (2) He incorporates a number of statements 
about direct infringement, fair use, etc., in the section on con-
tributary infringement. These statements are unnecessary for his 
conclusion in this case, and are inconsistent with the views that 
you have expressed. 
If JUSTICE STEVENS is willing to make major changes in 
the opinion as a whole, you could join the entire opinion. These 
changes would generally be deletions of statements inconsistent 
with your views rather than substantial rewriting. 
II 
Whether or not the case should be reargued depends on 
what you want to do. If you want to stay with JUSTICE BLACKMUN, 
I think the answer depends on what he is able to do. If he can 
have his opinion quickly converted to a dissent with which he can 
be satisfied, we might as well bring the case down. 
If you want to change your vote and join some or all of 
JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion, I think there is a lot of work to do. 
We have devoted a lot of time to reviewing JUSTICE BLACKMUN' s 
opinion carefully. We have had no where near so much time to 
review JUSTICE STEVENS'. If everyone jumps on now, without the 
opportunity for careful review, I think a lot of the broad state-
ments in his opinion will come back to haunt us. At the moment 
he has a lot in there that is too broad--and is probably wrong. 
I think it would be better to put the case over and give it the 
proper review that it deserves. 
If you want to write an opinion concurring in the judg-
ment, I am sure we could be ready to hand it down by next Wednes-








Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., No. 81-1687 
Now that JUSTICE BLACKMON has decided he can go no fur-
ther to accommodate JUSTICE O'CONNOR's views, it appears that 
JUSTICE STEVENS will have a Court opinion in this case. Accord-
ingly, JUSTICE BLACKMON will be writing the dissent. That leaves 
you with an entire range of options. This memo sets out what I 
see as the most likely possibilities. 
(1) If JUSTICE BLACKMON's dissent stays in essentially 
the same form as his latest circulation, you could join that. 
That would make this a 5-4 case. I see several advantages in 
this course. First, I think JUSTICE BLACKMON is probably right 
in his legal analysis. In this case, it may be better to vote 
the right way than to join the majority for the sake of being 
part of the Court. This not an area where lower courts will be 
looking to this Court for clear guidance. Second, a 5-4 decision 
will give a better indication to Congress of just how close this 
case really is. Congress might read a 6-3 decision as a strong 
indication of what the Court thinks the law should be. A 5-4 
decision might leave Congress in a better position to do what it 
should have done initially. Third, you voted with JUSTICE BLACK-
MUN at Conference. 
ference vote. 
There is some value in adhering to your Con-
(2) If JUSTICE BLACKMON returns to his initial posi-
tion, there will be portions of the opinion that I do not think 
... 
page 2. 
you should join--such as the standards for burden of proof and 
contributory infringement. You could ask him to leave these sec-
tions essentially as they are in order to keep it a 5-4 decision. 
Or you could write a short, separate dissent indicating a general 
agreement with his position, but noting these points of disagree-
ment. 
(3) If JUSTICE STEVENS writes a narrow opinion relying 
entirely on contributory infringement, you could join that. We 
have thought all along that the contributory infringement ques-
tion is close, and could go either way. If JUSTICE STEVENS' dis-
I 
cussion is closely tied to the record, and does not say too much 
~ about what is a noninfringing use, it should be acceptable. 
(4) If JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion is too broad, you could 
join those parts that discuss contributory infringement (assuming 
that they are suitably narrow). 
(5) You could write a brief opinion concurring in JUS-
TICE STEVENS' judgment. In such an opinion, you could indicate 
agreement with much of what JUSTICE BLACKMUN says if you think 
that would be appropriate. If you write such an opinion, I sug-
• i' 
something along the following lines: 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgement. 
I agree with much of what JUSTICE BLACKMUN has said 
about direct infringement and fair use. See post at 
I nevertheless concur in the Court's judgment 
because I do not believe that the respondents have 
proved contributory infringement in this case. 
Contributory infingement is a narrow doctrine in 
copyright law. Although there is no explicit statutory 
authorization for a contributory infringement action, 
page 3. 
the legislative history of the 1976 Act indicates that 
Congress recognized--and approved--the concept as it 
has been developed by the judiciary. [citation] But 
as JUSTICE STEVENS explains in Part ___ of the Court's 
opinion, ante, at ___ , the concept previously has been 
applied only in cases where the contributory infringer 
has had a much greater degree of involvement with the 
direct infringer than was proved in this case. 
Congress, of course, is free to expand the concept 
of contributory infringement as it sees fit. This 
Court, however, should be cautious in expanding the 
concept beyond its traditional limits without congres-
sional approval. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Art-
ists Television, Inc. , 392 U.S. 390, 404 (1968) (For-
tas, J., dissenting). 
This may be the best course of all. It permits you to indicate 
-------------your views without having to write a long opinion. I think it 
also would be helpful for Congress. And it allows you to get on 
with your other work without having to negotiate individual 
points with other Justices! 
t ' 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
Re : No • 81-16 8 7 
Dear Sandra: 
~tqtrttttt <!Jottrl of Ur~ ~ni:tt~ .itat.ts 
JlagJP:ngfon. ~. <!J. 2!1,?~~ 
June 28, 1983 
Studios, Inc. 
I have endeavored over the past several days to accommodate 
your many concerns. My letter of June 23 to you represents the 
limit of what I am willing to do. Five votes are not that impor-
tant to me when I feel that proper legal principles are involved. 
It therefore looks as though you and I are in substantial disagree-
ment. The case will have to go its own way by a different route 




cc: The Conference 
j 
mfs 06/29/83 
To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Michael 
Re: Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., No. 81-1687 
trf/~Lf r If you would like to join JUSTICE STEVENS I draft opin-
ion~ there are some major points you should note. I have written 
comments in the margin of the attached draft. See pp. 10, 18, 
22, 26, 27, 34, 40. I am sure there will be minor points, too. 
During the day, I will reread the draft more closely. But I 
thought you should have these major points before Conference in 
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To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: David 
Re: Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., No. 81-1687 
I believe that the JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion is funda-
mentally correct in its analysis of the legal issues in this 
case. The first section of this memorandum discusses whether 
home use of VTRs to copy programs off-the-air constitutes fair 
use. The second section considers whether Sony may be held lia-
ble for infringing uses of the VTRs it sells. 
While I think that JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion might be 
improved in significant ways, this memorandum does not discuss 
any suggested changes except to point to possible flaws in his 
analysis. 
I. Fair Use 
JUSTICE STEVENS' final draft abandons his earlier argu-
ment that the Copyright Act creates an implied exception for the 
making of single copies off-the-air for private use. As to the 
underlying question of infringement, the issue is whether such 
copying is privileged under the fair use doctrine. 
euf 
Section 107 of the Copy~ht \adopts the judicially for-
mula ted fair use doctrine. The four factors to be considered in 
fair use analysis point towards a flexible balancing of the bene-
fits derived from the use against the harm that the use inflicts 
upon the value of the copyright. Congress conceived of the fair 
use doctrine, enacted as section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act, 
as a "equitable rule of reason." Particularly, although Congress 
did not intend itself to "expand" the doctrine in any way by en-
acting it, it did indicate that the courts were to adapt the doc-
trine to new technologies. House Report, at 65-66. 
In addition, Congress indicated in the legislative his-
tory the types of factors which were to be considered in applying 
the very general terms of the fair use doctrine to particular 
cases. First, Congress indicates that the fact that single, 
rather than multiple, copies are made makes a differnce in fair 
use analysis See, e.g., House Report, at 73 {fair use to make 
single, but not multiple copies, for blind); Senate Report, at 63 
{single but not multiple copies for teachers preparing classes). 
Further, Congress indicates that the copying of entire works, 
including timeshifting of audiovisual works, may be fair use, 
although one may infer from Congress' discussion that this will 
be the exception rather than the rule. E.g., Senate Report, at 
65-66 {timeshifting of educational programs in Alaska and copying 
of works for blind); id. at 64 {reproduction of works for class-
room) • 
However, the indicia of legislative intent discussed by 
JUSTICE STEVENS are unconvincing. First, JUSTICE STEVENS refers 
to a 1961 Report of the Register of Copyrights. This Report has 
only an attenuated connection with the law enacted by Congress in 
1976. Further, although the Report recommends that both private 
"performances" of motion pictures in the home and reproduction of 
televised motion pictures be permitted, Congress adopted only the 
first recommendation. See§ 106{4), {5) {copyright as to motion 
pictures applies only to public display). It is hard to find in 
this history an endorsement of the recommendation which Congress 
in fact did not adopt. 
Second, JUSTICE STEVENS relies on the legislative histo-
ry of the 1971 Act. But as JUSTICE BLACKMON persuasively ex-
plains, this history addresses the problem which arose because no 
copyright protection applied to recordings, except for protection 
of the underlying composition. Op., at 16-18. [I shall refer to 
JUSTICE BLACKMON's proposed opinion as "op." and to JUSTICE STE-
VENS' memorandum as "mem."] The situation with regard to home 
VTRs, used to copy works which enjoy full copyright protection, 
is clearly different. 
Thus, the legislative history supplies only general in-
dications that off-the-air copying, particularly of single copies 
for home use, might, in certain circumstances, be fair use. Oth-
erwise, the legislative history supplies little guidance as to 
how the balancing process involved in determinations of fair use 
is to be conducted. 
Aside from his use of the legislative history, JUSTICE 
STEVENS arrives at a different result from JUSTICE BLACKMON on 
the fair use issue in two ways. First, ~~~mphasizes benefits to 
permitting off-the-air copying. Mem., at 40-42. Second, and 
more importantly, he would impose a higher standard of proof on 
the copyright holder who seeks to establish that an allegedly 
infringing use has diminished the value of the copyright. Mem., 
at 30-34. 
I find JUSTICE STEVENS' discussion of the benefits of 
permitting VTR use in the home largely unconvincing. First, 
' , '·. 
there are no special constitutional values implicated merely be-
cause the government seeks to regulate conduct "within the priva-
cy of the home." Stanley v. Georgia, 394 u.s. 557 (1969), the 
only case JUSTICE STEVENS cites, concerns a content-based regula-
tion on what is read in private -- in that case, on pornography. 
The Court concluded that the reading even of pornography in one's 
home deserved some first amendment protection. Id., at 564-565. 
In contrast, the copyright laws as applied in this case would not 
regulate what an individual reads or experiences in private~ they 
would regulate copying in private and consequently the subsequent 
use of the infringing copies. It is a fundamental premise of 
copyright law that an infringing use of a work deserves no first 
amendment protection. E.g., United States v. Bodin, 375 F.Supp. 
1265, 1267 (W.D. Okla. 1974) ~ Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pi-
rates, 345 F.Supp. 108, 115-116 (N.D. Cal. 1972). If off-the-air 
copying violates the copyright laws, the first amendment does not 
protect this copying whether the copies are viewed in the home or 
in public. Further, Stanley is premised on the observation that 
the justifications for banning public distribution of pornography 
do not apply to its private use. 394 u.s., at 567. In con-
trast, the purposes of copyright law are served by banning copy-
ing whether the copies are used in the home or displayed public-
ly. 
Second, JUSTICE STEVENS emphasizes the benefits from 
expanding access to television programs. But an infringer always 
increases access to the works he disseminates. Rather, one must 
inquire whether the purportedly fair use provides access not ob-
tainable by transactions authorized by the copyright holder. 
See, e.g., Senate Report, at 64 {"key ••• factor is whether or 
not the work is available to the potential user through nor-
mal channels"}. And convenience to the user of the infringing 
copy does not suffice to establish fair use. See, e.g., H.C. 
Wainright & Co. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 418 F.Supp. 620, 
627 {S.D.N.Y. 1976} {synopses of marketing studies}. JUSTICE 
STEVENS does not cite evidence to show that time-shifting expands 
access beyond what is available through normal broadcasting, re-
runs, or renting of tapes; nor does he demonstrate that off-the-
air copying serves more than the convenience of the viewer. 
Further, JUSTICE STEVENS's cursory analysis fails to 
distinguish productive from non-productive uses. This point 
bears more directly on the analysis of standards for proof of 
harm, and I shall discuss it below. 
Third, JUSTICE STEVENS observes that a finding of "no 
fair use" would brand millions of Americans as law-breakers. 
Further, although award of statutory damages under the old Copy-
right Act was discretionary with the trial judge, the language of 
the new Act supports JUSTICE STEVENS' conclusion that award of 
statutory damages of $100 is now mandatory. See § 504{c} {1} 
{"the copyright owner may elect ••• to recover an award of 
statutory damages for all infringements ••• "}; § 504 {c) {2} {in 
certain cases "the court ••• may reduce the award to a sum not 
less than $100"}. 
This is a troubling argument. I agree with the implied 
premise that the law should not stray too far from the moral in-
.. 
tuitions of the community. However, it is for Congress, and not 
this Court, to act as the vehicle by which popular preferences 
are enacted into law. The moral constraint upon this Court is 
not responsiveness to the public will but fidelity to precedent 
and the rule of law. If the doctrines of fair use which Congress 
enacted in section 107 indicate that off-the-air copying is in-
fringing, then the fact that a majority of Americans find such 
copying both convenient and blameless is beside the point. Con-
gress remains free to permit this copying, as it might have done 
in 1976 had it responsibly considered the problem. 
Thus, while off-the-air copying undoubtedly confers 
benefits, as JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion acknowledges, these bene-
fits do not deserve the special weight in fair use analysis which 
~ JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion attaches to them. 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS also differ on the 
threshold showing that the copyright holder must make of harm to 
the copyright. JUSTICE BLACKMUN would require only a "reasonable 
possibility" that harm will result; JUSTICE STEVENS "some mean-
ingful likelihood of future harm." The choice between these two 
standards is difficult because it essentially requires a legisla-
tive judgment whether to favor protection of the copyright over 
free dissemination of copied works. Neither past precedent or 
the 1976 Act clearly guides the Court's decision. Nonetheless, 
there are reasons to think that JUSTICE BLACKMUN's formulation is 
sounder. 
In most contexts, a showing that an entire work was cop-
~~ ied for an unproductive use would end the fair use inquiry. E.g. 
-
' 
Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 378 F.Supp. 
686, 689-690 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974); 
Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977). No ex-
plicit showing of harm would be required. Courts in effect pre-
sume substantial harm when an alleged infringer makes a copy 
clearly substitutable for the original work: analysis of the 
similarites between between the copyrighted and the infringing 
work replaces direct analysis of harm. See, e.g., Trebovik v. 
Grossman Music Corp., 305 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. Ohio 1969); H.C. 
Wainright & Co v. Wallt St. Transcript Corp., 418 F. 
627. In a competitive market, as for books or magazines, there 
is no question that the infringer's sales take away from the 
sales of the legitimate copyright holder: the copyright holder 
presumptively loses a sale each time an infringing copy is pur-
chased or used. The defendant may attempt to overcome this as-
sumption by showing that the the infringing copies are used by 
individuals who otherwise would be unable or unwilling to obtain 
the item directly or indirectly from the copyright holder: i.e., 
that the copy expands access in the ways discussed above. E.g., 
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1356-1357 
(Ct. Cl. 1973). 
The present case poses two difficulties for the copy-
right holder not present in the ordinary case. First is the 
unique structure of the "market" for television programs. Adver-
tisers, rather than viewers, pay the program producers. With the 
market structure of television, prediction of economic harm is 
~~ more speculative. Second, speculation is required because VTR is 
a new technology. The standard approach to fair use analysis 
adopted by the courts is therefore difficult to apply. 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN's "looser" standard for demonstration 
of harm would help to ensure that the unique difficulties of 
proof in this case are erected as barriers to enforcement of the 
programmers' copyrights. This is consistent both with congres-
sional intent and judicial precedent. Congress emphasized that 
the courts should attempt to deal with the problems posed by new 
technologies. House Report, at 66. To adopt JUSTICE STEVENS' 
higher standard of proof in effect decides that new technologies 
will rarely be found to be infringing, simply because it will be 
difficult to prove with any certainty what their effects will be. 
Further, JUSTICE STEVENS' standard may be inconsistent 
with precedent in two respects. First, it ignors the difference 
between productive and unproductive uses. The basic rationale for 
the fair use doctrine is to further the very creativity the copy-
right laws themselves were meant to foster by permitting creative 
use of already copyrighted works. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN reasons, 
the justification for extending the doctrine to unproductive 
copying is simply that when there is no harm to the copyright 
holder, there is no point to forgoing that increased public ac-
cess that the copying affords. Op., at 21-23. The extension of 
the doctrine to unproductive works is not unprecedented or unjus-
tifiable; but, as discussed above, wholesale copying whose pur-
pose is merely to increase access to the copyrighted work is more 
readily condemned than copying which is a component of a creative 
effort. But JUSTICE STEVENS would recognize no difference in the 
standard governing productive and unproductive uses. If his 
standard is appropriate for productive uses, a lesser standard is 
surely appropriate for non-productive ones. 
Further, by not adjusting the burden to the special dif-
ficulties of this case, JUSTICE STEVENS would make it considera-
bly more difficult for programmers than for other authors to pro-
teet their copyright. (Although JUSTICE BLACKMUN's formula would 
apply in any case of unproductive use, the choice between his 
formula and JUSTICE STEVENS' only makes a difference in especial-
ly difficult cases such as the present one. As I have suggested 
above, in most cases of wholesale copying of an entire work for 
an unproductive use, harm will be easily demonstrable under any 
standard.) The premise of copyright is that limiting public ac-
cess to works is justified to reward authors' creative endeavors; 
JUSTICE STEVENS' standard makes it harder for the programmers to 
limit public access and thereby thwarts this policy as it is em-
bodied in past fair use cases. In copyright as in other areas of 
the law, standards and modes of proof are often adjusted to take 
into account the evidentiary difficulties posed by special types 
of cases or issues. See, e.g., 3 Nimmer on Copyright, at§ 
13.0l[B] (presumption that proof of access plus similarity estab-
L 
lishes copying) ; and at least some courts have acknowledge that a 
~ 
"speculative" analysis of a potential market may be the basis for 
a finding of "no fair use." Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Showcase At-
lanta Co-op. Prod., 479 F.Supp. 351, 361 (N.D. Georgia 1979) 
(predicting the market for stage adaptation of book). See also 
Dow Jones & Co. v. Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago, 546 F. Supp. 
113, 121 (S.D. N.Y. 1982) (examining "potential" impairment of 
copyright value.) 
II. Contributory Infringement 
The cases establish that a defendant may be liable for 
contributory infringement (1) if he is in a position to control 
the direct infringer and derives profit from the infringement, or 
(2) if he knowingly aids or participates in the infringing activ-
ity. JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS do not differ on the 
basic formulation of the doctrine. 
Sony cannot directly control the infringing activities 
of horne users; however, Sony has been aware of VTR's infringing 
uses and might be said to aid and participate in them by selling 
VTRs and by advertising their infringing uses. Op., at 31-33. 
Nonetheless, it is a close question whether Sony might be held 
liable under the second prong of contributory infringement doc-
trine. The past cases which enunciate this standard concern aid 
or participation whose sole function is to further an infringing 
enterprise. In contrast, as the DC found, VTR may be used for 
noninfringing as well as infringing purposes. In other words, 
Sony knows that its production and sale of VTRs is contributing 
to some copyright infringement, although it cannot know in any 
individual case whether the user of its VTR is an infringer. 
To hold Sony liable as a contributory infringer thus 
expands the doctrine beyond its application in prior cases. How-
ever, this expansion seems to follow logically from the basic 
doctrine that an individual who knowingly aids in the commission 
'-~ of a tort is jointly and severally liable with the tortfeasor. 
; 
See Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 
256 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (applying tortfeasor doc-
trine to distributors and advertisers of pirated records). The 
only difference in the case is that Sony knows of a pattern of 
infringement but cannot know that any given individual purchaser 
of the VTR is a direct infringer. 
The only reason not to expand the doctrine in this way 
is that holding Sony liable would interfere with the legitimate -
- noninfringing -- uses of VTRs. This problem does not arise in 
prior cases under this branch of contributory infringement doc-
trine because these cases these cases concerned actions whose 
only purpose was to aid infringement. Here, because the contrib-
utory activity also serves valuable, noninfringing purposes, 
these purposes must be considered in fashioning a rule which 
might condemn Sony's sale of VTRs. 
As both JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS recognize, 
this concern is similar to that embodied in the "staple article" 
doctrine of patent law. Op., at 32-24; Mem., at 20-22. Howev-
er, there are differences between patent and copyright that make 
it dangerous to use the doctrine as more than a rough analogy. 
The patent standard evolved in reaction to attempts to control 
the use of additional articles which were used in conjunction 
with the patented device. For example, when a patentee attempts 
to require his licensee to purchase his refrigerant as well as 
pay royalties for his patent, the patentee attempts to dominate a 
second market -- that for refrigerant -- as well as to enforce 
his patent. Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp., 283 u.s. 
It .,. ~ .. 
..... t 
27, 33-34 (1931). Such requirements were condemned, under the 
doctrine of "patent misuse," as attempts to "expand the scope of 
the patent." "Contributory infringement" and "patent misuse" 
were thus diametrically opposed doctrines: for example, the pat-
entee could not sue a rival seller of refrigerant for contribu-
tory infringement because the attempt to exert the power over a 
second market constituted patent misuse. See Dawson Chemical Co. 
v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 u.s. 176, 191-197 (1950) (tracing history 
of contributory infringement doctrine). Congress eventually re-
solved the opposition between these two doctrines by legislating 
that attempts to control the use of staple articles of commerce 
constituted "patent misuse"; otherwise, patentees could control 
the articles to be used with their patented devices under the 
'- doctrine of contributory infringement. 35 u.s.c. §271. 
The patent law is not directly applicable here because 
there is no equivalent in copyright to "patent misuse." The 
copyright-holder who attempts to prevent copying of his program 
by VTR does not attempt to derive profit from a second market: he 
simply seeks to enforce his copyright. The difference is this: 
The attempt of the patentee to control the second market has no 
redeeming virtue; the attempt of the copyright holder to enforce 
his copyright serves purposes central to copyright law. 
Thus, the strict patent law standard for demonstrating 
contributory infringement is not justified for copyright. JUS-
TICE STEVENS may be correct in asserting that that "there is no 
reason to grant the copyright holder any broader right to bar 
noninfringing activities than the patent holder." However, that 
... • ... 
;_ 
observation does not call for use of the patent standard in this 
case, because the patent standard was developed to solve a total-
ly different problem -- use of the patent to derive profit from a 
second market, not to bar infringement. 
I believe that the standard proposed by JUSTICE BLACKMUN 
better accommodates the concerns of copyright law. If only an 
insignificant proportion of VTR use is noninfringing, then the 
classical test for liability for aiding a tortfeasor is reason-
ably satisfied. And a finding of contributory liability hardly 
interferes unduly with legitimate uses of VTR if these uses con-
stitute only an "insignificant" portion of total use. In that 
case, a balance of the interest in protecting the copyright with 
that in preserving legitimate VTR uses, would surely favor the 
'- former. 
III. Conclusion 
While the outcome reached by JUSTICE STEVENS is intu-
itively more appealing than that reached by JUSTICE BLACKMUN, it 
is useful to remember that his opinion does not reach any final 
decision on any of the issues raised by this suit. His opinion 
should perhaps be revised to emphasize that, on remand, it re-
mains to the district court to balance the benefits and harms of 
off-the-air copying after it has applied the standard for harm 
that the opinion sets forth. This balance may indicate the this 
copying is fair use even after plaintiffs have made the threshold 
showing that VTRs cause some harm. In addition, as JUSTICE STE-
VENS suggests, the DC may find that most copying is of programs 
not copyrighted or programs whose copyright holders permit copy-
ing. (Indeed, it is arguable that these findings, or a finding 
that no possibility of harm, is dictated by the record as it now 
stands. However, JUSTICE BLACKMON correctly observes that the 
district court declined to make findings on factual issues which 
are central to the analysis of the case.) 
Further, as JUSTICE BLACKMON observes, the DC retains 
broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate remedy. At this 
stage, the court can effectively consider any doubts about the 




MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE: 
81-1687 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios 
The purpose of this memo is to identify - as a 
memory refresher -some of the principal points in David's 
fine memo of 9/29. 
The memo is divided logically into two main 
divisions: "fair use" and "contributory infringement". 
In his final draft of June 27, John abandons his 
"implied exception to the Copyright Act for single copies 
for private use only". He now relies solely on the fair 
use doctrine of §107. 
The four factors to be considered in fair use 
analysis suggest a balancing of the benefits derived from 
the use against the harm that the use inflicts on the 
copyright owner and the policy of copyright laws. The 
legislative history - though viewed differently by Harry 
and John - indicates that Congress was thinking primarily 
about "single" rather than "multiple" copies. It also 
considered - perhaps as the controlling factor - whether 
the use was "productive or beneficial". Also, the extent 
to which the use may be productive is to be balanced 
against the harm done the copyright • 
•' 
John finds some benefit from VTR single 
recording for home use. I find this rather unpersuasive. 
If a home user misses a program, the better programs are 
reproduced on public television. Also tapes may be 
purchased. My private view is that relatively few of the 
drama type programs are beneficial in any public sense of 
that term. I feel differntly about Redskins games. 
Note: See my memorandum, circulated in 1974 in 
Williams & Wilkins. At that time, I distinguished been 
productive and nonproductive use. For me then, productive 
use meant: 
"The creating of something essentially new when 
the econmic value of the new work does not 
derive primarily from the old". (p. 3) 
Typical examples include use of portions of 
manuscripts in new articles in scientific journals, and 
use for educational purposes in schools and colleges. 
Here, the entire copyrighted program is copied and usually 
only for the personal benefit of the homeowner. 
Showing of Harm. John and Harry differ in the 
wording of the standard: 
John: "Copyright holder must show some 
meaningful likelihood of future harm" - p. 6. 
HAB: "Only need show a reasonale possibility". 
Again, David thinks HAB has the better argument. 
The general rule is quite straightforward: copying an 
entire work for nonproductive use is a conclusive answer 
to a fair use argument. 
John argues that TV is sufficiently different to 
have a different rule. Advertisers - not the viewers 
(consumers) - pay the owners of the copyrighted programs. 
David is not persuaded that this makes any difference. 
Contributory Infringement 
Again David agrees with Part V (pp. 28-35) of 
HAB's third draft of June 21. 
Harry's views are as follows: 
"A finding of contributory infringement has 
never depended on actual knowledge of particular 
instances of infringement; it is sufficient that 
the defendant have reason to know that 
infringement is taking place (i.e. constructive 
knowledge) • 
* * * 
"It is undisputed that Sony had reason to know 
that Betamax would be used by some owners to 
tape copyrighted works." (p. 31). 
* * * 
"Off the air recording is not only a foreseeable 
use of Betamax, but is the intended use." ••• 
"Sony has induced and materially contributed to 
the infringing conduct of Betamax owners." (p. 
32) 
HAB concedes, however, and indeed the DC found, 
that some of the Betamax recording was noninfringing -
i.e. the programs were not copyrighted. HAB then 
concluded: 
"If a significant portion of the product's use 
is noninfringing, the manufacturers and sellers 
cannot be held contributorily liable for the 
product's infringement. If virtually all of the ? 
product is to infringe, contributory liability 
may be imposed." 
As the DC made no factual finding on this 
critical issue of whether significant portions are 
noninfringing, HAB would remand the case for 
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Dear Harry: 
I will be delighted to join your dissent in 
this case. 
Justice Blackmun 
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Re: No. 81-1687 -Sony Corp':'' 6£ America 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 
Dear Thurgood: 
v 
October 6, 1983 
In view of yesterday's vote, I shall, with your 
permission, undertake the dissent in this case. Is this 
all right with you? ..• 1 -
Jl~ 
Justice Marshall 
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Dear John: 
As you will have surmised, I shall be undertaking the 
dissent in this case. 
Sincerely, 
.. tc ... 
. \ • ._, ' 
Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
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THE CHIEF" JUSTICE 
jJu.pTttttt Qf&tlttt of tJtt ~~ .l\tatts 
._ufringhtn. ~. <!f. 2ll.;i_,.~ 
November 25, 1983 
Re: No. 81-1687 - Sony Corporation of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc. 
Dear John: 
I join. I would be happier not to rest on the first 
of your "two conclusions" at the top of page 36. For me, 
the "second" is enough the case for your result. 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
November 28, 1983 
Re: No. 81-1687-Sony. v. Universal 
Dear John: 
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Re: 81-1687 - Sony Corporation of America 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 
Dear John, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.tu.prtntt ~111trt ltf t4t ~nittb ,jtzdt.G' 
Jht.s-lfington, ~. ~· 20'~~~ 
November 30, 1983 
No. 81-1687 Sony v. Universal City Studios 
Dear John, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
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CHAMI!IE:RS Of" 
JUSTICE w ... J . BRENNAN, JR. 
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December 1, 1983 
No. 81-1687 
Son¥' Corporation of America 
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January 3, 1984 
Re: No. 81-1687-Sony v. Universal City Studios 
Dear Harry: 




cc: The Conference 
January 4, 1984 
81-1687 Sony v. Universal City Studios 
Dear Harry: 
Please jni'l me- in your tUssent. 
Justice Blackmun 
lfp/ss 
cc: ~he Conference 
Sincerely, 
C HAMSERS OF" 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.Bnprmu Clftnrd(JI tJrt ~b .Blatt• 
._ufri:ngton. ~. <!f. 20bi~~ 
January 5, 1984 
Re: No. 81-1687 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion. 
Sincerely ;r 
Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
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 ~- The introduction of the home videotape recorder (VTR) ::.........::__]_ _ _ ____ _ 
~f'1Lt_-~ the market has enabled millions of Americans to make 
t:2A- dings of television programs in their own homes, for fu-
~ _ .,. _1ure and repeated viewing at their own convenience. While 
~ fov-'~s practice has proved highly popular with owners of televi-
,.,sf9n sets and VTRs, it understandably has distressed the 
._ ~ ~lders of copyrights in the recorded programs. The result 
~ e present litigation, raising the questions whether the 
~-~~ ~' home recording of television programs is an infringement of 
_ ~ 7 copyright, and, if so, whether the manufacturers and distrib-
~ .f.vu..<_ utors of VTRs are liable as contributory infringers. We 
,-1 " ~ have little doubt that these questions ultimately and defini-
y I. L ~~ _ .. , tively will be resolved by Congress; our task in the interim is 
{
c:vv; to resolve them under existing copyright law. 
z.. ,_. ~g) 
1)-/' ~-< ~--~:-;, . .i~ .P ~ 2-.:tf " 
? • '- 6 () - - ~ --~ 1~ !976, resp iversal City Studios, Inc., and 
Walt Disney Productions (the Studios) brought this copyright 
;? . /l,_ 1-e:> infringe~ent action 1 against petitioners Sony~Corporation 
c!fl2 ~~~·~s~ L-t.- ->3 
_ 'The St# ios also l ileged misrepresentatiOn under § 43( of the Trade-
Mark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 441, 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a), and unfair compe-
q _ /~.:· 
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and Sony Corporation of America (Sony), the manufacturers 
and distributors of the Betamax VTR. 2 The Studios sought 
damages, profits, and a wide-ranging injunction against fur-
ther sales or use of the Betamax or Betamax tapes. 
The Betamax, like other VTRs, is capable of recording 
television broadcasts off the air on videotape cassettes, and 
playing them back at a later time. 3 Two types of Betamax 
usage are at issue here. 4 The first is "tiiile-shifting," in CD 
which the user records a program in order to watch it at a 
later time, and then records over it after a single viewing. 
The second is "library-building," in which the user records a @ 
program to keep for repeated viewing over a longer term. 
tition and intentional interference with business relationships under state 
law. App. 4. These claims are not before us. 
2 Also named as defendants were a number of retailers that sell the 
Betamax (Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc.; Associated Dry Goods Cor- . 
poration; Federated Department Stores, Inc.; and Henry's Camera Cor-
poration); the advertising agency employed by Sony Corporation of Amer-
ica to promote the Betamax (Doyle Dane Bernbach, Inc.); and William 
Griffiths, an individual Betamax user. With the exception of Griffiths, 
these defendants are also petitioners here. Except where indicated, we 
refer to the petitioners collectively as "Sony." 
8 The Betamax has three primary components: a tuner that receives 
television ("RF") signals broadcast over the airwaves; an RF adapter that 
converts the RF signals into audio-video signals; and a recorder that 
records the audio-video signals on magnetic tape. Sony also manufactures 
VTRs without built-in tuners; these are capable of playing back prere-
corded tapes and recording home movies on videotape, but cannot record 
off the air. Since the Betamax has its own tuner, it can be used to record 
off one channel while another channel is being watched. 
The Betamax is available with a number of auxiliary features, including a 
timer, a pause control, and a fast-forward control; these features permit 
Betamax owners to record programs without being present, to avoid (if 
they are present) recording commercial messages, and to skip over com-
mercials while playing back the recording. Videotape is reusable; the user 
erases it by taping over the prior recording. 
' This case involves only the home recording for home use of television 
programs broadcast free over the airwaves. No issues are raised concern-
ing cable or pay television, or the sharing or trading of tapes. 
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Sony's advertisements, at various times, have suggested that 
Betamax users ''record favorite shows" or "build a library." 
Sony's Betamax advertising has never contained warnings 
about copyright infringement, although a warning appears in 
the Betamax operating instructions. 
The Studios produce copyrighted "movies" and other 
works that they release to theaters and license for television 
broadcast. The Studios also rent and sell their works on film 
and on prerecorded videotapes and videodiscs. License fees 
for television broadcasts are set according to audience rat-
ings, compiled by rating services that do not measure play-
back of videotapes. The Studios claim that VTR recording 
of their works may decrease their revenue from licensing 
their works to television and from marketing them in other 
ways. 
After a five-week trial, the United States District Court 
for the Central District of California, in a detailed opinion, 
ruled that home VTR recording did not infringe the Studios' 
copyrights under either the Act of March 4, 1909 (1909 Act), 
35 Stat. 1075, as amended (formerly codified as 17 U. S. C. 
§ 1 et seq. (1976 ed.)), or the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 
(1976 Act), 90 Stat. 2541, 17 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. (1976 ed., 
Supp. V). 5 The District Court also held that even if home 
VTR recording were an infringement, Sony could not be held 
liable under theories of direct infringement, contributory in-
fringement, or vicarious liability. Finally, the District 
Court concluded that an injunction against sales of the 
Betamax would be inappropriate even if Sony were liable 
under one of those theories. 480 F. Supp. 429 (1979). 
5 The Studios introduced evidence at trial of 32 individual instances in 
which their copyrighted works were recorded on Betamax VTRs. Two of 
these instances occurred after January 1, 1978, the primary effective date 
of the 1976 Act; all others occurred while the 1909 Act was still effective. 
Our analysis focuses primarily on the 1976 Act, but, as we show infra, the 
controlling legal principles under the two Acts are the same. 
81-1687-0PINION 
4 SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
re~rsed !!1 virtually ~1 resEects. 659 F. 2d 963 (1981). It 
held tha.t the 1909 Act and the 1976 Act contained no implied 
exemption for "home use" recording, that home use recording 
was not "fair use," and that the use of the Betamax to record 
the Studios' works therefore infringed their copyrights. The 
Court of Appeals also held Sony liable for contributory in-
fringement, reasoning that Sony knew and expected that the 
Betamax would be used to record copyrighted material off 
the air, and that Sony had induced, caused, or materially con-
tributed to the infringing conduct. The Court of Appeals 
then remanded for consideration of the question of relief, 
suggesting that the District Court could consider awarding 
damages or a continuing royalty in lieu of an injunction. I d., 
at 976. 
Because of the importance of the issues presented, we 
granted certiorari. 457 U. S. 1116 (1982). 
II 
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, 
empowers Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries." This Nation's initial copyright statute was 
passed by the First Congress. Entitled "An Act for the en-
couragement of learning," it gave an author "the sole right 
and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending" 
his "map, chart, book or books" for a period of 14 years. Act 
of May 31, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 124. Since then, as the technol-
ogy available to authors for creating and preserving their 
writings has changed, the law has changed with it. Through 
many amendments, and through complete revisions in 1831, 
1870, 1909, and 1976,6 authors' rights have been expanded to 
• Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436; Act of July 8, 1870, §§ 8fr-111, 
16 Stat. 212--217; Act of Mar. 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075 (formerly codified as 17 
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provide protection to any "original works of authorship fixed 
in any tangible medium of expression," including motion pic-
tures and other audiovisual works. 17 U. S. C. § 102(a). 7 
Section~ of the 1976 Act grants the owner of a copyright 
a variety o!exclusive rights in the copyrighted work, 8 includ-
U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1976 ed.)); Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 
2541 (codified as 17 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. V)). 
7 Section 102(a) provides: 
"Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now 
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, 
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device. Works of authorship include the following categories: 
"(1) literary works; 
"(2) musical works, including any accompanying words; 
"(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; 
"(4) pantomimes and choreographic works; 
"(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; 
"(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and 
"(7) sound recordings." 
"Audiovisual works" are "works that consist of a series of related images 
which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or de-
vices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with 
accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material ob-
jects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied." § 101, 112. 
"Motion pictures" are "audiovisual works consisting of a series of related 
images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion, 
together with accompanying sounds, if any." § 101, 1!17. Most commer-
cial television programs, if fixed on film or tape at the time of broadcast or 
before, will qualify as "audiovisual works." Since the categories set forth 
in § 102(a) are not mutually exclusive, a particular television program may 
also qualify for protection as a dramatic, musical, or other type of work. 
8 S~6 provides: 
"Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this 
title has the e~ve rights to do and to authorize any of the following: 
"(1) to reproducetlleCopyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
"(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
"(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
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ing the right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or 
phonorecords." 9 This grant is expressly made subject to 
§§ 107-118, which create a number of exemptions and limita-
tions on the copyright owner's rights. The most important 
of these sections, for our present purposes, is § 107; that sec-
tion states that "the f~se of a copyrighted work . . . is not 
an infringement of copyright." 10 
III 
The 1976 Act, like its predecessors, 11 does not give the 
copyright owner control over all possible uses of his work. 
lending; 
"(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform 
the copyrighted work publicly; and 
"(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi-
vidual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the 
copyrighted work publicly." 
9 A "phonorecord" is a reproduction of sounds other than sounds ac-
companying an audiovisual work, while a "copy" is a reproduction of a work 
in any form other than a phonorecord. § 101, ~~ 19, 7. 
10 ~ection.JOlprovides : 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords 
or by YY other means specified by that section, for purm>ses such ascriti-
cism, comment,'!iews reportin~ "teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use),VScholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy-
right. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
"(!) the purpose ~acter of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; -
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted w~
The four factors listed in this section are intended to be "illustrative and 
not limitative." § 101, ~ 14. 
11 The 1976 Act was the product of a revision effort lasting more than 20 
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If the work is put to some use not enumerated in § 106, the 
use is not an infringement. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United 
Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 393-395 (1968). Thus, before consid-
ering whether home videotaping comes within the scope of 
the fair use exemption, we first must inquire whether the 
practice violates the exclusive right "to reproduce the copy- {_ 
righted work in copies or phonorecords" granted by § 106(1). J 
.-c-' 
A 
Although the word "copies" appears in the plural in 
§ 106(1), it is clear that the making of even a' single unau-
thorize co y is rohi · ed. ~- he enate an ouse repo s 
explain that" t]he references to 'copies or phonorecords,' al-
though in the plural, are intended here and throughout the 
bill to include the singular (1 U. S. C. § 1)." 12 1975 Senate 
years. Spurred by the recognition that "significant developments in tech-
nology and communications" had rendered the 1909 Act inadequate, 
S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 47 (1975) (1975 Senate Report); see H. R. Rep. No. 
94-1476, p. 47 (1976) (1976 House Report), Congress in 1955 authorized the 
Copyright Office to prepare a series of studies on all aspects of the existing 
copyright law. Thirty-four studies were prepared and presented to Con-
gress. The Register of Copyrights drafted a comprehensive report with 
recommendations, House Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Re-
vision, Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the 
U. S. Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1961) (Regis-
ter's 1961 Report), and general revision bills were introduced near the end 
of the 88th Congress in 1964. H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1964). The Register issued a second report in 1965, with revised recom-
mendations. House Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revi-
sion, Pt. 6, Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the 
General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law: 1965 Revision Bill, 89th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1965) (Register's Supplementary Report). 
Action on copyright revision was held up from 1967 to 1974 by a dispute on 
cable television, see generally Second Supplementary Report of the Regis-
ter of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law: 
1975 Revision Bill, ch. V, pp. 2-26 (Draft Oct.-Dec. 1975) (Register's Sec-
ond Supplementary Report), but a compromise led to passage of the 
present Act in 1976. 
12 1 U. S. C. § 1 provides in relevant part: 
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Report 58; 1976 House Report 61. The reP.orts then de-
scribe the reproduction right established by § 106(1): 
'Tf]he rig t 'to reproduce the copyrighted work in' copies I 
or phonorecords' means the right to produce a material 
object in which the work is duplicated, transcribed, imi-
tated, or simulated in a fixed form from which it can be 
'perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, ei-
ther directly or with the aid of a machine or device.' As 
under the present law, a copyrighted work would be in-
fringed by reproducing it in whole or in any substantial 
part, and by duplicating it exactly or by imitation or 
simulation." 1975 Senate Report 58; 1976 House Report 
61. 
The making of even a §ing}e videotape recording at home falls 
within this definition;ilieVTR user produces a material ob-
ject from which the copyrighted work later can be perceived. 
Unless Congress intended a special exemption for the making 
of a single copy for personal use, we must conclude that VTR 
recording is contrary to the exclusive rights granted by 
§ 106(1). 
The 1976 Act and its accompanying reports specify in some 
detail tlleSifiii tio s in which a sin le co y of a co · te 
wo~ade. Section 1 8(a), for example, permits a I 
library or archives "to reproduce no more than one copy or 
phonorecord of a work" fo~on, but only under certain 
very limited conditions; an entire work, moreover, can be 
copied only if it cannot be obtained elsewhere at a fair price. 13 
"In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context 
indicates otherwise . . . words importing the plural include the 
singular .. . . " 
18 The library photocopying provisions of § 108 do not excuse from liabil-
ity any person who requests "a copy" from a library if the requester's use 
exceeds fair use. § 108(f)(2). Moreover, a library is absolved from liabil-
ity for the unsupervised use of its copying equipment if the equipment 
bears a notice informing users that "the making of a copy" may violate the 
~ I 
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§ 108(e); see also § 112(a) (broadcaster may "make no more 
than one copy or phonorecord of a particular transmission 
program," and only under certain conditions). In other re-
s~ts, the making of sin le copies is ermis ible ~hin 
the limited confines of the fair use doctrine. The Senate re-
~·-· ..... --.....-port, in a s~e ' ~lean m~lt!ple c~ng," notes 
that the fair use doctrine would permit a teacher making a 
single copy of a work for his or her own use in the classroom, 
but only if the work was not a "sizable" one such as a novel or 
treatise. 1975 Senate Report 63-64; accord, 1976 House Re-
port 6~9, 71. Other situations in which the making of a 
single copy would be fair use are described in the House and 
Senate reports. 14 But neither the statute nor its legislative 
history suggests any intent to create a general exemption for 
single copies made for personal or private use. 
Indeed, it appears that Congress considered and rejected 
the possibility of a spec~lJ>riv~e !ll'~ption. The issue 
was raised early in the copyright law revision process, in one 
of the studies prepared for Congress under the supervision of 
the Copyright Office. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted 
Works (1958), reprinted in Senate Committee on the Judi-
ciary, Copyright Law Revisior(, Studies Prepared for the 
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 
86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1960) (~atman Fair Use Study). 
This study found no reported cases supporting the existence I 
of an exemption for private use, although it noted that "the 
purpose and nature of a private use, and in some cases the 
copyright law. § 108(f)(1). 
•• For example, "the making of a single copy or phonorecord by an indi-
vidual as a free service for a blind person" would be a fair use, as would "a 
single copy reproduction of an excerpt from a copyrighted work by a callig-
rapher for a single client" or "a single reproduction of excerpts from a copy-
righted work by a student calligrapher or teacher in a learning situation. " 
1975 Senate Report 66-67; see 1976 House Report 73-74. Application of 
the fair use doctrine in these situations, of course, would be unnecessary if 
the 1976 Act created a general exemption for the making of single copies. 
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small amount taken, might lead a court to apply the general 
principles of fair use in such a way as to deny liability." I d., 
at 12. After reviewing a number of foreign copyright laws 
that contained explicit statutory exemptions for private or 
personal use, id., at 25, Professor Latman outlined several 
approaches that a revision bill could take to the general issue 
of exemptions and fair use. One of these was the adoption of 
particularized rules to cover specific situations, including 
"the field of personal use." I d., at 33. 15 
Rejecting the latter alternative, the Register of Copy-
rights recommended that the revised copyright statute sim-
ply mention the doctrine of fair use and indicate its general 
scope. The Register opposed the adoption of rules and ex-
emptions to cover specific situations, 16 preferring to rely on 
the judicial fair use doctrine to resolve new problems as they 
arose. See Register's 1961 Report 25; Register's Supple-
mentary Report 27-28. 
The Register's approach was reflected in the first copy-
right revision bills, drafted by the Copyright Office in 1964. 
16 Professor Latman made special mention of the "personal use" issue be-
cause the area was one that 
"has become disturbed by recent developments . . . . Photoduplication 
devices may make authors' and publishers' groups apprehensive. The 
Copyright Charter recently approved by [the Internati~l Confederation 
of Societies of Authors and Composers] emphasizes the concern of authors 
over 'private' uses which, because of technological developments, are said 
to be competing seriously with the author's economic interests." Latman 
Fair Use Study 33--34. 
16 The one exemption proposed by the Register, permitting libraries to 
make single photocopies of out-of-print works and of excerpts that request-
ers certified were needed for research, met with opposition and was not 
included in the bills initially introduced in Congress. See Register's 1961 
Report 26; H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Register's 
Supplementary Report 26. A library copying provision was restored to 
the bill in 1969, after pressure from library associations. Register 's Sec-
ond Supplementary Report, ch. III, pp. 10-11; seeS. 543, 91st Cong., 1st 
Sess., § 108 (Comm. Print Dec. 10, 1969); 1975 Senate Report 48. 
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These bills, like the 1976 Act, granted copyright owners the 
exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted work, subject 
only to the exceptions set out in later sections. H. R. 
11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., §5(a) (1964). The pri-
mary exception was the fair use doctrine, id., § 6, containing 
language virtually identical to § 107 of the 1976 Act. Al-
though the copyright revision bills changed in many respects 
from their first introduction in 1964 to final passage in 1976, 
those portions of the bills did not change. 17 We can conclude \ / 
only that Qongress; like the Register, intended to rel;y o.!!Jhe 
fair use doctr}ne, not a per se exemption for private use, to 
separate permissible copYJng om t e 1mpernussi le. 18 
17 The 1964 billsJlrovided ~at the !ill!:.J!se of copyrighted material for 
purposes "such as criticism, comment, news"feporting';'"teaching, scholar-
ship, or research" was not an infringement of copyright, and listed .fuyr 
"factors to be considered" in determining whether a particular use was fair. 
H:lt:'" 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., § 6 (1964). Revised bills, 
drafted by the Copyright Office in 1965, contained a fair use provision 
merely mentioning the doctrine but not indicating its scope: "Notwith-
standing the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work is 
not an infringement of copyright." H. R. 4347/S. 1006, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess., § 107 (1965). The House Judiciary Committee restored the provi-
sion to its earlier wording, H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 
5, 58 (1966), and the language adopted by the Committee remained in the 
bill in later Congresses. See H. R. 2512/S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 
§ 107 (1967); S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1969); S. 644, 92d Cong., 
1st Sess., § 107 (1971); S. 1361, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1973); H. R. 
2223/S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1975). With a few additions by 
the House Judiciary Committee in 1976, see 1976 House Report 5; H. R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 94-1733, p. 70 (1976), the same language appears in§ 107 of 
the 1976 Act. 
~liams &.. Wi~o. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d 
1345 (1973), affd by an equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975), decided 
during the process of revising the copyright statutes, the Court of Claims 
suggested that copying for personal use might be outside the scope of copy-
right protection under the 1909 Act. The court reasoned that because 
"hand copying" for personal use has always been regarded as permissible, 
and because the practice of making personal copies continued after type-
writers and photostat machines became available, the making of personal 
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When Congress intended special treatment for private use, 
moreover, it said so explicitly. One such explicit statement 
appears in § 106 itself. The copyright owner's right to per-
form a copyrighted work, unlike the right to reproduce the 
work in copies, is limited. Section 106(4) grants a copyright 
owner the exclusive right to perform the work "publicly," but 
does not restrict private performances by others. A motion 
picture is "performed" whenever its images are shown or its 
sounds are made audible. § 101, ~ 18. Like "sing[ing] a 
copyrighted lyric in the shower," Twentieth Century Music 
copies by any other means should be permissible as well. Id., at 84-88, 
487 F. 2d, at 1350-1352. ~ 
There appear to us to be several flaws in this reasoning. irs it is by 
no means clear that the malilllg of a "hand copy" of an entire ork is per-
missible; the most that can be said is that there are no reported cases on 
the subject, possibly because no copyright owner ever has thought it 
worthwhile to sue. See Latman Fair Use Study 11-12; 3 M. Nimmer, 
Copyright § 13.05[E][4][a] (1982). At least one early treatise asserted 
that infringement would result "if an individual made copies for his per-
sonal use, even in his own handwriting, as there is no rule of law excepting 
manuscript copies from thtal infringment." A. Wei!, American Copy-
right Law § 1066 (1917). econ , hand copying or even copying by type-
writer is self-limiting. T ~gery mvolved in making hand copies ordi-
narily ensures tliat only necessary and fairly small portions of a work are 
taken; it is unlikely that any user would make a hand copy as a substitute 
for one that could be purchased. The harm to the copyright owner from 
hand copying thus is minimal. The recent advent of inexpensive and I 
readily available copying machines, however, has changed the dimensions 
of the problem dramatically. See Register's Second Supplementary Re-
port ch. III, p. 3; Hearings on H. R. 2223 before the Subcommittee on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Ju-
diciary Committee, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 194 (1975) (1975 House Hear-
ings) (remarks of Rep. Danielson); id., at 234 (statement of Robert W. 
Cairns); id., at 250 (remarks of Rep. Danielson); id., at 354 (testimony of 
Irwin Karp); id., at 467 (testimony of Rondo Cameron); id., at 1795 (testi-
mony of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights). Thus, "[t]he supposi-
tion that there is no tort involved in a scholar copying a copyrighted text by 
hand does not much advance the question of machine copying." B. Kap-
lan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 101-102 (1967). 
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Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 155 (1975), watching televi-
sion at home with one's family and friends is now considered a 
performance. 1975 Senate Report 5~0; 1976 House Re-
port 63. 19 Home television viewing nevertheless does not in-
fringe any copyright-but only because§ 106(4) contains the 
word "publicly." 20 See generally 1975 Senate Report 60-61; 
1976 House Report 63-64; Register's 1961 Report 29-30. No 
such distinction between public and private uses appears in 
§ 106(1)'s prohibition on the making of copies. 21 
Similarly, an explicit reference to private use appears in 
§ 108. Under that section, a library can make a copy for a 
patron only for specific types of private uses: "private study, 
scholarship, or research." 22 § 108(d)(1) and (e)(1); see also 37 
'
9 In a trio of cases, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U.S. 390, 
398 (1968); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 
415 U. S. 394, 403-405 (1974); and Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Ai-
ken, 422 U. S. 151 (1975), this Court held that the reception of a radio or 
television broadcast was not a "performance" under the 1909 Act. The 
Court's "narrow construction" of the word "perform" was "completely 
overturned by the [1976 Act] and its broad definition of 'perform' in section 
101." 1976 House Report 87. 
20 A work is performed "publicly" if it takes place "at a place open to the 
public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a 
normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered." § 101, 
~ 23(1). 
{ 
21 One purpose of the exemption for private performances was to permit 
the home viewing of lawfully made videotapes. The Register noted in 
1961 that "[n]ew technical devices will probably make it practical in the fu-
ture to reproduce televised motion pictures in the home. We do not be-
lieve the private use of such a reproduction can or should be precluded by 
copyright." Register's 1961 Report 30 (emphasis added). Significantly, 
the Register did not suggest that the private making of a reproduction of a 
televised motion picture would be permitted by the copyright law. The 
Register later reminded Congress that "[i]n general the concept of 'per-
formance' must be distinguished sharply from the reproduction of copies." 
Register's Supplementary Report 22. 
22 During hearings on this provision, Representative Danielson inquired 
whether it would apply to works of fiction such as "Gone With the Wind," 
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CFR §201.14(b) (1982). Limits are also imposed on the ex-
tent of the copying and the type of institution that may make 
copies, and the exemption expressly is made inapplicable to 
motion pictures and certain other types of works. § 108(h). 
These limitations would be wholly superfluous if an entire 
copy of any work could be made by any person for private 
use. 23 
B 
The Di~trict Court in this case nevertheless concluded that 
the 1976 Act contained an imnlied exem@on for "home-use 
recording." 480 F. Supp., at 444 446. The court relied pri-
marily on the legislative history of a 1971 amendment to the 
1909 Act. That amendment addressed the specific problem 
of commercial piracy of sound recordings. Act of Oct. 15, 
1971, 85 Stat. 391 (1971 Amendment). The House report on 
the 1971 Amendment, in a section entitled "Home Record-
ing," contained the following statement: 
"In approving the creation of a limited copyright in 
sound recordings it is the intention of the Committee 
that this limited copyright not grant any broader rights 
than are accorded to other copyright proprietors under 
the existing title 17. Specifically, it is not the intention 
of the Committee to restrain the home recording, from 
broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded perfor-
mances, where the home recording is for private use and 
or whether it was limited to "strictly technical types of information." The 
uncontradicted response was that it would apply only in "general terms of 
science ... [and] the useful arts. " 1975 House Hearings 251 (testimony of 
Robert W. Cairns); cf. id., at 300 (statement of Harry Rosenfield) ("We are 
not asking ... for the right to copy 'Gone With the Wind' "). 
23 The House and Senate reports' mention of situations in which copies 
for private use would be permissible under the fair use doctrine-for exam-
ple, the making of a free copy for a blind person, 1975 Senate Report 66; 
1975 Senate Report 73, or the "recordings of performances by music stu-
dents for purposes of analysis and criticism," 1975 Senate Report 63-
would of course be superfluous as well. See n. 13, supra. 
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with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing 
commercially on it. This practice is common and unre-
strained today, and the record producers and performers 
would be in no different position from that of the owners 
of copyright in recorded musical compositions over the 
past 20 years." H. R. Rep. No. 92-487, p. 7 (1971) 
(1971 House Report). 
Similar statements were made during House hearings on the 
bill 24 and on the House floor, 25 although not in the Senate pro-
24 The following exchange took place during the testimony of Barbara 
Ringer, then Assistant Register of Copyrights: 
"[Rep.] Hiester. . .. I can tell you I must have a small pirate in my own 
home. My son has a cassette tape recorder, and as a particular record be-
comes a hit, he will retrieve it onto his little set .... [T]his legislation, of 
course, would not point to his activities, would it? 
"Miss Ringer. I think the answer is clearly, 'No, it would not.' I have 
spoken at a couple of seminars on video cassettes lately, and this question 
is usually asked: 'What about the home recorders?' The answer I have 
given and will give again is that this is something you cannot control. You 
simply cannot control it. My own opinion, whether this is philosophical 
dogma or not, is that sooner or later there is going to be a crunch here. 
But that is not what this legislation is addressed to, and I do not see the 
crunch coming in the immediate future. . . . I do not see anybody going 
into anyone's home and preventing this sort of thing, or forcing legislation 
that would engineer a piece of equipment not to allow home taping.'' 
Hearings on S. 646 and H. R. 6927 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 22-23 (1971) 
(1971 House Hearings). 
25 Shortly before passage of the bill, a colloquy took place between Rep-
resentative Kastenmeier, chairman of the House subcommittee that pro-
duced the bill, and Representative Kazen, who was not on the committee: 
"Mr. Kazen. Am I correct in assuming that the bill protects copy-
righted material that is duplicated for commercial purposes only? 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Yes. 
"Mr. Kazen. In other words, if your child were to record off of a pro-
gram which comes through the air on the radio or television, and then used 
it for her own personal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this use would not 
be included under the penalties of this bill? 
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ceedings. In concluding that these statements created a 
general exemption for home recording, the District Court, in 
our view, paid too little heed to the context in which the 
statements were made, and failed to consider the limited pur-
poses of the 1971 Amendment and the structure of the 1909 
Act. 
Unlike television broadcasts and other types of motion pic-
tures, sound recordings were not protected by copyright 
prior to passage of the 1971 Amendment. Although the un-
derlying musical work could be copyrighted, the 1909 Act 
provided no protection for a particular performer's rendition 
of the work. Moreover, copyrighted musical works that had 
been recorded for public distribution were subject to a "com-
pulsory license": any person was free to record such a work 
upon payment of a 2-cent royalty to the copyright owner. 
§ 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075-1076. Although reproduction without 
payment of the royalty was an infringement under the 1909 
Act, damages were limited to three times the amount of the 
unpaid royalty. § 25(e), 35 Stat. 1081-1082; Shapiro, Bern-
stein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F. 2d 260, 262-263, 265 (CA21957), 
cert. denied, 355 U. S. 952 (1958). Notably, it was observed 
that the practical effect of these provisions was to legalize 
record piracy. See S. Rep. No. 92-72, p. 4 (1971); 1971 
House Report 2. 
In order to suppress this piracy, the 1971 Amendment ex-
tended copyright protection beyond the underlying work to 
sound recordings themselves. Congress chose, however, to 
provide only limited protection: owners of copyright in sound 
recordings were given the exclusive right "[t]o reproduce 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. This is not included in the bill. I am glad the gen-
tleman raises the point. 
"On page 7 of the report, under 'Home Recordings,' Members will note 
that under the bill the same practice which prevails today is called for; 
namely, this is considered both presently and under the proposed law to be 
fair use. The child does not do this for commercial purposes. This is 
made clear in the report." 117 Cong. Rec. 34748-34749 (1971). 
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[their works] and distribute [them] to the public." 1971 
Amendment, § 1(a), 85 Stat. 391 (formerly codified as 17 
U. S. C. § 1(f) (1976 ed.)). 26 This right was merely the right 
of commercial distribution. See 117 Cong. Rec. 34748--34749 
(1971) (colloquy of Reps. Kazen & Kastenmeier) ("the bill 
protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for commer-
cial purposes only"). 
Against this background, the statements regarding home ~ 
recording under the 1971 Amendment appear in a different 
light. If home recording was "common and unrestrained" 
under the 1909 Act, see 1971 House Report 7, it was because 
sound recordings had no copyright protection and the owner 
of a copyright in the underlying musical work could collect no 
more than a 2-cent royalty plus 6 cents in damages for each 
unauthorized use. With so little at stake, it is not surprising 
that the Assistant Register "d[id] not see anybody going into 
anyone's home and preventing this sort of thing." 1971 
House Hearings 23. 
But the references to home sound recording in the 1971 
Amendment's legislative history do not demonstrate any con-
gressional intent to create a generalized home use exemption 
from copyright protection. Congress addressed only sound 
recordings and merely recognized that the 1909 Act had been 
unsuccessful in controlling home sound recording; the 1971 
Amendment was addressed to a different problem, that of 
commercial record piracy. To quote Assistant Register 
26 The 1909 Act's grant of an exclusive right to "copy,"§ 1(a), was of no 
assistance to the owner of a copyright in a sound recording, because a re-
production of a sound recording was technically considered not to be a 
"copy." See 1971 House Hearings 18 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, As-
sistant Register of Copyrights); 1971 Amendment, § 1(e), 85 Stat. 391 (for-
merly codified as 17 U. S. C. § 26 (1976 ed.)) ("For the purposes of [speci-
fied sections, not including § 1(a)], but not for any other purpose, a 
reproduction of a [sound recording] shall be considered to be a copy 
thereof'). This concept is carried forward into the 1976 Act, which 
distinguishes between "copies" and "phonorecords." Seen. 9, supra. 
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Ringer again, home use was "not what this legislation [was] 
addressed to." 1971 House Hearings 22. 27 
While the 1971 Amendment merely narrowed the sound re-
cordings loophole in prior copyright law, motion pictures and 
other audiovisual works have been accorded full copyright 
protection since at least 1912, see Act of Aug. 24, 1912, 37 
Stat. 488, and perhaps before, see Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 
240 (CA3 1903), app. dism'd, 195 U. S. 625 (1904). Congress 
continued this protection in the 1976 Act. Unlike the sound 
recording rights created by the 1971 Amendment, the re-
production rights associated with motion pictures under 
§ 106(1) are not limited to reproduction for public distribu-
tion; the copyright owner's right to reproduce the work ex-
ists independently, and the "mere duplication of a copy may 
constitute an infringement even if it is never distributed." 
Register's Supplementary Report 16; see 1975 Senate Report 
57; 1976 House Report 61. Moreover, the 1976 Act was in-
tended as a comprehensive treatment of all aspects of copy-
right law. The reports accompanying the 1976 Act, unlike 
the 1971 House report, contain no suggestion that home-use 
recording is somehow outside the scope of this all-inclusive 
statute. It was clearly the intent of Congress that no addi-
tional exemptions were to be implied. 28 
27 During consideration of the 1976 Act, Congress, of course, was well 
aware of the limited nature of the protection granted to sound recordings 
under the 1971 Amendment. See 1975 House Hearings 113 (testimony of 
Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights) (1971 Amendment "created a 
copyright in a sound recording ... but limited it to the particular situation 
of so-called piracy"); id. , at 1380 (letter from John Lorenz, Acting Librar-
ian of Congress) (under 1971 Amendment "only the unauthorized reproduc-
tion and distribution to the public of copies of the sound recording is pro-
hibited. Thus, the duplication of sound recordings for private, personal 
use and the performance of sound recordings through broadcasting or 
other means are outside the scope of the amendment"). 
28 Representative Kastenmeier, the principal House sponsor of the 1976 
revision bill and chairman of the House subcommittee that produced it, 
made this explicit on the opening day of the House hearings: 
"[F]rom time to time, certain areas have not been covered in the bill. But 
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We find in the 1976 Act no inu>lied exemption to cover the 
home taping of tel~n programs; wnetfier Tt be for single 
copies, for private use, or for home use. Thus, taping a 
copyrighted television program is infringement unless it is 
permitted by the fair use exempti~d in § 107 of the 
1976 Act. 
IV 
The doctrine of fair use has been called, with some justifi-
cation, "tlleffiost trouBiesome in the whole law of copyright." 
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F. 2d 661, 662 (CA2 
1939); see Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder 
Newspapers, Inc., 626 F. 2d 1171, 1174 (CA51980); Meeropol 
v. Nizer, 560 F. 2d 1061, 1068 (CA2 1977), cert. denied, 434 
U. S. 1013 (1978). Although courts have constructed lists of 
factors to be considered in determining whether a particular 
use is fair, 29 no fixed criteria have emerged by which that 
is it not the case, this being a unified code, that the operation of the bill 
does apply whether or not we specifically deal with a subject or not? ... 
"Therefore, we can really not fail to deal with an issue. It will be dealt 
with one way or the other. The code, title 17, will cover it. So we have 
made a conscious decision even by omission .... 
"By virtue of passing this bill, we will deal with every issue. Whether 
we deal with it completely or not for the purpose of resolving the issues 
involved is the only question, not whether it has dealt with the four corners 
of the bill because the four corners of the bill will presume to deal with ev-
erything in copyright." 1975 House Hearings 115. 
29 The precise phrase "fair use" apparently did not enter the case law 
until 1869, see Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (No. 8,136) (CC 
Mass.), but the doctrine itself found early expression in Folsom v. Marsh, 
9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (CC Mass. 1841). Justice Story was faced there 
with the "intricate and embarrassing questio[n]" whether a biography con-
taining copyrighted letters was "a justifiable use of the original materials, 
such as the law recognizes as no infringement of the copyright of the plain-
tiffs." !d., at 344, 348. In determining whether the use was permitted, 
said Justice Story, it was necessary to consider "the nature and objects of 
the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the 
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or 
supersede the objects, of the original work .... Much must, in such cases, 
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determination can be made. This Court thus far has pro-
vided no guidance; although fair use issues twice before have 
come to this Court, on each occasion the Court was equally 
divided and no opinions issued. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. 
United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d 1345 (1973), aff'd, 420 
U. S. 376 (1975); Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F. 2d 532 (CA9 
1956), aff'd, 356 U. S. 43 (1958). 
Nor did Congress provide clear rules when it codified the 
fair use doctrine in the 1976 Act; it simply incorporated a list 
of "factors to be considered": the "purpose and character of 
the use," the "nature of the copyrighted work," the "amount 
and substantiality of the portion used," and the "effect of the 
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work." § 107. No particular weight was assigned to any 
one of these, and the list was not intended to be exclusive. 
The House and Senate reports explain that § 107 does no 
more than give "statutory recognition" to the fair use doc-
trine; it was intended "to restate the present judicial doctrine 
of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." 
1976 House Report 66. See 1975 Senate Report 62; S. Rep. 
No. 93-983, p. 116 (1974); H. R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess., p. 32 (1967); H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d 
Sess., p. 61 (1966). 
A 
Despite this lack of clear standards, the fair use doctrine 
plays a crucial role in the law of copyright. - The purp;se of -----
depend upon the nature of the new work, the value and extent of the 
copies, and the degree in which the original authors may be injured 
thereby." Id., at 348-349. 
Similar lists have been developed by later courts. E. g., Tennessee 
Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F. 2d 279, 283 (CA5), cert. de-
nied, 398 U. S. 928 (1970); Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 
F. 2d 73, 85 (CA6 1943); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcast-
ing Co., 137 F. Supp. 348 (SD Cal. 1955); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P. 
F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U. S.P.Q. 40, 43 (SDNY 1934); Hill v. Whalen & 
Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (SDNY 1914). 
·. 
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copyright protection, in the words of the Constitution, is to 
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." Copy-
right is based on the belief that by granting authors the 
exclusive rights to reproduce their works, they are given an 
incentive to create, and that "encouragement of individual ef-
fort by personal gain is the best way to advance public wel-
fare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science 
and the useful Arts."' Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 219 
(1954). The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards \ ~ 
the individual author in order to benefit the public. Twenti- (f 
eth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1975); 
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127-128 (1932); see 
H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Gong., 2d Sess., p. 7 (1909). 
There are situations, nevertheless, in which strict enforce-
ment of this monopoly would inhibit the very "Progress of 
Science and useful Arts" that copyright is intended to pro-~ 
mote. A clear example is the scholar or researcher whose 
own work TependSOn the ability to refer to and to quote the 
work of prior scholars. Obviously, no author could create a 
new work if he were first required to repeat the research of 
every author who had gone before him. 30 The scholar, of 
course, could be left to bargain with each copyright owner for 
permission to quote from or refer to prior works. But there 
is a crucial difference between the ordinary user and the 
scholar. When the ordinary user decides that the owner's 
price is too high, and forgoes use of the work, only the indi-
vidual user is harmed. When the scholar forgoes the use of a 
prior work, not only does his own work suffer, but the public 
is deprived of his contribution to knowledge. The scholar's 
work, in other words, produces external benefits from which 
we all profit. In such a case, the fair use doctrine acts as a 
30 "The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our 
predecessors. 'A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see far-
ther than the giant himself.' " Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copy-
right: I, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 511 (1945). 
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form of subsidy-albeit at the first author's expense-to per-
mit the second author to make limited use of the first author's 
work for the public good. See Latman Fair Use Study 31; 
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural Analysis 
of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1600, 1630 (1982). 
A similar subsidy may be appropriate in a range of areas 
other than pure scholarship. The situations in which fair use 
is most common~zed are listed in § 107 itself; fair use 
may be found when a work is used "for purposes such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching, ... scholarship, 
or research." The House and Senate reports expand on this 
list somewhat, 3' and other examples may be found in the case 
law. 32 Each of these uses, however, reflects a common 
theme: each is a productive use, resulting in some added ben-
efit to the public beyond that produced by the first author's 
work. 33 The fair use doctrine, in other words, permits works 
31 Quoting from the Register's 1961 Report, the Senate and House re-
ports give examples of possible fair uses: 
"quotation of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or 
comment; quotation of short passages in a scholarly or technical work, for 
illustration or clarification of the author's observations; use in a parody of 
some of the content of the work parodied; summary of an address or arti-
cle, with brief quotations, in a news report; reproduction by a library of a 
portion of a work to replace part of a damaged copy; reproduction by a 
teacher or student of a small part of a work to illustrate a lesson; reproduc-
tion of a work in legislative or judicial proceedings or reports; incidental 
and fortuitous reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast, of a work located 
in the scene of an event being recorded." 1975 Senate Report 61-62; 1976 
House Report 65. 
82 E. g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-RidderNewspapers, Inc., 
626 F. 2d 1171 (CA5 1980) (comparative advertising). 
33 Professor Seltzer has characterized this list of uses as "reflect[ing] 
what in fact the subject matter of fair use has in the history of its adjudica-
tion consisted in: it has always had to do with the use by a second author of 
a first author's work." L. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright 
24 (1978) (emphasis removed). He distinguishes "the mere reproduction 
of a work in order to use it for its intrinsic purpose-to make what might be 
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to be used for "socially laudable purposes." See Copyright 
Office, Briefing Papers on Current Issues, reprinted in 1975 
House Hearings 2051, 2055. We are aware of no case in 
which the reproduction of a copyrighted work for the sole 
benefit of the user has been held to be fair use. 34 
We do not mean to suggest, of course, that every produc-
tive use is a fair use. A finding of fair use still must depend 
on the facts of the individual case, and on whether, under the 
circumstances, it is reasonable to expect the user to bargain 
with the copyright owner for use of the work. The fair use 
doctrine must strike a balance between the dual risks created 
by the copyright system: on the one hand, that depriving au-
called the 'ordinary' use of it." When copies are made for "ordinary'' use 
of the work, "ordinary infringement has customarily been triggered, not 
notions of fair use." Ibid. (emphasis in original). See also M. Nimmer, 
Copyright§ 13.05[A][1] (1982) ("Use of a work in each of the foregoing con-
texts either necessarily or usually involves its use in a derivative work"). 
While Seltzer's characterization may be said to be somewhat too ex-
treme-a teacher making copies for classroom use is obviously not a "sec-
ond author" using a first author's work-we find useful Seltzer's distinction 
between "ordinary'' uses of a work and what we have referred to in the 
text as "productive" uses. 
34 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d 
1345 (1973), affd by an equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975), in-
volved the photocopying of scientific journal articles; the Court of Claims 
stressed that the libraries performing the copying were "devoted solely to 
the advancement and dissemination of medical knowledge," 203 Ct. Cl., at 
91, 487 F. 2d, at 1354, and that "medical science would be seriously hurt if 
such library photocopying were stopped," id., at 95, 487 F. 2d, at 1356. 
Whether the Williams & Wilkins court was right or wrong in concluding 
that these copying practices were fair use, we doubt that the court would 
have reached the same result if it had not believed the practices at issue 
had such serious consequences for the progress of science. 
The issue of library copying is now covered by § 108 of the 1976 Act. 
That section, which Congress regarded as "authoriz[ing] certain photo-
copying practices which may not qualify as a fair use," 1975 Senate Report 
67; 1976 House Report 74, permits the making of copies only for "private 
study, scholarship, or research." § 108(d)(1) and (e)(1). 
.· 
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thors of their monopoly will reduce their incentive to create, 
and, on the other, that granting authors a complete monopoly 
will reduce the creative ability of others. 35 The inquiry is 
necessarily a flexible one, and the endless variety of situa-
tions that may arise precludes the formulation of exact rules. 
But when a user reproduces an entire work and uses it for its 
original purpose, with no added benefit to the public, the doc-
trine of fair use generally does not apply. There is no need 
to provide the ordinary user with a fair use subsidy at the au-
thor's expense. 
The making of a videotape recording for home viewing is 
an ordinary rather than a productive use of tfie Studios' copy-
righted works. The District Court found that "Betamax 
owners use the copy for the same purpose as the original. 
They add nothing of their own." 480 F. Supp., at 453. Al-
though applying the fair use doctrine to home VTR record-
ing, as Sony argues, may increase public access to material 
broadcast free over the public airwaves, we think Sony's ar-
gument misconceives the nature of copyright. Copyright 
gives the author a right to limit or even cut off access to his 
work. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127 (1932). 
A VTR recording creates np public benefits sufficient to jus-
tify limiting this right. Nor is this right extinguished by the 
copyright owner's choice to make the work available over the 
public airwaves. Section 106 of the 1976 Act grants the 
copyright owner the exclusive right to control the perform-
ance and the reproduction of his work, and the fact that he 
has licensed a single television performance is irrelevant to 
35 In the words of Lord Mansfield: "[W]e must take care to guard against 
two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have 
employed their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived 
of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the 
other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the 
progress of the arts be retarded. " Sayre v. Moore, 1 East *361 n. , 102 
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the existence of his right to control its reproduction. Al-
though a television broadcast may be free to the viewer, this 
fact is equally irrelevant; a book borrowed from the public li-
brary may not be copied any more freely than a book that is 
purchased. 
It may seem tempting to stretch the doctrine of fair use so 
as to permit unfettered use of this new technology in order to 
increase access to television programming. But such an ex-
tension would risk eroding the very basis of copyright law, by 
depriving authors of control over their works and conse-
quently of their incentive to create. 36 Even in the context of 
highly productive educational uses, Congress has avoided 
this temptation; in passing the 1976 Act, Congress made I 
clear that .off-the-air videotaping was to be permitted only in 
very limited situations. See 1976 House Report 71; 1975 
Senate Report 64. And, the Senate report adds, "[t]he com-
mittee does not intend to suggest ... that off-the-air record-
36 This point was brought home repeatedly by the Register of Copy-
rights. Mentioning the "multitude of technological developments" since 
passage of the 1909 Act, including "remarkable developments in the use of 
video tape, " Register's Supplementary Report xiv-xv, the Register 
cautioned: 
"I realize, more clearly now than I did in 1961, that the revolution in 
communications has brought with it a serious challenge to the author's 
copyright. This challenge comes not only from the ever-growing commer-
cial interests who wish to use the author's works for private gain. An 
equally serious attack has come from people with a sincere interest in the 
public welfare who fully recognize . . . 'that the real heart of civilization 
. . . owes its existence to the author'; ironically, in seeking to make the au-
thor's works widely available by freeing them from copyright restrictions, 
they fail to realize that they are whittling away the very thing that nur-
tures authorship in the first place. An accommodation among conflicting 
demands must be worked out, true enough, but not by denying the funda-
mental constitutional directive: to encourage cultural progress by securing 
the author's exclusive rights to him for a limited time. " I d ., at xv; see 
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ing for convenience would under any circumstances, be con-
sidered 'fair use.'" I d., at 66. We cannot disregard these 
admonitions. 
B 
We recognize that there are situations where permitting 
even an unproductive use would have no effect on the au-
thor's incentive to create, that is, where the use would not 
affect the value of, or the market for, the author's work. 
Photocopying a newspaper clipping to send to a friend may be 
one example; copying a quotation to pin on one's bulletin 
board may be another. In each of these cases, the effect on 
the author can truly be said to be de minimis. Thus, even 
though these uses provide no benefit to the public at large, no 
purpose is served by preserving the author's monopoly. 
Courts should move with caution, however, in depriving 
authors of protection from unproductive "ordinary" uses. 
Even in the case of a productive use, § 107(4) requires consid-
eration of "the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or value of the copyrighted work" (emphasis added). "[A] 
particular use which may seem to have little or no economic 
impact on the author's rights today can assume tremendous 
importance in times to come." Register's Supplementary 
Report 14. Although such a use may seem harmless when 
viewed in isolation, "[i]solated instances of minor infringe-
ments, when multiplied many times, become in the aggregate 
a major inroad on copyright that must be prevented." 1975 
Senate Report 65. 
We conclude that, at least when the proposed use is an un-
pr~ copyrig t o~er nee_.J.!ro uce on_y evi-
dence of a potential for harm:lliliingement then will be 
found, unTeSstfle user can demonstrate affirmatively that 
permitting the use would have no tendency to harm the mar-
ket for or the value of the copyrighted work. See 3 M. Nim-
mer, Copyright § 13.05[E][4][c], at 13-84 (1982); Gordon, 82 
Colum. L. Rev., at 1626. 37 This burden may be difficult for 
37 During the copyright Jaw revision process, Congress considered pro-
.· 
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the user to meet, and indeed may prove impossible in an area 
where the effect of a new technology is speculative. But any 
lesser burden would present the "real danger . . . of confin-
ing the scope of an author's rights on the basis of the present 
technology so that, as the years go by, his copyright loses 
much of its value because of unforeseen technical advances." 
Register's Supplementary Report 14. When the proposed 
use is one that creates no benefit to the public at large, the 
copyright owner should not be forced to bear this risk. 
The Studios have ide t' ed a number of wa in which 
VTR recordm could dama e their copYrights. VTR re-
cor mg cou d reduce their ability to market their works in 
motion picture theaters and through the rental or sale of pre-
recorded videotapes or videodiscs; it also could reduce 1J!eir 
rerun audience, and consequently the license fees 'available to 
them for repeated showings. Moreover, advertisers may be 
willing to pay for on!Y "live" viewing audiences, if they be-
lieve VTlr viewers will delete commercials or if they are un-
able to measure VTR use; if this is the case, VTR recording 
could reduce the license fees the Studios are able to charge 
even for first-run showings. 'rLibrary-building'raises at least 
the potential for each of the types of harm identified by the 
Studios, and time-shifting raises the potential for substantial ,_______...._ 
posals to include in the statute provisions placing the burden of proof on 
the issue of fair use as between the copyright owner or the user. The 
Register of Copyrights recommended against enacting such a rule, Regis-
ter's Supplementary Report 28, and the 1966 and 1967 House reports 
stated that "any special statutory provision placing the burden of proving 
fair use on one side or the other would be unfair and undesirable." H. R 
Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 66 (1966); H. R. Rep. No. 83, 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 37 (1967). Although this statement did not appear in 
the 1974 Senate report, S. Rep. No. 93-983, or the reports on the 1976 Act, 
the Register informed Congress that "its interpretation presumably re-
main[ed] valid," and that "rigid rules involving legal presumptions and bur-
dens of proof should not be laid out in the statute." Register's Second 
Supplementary Report, ch. II, at 23 and 29. As with other aspects of the 
fair use doctrine, Congress left burden of proof questions to the courts. 
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harm as well. 38 
Although the Distri~t _Qgurt foun_d no likelihood of harm 
from VTR use, 480 'F.Slip~ we conclude that it~­
plied an incorrect substantive standard and misallocateathe 
--~--~~ -
burden of proof. The District Court reasoned that the Stu-
dios had failed to prove that librarY:·building would occur "to 
any sigriificant extent,"· id., at 467; that the Studios' prere-
corded videodiscs could compete with VTR recordings and 
were "arguably ... more desirable," ibid.; that it was "not 
clear that movie audiences will decrease," id., at 468; and 
that the practice of deleting commercials "may be too te-
dious" for many viewers, id., at 468. To the extent any de-
crease in advertising revenues would occur, the court con-
cluded that the Studios had "marketing alternatives at hand 
to recoup some of that predicted loss." I d., at 452. In gen-
eral, the District Court found, the Studios had shown no ac-
tual harm as of the date of trial. I d., at 451. Because the 
Studios' prediction of harm was "based on so many assump-
tions and on a system of marketing which is rapidly chang-
38 A VTR owner who has taped a favorite motion picture for repeated 
viewing is less likely to rent or buy a tape containing the same motion pic-
ture, watc 'sed rerun, or pay to see the picture at a theater. Al-
thou~--tlme-s iftin may not replace theater or rerun viewing or the pur-
chaf(e of prer e apes or discs, it may well replace rental usage; a 
VTR user who has recorded a first-run motion picture for later viewing will 
have no need to rent a copy when he wants to see it. Both library-builders 
and time-shifters may avoid commercials; the library builder may use the 
pause control to record without them, and all users may fast-forward 
through commercials on playback. 
The Studios introduced expert testimony that both time-shifting and 
librarying would tend to decrease their revenue from copyrighted works. 
See 480 F. Supp., at 440. The District Court's findings also show substan-
tial library-building and avoidance of commercials. Both parties submit-
ted surveys showing that the average Betamax user owns between 25 and 
32 tapes. The Studios' survey showed that at least 40% of users had more 
than 10 tapes in a "library"; Sony's survey showed that more than 40% of 
users planned to view their tapes more than once; and both parties' surveys 
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ing," the court was "hesitant to identify 'probable effects' of 
home-use copying." ld., at 452. 
The District Court's reluctance to engage in prediction in 
this area is understandable, but, in our view, the court was 
mistaken in concluding that the Studios should bear the risk 
created by this uncertainty. The Studios have demon-
strated a potential for harm, which has not been and could 
not be refuted at this early stage of technological develop-
ment. Extensive library-building might well reduce the 
market for theater viewing, reruns, and sales of prerecorded 
videotapes. Time-shifting may reduce the Studios' ability to 
rent prerecorded tapes. Moreover, if rating services prove 
unable to measure time-shifting, or if the deletion of commer-
cials by time-shifters makes advertisers unwilling to pay for 
VTR viewing, the Studios' license fees could decrease. 
While these harms are speculative at present, we cannot 
deny the Studios copyright protection on the basis that a new 
technology that may result in substantial harm has not done 
so yet. 
If a business were to tape the Studios' works off the air, 
duplicate the tapes, and sell or rent them to members of the 
public for home viewing, it would undoubtedly be liable for 
infringement of the Studios' copyright. From the Studios' 
perspective, the consequences of home VTR recording are no 
different. The only distinction is that home VTR users do 
not record for commercial advantage; the commercial benefit 
accrues to the manufacturers and distributors of the 
Betamax. We next discuss whether these manufacturers 
and distributors can be held .CQ!ltributorily liable when the 
product they sell is used to infringe. 
v 
It is well established that liability for copyright infringe-
ment can be imposed on persons other than those who actu-
.ally carry out the infringing activity. Kalem Co. v. Harper 
Brothers, 222 U. S. 55, 62-63 (1911); 3 M. Nimmer, Copy-
right § 12.04[A] (1982); see Twentieth Century Music Corp. 
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v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 160, n. 11 (1975); Buck v. Jewell-La-
Salle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 198 (1931). Although the 
liability provision of the 1976 Act provides simply that "[a]ny-
one who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner ... is an infringer of the copyright," 17 U. S. C. 
§ 501(a), the House and Senate reports demonstrate that 
Congress intended to retain judicial doctrines of contributory 
infringement. 1975 Senate Report 57; 1976 House Report 
61.39 
The doctr~f contributory copYright infringement, how-
ever, is not well-defined. One of the few attempts at defini-
tion appears in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Art-
ists Management, Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159 (CA2 1971). The 
Gershwin court stated that "one who, with knowledge of the 
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes 
to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 
'contributory' infringer." !d., at 1162 (footnote omitted). 
While we have no quarrel with this general statement, it does 
not resolve this case; the District Court and the Court of Ap-
peals, both purporting to apply it, reached diametrically op-
posed results. 
A 
In absolving Sony from liability, the District Court rea-
soned that Sony had no direct involvement with individual 
Betamax users, did not participate in any off-the-air copying, 
and did not know that such copying was an infringement of 
the Studios' copyright. 480 F. Supp., at 460. We agree 
39 This intent is further manifested by several provisions of the 1976 Act 
that exempt from liability persons who, while not participating directly in 
any infringing activity, could otherwise be charged with contributory in-
fringement. See § 108(f)(1) (library not liable "for the unsupervised use of 
reproducing equipment located on its premises," provided that certain 
warnings are posted); § 110(6) ("governmental body'' or "nonprofit agricul-
tural or horticultural organization" not liable for infringing performance by 
concessionaire "in the course of an annual agricultural or horticultural fair 
or exhibition"). 
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with the Gershwin court that contributory liability may be 
imposed even when there has been no direct contact between 
the defendant and the infringer. The defendant in Gershwin 
was a concert promoter operating through local concert asso-
ciations that it sponsored; it had no contact with the infring-
ing performers themselves. 443 F. 2d, at 1162-1163; see 
also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S., at 
160, n. 11. Moreover, a finding of contributory infringment 
does not depend on actual knowledge of particular instances 
of infringement; it is sufficient that the defendant have rea-
son to know that infringement is taking place. 443 F. 2d, at 
1162; see Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi 
Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (SDNY 1966).40 In the so-
called "dance hall" cases, 41 in which questions of contributory 
40 In Screen Gems, on which the Gershwin court relied, the court held 
that liability could be imposed on a shipper of unauthorized "bootleg" 
records and a radio station that broadcast advertisements of the records, 
provided they knew or should have known that the records were infring-
ing. The court concluded that the records' low price and the manner in 
which they were marketed could support a finding of "constructive knowl-
edge" even if actual knowledge were not shown. 
"E. g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & 
Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d 1213 (CA11977); Dreamland Ball Room, 
Inc . v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F . 2d 354 (CA71929); M. Witmark & 
Sons v. Tremont Social & Athletic Club, 188 F. Supp. 787, 790 (Mass. 
1960); see Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S., at 157; 
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 19~199 (1931); 3 M. 
Nimmer, Copyright § 12.04[A], p. 12-35 (1982). 
Courts have premised liability in these cases on the notion that the de-
fendant had the ability to supervise or control the infringing activities, see, 
e. g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L . Green Co., 316 F . 2d 304, 307 
(CA21963); KECA Music, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72, 74 
(WD Mo. 1977), but this notion is to some extent fictional; the defendant 
cannot escape liability by instructing the performers not to play copy-
righted music, or even by inserting a provision to that effect into the per-
formers' contract. Famous Music Corp . v. Bay State Harness Horse 
Racing & Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d, at 1214-1215; KECA Music, 
Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co ., 432 F. Supp., at 75; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. 
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infringement arise with some frequency, proprietors of 
entertainment establishments routinely are held liable for un-
authorized performances on their premises, even when they 
have no knowledge that copyrighted works are being 
performed. 
Nor is it necessary that the defendant be aware that the 
infringing activity violates the copyright laws. Section 
504(c)(2) of the 1976 Act provides for a reduction in statutory 
damages when an infringer proves he "was not aware and 
had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an 
infringement of copyright," but the statute establishes no 
general exemption for those who believe their infringing ac-
tivities are legal. Moreover, such an exemption would be 
meaningless in a case such as this, in which prospective relief 
is sought; once a court has established that the copying at 
issue is infringement, the defendants are necessarily aware of 
that fact for the future. It is undisputed in this case that 
Sony had reason to know the Betamax would be used by 
some owners to tape copyrighted works off the air. See 480 
F. Supp., at 459, 460. 
The District Court also found no evidence that Sony l 
caused, induced, or contributed materially to the infringing 
activities of Betamax owners. 480 F. Supp., at 460. In a 
case of this kind, however, causation can be shown indirectly; 
it does not depend on evidence that particular Betamax own-
ers relied on particular advertisements. In an analogous 
case decided just last Term, the Court approved a lower 
court conclusion that liability for contributory trademark in-
fringement could be imposed on a manufacturer who "sug-
v. Veltin , 47 F . Supp. 648, 649 (WD La. 1942). In effect, the proprietors 
in these cases are charged with constructive knowledge of performances 
taking place on their premises. Congress expressly rejected a proposal to 
exempt proprietors from this type of liability under the 1976 Act. See 
1975 Senate Report 141-142; 1976 House Report 159-160; 1975 House 
Hearings 1812-1813 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copy-
rights); id., at 1813 (colloquy between Rep. Pattison and Barbara Ringer). 
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gested, even by implication" that a retailer use the manufac-
turer's goods to infringe the trademark of another. Inwood 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S. 844, 
851 (1982); see id., at 860 (concurring opinion). We think 
this standard is equally appropriate in the copyright context. 
The District Court found that Sony has advertised the 
Betamax as suitable for off-the-air recording of "favorite 
shows," "novels for television," and "classic movies," 480 F. 
Supp., at 436, with no visible warning that such .recording 
could constitute copyright infringement. Without the aid of 
the Betamax or some other VTR, it would not be possible to-
day for home television viewers to infringe copyright by re-
cording off-the-air. Off-the-air recording is not only a fore-
seeable use for the Betamax, but indeed is its intended use. 
Under the circumstances, we agree with the Court of Ap-
peals that Sony has induced and materially contributed to the 
infringing conduct of etamax owners. 
- ·-.. - - -··---------B " 
Sony urges us to hold that the manufacturer or seller of a 
product used to infringe is absolved from liablity whenever 
the product can be put to any substantial noninfringing use. 
Brief for Petitioners 41-42. The District Court so held, bor-
rowing the "staple article of commerce" doctrine governing 
liability for contributory infringement of patents. See 35 
42 Our conclusion respecting contributory infringement does not include 
the retailer defendants, see n. 2, supra. The District Court found that one 
of the retailer defendants had assisted in the advertising campaign for the 
Betamax, but made no other findings respecting their knowledge of the 
Betamax's intended uses. We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals 
that, at least on this record, the retailers "are sufficiently engaged in the 
enterprise to be held accountable." 659 F. 2d, at 976. In contrast, the 
advertising agency employed to promote the Betamax was far more ac-
tively engaged in the advertising campaign, and petitioners have not ar-
gued that its liability differs in any way from that of Sony Corporation and 
Sony Corporation of America. 
81-1687-0PINION 
34 SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC. 
U. S. C. § 271. 43 We cannot agree that this technical doc-
trine of patent law, based on concerns largely irrelevant to 
the field of copyright, see generally Dawson Chemical Co. v. 
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U. S. 176, 187-199 (1980), should be 
imported wholesale into copyright law. Despite their com-
mon constitutional source, the development of patent and 
copyright protections has not been parallel and this Court has 
borrowed patent concepts in copyright cases sparingly in the 
past. See Bobbs-Merr.ill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 
345-346 (1908). 
The District Court was understandably concerned that if li-
ability for contributory infringement were imposed on the 
manufacturer or seller of every product used to infringe-a 
typewriter, a camera, a photocopying machine-the "wheels 
of commerce" would be blocked. A similar concern was ex-
pressed in Kalem Co. v: Harper Brothers, 222 U. S. 55, 62 
(1911), this Court's only prior decision in the area of contribu-
tory copyright infringement. . 
The products sold in Kalem were films of the story of a 
copyrighted book, and the seller was held liable on the 
42 The "staple article of commerce" doctrine protects those who manufac-
ture products incorporated into or used with patented inventions-for ex-
ample, the paper and ink used with patented prillting machines, Henry v. 
A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1 (1912), or the dry ice used with patented refrig-
eration systems, Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp., 283 U. S. 27 
(1931). Because a patent-holder has the right to control the use of the pat-
ented item as well as its manufacture, see Motion Picture Patents Co. v. 
Universal Film Co., 243 U. S. 502, 509--510 (1917); 35 U. S. C. 271(a), 
such protection is necessary to prevent patent-holders from extending 
their monopolies by suppressing competition in unpatented components 
and supplies suitable for use with the patented item. See Dawson Chemi-
cal Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U. S. 176, 197-198 (1980). The doctrine 
of contributory patent infringement has been the subject of attention by 
the courts and by Congress, see id., at 202-212, and has been codified since 
1952, 66 Stat. 792, but was never mentioned during the copyright law revi-
sion process as having any relevance to contributory copyright 
infringement. 
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ground that use of the films in infringing exhibitions "was the 
most conspicuous purpose for which they could be used, and 
the one for which especially they were made." Id., at 63. 44 
In this case, of course, the Betamax has noninfringing uses 45 
while the films manufactured in Kalem perhaps did not. But 
the existence of noninfringing uses does not absolve the man-
ufacturer of a product whose "most conspicuous purpose" is 
to infringe. When copyright infringement is the product's 
primary use and, as the Court of Appeals put it, a major 
"source of the product's consumer appeal," 659 F. 2d, at 975, 
the manufacturer profits directly from the infringing activity 
and has a financial interest in its continuation. Even though 
the manufacturer itself makes no unauthorized copies, it 
"reap[s] the benefit of countless violations" by others. Fam-
ous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & 
Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d 1213, 1215 (CA11977). 
c /?') 
The Court of Appeals concluded th~ny should be held I L 4 f 
liable for contributory infring~ment, reasoning that "[ v ]ideo-
tape recorders are manufactured, advertised, and sold for the 
pri~ purpose of reproducing television programming," 
a:ri~v ]irtually all television programming is copyrighted 
~terial." (\59 F. 2d, at 975. While we agree with the first 
of these propositions, 46 the second is problematic. The par-
44 The making of the films was not itself an infringement under the 1909 
Act, see 222 U. S., at 62, but the exhibitions violated the copyright owner's 
right to dramatize his work. Ibid. 
"' N oninfringing uses would include, for example, recording works that 
have never been protected by copyright, recording works that have en-
tered the public domain, recording with permission of the copyright owner, 
and, of course, any recording that qualifies as fair use. See, e. g. , 
Bruzzone v. Miller Brewing Co., 202 U. S.P.Q. 809 (ND Cal. 1979) (use of 
home VTR for market research studies). 
46 Although VTRs also may be used to watch prerecorded video cassettes 
and to make home motion pictures, these uses do not require a tuner such 
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ties and their amici have argued vigorously about both the 
amount of television programming that is covered by copy-
right and the amount for which permission to copy has been 
given. The proportion of VTR recording that is infringing is 
primarily a quesf10n o act, 7 an the 1s r1ct Court specifi-
cally ~dings on the "percentage of legal 
versus illegal home-use recording." 480 F. Supp., at 468. 
In light of our view of the law, resolution of this factual ques-
tion is essential. We therefore remand for further consider-
ation by the District Courr--------_._-............ __.....__... __ 
......._ ___ ...., 
VI 
The Court of Appeals, having found Sony liable, remanded 
for the District Court to reconsider the propriety of injunc-
tive or other relief. Because of our disposition of the issue of I 
liability, we, too, do not decide what remedy would be appro-
priate if liability were found. We concur, however, in the 
Court of Appeals' suggestion that some form of limited in-
as the Betamax contains. See n. 3, supra. The Studios do not object to 
Sony's sale of VTRs without tuners. Brief for Respondents 5, n. 9. In 
considering the noninfringing uses of the Betamax, therefore, those uses 
that would remain possible without the Betamax's built-in tuner should not 
be taken into account. 
47 Sony asserts that much or most television broadcasting is available for 
home recording because (1) no copyright owners other than the Studios 
have brought infringement actions, and (2) much televised material is ineli-
gible for copyright protection because videotapes of the broadcasts are not 
kept. The first of these assertions is irrelevant; Sony's liability does not 
turn on the fact that only two copyright owners thus far have brought suit. 
The amount of infringing use must be determined through consideration of 
the television market as a whole. Sony's second assertion is based on a 
faulty premise; the Copyright Office permits audiovisual works transmit-
ted by television to be registered by deposit of sample frames pius a de-
scription of the work. See 37 CFR §§ 202.20(c)(2)(ii) and 202.21(g) (1982). 
Moreover, although an infringement action cannot be brought unless the 
work is registered, 17 U. S. C. § 411(a), registration is not a condition of 
copyright protection. § 408(a). Copying an unregistered work is still in-
fringement. Cf. § 506(a) (liability for criminal copyright infringement; not 
conditioned on prior registration). 
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junction, or an award of damages or continuing royalties in I 
lieu of injunctive relief, may well be an appropriate means of 
balancing the equities in this case. 48 Although we express no 
view on the merits of any particular proposal, we are certain 
that, if Sony is found liable in this case, the District Court 
will be able to fashion appropriate relief. 
Like so many other problems created by the interaction of 
copyright law with a new technology, "[t]here can be no 
really satisfactory solution to the problem presented here, 
until Congress acts." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Ai-
ken, 422 U. 8., at 167 (THE CHIEF JUSTICE, dissenting). 
But in the absence of a congressional solution, courts cannot 
avoid difficult problems by refusing to apply the law. We 
must "take the Copyright Act ... as we find it," Fortnightly 
Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 401-402 (1968), and 
"do as little damage as possible to traditional copyright prin-
ciples . . . until the Congress legislates." I d., at 404 (dis-
senting opinion). 
VII 
Insofar as the Court of Appeals held that home VTR re-
cording for personal use is an infringement of copyright, its 
judgment is af n a ot er respects, the judgment is 
48 Other Nations have imposed royalties on the manufacturers of prod-
ucts used to infringe copyright. See, e. g., Copyright Laws and Treaties 
of the World (UNESCO/BNA 1982) (English translation), reprinting Fed-
eral Act On Copyright in Works of Literature and Art and on Related 
Rights (Austria), § 42(5)-(7), and An Act dealing with Copyright and Re-
lated Rights (Federal Republic of Germany), Art. 53(5). A study pro-
duced for the Commission of European Communities has recommended 
that these requirements "serve as a pattern" for the European community. 
A. Dietz, Copyright Law in the European Community 135 (1978). While 
these royalty systems ordinarily depend on the existence of authors' col-
lecting societies, see id., at 119, 136, such collecting societies are a familiar 
part of our copyright law. See generally Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U. S. 1, 4-5 (1979). Fashioning relief 
of this sort, of course, might require bringing other copyright owners into 
court. 
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vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. No costs are allowed. 
It is so ordered. 
-
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The introduction of the home videotape recorder (VTR) 
upon the market has enabled millions of Americans to make 
recordings of television programs in their own homes, for fu-
ture and repeated viewing at their own convenience. While 
this practice has proved highly popular with owners of televi-
sion sets and VTRs, it understandably has distressed the 
holders of copyrights in the recorded programs. The result 
is the present litigation, raising the questions whether the 
home recording of television programs is an infringement of 
copyright, and, if so, whether the manufacturers and distrib-
utors of VTRs are liable as contributory infringers. We 
have little doubt that these questions ultimately and defini-
tively will be resolved by Congress; our task in the interim is 
to resolve them under existing copyright law. 
I 
In 1976, respondents Universal City Studios, Inc., and 
Walt Disney Productions (the Studios) brought this copyright 
infringement action 1 against petitioners Sony Corporation 
1 The Studios also alleged misrepresentation under § 43(a) of the Trade-
Mark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 441, 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a), and unfair compe-
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and Sony Corporation of America (Sony), the manufacturers 
..and distributors of the Betamax VTR. 2 The Studios sought 
damages, profits, and a wide-ranging injunction against fur-
ther sales or use of the Betamax or Betamax tapes. 
The Betamax, like other VTRs, is capable of recording 
television broadcasts off the air on videotape cassettes, and 
playing them back at a later time. 3 Two types of Betamax 
usage are at issue here. 4 The first is "time-shifting," in 
which the user records a program in order to watch it at a 
later time, and then records over it after a single viewing. 
The second is "library-building," in which the user records a 
program to keep for repeated viewing over a longer term. 
tition and intentional interference with business relationships under state 
law. App. 4. These claims are not before us. 
2 Also named as defendants were a number of retailers that sell the 
Betamax (Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc.; Associated Dry Goods Cor-
poration; Federated Department Stores, Inc.; and Henry's Camera Cor-
poration); the advertising agency employed by Sony Corporation of Amer-
ica to promote the Betamax (Doyle Dane Bernbach, Inc.); and William 
Griffiths, an individual Betamax user. With the exception of Griffiths, 
these defendants are also petitioners here. Except where indicated, we 
refer to the petitioners collectively as "Sony." 
3 The Betamax has three primary components: a tuner that receives 
television ("RF") signals broadcast over the airwaves; an RF adapter that 
converts the RF signals into audio-video signals; and a recorder that 
records the audio-video signals on magnetic tape. Sony also manufactures 
VTRs without built-in tuners; these are capable of playing back prere-
corded tapes and recording home movies on videotape, but cannot record 
off the air. Since the Betamax has its own tuner, it can be used to record 
off one channel while another channel is being watched. 
The Betamax is available with a number of auxiliary features , including a 
timer, a pause control, and a fast-forward control; these features permit 
Betamax owners to record programs without being present, to avoid (if 
they are present) recording commercial messages, and to skip over com-
mercials while playing back the recording. Videotape is reusable; the user 
erases it by taping over the prior recording. 
• This case involves only the home recording for home use of television 
programs broadcast free over the airwaves. No issues are raised concern-
ing cable or pay television, or the sharing or trading of tapes. 
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Sony's advertisements, at various times, have suggested that 
Betamax users "record favorite shows" or "build a library." 
Sony's Betamax advertising has never contained warnings 
about copyright infringement, although a warning appears in 
the Betamax operating instructions. 
The Studios produce copyrighted "movies" and other 
works that they release to theaters and license for television 
broadcast. The Studios also rent and sell their works on film 
and on prerecorded videotapes and videodiscs. License fees 
for television broadcasts are set according to audience rat-
ings, compiled by rating services that do not measure play-
back of videotapes. The Studios claim that VTR recording 
of their works may decrease their revenue from licensing 
their works to television and from marketing them in other 
ways. 
After a five-week trial, the United States District Court 
for the Central District of California, in a detailed opinion, 
ruled that home VTR recording did not infringe the Studios' 
copyrights under either the Act of March 4, 1909 (1909 Act), 
35 Stat. 1075, as amended (formerly codified as 17 U. S. C. 
§ 1 et seq. (1976 ed.)), or the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 
(1976 Act), 90 Stat. 2541, 17 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. (1976 ed., 
Supp. V). 5 The District Court also held that even if home 
VTR recording were an infringement, Sony could not be held 
liable under theories of direct infringement, contributory in-
fringement, or vicarious liability. Finally, the District 
Court concluded that an injunction against sales of the 
Betamax would be inappropriate even if Sony were liable 
under one of those theories. 480 F. Supp. 429 (1979). 
5 The Studios introduced evidence at trial of 32 individual instances in 
which their copyrighted works were recorded on Betamax VTRs. Two of 
these instances occurred after January 1, 1978, tile primary effective date 
of the 1976 Act; all others occurred while the 1909 Act was still effective. 
Our analysis focuses primarily on the 1976 Act, but, as we show infra, the 
legal principles governing copyright protection for these works under the \ 
two Acts are the same. 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed in virtually all respects. 659 F. 2d 963 (1981). It 
held that the 1909 Act and the 1976 Act contained no implied 
exemption for "home use" recording, that home use recording 
was not "fair use," and that the use of the Betamax to record 
the Studios' works therefore infringed their copyrights. The 
Court of Appeals also held Sony liable for contributory in-
fringement, reasoning that Sony knew and expected that the 
Betamax would be used to record copyrighted material off 
the air, and that Sony had induced, caused, or materially con-
tributed to the infringing conduct. The Court of Appeals 
then remanded for consideration of the question of relief, 
suggesting that the District Court could consider awarding 
damages or a continuing royalty in lieu of an injunction. I d., 
at 976. 
Because of the importance of the issues presented, we 
granted certiorari. 457 U. S. 1116 (1982). 
II 
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, 
empowers Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries." This Nation's initial copyright statute was 
passed by the First Congress. Entitled "An Act for the en-
couragement of learning," it gave an author "the sole right 
and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending" 
his "map, chart, book or books" for a period of 14 years. Act 
of May 31, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 124. Since then, as the technol-
ogy available to authors for creating and preserving their 
writings has changed, the law has changed with it. Through 
many amendments, and through complete revisions in 1831, 
1870, 1909, and 1976,6 authors' rights have been expanded to 
6 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436; Act of July 8, 1870, §§ 8&-111, 
16 Stat. 212-217; Act of Mar. 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075 (formerly codified as 17 
.. 
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provide protection to any "original works of authorship fixed 
in any tangible medium of expression," including motion pic-
tures and other audiovisual works. 17 U. S. C. § 102(a). 7 
Section 106 of the 1976 Act grants the owner of a copyright 
a variety of exclusive rights in the copyrighted work, 8 includ-
U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1976 ed.)); Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 
2541 (codified as 17 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. V)). 
7 Section 102(a) provides: 
"Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now 
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, 
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device. Works of authorship include the following categories: 
"(1) literary works; 
"(2) musical works, including any accompanying words; 
"(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; 
"(4) pantomimes and choreographic works; 
"(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; 
"(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and 
"(7) sound recordings." 
"Audiovisual works" are "works that consist of a series of related images 
which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or de-
vices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with 
accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material ob-
jects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied." § 101, ~ 2. 
"Motion pictures" are "audiovisual works consisting of a series of related 
images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion, 
together with accompanying sounds, if any." § 101, ~ 17. Most commer-
cial television programs, if fixed on film or tape at the time of broadcast or 
before, will qualify as "audiovisual works." Since the categories set forth 
in § 102(a) are not mutually exclusive, a particular television program may 
also qualify for protection as a dramatic, musical, or other type of work. 
8 Section 106 provides: 
"Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this 
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: 
"(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
"(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
"(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
·" 
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ing the right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or 
phonorecords." 9 This grant is expressly made subject to 
§§ 107-118, which create a number of exemptions and limita-
tions on the copyright owner's rights. The most important 
of these sections, for our present purposes, is § 107; that sec-
tion states that "the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not 
an infringement of copyright." 10 
III 
The 1976 Act, like its predecessors, 11 does not give the 
copyright owner control over all possible uses of his work. 
lending; 
"(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform 
the copyrighted work publicly; and 
"(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi-
vidual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the 
copyrighted work publicly." 
9 A "phonorecord" is a reproduction of sounds other than sounds ac-
companying an audiovisual work, while a "copy" is a reproduction of a work 
in any form other than a phonorecord. § 101, ~~ 19, 7. 
10 Section 107 provides: 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords 
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy-
right. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
"(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work." 
The four factors listed in this section are intended to be "illustrative and 
not limitative." § 101, ~ 14. 
11 The 1976 Act was the product of a revision effort lasting more than 20 
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If the work is put to some use not enumerated in § 106, the 
use is not an infringement. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United 
Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 393-395 (1968). Thus, before consid-
ering whether home videotaping comes within the scope of 
the fair use exemption, we first must inquire whether the 
practice violates the exclusive right "to reproduce the copy-
righted work in copies or phonorecords" granted by § 106(1). 
A 
Although the word "copies" appears in the plural in 
§ 106(1), it is clear that the making of even a single unau-
thorized copy is prohibited. The Senate and House reports 
explain that "[t]he references to 'copies or phonorecords,' al-
though in the plural, are intended here and throughout the 
bill to include the singular (1 U. S. C. § 1)." 12 1975 Senate 
years. Spurred by the recognition that "significant developments in tech-
nology and communications" had rendered the 1909 Act inadequate, 
S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 47 (1975) (1975 Senate Report); see H. R. Rep. No. 
94-1476, p. 47 (1976) (1976 House Report), Congress in 1955 authorized the 
Copyright Office to prepare a series of studies on all aspects of the existing 
copyright law. Thirty-four studies were prepared and presented to Con-
gress. The Register of Copyrights drafted a comprehensive report with 
recommendations, House Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Re-
vision, Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the 
U. S. Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1961) (Regis-
ter's 1961 Report), and general revision bills were introduced near the end 
of the 88th Congress in 1964. H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1964). The Register issued a second report in 1965, with revised recom-
mendations. House Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revi-
sion, Pt. 6, Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the 
General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law: 1965 Revision Bill, 89th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1965) (Register's Supplementary Report). 
Action on copyright revision was held up from 1967 to 1974 by a dispute on 
cable television, see generally Second Supplementary Report of the Regis-
ter of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law: 
1975 Revision Bill, ch. V, pp. 2-26 (Draft Oct.-Dec. 1975) (Register's Sec-
ond Supplementary Report), but a compromise led to passage of the 
present Act in 1976. 
12 1 U. S. C. § 1 provides in relevant part: 
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Report 58; 1976 House Report 61. The reports then de-
scribe the reproduction right established by § 106(1): 
"[T]he right 'to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies 
or phonorecords' means the right to produce a material 
object in which the work is duplicated, transcribed, imi-
tated, or simulated in a fixed form from which it can be 
'perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, ei-
ther directly or with the aid of a machine or device.' As 
under the present law, a copyrighted work would be in-
fringed by reproducing it in whole or in any substantial 
part, and by duplicating it exactly or by imitation or 
simulation." 1975 Senate Report 58; 1976 House Report 
61. 
The making of even a single videotape recording at home falls 
within this definition; the VTR user produces a material ob-
ject from which the copyrighted work later can be perceived. 
Unless Congress intended a special exemption for the making 
of a single copy for personal use, we must conclude that VTR 
recording is contrary to the exclusive rights granted by 
§ 106(1). 
The 1976 Act and its accompanying reports specify in some 
detail the situations in which a single copy of a copyrighted 
work may be made. Section 108(a), for example, permits a 
library or archives "to reproduce no more than one copy or 
phonorecord of a work" for a patron, but only under certain 
very limited conditions; an entire work, moreover, can be 
copied only if it cannot be obtained elsewhere at a fair price. 13 
"In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context 
indicates otherwise . . . words importing the plural include the 
singular .... " 
13 The library photocopying provisions of § 108 do not excuse from liabil-
ity any person who requests "a copy" from a library if the requester's use 
exceeds fair use. § 108(f)(2). Moreover, a library is absolved from liabil-
ity for the unsupervised use of its copying equipment if the equipment 
bears a notice informing users that "the making of a copy" may violate the 
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§ 108(e); see also § 112(a) (broadcaster may "make no more 
than one copy or phonorecord of a particular transmission 
program," and only under certain conditions). In other re-
spects, the making of single copies is permissible only within 
the limited confines of the fair use doctrine. The Senate re-
port, in a section headed "Single and multiple copying," notes 
that the fair use doctrine would permit a teacher to make a 
single copy of a work for his or her own use in the classroom, 
but only if the work was not a "sizable" one such as a novel or 
treatise. 1975 Senate Report 63-64; accord, 1976 House Re-
port 68--69, 71. Other situations in which the making of a 
single copy would be fair use are described in the House and 
Senate reports. 14 But neither the statute nor its legislative 
history suggests any intent to create a general exemption for 
single copies made for personal or private use. 
Indeed, it appears that Congress considered and rejected 
the possibility of a special private use exemption. The issue 
was raised early in the copyright law revision process, in one 
of the studies prepared for Congress under the supervision of 
the Copyright Office. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted 
Works (1958), reprinted in Senate Committee on the Judi-
ciary, Copyright Law Revision, Studies Prepared for the 
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 
86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1960) (Latman Fair Use Study). 
This study found no reported cases supporting the existence 
of an exemption for private use, although it noted that "the 
purpose and nature of a private use, and in some cases the 
copyright law. § 108(f)(1). 
14 For example, "the making of a single copy or phonorecord by an indi-
vidual as a free service for a blind person" would be a fair use, as would "a 
single copy reproduction of an excerpt from a copyrighted work by a callig-
rapher for a single client" or "a single reproduction of excerpts from a copy-
righted work by a student calligrapher or teacher in a learning situation." 
1975 Senate Report 66-67; see 1976 House Report 73-74. Application of 
the fair use doctrine in these situations, of course, would be unnecessary if 
the 1976 Act created a general exemption for the making of single copies. 
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small amount taken, might lead a court to apply the general 
principles of fair use in such a way as to deny liability." ld., 
at 12. Mter reviewing a number of foreign copyright laws 
that contained explicit statutory exemptions for private or 
personal use, id., at 25, Professor Latman outlined several 
approaches that a revision bill could take to the general issue 
of exemptions and fair use. One of these was the adoption of 
particularized rules to cover specific situations, including 
''the field of personal use." I d., at 33. 15 
Rejecting the latter alternative, the Register of Copy-
rights recommended that the revised copyright statute sim-
ply mention the doctrine of fair use and indicate its general 
scope. The Register opposed the adoption of rules and ex-
emptions to cover specific situations, 16 preferring to rely on 
the judicial fair use doctrine to resolve new problems as they 
arose. See Register's 1961 Report 25; Register's Supple-
mentary Report 27-28. 
The Register's approach was reflected in the first copy-
right revision bills, drafted by the Copyright Office in 1964. 
15 Professor Latman made special mention of the "personal use" issue be-
cause the area was one that 
"has become disturbed by recent developments . . . . Photoduplication 
devices may make authors' and publishers' groups apprehensive. The 
Copyright Charter recently approved by [the International Confederation 
of Societies of Authors and Composers] emphasizes the concern of authors 
over 'private' uses which, because of technological developments, are said 
to be competing seriously with the author's economic interests." Latman 
Fair Use Study 3~4. 
16 The one exemption proposed by the Register, permitting libraries to 
make single photocopies of out-of-print works and of excerpts that request-
ers certified were needed for research, met with opposition and was not 
included in the bills initially introduced in Congress. See Register's 1961 
Report 26; H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Register's 
Supplementary Report 26. A library copying provision was restored to 
the bill in 1969, after pressure from library associations. Register's Sec-
ond Supplementary Report, ch. III, pp. 10-11; seeS. 543, 91st Cong., 1st 
Sess., § 108 (Comm. Print Dec. 10, 1969); 1975 Senate Report 48. 
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These bills, like the 1976 Act, granted copyright owners the 
exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted work, subject 
only to the exceptions set out in later sections. H. R. 
11947/S. 3008, 88th Gong., 2d Sess., § 5(a) (1964). The pri-
mary exception was the fair use doctrine, id., § 6, containing 
language virtually identical to § 107 of the 1976 Act. Al-
though the copyright revision bills changed in many respects 
from their first introduction in 1964 to final passage in 1976, 
those portions of the bills did not change. 17 We can conclude 
only that Congress, like the Register, intended to rely on the 
fair use doctrine, not a per se exemption for private use, to 
separate permissible copying from the impermissible. 18 
17 The 1964 bills provided that the fair use of copyrighted material for 
purposes "such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholar-
ship, or research" was not an infringement of copyright, and listed four 
"factors to be considered" in determining whether a particular use was fair. 
H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., § 6 (1964). Revised bills, 
drafted by the Copyright Office in 1965, contained a fair use provision 
merely mentioning the doctrine but not indicating its scope: "Notwith-
standing the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work is 
not an infringement of copyright." H. R. 4347/S. 1006, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess., § 107 (1965). The House Judiciary Committee restored the provi-
sion to its earlier wording, H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 
5, 58 (1966), and the language adopted by the Committee remained in the 
bill in later Congresses. See H. R. 2512/S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 
§ 107 (1967); S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1969); S. 644, 92d Cong., 
1st Sess., § 107 (1971); S. 1361, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1973); H. R. 
2223/S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1975). With a few additions by 
the House Judiciary Committee in 1976, see 1976 House Report 5; H. R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 94-1733, p. 70 (1976), the same language appears in§ 107 of 
the 1976 Act. 
18 In Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d 
1345 (1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975), decided 
during the process of revising the copyright statutes, the Court of Claims 
suggested that copying for personal use might be outside the scope of copy-
right protection under the 1909 Act. The court reasoned that because 
"hand copying" for personal use has always been regarded as permissible, 
and because the practice of making personal copies continued after type-
writers and photostat machines became available, the making of personal 
.. 
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When Congress intended special treatment for private use, 
moreover, it said so explicitly. One such explicit statement \ 
appears in § 106 itself. The copyright owner's exclusive 
right to perform a copyrighted work, unlike the right to re-
produce the work in copies, is limited. Section 106(4) grants 
a copyright owner the exclusive right to perform the work 
"publicly," but does not restrict private performances by oth-
ers. A motion picture is "performed" whenever its images 
are shown or its sounds are made audible. § 101, ~ 18. Like 
"sing[ing] a copyrighted lyric in the shower," Twentieth Cen-
copies by any other means should be permissible as well. Id., at 84--88, 
487 F. 2d, at 1350-1352. 
There appear to us to be several flaws in this reasoning. First, it is by 
no means clear that the making of a "hand copy" of an entire work is per-
missible; the most that can be said is that there are no reported cases on 
the subject, possibly because no copyright owner ever has thought it 
worthwhile to sue. See Latman Fair Use Study 11-12; 3 M. Nimmer, 
Copyright § 13.05[E][4][a] (1982). At least one early treatise asserted 
that infringement would result "if an individual made copies for his per-
sonal use, even in his own handwriting, as there is no rule of law excepting 
manuscript copies from the law ofinfringment." A. Wei!, American Copy-
right Law § 1066 (1917). Second, hand copying or even copying by type-
writer is self-limiting. The drudgery involved in making hand copies ordi-
narily ensures that only necessary and fairly small portions of a work are 
taken; it is unlikely that any user would make a hand copy as a substitute 
for one that could be purchased. The harm to the copyright owner from 
hand copying thus is minimal. The recent advent of inexpensive and 
readily available copying machines, however, has changed the dimensions 
of the problem dramatically. See Register's Second Supplementary Re-
port ch. III, p. 3; Hearings on H. R. 2223 before the Subcommittee on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Ju-
diciary Committee, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 194 (1975) (1975 House Hear-
ings) (remarks of Rep. Danielson); id., at 234 (statement of Robert W. 
Cairns); id., at 250 (remarks of Rep. Danielson); id., at 354 (testimony of 
Irwin Karp); id., at 467 (testimony of Rondo Cameron); id., at 1795 (testi-
mony of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights). Thus, "[t]he supposi-
tion that there is no tort involved in a scholar copying a copyrighted text by 
hand does not much advance the question of machine copying." B. Kap-
lan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 101-102 (1967) . 
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tury Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 155 (1975), watch-
ing television at home with one's family and friends is now 
considered a performance. 1975 Senate Report 59--60; 1976 
House Report 63. 19 Home television viewing nevertheless 
does not infringe any copyright-but only because § 106(4) 
contains the word "publicly." 20 See generally 1975 Senate 
Report 60-61; 1976 House Report 63-64; Register's 1961 Re-
port 29-30. No such distinction between public and private 
uses appears in § 106(1)'s prohibition on the making of 
copies. 21 
Similarly, an explicit reference to private use appears in 
§ 108. Under that section, a library can make a copy for a 
patron only for specific types of private uses: "private study, 
scholarship, or research." 22 § 108(d)(1) and (e)(1); see also 37 
19 In a trio of cases, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 
398 (1968); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 
415 U. S. 394, 403-405 (1974); and Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Ai-
ken, 422 U. S. 151 (1975), this Court held that the reception of a radio or 
television broadcast was not a "performance" under the 1909 Act. The 
Court's "narrow construction" of the word "perform" was "completely 
overturned by the [1976 Act] and its broad definition of 'perform' in section 
101." 1976 House Report 87. 
20 A work is performed "publicly" if it takes place "at a place open to the 
public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a 
normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered." § 101, 
~ 23(1). 
21 One purpose of the exemption for private performances was to permit 
the home viewing of lawfully made videotapes. The Register noted in 
1961 that "[n]ew technical devices will probably make it practical in the fu-
ture to reproduce televised motion pictures in the home. We do not be-
lieve the private use of such a reproduction can or should be precluded by 
copyright." Register's 1961 Report 30 (emphasis added). Significantly, 
the Register did not suggest that the private making of a reproduction of a 
televised motion picture would be permitted by the copyright law. The 
Register later reminded Congress that "[i]n general the concept of 'per-
formance' must be distinguished sharply from the reproduction of copies." 
Register's Supplementary Report 22. 
22 During hearings on this provision, Representative Danielson inquired 
whether it would apply to works of fiction such as "Gone With the Wind," 
·' 
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CFR § 201.14(b) (1982). Limits also are imposed on the ex-
tent of the copying and the type of institution that may make 
copies, and the exemption expressly is made inapplicable to 
. motion pictures and certain other types of works. § 108(h). 
These limitations would be wholly superfluous if an entire 
copy of any work could be made by any person for private 
use. 23 
B 
The District Court in this case nevertheless concluded that 
the 1976 Act contained an implied exemption for "home-use 
recording." 480 F. Supp., at 444 446. The court relied pri-
marily on the legislative history of a 1971 amendment to the 
1909 Act. That amendment addressed the specific problem 
of commercial piracy of sound recordings. Act of Oct. 15, 
1971, 85 Stat. 391 (1971 Amendment). The House report on 
the 1971 Amendment, in a section entitled "Home Record-
ing," contained the following statement: 
"In approving the creation of a limited copyright in 
sound recordings it is the intention of the Committee 
that this limited copyright not grant any broader rights 
than are accorded to other copyright proprietors under 
the existing title 17. Specifically, it is not the intention 
of the Committee to restrain the home recording, from 
broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded perfor-
mances, where the home recording is for private use and 
or whether it was limited to "strictly technical types of information." The 
uncontradicted response was that it would apply only in "general terms of 
science ... [and] the useful arts." 1975 House Hearings 251 (testimony of 
Robert W. Cairns); cf. id., at 300 (statement of Harry Rosenfield) ("We are 
not asking ... for the right to copy 'Gone With the Wind'"). 
23 The House and Senate reports' mention of situations in which copies 
for private use would be permissible under the fair use doctrine--for exam-
ple, the making of a free copy for a blind person, 1975 Senate Report 66; 
1975 Senate Report 73, or the "recordings of performances by music stu-
dents for purposes of analysis and criticism," 1975 Senate Report 63--
would of course be superfluous as well. See n. 14, supra. 
·' 
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with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing 
commercially on it. This practice is common and unre-
strained today, and the record producers and performers 
would be in no different position from that of the owners 
of copyright in recorded musical compositions over the 
past 20 years." H. R. Rep. No. 92-487, p. 7 (1971) 
(1971 House Report). 
Similar statements were made during House hearings on the 
bill 24 and on the House floor, 25 although not in the Senate pro-
24 The following exchange took place during the testimony of Barbara 
Ringer, then Assistant Register of Copyrights: 
"[Rep.] Biester. . . . I can tell you I must have a small pirate in my own 
home. My son has a cassette tape recorder, and as a particular record be-
comes a hit, he will retrieve it onto his little set . . .. [T]his legislation, of 
course, would not point to his activities, would it? 
"Miss Ringer. I think the answer is clearly, 'No, it would not.' I have 
spoken at a couple of seminars on video cassettes lately, and this question 
is usually asked: 'What about the home recorders?' The answer I have 
given and will give again is that this is something you cannot control. You 
simply cannot control it. My own opinion, whether this is philosophical 
dogma or not, is that sooner or later there is going to be a crunch here. 
But that is not what this legislation is addressed to, and I do not see the 
crunch coming in the immediate future. . . . I do not see anybody going 
into anyone's home and preventing this sort of thing, or forcing legislation 
that would engineer a piece of equipment not to allow home taping.'' 
Hearings on S. 646 and H. R. 6927 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. , 1st Sess. , 22-23 (1971) 
(1971 House Hearings). 
25 Shortly before passage of the bill, a colloquy took place between Rep-
resentative Kastenmeier, chairman of the House subcommittee that pro-
duced the bill, and Representative Kazen, who was not on the committee: 
"Mr. Kazen. Am I correct in assuming that the bill protects copy-
righted material that is duplicated for commercial purposes only? 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Yes. 
"Mr. Kazen. In other words, if your child were to record off of a pro-
gram which comes through the air on the radio or television, and then used 
it for her own personal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this use would not 
be included under the penalties of this bill? 
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ceedings. In concluding that these statements created a 
general exemption for home recording, the District Court, in 
our view, paid too little heed to the context in which the 
statements were made, and failed to consider the limited pur-
poses of the 1971 Amendment and the structure of the 1909 
Act. 
Unlike television broadcasts and other types of motion pic-
tures, sound recordings were not protected by copyright 
prior to passage of the 1971 Amendment. Although the un-
derlying musical work could be copyrighted, the 1909 Act 
provided no protection for a particular performer's rendition 
of the work. Moreover, copyrighted musical works that had 
been recorded for public distribution were subject to a "com-
pulsory license": any person was free to record such a work 
upon payment of a 2-cent royalty to the copyright owner. 
§ 1(e), 35 Stat. 107&-1076. Although reproduction without 
payment of the royalty was an infringement under the 1909 
Act, damages were limited to three times the amount of the 
unpaid royalty. § 25(e), 35 Stat. 1081-1082; Shapiro, Bern-
stein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F. 2d 260, 262-263, 265 (CA21957), 
cert. denied, 355 U. S. 952 (1958). Notably, it was observed 
that the practical effect of these provisions was to legalize 
record piracy. See S. Rep. No. 92-72, p. 4 (1971); 1971 
House Report 2. 
In order to suppress this piracy, the 1971 Amendment ex-
tended copyright protection beyond the underlying work to 
sound recordings themselves. Congress chose, however, to 
provide only limited protection: owners of copyright in sound 
recordings were given the exclusive right "[t]o reproduce 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. This is not included in the bill. I am glad the gen-
tleman raises the point. 
"On page 7 of the report, under 'Home Recordings,' Members will note 
that under the bill the same practice which prevails today is called for; 
namely, this is considered both presently and under the proposed law to be 
fair use. The child does not do this for commercial purposes. This is 
made clear in the report." 117 Cong. Rec. 3474&-34749 (1971). 
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[their works] and distribute [them] to the public." 1971 
Amendment, § 1(a), 85 Stat. 391 (formerly codified as 17 
U. S. C. § 1(f) (1976 ed.)). 26 This right was merely the right 
of commercial distribution. See 117 Cong. Rec. 34748-34749 
(1971) (colloquy of Reps. Kazen & Kastenmeier) ("the bill 
protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for commer-
cial purposes only"). 
Against this background, the statements regarding home 
recording under the 1971 Amendment appear in a different 
light. If home recording was "common and unrestrained" 
under the 1909 Act, see 1971 House Report 7, it was because 
sound recordings had no copyright protection and the owner 
of a copyright in the underlying musical work could collect no 
more than a 2-cent royalty plus 6 cents in damages for each 
unauthorized use. With so little at stake, it is not surprising 
that the Assistant Register "d[id] not see anybody going into 
anyone's home and preventing this sort of thing." 1971 
House Hearings 23. 
But the references to home sound recording in the 1971 
Amendment's legislative history do not demonstrate any con-
gressional intent to create a generalized home use exemption 
from copyright protection. Congress addressed only sound 
recordings and merely recognized that the 1909 Act had been 
unsuccessful in controlling home sound recording; the 1971 
Amendment was addressed to a different problem, that of 
commercial record piracy. To quote Assistant Register 
26 The 1909 Act's grant of an exclusive right to "copy,"§ 1(a), was of no 
assistance to the owner of a copyright in a sound recording, because a re-
production of a sound recording was technically considered not to be a 
"copy." See 1971 House Hearings 18 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, As-
sistant Register of Copyrights); 1971 Amendment, § 1(e), 85 Stat. 391 (for-
merly codified as 17 U. S. C. § 26 (1976 ed.)) ("For the purposes of [speci-
fied sections, not including § 1(a)], but not for any other purpose, a 
reproduction of a [sound recording] shall be considered to be a copy 
thereof"). This concept is carried forward into the 1976 Act, which 
distinguishes between "copies" and "phonorecords." Seen. 9, supra. 
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Ringer again, home use was "not what this legislation [was] 
addressed to." 1971 House Hearings 22. 27 
While the 1971 Amendment merely narrowed the sound re-
cordings loophole in prior copyright law, motion pictures and 
other audiovisual works have been accorded full copyright 
protection since at least 1912, see Act of Aug. 24, 1912, 37 
Stat. 488, and perhaps before, see Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 
240 (CA3 1903), app. dism'd, 195 U. S. 625 (1904). Congress 
continued this protection in the 1976 Act. Unlike the sound 
recording rights created by the 1971 Amendment, the re-
production rights associated with motion pictures under 
§ 106(1) are not limited to reproduction for public distribu-
tion; the copyright owner's right to reproduce the work ex-
ists independently, and the "mere duplication of a copy may 
constitute an infringement even if it is never distributed." 
Register's Supplementary Report 16; see 1975 Senate Report 
57; 1976 House Report 61. Moreover, the 1976 Act was in-
tended as a comprehensive treatment of all aspects of copy-
right law. The reports accompanying the 1976 Act, unlike 
the 1971 House report, contain no suggestion that home-use 
recording is somehow outside the scope of this all-inclusive 
statute. It was clearly the intent of Congress that no addi-
tional exemptions were to be implied. 28 
27 During consideration of the 1976 Act, Congress, of course, was well 
aware of the limited nature of the protection granted to sound recordings 
under the 1971 Amendment. See 1975 House Hearings 113 (testimony of 
Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights) (1971 Amendment "created a 
copyright in a sound recording ... but limited it to the particular situation 
of so-called piracy"); id., at 1380 (letter from John Lorenz, Acting Librar-
ian of Congress) (under 1971 Amendment "only the unauthorized reproduc-
tion and distribution to the public of copies of the sound recording is pro-
hibited. Thus, the duplication of sound recordings for private, personal 
use and the performance of sound recordings through broadcasting or 
other means are outside the scope of the amendment"). 
28 Representative Kastenmeier, the principal House sponsor of the 1976 
revision bill and chairman of the House subcommittee that produced it, 
made this explicit on the opening day of the House hearings: 
"[F)rom time to time, certain areas have not been covered in the bill. But 
·' 
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We find in the 1976 Act no implied exemption to cover the 
home taping of television programs, whether it be for single 
copies, for private use, or for home use. Thus, taping a 
copyrighted television program is infringement unless it is 
permitted by the fair use exemption contained in § 107 of the 
1976 Act. 
IV 
The doctrine of fair use has been called, with some justifi-
cation, "the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright." 
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F. 2d 661, 662 (CA2 
1939); see Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder 
Newspapers, Inc., 626 F. 2d 1171, 1174 (CA51980); Meeropol 
v. Nizer, 560 F. 2d 1061, 1068 (CA2 1977), cert. denied, 434 
U. S. 1013 (1978). Although courts have constructed lists of 
factors to be considered in determining whether a particular 
use is fair, 29 no fixed criteria have emerged by which that 
is it not the case, this being a unified code, that the operation of the bill 
does apply whether or not we specifically deal with a subject or not? . . . 
"Therefore, we can really not fail to deal with an issue. It will be dealt 
with one way or the other. The code, title 17, will cover it. So we have 
made a conscious decision even by omission. . . . 
"By virtue of passing this bill, we will deal with every issue. Whether 
we deal with it completely or not for the purpose of resolving the issues 
involved is the only question, not whether it has dealt with the four corners 
of the bill because the four corners of the bill will presume to deal with ev-
erything in copyright." 1975 House Hearings 115. 
29 The precise phrase "fair use" apparently did not enter the case law 
until 1869, see Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F . Cas. 26, 60 (No. 8,136) (CC 
Mass.), but the doctrine itself found early expression in Folsom v. Marsh, 
9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (CC Mass. 1841). Justice Story was faced there 
with the "intricate and embarrassing questio[n]" whether a biography con-
taining copyrighted letters was "a justifiable use of the original materials, 
such as the law recognizes as no infringement of the copyright of the plain-
tiffs." Id., at 344, 348. In determining whether the use was permitted, 
said Justice Story, it was necessary to consider "the nature and objects of 
the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the 
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or 
supersede the objects, of the original work .... Much must, in such cases, 
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determination can be made. This Court thus far has pro-
vided no guidance; although fair use issues twice before have 
come to this Court, on each occasion the Court was equally 
divided and no opinions issued. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. 
United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d 1345 (1973), aff'd, 420 
U. S. 376 (1975); Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F. 2d 532 (CA9 
1956), aff'd, 356 u. s. 43 (1958). 
Nor did Congress provide clear rules when it codified the 
fair use doctrine in the 1976 Act; it simply inc·orporated a list 
of "factors to be considered": the "purpose and character of 
the use," the "nature of the copyrighted work," the "amount 
and substantiality of the portion used," and the "effect of the 
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work." § 107. No particular weight was assigned to any 
one of these, and the list was not intended to be exclusive. 
The House and Senate reports explain that § 107 does no 
more than give "statutory recognition" to the fair use doc-
trine; it was intended "to restate the present judicial doctrine 
of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." 
1976 House Report 66. See 1975 Senate Report 62; S. Rep. 
No. 93-983, p. 116 (1974); H. R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess., p. 32 (1967); H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d 
Sess., p. 61 (1966). 
A 
Despite this lack of clear standards, the fair use doctrine 
plays a crucial role in the law of copyright. The purpose of 
depend upon the nature of the new work, the value and extent of the 
copies, and the degree in which the original authors may be injured 
thereby." Id., at 34&-349. 
Similar lists have been developed by later courts. E. g., Tennessee 
Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F. 2d 279, 283 (CA5), cert. de-
nied, 398 U. S. 928 (1970); Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 
F. 2d 73, 85 (CA6 1943); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcast-
ing Co., 137 F. Supp. 348 (SD Cal. 1955); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P. 
F . Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. 40, 43 (SDNY 1934); Hill v. Whalen & 
Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (SDNY 1914). 
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copyright protection, in the words of the Constitution, is to 
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." Copy-
right is based on the belief that by granting authors the 
exclusive rights to reproduce their works, they are given an 
incentive to create, and that "encouragement of individual ef-
fort by personal gain is the best way to advance public wel-
fare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science 
and the useful Arts."' Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 219 
(1954). The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards 
the individual author in order to benefit the public. Twenti-
eth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1975); 
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127-128 (1932); see 
H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Gong., 2d Sess., p. 7 (1909). 
There are situations, nevertheless, in which strict enforce-
ment of this monopoly would inhibit the very "Progress of 
Science and useful Arts" that copyright is intended to pro-
mote. A clear example is the scholar or researcher whose 
own work depends on the ability to refer to and to quote the 
work of prior scholars. Obviously, no author could create a 
new work if he were first required to repeat the research of 
every author who had gone before him. 30 The scholar, like I 
the ordinary user, of course could be left to bargain with each 
copyright owner for permission to quote from or refer to 
prior works. But there is a crucial difference between the 
ordinary user and the scholar. When the ordinary user de-
cides that the owner's price is too high, and forgoes use of the 
work, only the individual user is harmed. When the scholar 
forgoes the use of a prior work, not only does his own work 
suffer, but the public is deprived of his contribution to knowl-
edge. The scholar's work, in other words, produces external 
benefits from which we all profit. In such a case, the fair use 
30 "The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our 
predecessors. 'A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see far-
ther than the giant himself."' Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copy-
right: I, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 511 (1945). 
.-
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doctrine acts as a form of subsidy-albeit at the first author's 
expense-to permit the second author to make limited use of 
the first author's work for the public good. See Latman Fair 
Use Study 31; Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Struc-
tural Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 
Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1630 (1982). 
A similar subsidy may be appropriate in a range of areas 
other than pure scholarship. The situations in which fair use 
is most commonly recognized are listed in§ 107 itself; fair use 
may be found when a work is used "for purposes such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching, ... scholarship, 
or research." The House and Senate reports expand on this 
list somewhat, 31 and other examples may be found in the case 
law. 32 Each of these uses, however, reflects a common 
theme: each is a productive use, resulting in some added ben-
efit to the public beyond that produced by the first author's 
work. 33 The fair use doctrine, in other words, permits works 
~~Quoting from the Register's 1961 Report, the Senate and House re-
ports give examples of possible fair uses: 
"quotation of excerpts in a revi.ew or criticism for purposes of illustration or 
comment; quotation of short passages in a scholarly or technical work, for 
illustration or clarification of the author's observations; use in a parody of 
some of the content of the work parodied; summary of an address or arti-
cle, with brief quotations, in a news report; reproduction by a library of a 
portion of a work to replace part of a damaged copy; reproduction by a 
teacher or student of a small part of a work to illustrate a lesson; reproduc-
tion of a work in legislative or judicial proceedings or reports; incidental 
and fortuitous reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast, of a work located 
in the scene of an event being recorded." 1975 Senate Report 61-62; 1976 
House Report 65. 
32 E. g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 
626 F. 2d 1171 (CA5 1980) (comparative advertising). 
33 Professor Seltzer has characterized these lists of uses as "reflect[ing] 
what in fact the subject matter of fair use has in the history of its adjudica-
tion consisted in: it has always had to do with the use by a second author of 
a first author's work." L. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright 
24 (1978) (emphasis removed). He distinguishes "the mere reproduction 
of a work in order to use it for its intrinsic purpose-to make what might be 
·' 
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to be used for "socially laudable purposes." See Copyright 
Office, Briefing Papers on Current Issues, reprinted in 1975 
House Hearings 2051, 2055. We are aware of no case in 
which the reproduction of a copyrighted work for the sole 
benefit of the user has been held to be fair use. 34 
We do not mean to suggest, of course, that every produc-
tive use is a fair use. A finding of fair use still must depend 
on the facts of the individual case, and on whether, under the 
circumstances, it is reasonable to expect the user to bargain 
with the copyright owner for use of the work. The fair use 
doctrine must strike a balance between the dual risks created 
by the copyright system: on the one hand, that depriving au-
thors of their monopoly will reduce their incentive to create, 
and, on the other, that granting authors a complete monopoly 
will reduce the creative ability of others. 35 The inquiry is 
called the 'ordinary' use of it." When copies are made for "ordinary'' use 
of the work, "ordinary infringement has customarily been triggered, not 
notions of fair use." Ibid. (emphasis in original). See also M. Nimmer, 
Copyright § 13. 05[A][1] (1982) ("Use of a work in each of the foregoing con-
texts either necessarily or usually involves its use in a derivative work"). 
34 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d 
1345 (1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975), in-
volved the photocopying of scientific journal articles; the Court of Claims 
stressed that the libraries performing the copying were "devoted solely to 
the advancement and dissemination of medical knowledge," 203 Ct. Cl., at 
91, 487 F. 2d, at 1354, and that "medical science would be seriously hurt if 
such library photocopying were stopped," id., at 95, 487 F. 2d, at 1356. 
Whether the Williams & Wilkins court was right or wrong in concluding 
that these copying practices were fair use, we doubt that the court would 
have reached the same result if it had not believed the practices at issue 
had such serious consequences for the progress of science. 
The issue of library copying is now covered by § 108 of the 1976 Act. 
That section, which Congress regarded as "authoriz[ing] certain photo-
copying practices which may not qualify as a fair use," 1975 Senate Report 
67; 1976 House Report 74, permits the making of copies only for "private 
study, scholarship, or research." § 108(d)(1) and (e)(1). 
36 In the words of Lord Mansfield: "[W]e must take care to guard against 
two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have 
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necessarily a flexible one, and the endless variety of situa-
tions that may arise precludes the formulation of exact rules. 
But when a user reproduces an entire work and uses it for its 
original purpose, with no added benefit to the public, the doc-
trine of fair use generally does not apply. There is no need 
to provide the ordinary user with a fair use subsidy at the au-
thor's expense. 
The making of a videotape recording for home viewing is 
an ordinary rather than a productive use of the Studios' copy-
righted works. The District Court found that "Betamax 
owners use the copy for the same purpose as the original. 
They add nothing of their own." 480 F. Supp., at 453. Al-
though applying the fair use doctrine to home VTR record-
ing, as Sony argues, may increase public access to material 
broadcast free over the public airwaves, we think Sony's ar-
gument misconceives the nature of copyright. Copyright 
gives the author a right to limit or even cut off access to his 
work. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127 (1932). 
A VTR recording creates no public benefits sufficient to jus-
tify limiting this right. Nor is this right extinguished by the 
copyright owner's choice to make the work available over the 
public airwaves. Section 106 of the 1976 Act grants the 
copyright owner the exclusive right to control the perform-
ance and the reproduction of his work, and the fact that he 
has licensed a single television performance is irrelevant to 
the existence of his right to control its reproduction. Al-
though a television broadcast may be free to the viewer, this 
fact is equally irrelevant; a book borrowed from the public li-
brary may not be copied any more freely than a book that is 
purchased. 
employed their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived 
of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the 
other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the 
progress of the arts be retarded." Sayre v. Moore, 1 East 361 n. (b), 102 
Eng. Rep. 139, 140 n. (K.B. 1785). See Register's Supplementary Report 
13. 
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It may seem tempting to stretch the doctrine of fair use so 
as to permit unfettered use of this new technology in order to 
increase access to television programming. But such an ex-
tension would risk eroding the very basis of copyright law, by 
depriving authors of control over their works and conse-
quently of their incentive to create. 36 Even in the context of 
highly productive educational uses, Congress has avoided 
this temptation; in passing the 1976 Act, Congress made 
clear that off-the-air videotaping was to be permitted only in 
very limited situations. See 1976 House Report 71; 1975 
Senate Report 64. And, the Senate report adds, "[t]he com-
mittee does not intend to suggest ... that off-the-air record-
ing for convenience would under any circumstances, be con-
sidered 'fair use.'" I d., at 66. We cannot disregard these 
admonitions. 
B 
We recognize that there are situations where permitting 
even an unproductive use would have no effect on the au-
36 This point was brought home repeatedly by the Register of Copy-
rights. Mentioning the "multitude of technological developments" since 
passage of the 1909 Act, including "remarkable developments in the use of 
video tape," Register's Supplementary Report xiv-xv, the Register 
cautioned: 
"I realize, more clearly now than I did in 1961, that the revolution in 
communications has brought with it a serious challenge to the author's 
copyright. This challenge comes not only from the ever-growing commer-
cial interests who wish to use the author's works for private gain. An 
equally serious attack has come from people with a sincere interest in the 
public welfare who fully recognize ... 'that the real heart of civilization 
.. . owes its existence to the author'; ironically, in seeking to make the au-
thor's works widely available by freeing them from copyright restrictions, 
they fail to realize that they are whittling away the very thing that nur-
tures authorship in the first place. An accommodation among conflicting 
demands must be worked out, true enough, but not by denying the funda-
mental constitutional directive: to encourage cultural progress by securing 
the author's exclusive rights to him for a limited time." Id ., at xv; see 
1975 House Hearings 117 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of 
Copyrights). 
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thor's incentive to create, that is, where the use would not 
affect the value of, or the market for, the author's work. 
Photocopying a newspaper clipping to send to a friend may be 
one example; copying a quotation to pin on one's bulletin 
board may be another. In each of these cases, the effect on 
the author can truly be said to be de minimis. Thus, even 
though these uses provide no benefit to the public at large, no 
purpose is served by preserving the author's monopoly. 
Courts should move with caution, however, in depriving 
authors of protection from unproductive "ordinary'' uses. 
Even in the case of a productive use, § 107(4) requires consid-
eration of "the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or value of the copyrighted work" (emphasis added). "[A] 
particular use which may seem to have little or no economic 
impact on the author's rights today can assume tremendous 
importance in times to come." Register's Supplementary 
Report 14. Although such a use may seem harmless when 
viewed in isolation, "[i]solated instances of minor infringe-
ments, when multiplied many times, become in the aggregate 
a major inroad on copyright that must be prevented." 1975 
Senate Report 65. 
We conclude that, at least when the proposed use is an un-
productive one, a copyright owner need produce only evi-
dence of a potential for harm. Infringement then will be 
found, unless the user can demonstrate affirmatively that 
permitting the use would have no tendency to harm the mar-
ket for or the value of the copyrighted work. See 3 M. Nim-
mer, Copyright § 13.05[E][4][c], at 13-84 (1982); Gordon, 82 
Colum. L. Rev., at 1626.37 This burden may be difficult for 
37 During the copyright law revision process, Congress considered pro-
posals to include in the statute provisions allocating the burden of proof on 
the issue of fair use as between the copyright owner or the user. The 
Register of Copyrights recommended against enacting such a rule, Regis-
ter's Supplementary Report 28, and the 1966 and 1967 House reports 
stated that "any special statutory provision placing the burden of proving 
fair use on one side or the other would be unfair and undesirable." H. R 
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the user to meet, and indeed may prove impossible in an area 
where the effect of a new technology is speculative. But any 
lesser burden would present the "real danger . . . of confin-
ing the scope of an author's rights on the basis of the present 
technology so that, as the years go by, his copyright loses 
much of its value because of unforeseen technical advances." 
Register's Supplementary Report 14. When the proposed 
use is one that creates no benefit to the public at large, the 
copyright owner should not be forced to bear this risk. 
The Studios have identified a number of ways in which 
VTR recording could damage their copyrights. VTR re-
cording could reduce their ability to market their works in 
motion picture theaters and through the rental or sale of pre-
recorded videotapes or videodiscs; it also could reduce their 
rerun audience, and consequently the license fees available to 
them for repeated showings. Moreover, advertisers may be 
willing to pay for only "live" viewing audiences, if they be-
lieve VTR viewers will delete commercials or if rating serv-
ices are unable to measure VTR use; if this is the case, VTR 
recording could reduce the license fees the Studios are able to 
charge even for first-run showings. Library-building raises 
at least the potential for each of the types of harm identified 
by the Studios, and time-shifting raises the potential for sub-
stantial harm as well. 38 
Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 66 (1966); H. R. Rep. No. 83, 90th 
Cong. , 1st Sess., p. 37 (1967). Although this statement did not appear in 
the 1974 Senate report, S. Rep. No. 93-983, or the reports on the 1976 Act, 
the Register informed Congress that "its interpretation presumably re-
main[ed] valid," and that "rigid rules involving legal presumptions and bur-
dens of proof should not be laid out in the statute." Register's Second 
Supplementary Report, ch. II , at 23 and 29. As with other aspects of the 
fair use doctrine, Congress left burden of proof questions to the courts. 
38 A VTR owner who has taped a favorite motion picture for repeated 
viewing is less likely to rent or buy a tape containing the same motion pic-
ture, watch a televised rerun, or pay to see the picture at a theater. Al-
though time-shifting may not replace theater or rerun viewing or the pur-
. ~ 
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Although the District Court found no likelihood of harm 
from VTR use, 480 F. Supp., at 468, we conclude that it ap-
plied an incorrect substantive standard and misallocated the 
burden of proof.. The District Court reasoned that the Stu-
dios had failed to prove that library-building would occur "to 
any significant extent," id., at 467; that the Studios' prere-
corded videodiscs could compete with VTR recordings and 
were "arguably ... more desirable," ibid.; that it was "not 
clear that movie audiences will decrease," id., at 468; and 
that the practice of deleting commercials "may be too te-
dious" for many viewers, id., at 468. To the extent any de-
crease in advertising revenues would occur, the court con- ' 
eluded that the Studios had "marketing alternatives at hand 
1 
_ . ~ 
to recoup some of that predicted loss." I d., at 452. Be- tfl"'#"'"" 
cause the Studios' prediction of harm was "based on so many 
assumptions and on a system of marketing which is rapidly 
changing," the court was "hesitant to identify 'probable ef-
fects' of home-use copying." I d., at 452. 
The District Court's reluctance to engage in prediction in 
this area is understandable, but, in our view, the court was 
mistaken in concluding that the Studios should bear the risk 
created by this uncertainty. The Studios have demon-
chase of prerecorded tapes or discs, it may well replace rental usage; a 
VTR user who has recorded a first-run motion picture for later viewing will 
have no need to rent a copy when he wants to see it. Both library-builders 
and time-shifters may avoid commercials; the library builder may use the 
pause control to record without them, and all users may fast-forward 
through commercials on playback. 
The Studios introduced expert testimony that both time-shifting and 
librarying would tend to decrease their revenue from copyrighted works. 
See 480 F. Supp., at 440. The District Court's findings also show substan-
tial library-building and avoidance of commercials. Both parties submit-
ted surveys showing that the average Betamax user owns between 25 and 
32 tapes. The Studios' survey showed that at least 40% of users had more 
than 10 tapes in a "library"; Sony's survey showed that more than 40% of 
users planned to view their tapes more than once; and both parties' surveys 
showed that commercials were avoided at least 25% of the time. See id., 
at 438-439 . 
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strated a potential for harm, which has not been and could 
not be refuted at this early stage of technological develop- _ .~ 
ment. While the Studios' evidence is speculative at present, l ~-
we cannot deny the Studios copyright protection on the basis 
that a new technology that may result in substantial harm 
has not done so yet. 
· If a business were to tape the Studios' works off the air, 
duplicate the tapes, and sell or rent them to members of the 
public for home viewing, it would undoubtedly be liable for 
infringement of the Studios' copyright. From the Studios' 
perspective, the consequences of home VTR recording are no 
different. The only distinction is that home VTR users do 
not record for commercial advantage; the commercial benefit 
accrues to the manufacturers and distributors of the 
Betamax. We next discuss whether these manufacturers 
and distributors can be held contributorily liable when the 
product they sell is used to infringe. 
v 
It is well established that liability for copyright infringe-
ment can be imposed on persons other than those who actu-
ally carry out the infringing activity. Kalem Co. v. Harper 
Brothers, 222 U. S. 55, 62-63 (1911); 3 M. Nimmer, Copy-
right § 12.04[A] (1982); see Twentieth Century Music Corp. 
v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 160, n. 11 (1975); Buck v. Jewell-La-
Salle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 198 (1931). Although the 
liability provision of the 1976 Act provides simply that "[a]ny-
one who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner ... is an infringer of the copyright," 17 U. S. C. 
§ 501(a), the House and Senate reports demonstrate that 
Congress intended to retain judicial doctrines of contributory 
infringement. 1975 Senate Report 57; 1976 House Report 
61. 39 
39 This intent is further manifested by several provisions of the 1976 Act 
that exempt from liability persons who, while not participating directly in 
any infringing activity, could otherwise be charged with contributory in-
.. 
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The doctrine of contributory copyright infringement, how-
ever, is not well-defined. One of the few attempts at defini-
tion appears in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Art-
ists Management, Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159 (CA2 1971). The 
Gershwin court stated that "one who, with knowledge of the 
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes 
to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 
'contributory' infringer." ld., at 1162 (footnote omitted). 
While we have no quarrel with this general statement, it does 
not resolve this case; the District Court and the Court of Ap-
peals, both purporting to apply it, reached diametrically op-
posed results. 
A 
In absolving Sony from liability, the District Court rea-
soned that Sony had no direct involvement with individual 
Betamax users, did not participate in any off-the-air copying, 
and did not know that such copying was an infringement of 
the Studios' copyright. 480 F. Supp., at 460. We agree 
with the Gershwin court that contributory liability may be 
imposed even when there has been no direct contact between 
the defendant and the infringer. The defendant in Gershwin 
was a concert promoter operating through local concert asso-
ciations that it sponsored; it had no contact with the infring-
ing performers themselves. 443 F. 2d, at 1162-1163; see 
also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S., at 
160, n. 11. Moreover, a finding of contributory infringement I 
has never depended on actual knowledge of particular in-
stances of infringement; it is sufficient that the defendant 
have reason to know that infringement is taking place. 443 
fringement. See § 108(f)(1) (library not liable "for the unsupervised use of 
reproducing equipment located on its premises," provided that certain 
warnings are posted); § 110(6) ("governmental body'' or "nonprofit agricul-
tural or horticultural organization" not liable for infringing performance by 
concessionaire "in · fair 
.• 
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F. 2d, at 1162; see Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. 
Mark-FiRecords, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (SDNY 1966).40 In 
the so-called "dance hall" cases, in which questions of con-
tributory infringement arise with some frequency, propri-
etors of entertainment establishments routinely are held lia-
ble for unauthorized performances on their premises, even 
when they have no knowledge that copyrighted works are 
being performed. In effect, the proprietors in these cases I 
are charged with constructive knowledge of performances 
taking place on their premises. 41 
40 In Screen Gems, on which the Gershwin court relied, the court held 
that liability could be imposed on a shipper of unauthorized "bootleg" 
records and a radio station that broadcast advertisements of the records, 
provided they lmew or should have lmown that the records were infring-
ing. The court concluded that the records' low price and the manner in 
which they were marketed could support a finding of "constructive lmowl-
edge" even if actual lmowledge were not shown. 
41 E. g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & 
Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d 1213 (CA11977); Dreamland Ball Room, 
Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F. 2d 354 (CA71929); M. Witmark & 
Sons v. Tremont Social & Athletic Club, 188 F. Supp. 787, 790 (Mass. 
1960); see Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S., at 157; 
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 198-199 (1931); 3 M. 
Nimmer, Copyright § 12.04[A], p. 12-35 (1982). 
Courts have premised liability in these cases on the notion that the de-
fendant had the ability to supervise or control the infringing activities, see, 
e. g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F. 2d 304, 307 
(CA21963); K.ECA Music, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72, 74 
(WD Mo. 1977), but this notion is to some extent fictional; the defendant 
cannot escape liability by instructing the performers not to play copy-
righted music, or even by inserting a provision to that effect into the per-
formers' contract. Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse 
Racing & Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d, at 1214-1215; KECA Music, 
Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp., at 75; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. 
v. Veltin, 47 F. Supp. 648, 649 (WD La. 1942). Congress expressly re-
jected a proposal to exempt proprietors from this type of liability under the 
1976 Act. See 1975 Senate Report 141-142; 1976 House Report 159-160; 
1975 House Hearings 1812-1813 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of 
Copyrights); id., at 1813 (colloquy between. Rep. Pattison and Barbara 
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Nor is it necessary that the defendant be aware that the 
infringing activity violates the copyright laws. Section 
504(c)(2) of the 1976 Act provides for a reduction in statutory 
damages when an infringer proves he "was not aware and 
had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an 
infringement of copyright," but the statute establishes no 
general exemption for those who believe their infringing ac-
tivities are legal. Moreover, such an exemption would be 
meaningless in a case such as this, in which prospective relief 
is sought; once a court has established that the copying at 
issue is infringement, the defendants are necessarily aware of 
that fact for the future. It is undisputed in this case that 
Sony had reason to know the Betamax would be used by 
some owners to tape copyrighted works off the air. See 480 
F. Supp., at 459, 460. 
The District Court also concluded that Sony had not 
caused, induced, or contributed materially to the infringing 
activities of Betamax owners. 480 F. Supp., at 460. In a 
case of this kind, however, causation can be shown indirectly; 
it does not depend on evidence that particular Betamax own-
ers relied on particular advertisements. In an analogous 
case decided just last Term, the Court approved a lower 
court conclusion that liability for contributory trademark in-
fringement could be imposed on a manufacturer who "sug-
gested, even by implication" that a retailer use the manufac-
turer's goods to infringe the trademark of another. Inwood 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S. 844, 
851 (1982); see id., at 860 (concurring opinion). We think 
this standard is equally appropriate in the copyright context. 
The District Court found that Sony has advertised the 
Betamax as suitable for off-the-air recording of "favorite 
shows," "novels for television," and "classic movies," 480 F. 
Supp., at 436, with no visible warning that such recording 
could constitute copyright infringement. Without the aid of 
Ringer). 
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the Betamax or some other VTR, it would not be possible to-
day for home television viewers to infringe copyright by re-
cording off-the-air. Off-the-air recording is not only a fore-
seeable use for the Betamax, but indeed is its intended use. 
Under the circumstances, we agree with the Court of Ap-
peals that Sony has induced and materially contributed to the 
infringing conduct of Betamax owners. 42 
B 
Sony urges us to hold that the manufacturer or seller of a 
product used to infringe is absolved from liablity whenever 
the product can be put to any substantial noninfringing use. 
Brief for Petitioners 41-42. The District Court so held, bor-
rowing the "staple article of commerce" doctrine governing 
liability for contributory infringement of patents. See 35 
U. S. C. § 271. 43 We cannot agree that this technical doc-
42 Our conclusion respecting contributory infringement does not include 
the retailer defendants, see n. 2, supra. The District Court found that one 
of the retailer defendants had assisted in the advertising campaign for the 
Betamax, but made no other findings respecting their knowledge of the 
Betamax's intended uses. We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals 
that, at least on this record, the retailers "are sufficiently engaged in the 
enterprise to be held accountable," 659 F. 2d, at 976; this is an issue that 
may be pursued on remand. In contrast, the advertising agency employed 
to promote the Betamax was far more actively engaged in the advertising 
campaign, and petitioners have not argued that its liability differs in any 
way from that of Sony Corporation and Sony Corporation of America. 
43 The "staple article of commerce" doctrine protects those who manufac-
ture products incorporated into or used with patented inventions-for ex-
ample, the paper and ink used with patented printing machines, Henry v. 
A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1 (1912), or the dry ice used with patented refrig-
eration systems, Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp., 283 U. S. 27 
(1931). Because a patent-holder has the right to control the use of the pat-
ented item as well as its manufacture, see Motion Picture Patents Co. v. 
Universal Film Co., 243 U. S. 502, 509-510 (1917); 35 U. S. C. 271(a), 
such protection is necessary to prevent patent-holders from extending 
their monopolies by suppressing competition in unpatented components 
and supplies suitable for use with the patented item. See Dawson Chemi-
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trine of patent law, based on concerns largely irrelevant to 
the field of copyright, see generally Dawson Chemical Co. v. 
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U. S. 176, 187-199 (1980), should be 
imported wholesale into copyright law. Despite their com-
mon constitutional source, the development of patent and 
copyright protections has not been parallel and this Court has 
borrowed patent concepts in copyright cases sparingly in the 
past. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 
345-346 (1908). 
The District Court was understandably concerned that if li-
ability for contributory infringement were imposed on the 
manufacturer or seller of every product used to infringe-a 
typewriter, a camera, a photocopying machine-the "wheels 
of commerce" would be blocked. A similar concern was ex-
pressed in Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U. S. 55, 62 
(1911), this Court's only prior decision in the area of contribu-
tory copyright infringement. 
The products sold in Kalem were films of the story of a 
copyrighted book, and the seller was held liable on the 
ground that use of the films in infringing exhibitions "was the 
most conspicuous purpose for which they could be used, and 
the one for which especially they were made." Id., at 63. 44 
In this case, of course, the Betamax has noninfringing uses 45 
cal Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U. S. 176, 197-198 (1980). The doctrine 
of contributory patent infringement has been the subject of attention by 
the courts and by Congress, see id., at 202-212, and has been codified since 
1952, 66 Stat. 792, but was never mentioned during the copyright law revi-
sion process as having any relevance to contributory copyright 
infringement. 
44 The making of the films was not itself an infringement under the 1909 
Act, see 222 U. S., at 62, but the exhibitions violated the copyright owner's 
right to dramatize his work. Ibid. 
46 N oninfringing uses would include, for example, recording works that 
have never been protected by copyright, recording works that have en-
tered the public domain, recording with permission of the copyright owner, 
and, of course, any recording that qualifies as fair use. See, e. g., 
Bruzzone v. Miller Brewing Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. 809 (ND Cal. 1979) (use of 
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while the films manufactured in Kalem perhaps did not. But 
the existence of noninfringing uses does not absolve the man-
ufacturer of a product whose "most conspicuous purpose" is 
to infringe. When copyright infringement is the product's 
primary use and, as the Court of Appeals put it, a major 
"source of the product's consumer appeal," 659 F. 2d, at 975, 
the manufacturer profits directly from the infringing activity 
and has a financial interest in its continuation. Even though 
the manufacturer itself makes no unauthorized copies, it 
"reap[s] the benefit of countless violations" by others. Fam-
ous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & 
Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d 1213, 1215 (CA11977). 
c 
The Court of Appeals concluded that Sony should be held 
liable for contributory infringement, reasoning that "[ v ]ideo-
tape recorders are manufactured, advertised, and sold for the 
primary purpose of reproducing television programming," 
and "[ v ]irtually all television programming is copyrighted 
material." 659 F. 2d, at 975. While we agree with the first 
of these propositions, 46 the second is problematic. The par-
ties and their amici have argued vigorously about both the 
amount of television programming that is covered by copy-
right and the amount for which permission to copy has been 
given. The proportion of VTR recording that is infringing is 
primarily a question of fact, 47 and the District Court specifi-
home VTR for market research studies). 
46 Although VTRs also may be used to watch prerecorded video cassettes 
and to make home motion pictures, these uses do not require a tuner such 
as the Betamax contains. See n. 3, supra. The Studios do not object to 
Sony's sale of VTRs without tuners. Brief for Respondents 5, n. 9. In 
considering the noninfringing uses of the Betamax, therefore, those uses 
that would remain possible without the Betamax's built-in tuner should not 
be taken into account. 
47 Sony asserts that much or most television broadcasting is available for 
home recording because (1) no copyright owners other than the Studios 
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cally declined to make findings on the "percentage of legal 
versus illegal home-use recording." 480 F. Supp., at 468. 
In light of our view of the law, resolution of this factual ques-
tion is essential. We therefore remand for further consider-
ation by the District Court. 
VI 
The Court of Appeals, having found Sony liable, remanded 
for the District Court to reconsider the propriety of injunc-
tive or other relief. Because of our disposition of the issue of 
liability, we, too, do not decide what remedy would be appro-
priate if liability were found. We concur, however, in the 
Court of Appeals' suggestion that some form of limited in-
junction, or an award of damages or continuing royalties in 
lieu of injunctive relief, may well be an appropriate means of 
balancing the equities in this case. 48 Although we express no 
view on the merits of any particular proposal, we are certain 
have brought infringement actions, and (2) much televised material is ineli-
gible for copyright protection because videotapes of the broadcasts are not 
kept. The first of these assertions is irrelevant; Sony's liability does not 
turn on the fact that only two copyright owners thus far have brought suit. 
The amount of infringing use must be determined through consideration of 
the television market as a whole. Sony's second assertion is based on a 
faulty premise; the Copyright Office permits audiovisual works transmit-
ted by television to be registered by deposit of sample frames plus a de-
scription of the work. See 37 CFR §§ 202.20(c)(2)(ii) and 202.21(g) (1982). 
Moreover, although an infringement action cannot be brought unless the 
work is registered, 17 U. S. C. § 411(a), registration is not a condition of 
copyright protection. § 408(a). Copying an unregistered work is still in-
fringement. Cf. § 506(a) (liability for criminal copyright infringement; not 
conditioned on prior registration). 
48 Other Nations have imposed royalties on the manufacturers of prod-
ucts used to infringe copyright. See, e. g., Copyright Laws and Treaties 
of the World (UNESCO/BNA 1982) (English translation), reprinting Fed-
eral Act On Copyright in Works of Literature and Art and on Related 
Rights (Austria), § 42(5)-(7), and An Act dealing with Copyright and Re-
lated Rights (Federal Republic of Germany), Art. 53(5). A study pro-
duced for the Commission of European Communities has recommended 
that these requirements "serve as a pattern" for the European community. 
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that, if Sony is found liable in this case, the District Court 
will be able to fashion appropriate relief. The District Court 
may conclude, of course, that a continuing royalty or other 
equitable relief is not feasible in this case. The Studios then 
would be relegated to statutory damages for proven in-
stances of infringement. But the difficulty of fashioning re-
lief, and the possibility that complete relief may be unavail-
able, cannot affect our interpretation of the statute. 
Like so many other problems created by the interaction of 
copyright law with a new technology, "[t]here can be no 
really satisfactory solution to the problem presented here, 
until Congress acts." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Ai-
ken, 422 U. S., at 167 (THE CHIEF JUSTICE, dissenting). 
But in the absence of a congressional solution, courts cannot 
avoid difficult problems by refusing to apply the law. We 
must "take the Copyright Act ... as we find it," Fortnightly 
Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 401-402 (1968), and 
"do as little damage as possible to traditional copyright prin-
ciples ... until the Congress legislates." Id., at 404 (dis-
senting opinion). 
VII 
Insofar as the Court of Appeals held that home VTR re-
cording for personal use is an infringement of copyright, its 
judgment is affirmed. In all other respects, the judgment is 
vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. No costs are allowed. 
It is so ordered. 
A. Dietz, Copyright Law in the European Community 135 (1978). While 
these royalty systems ordinarily depend on the existence of authors' col-
lecting societies, see id., at 119, 136, such collecting societies are a familiar 
part of our copyright law. See generally Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U. S. 1, 4-5 (1979). Fashioning relief 
of this sort, of course, might require bringing other copyright owners into 
court through certification of a class or otherwise. 
. ~ 
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The introduction of the home videotape recorder (VTR) 
upon the market has enabled millions of Americans to make 
recordings of television programs in their own homes, for fu-
ture and repeated viewing at their own convenience. While 
this practice has proved highly popular with owners of televi-
sion sets and VTRs, it understandably has distressed the 
holders of copyrights in the recorded programs. The result 
is the present litigation, raising the questions whether the 
home recording of television programs is an infringement of 
copyright, and, if so, whether the manufacturers and distrib-
utors of VTRs are liable as contributory infringers. We 
have little doubt that these questions ultimately and defini-
tively will be resolved by Congress; our task in the interim is 
to resolve them under existing copyright law. 
I 
In 1976, respondents Universal City Studios, Inc., and 
Walt Disney Productions (the Studios) brought this copyright 
infringement action 1 against petitioners Sony Corporation 
1 The Studios also alleged misrepresentation under § 43(a) of the Trade-
Mark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 441, 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a), and unfair compe-
'. 
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and Sony Corporation of America (Sony), the manufacturers 
and distributors of the Betamax VTR. 2 The Studios sought 
damages, profits, and a wide-ranging injunction against fur-
ther sales or use of the Betamax or Betamax tapes. 
The Betamax, like other VTRs, is capable of recording 
television broadcasts off the air on videotape cassettes, and 
playing them back at a later time. 3 Two types of Betamax 
usage are at issue here. 4 The first is "time-shifting," in 
which the user records a program in order to watch it at a 
later time, and then records over it after a single viewing. 
The second is "library-building," in which the user records a 
program to keep for repeated viewing over a longer term. 
tition and intentional interference with business relationships under state 
law. App. 4. These claims are not before us. 
2 Also named as defendants were a number of retailers that sell the 
Betamax (Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc.; Associated Dry Goods Cor-
poration; Federated Department Stores, Inc.; and Henry's Camera Cor-
poration); the advertising agency employed by Sony Corporation of Amer-
ica to promote the Betamax (Doyle Dane Bernbach, Inc.); and William 
Griffiths, an individual Betamax user. With the exception of Griffiths, 
these defendants are also petitioners here. Except where indicated, we 
refer to the petitioners collectively as "Sony." 
3 The Betamax has three primary components: a tuner that receives 
television ("RF") signals broadcast over the airwaves; an RF adapter that 
converts the RF signals into audio-video signals; and a recorder that 
records the audio-video signals on magnetic tape. Sony also manufactures 
VTRs without built-in tuners; these are capable of playing back prere-
corded tapes and recording home movies on videotape, but cannot record 
off the air. Since the Betamax has its own tuner, it can be used to record 
off one channel while another channel is being watched. 
The Betamax is available with a number of auxiliary features, including a 
timer, a pause control, and a fast-forward control; these features permit 
Betamax owners to record programs without being present, to avoid (if 
they are present) recording commercial messages, and to skip over com-
mercials while playing back the recording. Videotape is reusable; the user 
erases it by taping over the prior recording. 
'This case involves only the home recording for home use of television 
programs broadcast free over the airwaves. No issues are raised concern-
ing cable or pay television, or the sharing or trading of tapes. 
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Sony's advertisements, at various times, have suggested that 
Betamax users "record favorite shows" or "build a library." 
Sony's Betamax advertising has never contained warnings 
about copyright infringement, although a warning appears in 
the Betamax operating instructions. 
The Studios produce copyrighted "movies" and other 
works that they release to theaters and license for television 
broadcast. The Studios also rent and sell their works on film 
and on prerecorded videotapes and videodiscs. License fees 
for television broadcasts are set according to audience rat-
ings, compiled by rating services that do not measure play-
back of videotapes. The Studios claim that VTR recording 
of their works may decrease their revenue from licensing 
their works to television and from marketing them in other 
ways. 
After a five-week trial, the United States District Court 
for the Central District of California, in a detailed opinion, 
ruled that home VTR recording did not infringe the Studios' 
copyrights under either the Act of March 4, 1909 (1909 Act), 
35 Stat. 1075, as amended (formerly codified as 17 U. S. C. 
§ 1 et seq. (1976 ed.)), or the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 
(1976 Act), 90 Stat. 2541, 17 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. (1976 ed., 
Supp. V). 5 The District Court also held that even if home 
VTR recording were an infringement, Sony could not be held 
liable under theories of direct infrin ement, contributory in-
fringement, or vicarious iability. Finally, the District 
Court concluded tllafai1lnjUnction against sales of the 
Betamax would be inappropriate even if Sony were liable 
under one of those theories. 480 F. Supp. 429 (1979). 
5 The Studios introduced evidence at trial of 32 individual instances in 
which their copyrighted works were recorded on Betamax VTRs. Two of 
these instances occurred after January 1, 1978, the primary effective date 
of the 1976 Act; all others occurred while the 1909 Act was still effective. 
Our analysis focuses primarily on the 1976 Act, but, as we show infra, the 
legal principles governing copyright protection for these works under the 
two Acts are the same. 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed in virtually ~11 rj1liec~. 659 F. 2d 963 (1981). It 
held that the 1909 Act and t e 976 Act contained no implied 
exemption for "home use" recording, that home use recording 
was not "fair use," and that the use of the Betamax to record 
the Studios' works therefore infringed their copyrights. The 
Court of Appeals also held Son liable for contributory in-
fri~nt, reasoning that ony knew an expecte t at the 
Betamax would be used to record copyrighted material off 
the air, and that Sony had induced caused or materiall con-
tributed to the inffmgmg con uc . he Court of Appeals 
then ~eration of the question of relief, 
suggesting that the District Court could consider awarding 
damages or a continuing royalty in lieu of an injunction. I d., 
at 976. 
Because of the importance of the issues presented, we 
granted certiorari. 457 U. S. 1116 (1982). 
II 
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, 
empowers Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries." This Nation's initial copyright statute was 
passed by the First Congress. Entitled "An Act for the en-
couragement of learning," it gave an author "the sole right 
and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending" 
his "map, chart, book or books" for a period of 14 years. Act 
of May 31, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 124. Since then, as the technol-
ogy available to authors for creating and preserving their 
writings has changed, the law has changed with it. Through 
many amendments, and through complete revisions in 1831, 
1870, 1909, and 1976,6 authors' rights have been expanded to 
' Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436; Act of July 8, 1870, §§ 85-111, 
16 Stat. 212-217; Act of Mar. 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075 (formerly codified as 17 
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provide protection to any "original works of authorship fixed 
in any tangible medium of expression," including motion pic-
tures and other audiovisual works. 17 U. S. C. § 102(a). 7 
Section 106 of the 1976 Act grants the owner of a copyright 
a variety of exclusive rights in the copyrighted work, 8 includ-
U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1976 ed.)); Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 
2541 (codified as 17 U.S. C. § 101 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. V)). 
7 Section 102(a) provides: 
"Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now 
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, 
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device. Works of authorship include the following categories: 
"(1) literary works; 
"(2) musical works, including any accompanying words; 
"(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; 
"(4) pantomimes and choreographic works; 
"(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; 
"(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and 
"(7) sound recordings." 
"Audiovisual works" are "works that consist of a series of related images 
which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or de-
vices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with 
accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material ob-
jects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied." § 101, ~ 2. 
"Motion pictures" are "audiovisual works consisting of a series of related 
images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion, 
together with accompanying sounds, if any." § 101, ~ 17. Most commer-
cial television programs, if fixed on film or tape at the time of broadcast or 
before, will qualify as "audiovisual works." Since the categories set forth 
in § 102(a) are not mutually exclusive, a particular television program may 
also qualify for protection as a dramatic, musical, or other type of work. 
8 Section 106 provides: 
"Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this 
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: 
"(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
"(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
"(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
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ing the right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or 
phonorecords." 9 This grant is expressly made subject to 
§§ 107-118, which create a number of exemptions and limita-
tions on the copyright owner's rights. The most important 
of these sections, for our present purposes, is § 107; that sec-
tion states that "the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not 
an infringement of copyright." 10 
III 
The 1976 Act, like its predecessors, 11 does not give the 
copyright owner control over all possible uses of his work. 
lending; 
"(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform 
the copyrighted work publicly; and 
"(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi-
vidual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the 
copyrighted work publicly. " 
9 A "phonorecord" is a reproduction of sounds other than sounds ac-
companying an audiovisual work, while a "copy" is a reproduction of a work 
in any form other than a phonorecord. § 101, ~~ 19, 7. 
10 Section 107 provides: 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords 
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy-
right. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
"(!) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work." 
The four factors listed in this section are intended to be "illustrative and 
not limitative." § 101, ~ 14. 
11 The 1976 Act was the product of a revision effort lasting more than 20 
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If the work is put to some use not enumerated in § 106, the 
use is not an infringement. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United 
Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 393-395 (1968). Thus, before consid-
ering whether home videotaping comes within the scope of 
the fair use exemption, we first must inquire whether the 
practice violates the exclusive right "to reproduce the copy-
righted work in copies or phonorecords" granted by§ 106(1). 
A 
Although the word "copies" appears in the plural in 
§ 106(1), it is clear that the making of even a single unau-
thorized copy is prohibited. The Senate and House reports 
explain that "[t]he references to 'copies or phonorecords,' al-
though in the plural, are intended here and throughout the 
bill to include the singular (1 U. S. C. § 1)." 12 1975 Senate 
years. Spurred by the recognition that "significant developments in tech-
nology and communications" had rendered the 1909 Act inadequate, 
S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 47 (1975) (1975 Senate Report); see H. R. Rep. No. 
94-1476, p. 47 (1976) (1976 House Report), Congress in 1955 authorized the 
Copyright Office to prepare a series of studies on all aspects of the existing 
copyright law. Thirty-four studies were prepared and presented to Con-
gress. The Register of Copyrights drafted a comprehensive report with 
recommendations, House Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Re-
vision, Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the 
U. S. Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1961) (Regis-
ter's 1961 Report), and general revision bills were introduced near the end 
of the 88th Congress in 1964. H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1964). The Register issued a second report in 1965, with revised recom-
mendations. House Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revi-
sion, Pt. 6, Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the 
General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law: 1965 Revision Bill, 89th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1965) (Register's Supplementary Report). 
Action on copyright revision was held up from 1967 to 1974 by a dispute on 
cable television, see generally Second Supplementary Report of the Regis-
ter of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law: 
1975 Revision Bill, ch. V, pp. 2-26 (Draft Oct.-Dec. 1975) (Register's Sec-
ond Supplementary Report), but a compromise led to passage of the 
present Act in 1976. 
12 1 U. S. C. § 1 provides in relevant part: 
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Report 58; 1976 House Report 61. The reports then de-
scribe the reproduction right established by § 106(1): 
"[T]he right 'to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies 
or phonorecords' means the right to produce a material 
object in which the work is duplicated, transcribed, imi-
tated, or simulated in a fixed form from which it can be 
'perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, ei-
ther directly or with the aid of a machine or device.' As 
under the present law, a copyrighted work would be in-
fringed by reproducing it in whole or in any substantial 
part, and by duplicating it exactly or by imitation or 
simulation." 1975 Senate Report 58; 1976 House Report 
61. 
The making of even a single videotape recording at home falls 
within this definition; the VTR user produces a material ob-
ject from which the copyrighted work later can be perceived. 
Unless Congress intended a special exemption for the making 
of a single copy for personal use, we must conclude that VTR 
recording is contrary to the exclusive rights granted by 
§ 106(1). 
The 1976 Act and its accompanying reports specify in some 
detail the situations in which a single copy of a copyrighted 
work may be made. Section 108(a), for example, permits a 
library or archives "to reproduce no more than one copy or 
phonorecord of a work" for a patron, but only under certain 
very limited conditions; an entire work, moreover, can be 
copied only if it cannot be obtained elsewhere at a fair price. 13 
"In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context 
indicates otherwise . . . words importing the plural include the 
singular .... " 
13 The library photocopying provisions of § 108 do not excuse from liabil-
ity any person who requests "a copy'' from a library if the requester's use 
exceeds fair use. § 108(f)(2). Moreover, a library is absolved from liabil-
ity for the unsupervised use of its copying equipment if the equipment 
bears a notice informing users that "the making of a copy'' may violate the 
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§ 108(e); see also § 112(a) (broadcaster may "make no more 
than one copy or phonorecord of a particular transmission 
program," and only under certain conditions). In other re-
spects, the making of single copies is permissible only within 
the limited confines of the fair use doctrine. The Senate re-
port, in a section headed "Single and multiple copying," notes 
that the fair use doctrine would permit a teacher to make a 
single copy of a work for his or her own use in the classroom, 
but only if the work was not a "sizable" one such as a novel or 
treatise. 1975 Senate Report 63-64; accord, 1976 House Re-
port 68-69, 71. Other situations in which the making of a 
single copy would be fair use are described in the House and 
Senate reports. 14 But neither the statute nor its legislative 
history suggests any .intent to create a general exemption for 
single copies made for personal or private use. 
Indeed, it appears that Congress considered and rejected 
the possibility of a special private use exemption. The issue 
was raised early in the copyright law revision process, in one 
of the studies prepared for Congress under the supervision of 
the Copyright Office. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted 
Works (1958), reprinted in Senate Committee on the Judi-
ciary, Copyright Law Revision, Studies Prepared for the 
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 
86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1960) (Latman Fair Use Study). 
This study found no reported cases supporting the existence 
of an exemption for private use, although it noted that "the 
purpose and nature of a private use, and in some cases the 
copyright law. § 108(f)(1). 
"For example, "the making of a single copy or phonorecord by an indi-
vidual as a free service for a blind person" would be a fair use, as would "a 
single copy reproduction of an excerpt from a copyrighted work by a callig-
rapher for a single client" or "a single reproduction of excerpts from a copy-
righted work by a student calligrapher or teacher in a learning situation." 
1975 Senate Report 66-67; see 1976 House Report 73-74. Application of 
the fair use doctrine in these situations, of course, would be unnecessary if 
the 1976 Act created a general exemption for the making of single copies. 
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small amount taken, might lead a court to apply the general 
principles of fair use in such a way as to deny liability." !d., 
at 12. After reviewing a number of foreign copyright laws 
that contained explicit statutory exemptions for private or 
personal use, id., at 25, Professor Latman outlined several 
approaches that a revision bill could take to the general issue 
of exemptions and fair use. One of these was the adoption of 
particularized rules to cover specific situations, including 
"the field of personal use." I d., at 33. 15 
Rejecting the latter alternative, the Register of Copy-
rights recommended that the revised copyright statute sim-
ply mention the doctrine of fair use and indicate its general 
scope. The Register opposed the adoption of rules and ex-
emptions to cover specific situations, 16 preferring to rely on 
the judicial fair use doctrine to resolve new problems as they 
arose. See Register's 1961 Report 25; Register's Supple-
mentary Report 27-28. 
The Register's approach was reflected in the first copy-
right revision bills, drafted by the Copyright Office in 1964. 
15 Professor Latman made special mention of the "personal use" issue be-
cause the area was one that 
"has become disturbed by recent developments . . . . Photoduplication 
devices may make authors' and publishers' groups apprehensive. The 
Copyright Charter recently approved by [the International Confederation 
of Societies of Authors and Composers] emphasizes the concern of authors 
over 'private' uses which, because of technological developments, are said 
to be competing seriously with the author's economic interests." Latman 
Fair Use Study 33-34. 
16 The one exemption proposed by the Register, permitting libraries to 
make single photocopies of out-of-print works and of excerpts that request-
ers certified were needed for research, met with opposition and was not 
included in the bills initially introduced in Congress. See Register's 1961 
Report 26; H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Register's 
Supplementary Report 26. A library copying provision was restored to 
the bill in 1969, after pressure from library associations. Register's Sec-
ond Supplementary Report, ch. III, pp. 10-11; seeS. 543, 91st Cong., 1st 
Sess., § 108 (Comm. Print Dec. 10, 1969); 1975 Senate Report 48. 
' . 
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These bills, like the 1976 Act, granted copyright owners the 
exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted work, subject 
only to the exceptions set out in later sections. H. R. 
1194 7/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., § 5(a) (1964). The pri-
mary exception was the fair use doctrine, id., § 6, containing 
language virtually identical to § 107 of the 1976 Act. Al-
though the copyright revision bills changed in many respects 
from their first introduction in 1964 to final passage in 1976, 
those portions of the bills did not change. 17 We can conclude 
only that Congress, like the Register, intended to rely on the 
fair use doctrine, not a per se exemption for private use, to 
separate permissible copying from the impermissible. 18 
17 The 1964 bills provided that the fair use of copyrighted material for 
purposes "such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholar-
ship, or research" was not an infringement of copyright, and listed four 
"factors to be considered" in determining whether a particular use was fair. 
H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., § 6 (1964). Revised bills, 
drafted by the Copyright Office in 1965, contained a fair use provision 
merely mentioning the doctrine but not indicating its scope: "Notwith-
standing the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work is 
not an infringement of copyright." H. R. 4347/S. 1006, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess., § 107 (1965). The House Judiciary Committee restored the provi-
sion to its earlier wording, H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 
5, 58 (1966), and the language adopted by the Committee remained in the 
bill in later Congresses. See H. R. 2512/S, 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 
§ 107 (1967); S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1969); S. 644, 92d Cong., 
1st Sess., § 107 (1971); S. 1361, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1973); H. R. 
2223/S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1975). With a few additions by 
the House Judiciary Committee in 1976, see 1976 House Report 5; H. R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 94-1733, p. 70 (1976), the same language appears in§ 107 of 
the 1976 Act. 
18 In Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d 
1345 (1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975), decided 
during the process of revising the copyright statutes, the Court of Claims 
suggested that copying for personal use might be outside the scope of copy-
right protection under the 1909 Act. The court reasoned that because 
"hand copying" for personal use has always been regarded as permissible, 
and because the practice of making personal copies continued after type-
writers and photostat machines became available, the making of personal 
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When Congress intended special treatment for private use, 
moreover, it said so explicitly. One such explicit statement 
appears in § 106 itself. The copyright owner's exclusive 
right to perform a copyrighted work, unlike the right to re-
produce the work in copies, is limited. Section 106(4) grants 
a copyright owner the exclusive right to perform the work 
"publicly," but does not restrict private performances by oth-
ers. A motion picture is "performed" whenever its images 
are shown or its sounds are made audible. § 101, ~ 18. Like 
"sing[ing] a copyrighted lyric in the shower," Twentieth Cen-
copies by any other means should be permissible as well. I d., at 84-88, 
487 F. 2d, at 1350-1352. 
There appear to us to be several flaws in this reasoning. First, it is by 
no means clear that the making of a "hand copy" of an entire work is per-
missible; the most that can be said is that there are no reported cases on 
the subject, possibly because no copyright owner ever has thought it 
worthwhile to sue. See Latman Fair Use Study 11-12; 3 M. Nimmer, 
Copyright § 13.05[E][4][a] (1982). At least one early treatise asserted 
that infringement would result "if an individual made copies for his per-
sonal use, even in his own handwriting, as there is no rule of law excepting 
manuscript copies from the law ofinfringment." A. Weil, American Copy-
right Law § 1066 (1917). Second, hand copying or even copying by type-
writer is self-limiting. The drudgery involved in making hand copies ordi-
narily ensures that only necessary and fairly small portions of a work are 
taken; it is unlikely that any user would make a hand copy as a substitute 
for one tl\at could be purchased. The harm to the copyright owner from 
hand copying thus is minimal. The recent advent of inexpensive and 
readily available copying machines, however, has changed the dimensions 
of the problem dramatically. See Register's Second Supplementary Re-
port ch. III, p. 3; Hearings on H. R. 2223 before the Subcommittee on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Ju-
diciary Committee, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 194 (1975) (1975 House Hear-
ings) (remarks of Rep. Danielson); id., at 234 (statement of Robert W. 
Cairns); id., at 250 (remarks of Rep. Danielson); id., at 354 (testimony of 
Irwin Karp); id., at 467 (testimony of Rondo Cameron); id., at 1795 (testi-
mony of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights). Thus, "[t]he supposi-
tion that there is no tort involved in a scholar copying a copyrighted text by 
hand does not much advance the question of machine copying." B. Kap-
lan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 101-102 (1967). 
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tury Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 155 (1975), watch-
ing television at home with one's family and friends is now 
considered a performance. 1975 Senate Report 59-60; 1976 
House Report 63. 19 Home television viewing nevertheless 
does not infringe any copyright-but only because § 106(4) 
contains the word "publicly." 20 See generally 1975 Senate 
Report 60-61; 1976 House Report 63--64; Register's 1961 Re-
port 29--30. No such distinction between public and private 
uses appears in § 106(1)'s prohibition on the making of 
copies. 21 
Similarly, an explicit reference to private use appears in 
§ 108. Under that section, a library can make a copy for a 
patron only for specific types of private uses: "private study, 
scholarship, or research." 22 § 108(d)(l) and (e)(1); see also 37 
19 In a trio of cases, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 
398 (1968); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 
415 U. S. 394, 403-405 (1974); and Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Ai-
ken, 422 U. S. 151 (1975), this Court held that the reception of a radio or 
television broadcast was not a "performance" under the 1909 Act. .The 
Court's "narrow construction" of the word "perform" was "completely 
overturned by the [1976 Act] and its broad definition of 'perform' in section 
101." 1976 House Report 87. 
20 A work is performed "publicly" if it takes place "at a place open to the 
public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a 
normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered." § 101, 
1\23(1). 
21 One purpose of the exemption for private performances was to permit 
the home viewing of lawfully made videotapes. The Register noted in 
1961 that "[n]ew technical devices will probably make it practical in the fu-
ture to reproduce televised motion pictures in the home. We do not be-
lieve the private use of such a reproduction can or should be precluded by 
copyright." Register's 1961 Report 30 (emphasis added). Significantly, 
the Register did not suggest that the private making of a reproduction of a 
televised motion picture would be permitted by the copyright law. The 
Register later reminded Congress that "[i]n general the concept of 'per-
formance' must be distinguished sharply from the reproduction of copies." 
Register's Supplementary Report 22. 
22 During hearings on this provision, Representative Danielson inquired 
whether it would apply to works of fiction such as "Gone With the Wind," 
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CFR § 201.14(b) (1982). Limits also are imposed on the ex-
tent of the copying and the type of institution that may make 
copies, and the exemption expressly is made inapplicable to 
motion pictures and certain other types of works. § 108(h). 
These limitations would be wholly superfluous if an entire 
copy of any work could be made by any person for private 
use. 23 
B 
The District Court in this case nevertheless concluded that 
the 1976 Act contained an implied exemption for "home-use 
recording." 480 F. Supp., at 444-446. The court relied pri-
marily on the legislative history of a 1971 amendment to the 
1909 Act. That amendment addressed the specific problem 
of commercial piracy of sound recordings. Act of Oct. 15, 
1971, 85 Stat. 391 (1971 Amendment). The House report on 
the 1971 Amendment, in a section entitled "Home Record-
ing," contained the following statement: 
"In approving the creation of a limited copyright in 
sound recordings it is the intention of the Committee 
that this limited copyright not grant any broader rights 
than are accorded to other copyright proprietors under 
the existing title 17. Specifically, it is not the intention 
of the Committee to restrain the home recording, from 
broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded perfor-
mances, where the home recording is for private use and 
or whether it was limited to "strictly technical types of information." The 
uncontradicted response was that it would apply only in "general terms of 
science . .. [and] the useful arts." 1975 House Hearings 251 (testimony of 
Robert W. Cairns); cf. id., at 300 (statement of Harry Rosenfield) ("We are 
not asking ... for the right to copy 'Gone With the Wind' "). 
23 The House and Senate reports' mention of situations in which copies 
for private use would be permissible under the fair use doctrine-for exam-
ple, the making of a free copy for a blind person, 1975 Senate Report 66; 
1975 Senate Report 73, or the "recordings of performances by music stu-
dents for purposes of analysis and criticism," 1975 Senate Report 63-
would of course be superfluous as well. See n. 14, supra. 
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with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing 
commercially on it. This practice is common and unre-
strained today, and the record producers and performers 
would be in no different position from that of the owners 
of copyright in recorded musical compositions over the 
past 20 years." H. R. Rep. No. 92-487, p. 7 (1971) 
(1971 House Report). 
Similar statements were made during House hearings on the 
bill 24 and on the House floor, 25 although not in the Senate pro-
24 The following exchange took place during the testimony of Barbara 
Ringer, then Assistant Register of Copyrights: 
"[Rep.] Biester. . .. I can tell you I must have a small pirate in my own 
home. My son has a cassette tape recorder, and as a particular record be-
comes a hit, he will retrieve it onto his little set. ... [T]his legislation, of 
course, would not point to his activities, would it? 
"Miss Ringer. I think the answer is clearly, 'No, it would not.' I have 
spoken at a couple of seminars on video cassettes lately, and this question 
is usually asked: 'What about the home recorders?' The answer I have 
given and will give again is that this is something you cannot control. You 
simply cannot control it. My own opinion, whether this is philosophical 
dogma or not, is that sooner or later there is going to be a crunch here. 
But that is not what this legislation is addressed to, and I do not see the 
crunch coming in the immediate future. . . . I do not see anybody going 
into anyone's home and preventing this sort of thing, or forcing legislation 
that would engineer a piece of equipment not to allow home taping.'' 
Hearings on S. 646 and H. R. 6927 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 22-23 (1971) 
(1971 House Hearings). 
26 Shortly before passage of the bill, a colloquy took place between Rep-
resentative Kastenmeier, chairman of the House subcommittee that pro-
duced the bill, and Representative Kazen, who was not on the committee: 
"Mr. Kazen. Am I correct in assuming that the bill protects copy-
righted material that is duplicated for commercial purposes only? 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Yes. 
"Mr. Kazen. In other words, if your child were to record off of a pro-
gram which comes through the air on the radio or television, and then used 
it for her own personal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this use would not 
be included under the penalties of this bill? 
. • 
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ceedings. In concluding that these statements created a 
general exemption for home recording, the District Court, in 
our view, paid too little heed to the context in which the 
statements were made, and failed to consider the limited pur-
poses of the 1971 Amendment and the structure of the 1909 
Act. 
Unlike television broadcasts and other types of motion pic-
tures, sound recordings were not protected by copyright 
prior to passage of the 1971 Amendment. Although the un-
derlying musical work could be copyrighted, the 1909 Act 
provided no protection for a particular performer's rendition 
of the work. Moreover, copyrighted musical works that had 
been recorded for public distribution were subject to a "com-
pulsory license": any person was free to record such a work 
upon payment of a 2-cent royalty to the copyright owner. 
§ 1(e), 35 Stat. 107~1076. Although reproduction without 
payment of the royalty was an infringement under the 1909 
Act, damages were limited to three times the amount of the 
unpaid royalty. § 25(e), 35 Stat. 1081-1082; Shapiro, Bern-
stein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F. 2d 260, 262-263, 265 (CA21957), 
cert. denied, 355 U. S. 952 (1958). Notably, it was observed 
that the practical effect of these provisions was to legalize 
record piracy. See S. Rep. No. 92-72, p. 4 (1971); 1971 
House Report 2. 
In order to suppress this piracy, the 1971 Amendment ex-
tended copyright protection beyond the underlying work to 
sound recordings themselves. Congress chose, however, to 
provide only limited protection: owners of copyright in sound 
recordings were given the exclusive right "[t]o reproduce 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. This is not included in the bill. I am glad the gen-
tleman raises the point. 
"On page 7 of the report, under 'Home Recordings,' Members will note 
that under the bill the same practice which prevails today is called for; 
namely, this is considered both presently and under the proposed law to be 
fair use. The child does not do this for commercial purposes. This is 
made clear in the report." 117 Cong. Rec. 34748-34749 (1971) . 
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[their works] and distribute [them] to the public." 1971 
Amendment, § 1(a), 85 Stat. 391 (formerly codified as 17 
U. S. C. § 1(f) (1976 ed.)). 26 This right was merely the right 
of commercial distribution. See 117 Cong. Rec. 34748-34749 
(1971) (colloquy of Reps. Kazen & Kastenmeier) ("the bill 
protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for commer-
cial purposes only"). 
Against this background, the statements regarding home 
recording under the 1971 Amendment appear in a different 
light. If home recording was "common and unrestrained" 
under the 1909 Act, see 1971 House Report 7, it was because 
sound recordings had no copyright protection and the owner 
of a copyright in the underlying musical work could collect no 
more than a 2-cent royalty plus 6 cents in damages for each 
unauthorized use. With so little at stake, it is not surprising 
that the Assistant Register "d[id] not see anybody going into 
anyone's home and preventing this sort of thing." 1971 
House Hearings 23. 
But the references to home sound recording in the 1971 
Amendment's legislative history do not demonstrate any con-
gressional intent to create a generalized home use exemption 
from copyright protection. Congress addressed only sound 
recordings and merely recognized that the 1909 Act had been 
unsuccessful in controlling home sound recording; the 1971 
Amendment was addressed to a different problem, that of 
commercial record piracy. To quote Assistant Register 
26 The 1909 Act's grant of an exclusive right to "copy,"§ 1(a), was of no 
assistance to the owner of a copyright in a sound recording, because a re-
production of a sound recording was technically considered not to be a 
"copy." See 1971 House Hearings 18 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, As-
sistant Register of Copyrights); 1971 Amendment, § 1(e), 85 Stat. 391 (for-
merly codified as 17 U. S. C. § 26 (1976 ed.)) ("For the purposes of [speci-
fied sections, not including § 1(a)], but not for any other purpose, a 
reproduction of a [sound recording] shall be considered to be a copy 
thereof"). This concept is carried forward into the 1976 Act, which 
distinguishes between "copies" and "phonorecords." Seen. 9, supra. 
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Ringer again, home use was "not what this legislation [was] 
addressed to." 1971 House Hearings 22. 'l:7 
While the 1971 Amendment merely narrowed the sound re-
cordings loophole in prjor copyright law, motion pictures and 
other audiovisual works have been accorded full copyright 
protection since at least 1912, see Act of Aug. 24, 1912, 37 
Stat. 488, and perhaps before, see Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 
240 (CA3 1903), app. dism'd, 195 U. S. 625 (1904). Congress 
continued this protection in the 1976 Act. Unlike the sound 
recording rights created by the 1971 Amendment, the re-
production rights associated with motion pictures under 
§ 106(1) are not limited to reproduction for public distribu-
tion; the copyright owner's right to reproduce the work ex-
ists independently, and the "mere duplication of a copy may 
constitute an infringement even if it is never distributed." 
Register's Supplementary Report 16; see 1975 Senate Report 
57; 1976 House Report 61. Moreover, the 1976 Act was in-
tended as a comprehensive treatment of all aspects of copy-
right law. The reports accompanying the 1976 Act, unlike 
the 1971 House report, contain no suggestion that home-use 
recording is somehow outside the scope of this all-inclusive 
statute. It was clearly the intent of Congress that no addi-
tional exemptions were to be implied. 28 
21 During consideration of the 1976 Act, Congress, of course, was well 
aware of the limited nature of the protection granted to sound recordings 
under the 1971 Amendment. See 1975 House Hearings 113 (testimony of 
Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights) (1971 Amendment "created a 
copyright in a sound recording ... but limited it to the particular situation 
of so-called piracy"); id., at 1380 (letter from John Lorenz, Acting Librar-
ian of Congress) (under 1971 Amendment "only the unauthorized reproduc-
tion and distribution to the public of copies of the sound recording is pro-
hibited. Thus, the duplication of sound recordings for private, personal 
use and the performance of sound recordings through broadcasting or 
other means are outside the scope of the amendment"). 
28 Representative Kastenmeier, the principal House sponsor of the 1976 
revision bill and chairman of the House subcommittee that produced it, 
made this explicit on the opening day of the House hearings: 
"[F]rom time to time, certain areas have not been covered in the bill. But 
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We find in the 1976 Act no implied exemption to cover the 
home taping of television programs, whether it be for single 
copies, for private use, or for home use. Thus, taping a 
copyrighted television program is infringement unless it is 
permitted by the fair use exemption contained in § 107 of the 
1976 Act. 
IV 
The doctrine of fair use has been called, with some justifi-
cation, "the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright." 
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F. 2d 661, 662 (CA2 
1939); see Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder 
Newspapers, Inc., 626 F. 2d 1171, 1174 (CA51980); Meeropol 
v. Nizer, 560 F. 2d 1061, 1068 (CA2 1977), cert. denied, 434 
U. S. 1013 (1978). Although courts have constructed lists of 
factors to be considered in determining whether a particular 
use is fair, 29 no fixed criteria have emerged by which that 
is it not the case, this being a unified code, that the operation of the bill 
does apply whether or not we specifically deal with a subject or not? ... 
"Therefore, we can really not fail to deal with an issue. It will be dealt 
with one way or the other. The code, title 17, will cover it. So we have 
made a conscious decision even by omission. . . . 
"By virtue of passing this bill, we will deal with every issue. Whether 
we deal with it completely or not for the purpose of resolving the issues 
involved is the only question, not whether it has dealt with the four corners 
of the bill because the four corners of the bill will presume to deal with ev-
erything in copyright." 1975 House Hearings 115. 
29 The precise phrase "fair use" apparently did not enter the case law 
until 1869, see Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (No. 8,136) (CC 
Mass.), but the doctrine itself found early expression in Folsom v. Marsh, 
9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (CC Mass. 1841). Justice Story was faced there 
with the "intricate and embarrassing questio[n]" whether a biography con-
taining copyrighted letters was "a justifiable use of the original materials, 
such as the law recognizes as no infringement of the copyright of the plain-
tiffs." Id., at 344, 348. In determining whether the use was permitted, 
said Justice Story, it was necessary to consider "the nature and objects of 
the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the 
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or 
supersede the objects, of the original work ... . Much must, in such cases, 
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determination can be made. This Court thus far has pro-
vided no guidance; although fair use issues twice before have 
come to this Court, on each occasion the Court was equally 
divided and no opinions issued. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. 
United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d 1345 (1973), aff'd, 420 
U. S. 376 (1975); Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F. 2d 532 (CA9 
1956), aff'd, 356 U. S. 43 (1958). 
Nor did Congress provide clear rules when it codified the 
fair use doctrine in the 1976 Act; it simply incorporated a list 
of "factors to be considered": the "purpose and character of 
the use," the "nature of the copyrighted work," the "amount 
and substantiality of the portion used," and the "effect of the 
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work." § 107. No particular weight was assigned to any 
one of these, and the list was not intended to be exclusive. 
The House and Senate reports explain that § 107 does no 
more than give "statutory recognition" to the fair use doc-
trine; it was intended "to restate the present judicial doctrine 
of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." 
1976 House Report 66. See 1975 Senate Report 62; S. Rep. 
No. 93-983, p. 116 (1974); H. R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess., p. 32 (1967); H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d 
Sess., p. 61 (1966). 
A 
Despite this lack of clear standards, the fair use doctrine 
plays a crucial role in the law of copyright. The purpose of 
depend upon the nature of the new work, the value and extent of the 
copies, and the degree in which the original authors may be injured 
thereby." Id., at 348--349. 
Similar lists have been developed by later courts. E. g., Tennessee 
Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F. 2d 279, 283 (CA5), cert. de-
nied, 398 U. S. 928 (1970); Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 
F. 2d 73, 85 (CA6 1943); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcast-
ing Co., 137 F . Supp. 348 (SD Cal. 1955); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P. 
F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. 40, 43 (SDNY 1934); Hill v. Whalen & 
Martell , Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (SDNY 1914). 
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copyright protection, in the words of the Constitution, is to 
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." Copy-
right is based on the belief that by granting authors the 
exclusive rights to reproduce their works, they are given an 
incentive to create, and that "encouragement of individual ef-
fort by personal gain is the best way to advance public wei.:. 
fare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science 
and the useful Arts."' Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 219 
(1954). The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards 
the individual author in order to benefit the public. Twenti-
eth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1975); 
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127-128 (1932); see 
H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7 (1909). 
There are situations, nevertheless, in which strict enforce-
ment of this monopoly would inhibit the very "Progress of 
Science and useful Arts" that copyright is intended to pro-
mote. A clear example is the scholar or researcher whose 
own work depends on the ability to refer to and to quote the 
work of prior scholars. Obviously, no author could create a 
new work if he were first required to repeat the research of 
every author who had gone before him. 30 The scholar, like 
the ordinary user, of course could be left to bargain with each 
copyright owner for permission to quote from or refer to 
prior works. But there is a crucial difference between the 
ordinary user and the scholar. When the ordinary user de-
cides that the owner's price is too high, and forgoes use of the 
work, only the individual user is harmed. When the scholar 
forgoes the use of a prior work, not only does his own work 
suffer, but the public is deprived of his contribution to knowl-
edge. The scholar's work, in other words, produces external 
benefits from which we all profit. In such a case, the fair use 
30 "The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our 
predecessors. 'A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see far-
ther than the giant himself."' Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copy-
right: I, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 511 (1945). 
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doctrine acts as a form of subsidy-albeit at the first author's 
expense-to permit the second author to make limited use of 
the first author's work for the public good. See Latman Fair 
Use Study 31; Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Struc-
tural Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 
Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1630 (1982). 
A similar subsidy may be appropriate in a range of areas 
other than pure scholarship. The situations in which fair use 
is most commonly recognized are listed in§ 107 itself; fair use 
may be found when a work is used "for purposes such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching, ... scholarship, 
or research." The House and Senate reports expand on this 
list somewhat, 31 and other examples may be found in the case 
law. 32 Each of these uses, however, reflects a common 
theme: each is a productive use, resulting in some added ben-
efit to the public beyond that produced by the first author's 
work. 33 The fair use doctrine, in other words, permits works 
31 Quoting from the Register's 1961 Report, the Senate and House re-
ports give examples of possible fair uses: 
"quotation of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or 
comment; quotation of short passages in a scholarly or technical work, for 
illustration or clarification of the author's observations; use in a parody of 
some of the content of the work parodied; summary of an address or arti-
cle, with brief quotations, in a news report; reproduction by a library of a 
portion of a work to replace part of a damaged copy; reproduction by a 
teacher or student of a small part of a work to illustrate a lesson; reproduc-
tion of a work in legislative or judicial proceedings or reports; incidental 
and fortuitous reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast, of a work located 
in the scene of an event being recorded." 1975 Senate Report 61-62; 1976 
House Report 65. 
32 E. g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 
626 F. 2d 1171 (CA5 1980) (comparative advertising). 
33 Professor Seltzer has characterized these lists of uses as "reflect[ing] 
what in fact the subject matter of fair use has in the history of its adjudica-
tion consisted in: it has always had to do with the use by a second author of 
a first author's work." L. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright 
24 (1978) (emphasis removed). He distinguishes "the mere reproduction 
of a work in order to use it for its intrinsic purpose-to make what might be 
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to be used for "socially laudable purposes." See Copyright 
Office, Briefing Papers on Current Issues, reprinted in 1975 
House Hearings 2051, 2055. We are aware of no case in 
which the reproduction of a copyrighted work for the sole 
benefit of the user has been held to be fair use. 34 
We do not mean to suggest, of course, that every produc-
tive use is a fair use. A finding of fair use still must depend 
on the facts of the individual case, and on whether, under the 
circumstances, it is reasonable to expect the user to bargain 
with the copyright owner for use of the work. The fair use 
doctrine must strike a balance between the dual risks created 
by the copyright system: on the one hand, that depriving au-
thors of their monopoly will reduce their incentive to create, 
and, on the other, that granting authors a complete monopoly 
will reduce the creative ability of others. 35 The inquiry is 
called the 'ordinary' use of it." When copies are made for "ordinary" use 
of the work, "ordinary infringement has customarily been triggered, not 
notions of fair use." Ibid. (emphasis in original). See also M. Nimmer, 
Copyright § 13. 05[A][1] (1982) ("Use of a work in each of the foregoing con-
texts either necessarily or usually involves its use in a derivative work"). 
34 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d 
1345 (1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975), in-
volved the photocopying of scientific journal articles; the Court of Claims 
stressed that the libraries performing the copying were "devoted solely to 
the advancement and dissemination of medical knowledge," 203 Ct. Cl., at 
91, 487 F. 2d, at 1354, and that "medical science would be seriously hurt if 
such library photocopying were stopped," id., at 95, 487 F. 2d, at 1356. 
Whether the Williams & Wilkins court was right or wrong in concluding 
that these copying practices were fair use, we doubt that the court would 
have reached the same result if it had not believed the practices at issue 
had such serious consequences for the progress of science. 
The issue of library copying is now covered by § 108 of the 1976 Act. 
That section, which Congress regarded as "authoriz[ing] certain photo-
copying practices which may not qualify as a fair use," 1975 Senate Report 
67; 1976 House Report 74, permits the making of copies only for "private 
study, scholarship, or research." § 108(d)(1) and (e)(1). 
36 In the words of Lord Mansfield: "[W]e must take care to guard against 
two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have 
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necessarily a flexible one, and the endless variety of situa-
tions that may arise precludes the formulation of exact rules. 
But when a user reproduces an entire work and uses it for its 
original purpose, with no added benefit to the public, the doc-
trine of fair use generally does not apply. There is no need 
to provide the ordinary user with a fair use subsidy at the au-
thor's expense. 
The making of a videotape recording for home viewing is 
an ordinary rather than a productive use of the Studios' copy-
righted works. The District Court found that "Betamax 
owners use the copy for the same purpose as the original. 
They add nothing of their own." 480 F. Supp., at 453. Al-
though applying the fair use doctrine to home VTR record-
ing, as Sony argues, may increase public access to material 
broadcast free over the public airwaves, we think Sony's ar-
gument misconceives the nature of copyright. Copyright 
gives the author a right to limit or even cut off access to his 
work. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127 (1932). 
A VTR recording creates no public benefits sufficient to jus-
tify limiting this right. Nor is this right extinguished by the 
copyright owner's choice to make the work available over the 
public airwaves. Section 106 of the 1976 Act grants the 
copyright owner the exclusive right to control the perform-
ance and the reproduction of his work, and the fact that he 
has licensed a single television performance is irrelevant to 
the existence of his right to control its reproduction. Al-
though a television broadcast may be free to the viewer, this 
fact is equally irrelevant; a book borrowed from the public li-
brary may not be copied any more freely than a book that is 
purchased. 
employed their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived 
of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the 
other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the 
progress of the arts be retarded." Sayre v. Moore, 1 East 361 n. (b), 102 
Eng. Rep. 139, 140 n. (b) (K.B. 1785). See Register's Supplementary Re-
port 13. 
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It may seem tempting to stretch the doctrine of fair use so 
as to permit unfettered use of this new technology in order to 
increase access to television programming. But such an ex-
tension would risk eroding the very basis of copyright law, by 
depriving authors of control over their works and conse-
quently of their incentive to create. 36 Even in the context of 
highly productive educational uses, Congress has avoided 
this temptation; in passing the 1976 Act, Congress made 
clear that off-the-air videotaping was to be permitted only in 
very limited situations. See 1976 House Report 71; 1975 
Senate Report 64. And, the Senate report adds, "[t]he com-
mittee does not intend to suggest . . . that off-the-air record-
ing for convenience would under any circumstances, be con-
sidered 'fair use.'" I d., at 66. We cannot disregard these 
admonitions. 
B 
We recognize, nevertheless, that there are situations 
where permitting even an unproductive use would have no 
36 This point was brought home repeatedly by the Register of Copy-
rights. Mentioning the "multitude of technological developments" since 
passage of the 1909 Act, including "remarkable developments in the use of 
video tape," Register's Supplementary Report xiv-xv, the Register 
cautioned: 
"I realize, more clearly now than I did in 1961, that the revolution in 
communications has brought with it a serious challenge to the author's 
copyright. This challenge comes not only from the ever-growing commer-
cial interests who wish to use the author's works for private gain. An 
equally serious attack has come from people with a sincere interest in the 
public welfare who fully recognize . . . 'that the real heart of civilization 
... owes its existence to the author'; ironically, in seeking to make the au-
thor's works widely available by freeing them from copyright restrictions, 
they fail to realize that they are whittling away the very thing that nur-
tures authorship in the first place. An accommodation among conflicting 
demands must be worked out, true enough, but not by denying the funda-
mental constitutional directive: to encourage cultural progress by securing 
the author's exclusive rights to him for a limited time." Id ., at xv; see 
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effect on the author's incentive to create, that is, where the 
use would not affect the value of, or the market for, the au-
thor's work. Photocopying an old newspaper clipping to 
send to a friend may be one example; copying a quotation to 
pin on one's bulletin board may be another. In each of these 
cases, the effect on the author can truly be said to be de 
minimis. Thus, even though these uses provide no benefit to 
the public at large, no purpose is served by preserving the 
author's monopoly, and the use may be regarded as fair. 
Courts should move with caution, however, in depriving 
authors of protection from unproductive "ordinary" uses. 
Even in the case of a productive use, § 107(4) requires consid-
eration of "the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or value of the copyrighted work" (emphasis added). "[A] 
particular use which may seem to have little or no economic 
impact on the author's rights today can assume tremendous 
importance in times to come." Register's Supplementary 
Report 14. Although. such a use may seem harmless when 
viewed in isolation, "[i]solated instances of minor infringe-
ments, when multiplied many times, become in the aggregate 
a major inroad on copyright that must be prevented." 1975 
Senate Report 65. 
We conclude that, at least when the proposed use is an un-
productive one, a copyright owner need rove only a poten-
tial for harm to the mar et or alue of the co 1g ed 
work. See . Nimmer, Copyright § 13.05[E][4][c], at 
13:84 (1982). Proof of actual harm, or even probable harm, 
may be impossible in an area where the effect of a new tech-
nology is speculative, and requiring such proof would present 
the "real danger ... of confining the scope of an author's 
rights on the basis of the present technology so that, as the 
years go by, his copyright loses much of its value because of 
unforeseen technical advances." Register's Supplementary 
Report 14. I~ingement thus will be found if the copyright 
o~er demonstrates a reasonable PQSSibw~ that harm ~ll 
result from tlie proposed use. When the use is one t'hat ere-
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ates no benefit to the public at large, copyright protection 
cannot be denied on the basis that a new technology that ~ 
result in harm has not done so yet. 
The Studios have identified a number of ways in which 
VTR recording could damage their copyrights. VTR re-
cording could reduce their ability to market their works in 
movie theaters and through the rental or sale of pre-recorded 
videotapes or videodiscs; it also could reduce their rerun au-
dience, and consequently the license fees available to them 
for repeated showings. Moreover, advertisers may be will-
ing to pay for only "live" viewing audiences, if they believe 
VTR viewers will delete commercials or if rating services are 
unable to measure VTR use; if this is the case, VTR record-
ing could reduce the license fees the Studios are able to 
charge even for first-run showings. Library-building may 
raise the potential for each of the types of harm identified by 
the Studios, and time-shifting may raise the potential for sub-
stantial harm as well. 37 
31 A VTR owner who has taped a favorite motion picture for repeated 
viewing may be less likely to rent or buy a tape containing the same motion 
picture, watch a televised rerun, or pay to see the picture at a theater. 
Although time-shifting may not replace theater or rerun viewing or the 
purchase of prerecorded tapes or discs, it may well replace rental usage; a 
VTR user who has recorded a first-run motion picture for later viewing will 
have no need to rent a copy when he wants to see it. Both library-builders 
and time-shifters may avoid commercials; the library builder may use the 
pause control to record without them, and all users may fast-forward 
through commercials on playback. 
The Studios introduced expert testimony that both time-shifting and 
librarying would tend to decrease their revenue from copyrighted works. 
See 480 F. Supp., at 440. The District Court's findings also show substan-
tial library-building and avoidance of commercials. Both parties submit-
ted surveys showing that the average Betamax user owns between 25 and 
32 tapes. The Studios' survey showed that at least 40% of users had more 
than 10 tapes in a "library"; Sony's survey showed that more than 40% of 
users planned to view their tapes more than once; and both parties' surveys 
showed that commercials were avoided at least 25% of the time. See id., 
at 438-439. 
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The District Court found that the Studios had suffered no 
actual harm through VTR use, and that they were unable to 
predict the point at which harm would occur. 480 F. Supp., 
at 451. Because the Studios' prediction of harm was "based 
on so many assumptions and on a system of marketing which 
is rapidly changing," the court was "hesitant to identify 
'probable effects' of home-use copying." Id., at 452. The 
District Court's reluctance to engage in prediction in this 
area is understandable,. but we conclude that some degree of 
prediction is required. As we have explained above, we do 
not agree with the District Court that VTR recording would 
be fair use even if some potential for harm were shown. Be-
cause the District Court made no specific findings regarding 
the possibility of harm, we remand for reconsideration of this 
issue. 
v ~~ 
From the Stug~s' 2erspec~ve, the consequences of home 
VTR recording are the same as if a business had taped the 
Studios' works off the air, duplicated the tapes, and sold or 
rented them to members of the public for home viewing. 
The only: distin<;.t.ion is that home VTR users do not record for 
commercial advantage; the commercial benefit accrues to the 
manufacturers and distriliutors of the ~x. We next 
discuss w ether these manufacturers and distributors can be 
held contributorily liable if the product they sell is used to 
infringe. 
It is well established that liability for copyright infringe-
ment can be imposed on persons other than those who actu-
ally carry out the infringing activity. Kalem Co. v. Harper 
Brothers, 222 U. S. 55, 62-63 (1911); 3 M. Nimmer, Copy-
right § 12.04[A] (1982); see Twentieth Century Music Corp. 
v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 160, n. 11 (1975); Buck v. Jewell-La-
Salle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 198 (1931). Although the j 
liability provision of the 1976 Act provides simply that "[a]ny-
one who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright 
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owner ... is an infringer of the copyright," 17 U. S. C. 
§ 501(a), the House and Senate reports demonstrate that 
Congress intended to retain judicial doctrines of contributory 
infringement. 1975 Senate Report 57; 1976 House Report 
61.38 
The doctrine of contributory co~ight infr~ent, how-
ever, is not well-defi.nea:---One of the few attempts at defini-
tion appears in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Art-
'- ists Management, Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159 (CA2 1971). The 
Gershwin court stated that "one who, with knowledge of the 
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes 
to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 
'contributory' infringer." !d., at 1162 (footnote omitted). 
While we have no quarrel with this general statement, it does 
not resolve this case; the District Court and the Court of Ap-
peals, both purporting to apply it, reached diametrically op-
posed results. 
A 
In absolving Sony from liability, the District Court rea-
soned that Sony had no direct involvement with individual 
Betamax users, did not participate in any off-the-air copying, 
and did not know that such copying was an infringement of 
the Studios' copyright. 480 F. Supp., at 460. We agree 
with the Gershwin court that contributo,.a liability may be 
imposed even when there has been no direct contact between 
the defendant and tlie fn.i'ringer. -rhe defendant in Gershwin 
was a concert promoter operanng through local concert asso-
38 This intent is further manifested by several provisions of the 1976 Act 
that exempt from liability persons who, while not participating directly in 
any infringing activity, could otherwise be charged with contributory in-
fringement. See § 108(f)(1) (library not liable "for the unsupervised use of 
reproducing equipment located on its premises," provided that certain 
warnings are posted); § 110(6) ("governmental body'' or "nonprofit agricul-
tural or horticultural organization" not liable for infringing performance by 
concessionaire "in the course of an annual agricultural or horticultural fair 
or exhibition"). 
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ciations that it sponsored; it had no contact with the infring-
ing performers themselves. 443 F. 2d, at 1162--1163; see 
also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S., at J 
160, n. 11. Moreover, a finding of contributory infringement 
has never depended on actual knowledge of particular in-
stances of infringement; it is sufficient that the defendant 
have reason to know that infringement 1s takin place. 443 
F. ~d, at 1162; see Screen Gems- olumbia Music, Inc. v. 
Mark-FiRecords, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (SDNY 1966).39 In 
the so-called "dance hall" cases, in which questions of con-
tributory infringement arise with some frequency, propri-
etors of entertainment establishments routinely are held lia-
ble for unauthorized performances on their premises, even 
when they have no knowledge that copyrighted works are 
being performed. In effect, the proprietors in these cases I 
are charged with c,onst..,ructive knowledge of performances 
taking place on their premises. 40 
89 In Screen Gems, on which the Gershwin court relied, the court held 
that liability could be imposed on a shipper of unauthorized "bootleg" 
records and a radio station that broadcast advertisements of the records, 
provided they knew or should have known that the records were infring-
ing. The court concluded that the records' low price and the manner in 
which they were marketed could support a finding of "constructive knowl-
edge" even if actual knowledge were not shown. 
40 E. g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & 
Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d 1213 (CA11977); Dreamland Ball Room, 
Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F. 2d 354 (CA71929); M. Witmark & 
Sons v. Tremont Social & Athletic Club, 188 F. Supp. 787, 790 (Mass. 
1960); see Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S., at 157; 
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 198-199 (1931); 3 M. 
Nimmer, Copyright § 12.04[A], p. 12-35 (1982). 
Courts have premised liability in these cases on the notion that the de-
fendant had the ability to supervise or control the infringing activities, see, 
e. g., Shapiro , Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F. 2d 304, 307 
(CA21963); KECA Music, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72, 74 
(WD Mo. 1977), but this notion is to some extent fictional; the defendant 
cannot escape liability by instructing the performers not to play copy-
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Nor is it necessary that the defendant be aware that the I 
infringing activity violates the copyright laws. Section 
504(c)(2) of the 1976 Act provides for a reduction in statutory , 
damages when an infringer proves he "was not aware and 
had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an 
infringement of copyright," but the statute establishes no 
general exemption for those who believe their infringing ac-
tivities are legal. Moreover, such an exemption would be 
meaningless in a case such as this, in which prospective relief 
is sought; once a court has established that the copying at 
issue is infringement, the defendants are necessarily aware of 
that fact for the future. It is undisputed in this case that 
Sony had reason to know tile Be£amax would 15e "iiSeaby 
some owners to tape copyrighted works off the air. See 480 
F. Supp., at 459, 460. 
The District Court also concluded that Sony had not 
caused, induced, or contributed materially to any infringing 
activities of Betamax owners. 480 F. Supp., at 460. In a 
case of this kind, however, causation can be shown indirectly; 
it does not depend on evidence a particular Betamax own-
ers relied on particular advertisements. In an analogous 
case decided just last Term, the Court approved a lower 
court conclusion that liability for contributory trademark in-
fringement could be imposed on a manufacturer who "sug-
gested, even by implication" that a retailer use the manufac-....--
righted music, or even by inserting a provision to that effect into the per-
formers' contract. Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse 
Racing & Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d, at 1214-1215; KECA Music, 
Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp., at 75; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. 
v. Veltin, 47 F. Supp. 648, 649 (WD La. 1942). Congress expressly re-
jected a proposal to exempt proprietors from this type of liability under the 
1976 Act. See 1975 Senate Report 141-142; 1976 House Report 159-160; 
1975 House Hearings 1812-1813 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of 
Copyrights); id., at 1813 (colloquy between Rep. Pattison and Barbara 
Ringer). 
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turer's goods to infringe the trademark of another. Inwood 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S. 844, 
851 (1982); see id., at 860 (concurring opinion). We think 
this standard is equally appropriate in the copyright context. 
The District Court found that Sony has advertised the 
Betamax as suitable for off-the-air recording of "favorite 
shows," "novels for television," and "classic movies," 480 F. 
Supp., at 436, with no visible warning that such recording 
could constitute copyright infringement. Without the aid of 
· the Betamax or some other VTR, it would not be possible to-
day for home television viewers to infringe copyright by re-
cording off-the-air. Off-the-air recording is not only a fore-
seeable use for the Betamax, but fnde'ed is its intended use. 
Under the circumstances, we agree with the Court of Ap-
peals that if off-the-air recording is an infringement of copy-
right, Sony has induced and materially contributed to the in-
fringing conduct of Betamax owners. 41 
B 
Sony urges us to hold that the manufacturer or seller of a 
product used to infringe is absolved from liability whenever 
the product can be put to any substantial ninfringing use. 
Brief for PetitiOners 1 . The District Court so held, bor-
rowing the "staple article of commerce" doctrine governing 
liability for contributory infringement of patents. See 35 
U. S. C. §271.42 We do not agree that this technical doctrine 
41 Our conclusion respecting contributory infringement does not include 
the retailer defendants, seen. 2, supra. The District Court found that one 
of the retailer defendants had assisted in the advertising campaign for the 
Betamax, but made no other findings respecting their knowledge of the 
Betamax's intended uses. We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals 
that, at least on this record, the retailers "are sufficiently engaged in the 
enterprise to be held accountable," 659 F . 2d, at 976; this is an issue that 
may be pursued on remand. In contrast, the advertising agency employed 
to promote the Betamax was far more actively engaged in the advertising 
campaign, and petitioners have not argued .that its liability differs in any 
way from that of Sony Corporation and Sony Corporation of America. 
42 The "staple article of commerce" doctrine protects those who manufac-
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of patent law, based in part on considerations irrelevant to 
the field of copyright, see generally Dawson Chemical Co. v. 
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U. S. 176, 187-199 (1980), should be 
imported wholesale into copyright law. Despite their com-
mon constitutional source, the development of patent and 
copyright protections has not been parallel and this Court has 
borrowed patent concepts in copyright cases sparingly in the 
past. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 
34fh346 (1908). 
We recognize, however, that many of the concerns under-
lying the "staple article of commerce" doctrine are present in 
copyright law as well. As the District Court not~_d, if liabil-
ity for contributory infringement were imposed on the manu- ..-~ 
facturer or seller of every product used to infringe-a type- , 
writer, a camera, a photocopying machine-the "wheels of 
commerce" would be blocked. 480 F. Supp., at 461; see also 
Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U. S. 55, 62 (1911). The 
copyright owner's monopoly would be used to prevent legiti-
mate uses of the product, as well as infringing uses. / J. _ /I _ ~ . -~ " · 
We therefore conclude that if a~fica~ion of the ~v
product's use is noniili'ringin$, the manuractllrersimd sellers 
cannofbe held contributorily liable for the product's infring- ~ q d.--
ture products incorporated into or used with patented inventions-for ex-
ample, the paper and ink used with patented printing machines, Henry v. 
A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1 (1912), or the dry ice used with patented refrig-
eration systems, Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp., 283 U. S. 27 
(1931). Because a patent-holder has the right to control the use of the pat-
ented item as well as its manufacture, see Motion Picture Patents Co. v. 
Universal Film Co., 243 U. S. 502, 509--510 (1917); 35 U. S. C. 271(a), 




. opoli~s bbly ;uppress~nhg chompetitiond .in unpaStentDed compCohnent~ 6a E _ > ? a !II • ;(;;.,), 
an supp 1es sUlta e 10r use Wit t e patente 1tem. ee awson emt-
cal Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 197-198 (1980). The doctrine ~ ~ ~~ .• J ... 
of contributory patent infringement has been the subject of attention by '-:: . - ~ -- --~ 
the courts and by Congress, see id., at 202-212, and has been codified since ~ ~__,h- .J . 
1952, 66 Stat. 792, but was never mentioned during the copyright law revi- ;_ -~ ~~ 
sion process as having any relevance to contributory copyright ___ ~ rz1 -
infringement. ~A..~ ) 
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ing uses. If virtually all of the product's use is to infringe, 
however, contributory liability may be imposed. In such a 
case, the copyright owner's monopoly would not be extended 
beyond its proper bounds; the manufacturer of such a product 
contributes to the infringing activities of others and profits 
directly thereby, while providing no benefit to the public suf-
ficient to justify the infringement. 
c 
The Court of Appeals concluded that Sony should be held 
liable for contributory infringement, reasoning that "[ v ]ideo-
tape recorders are manufactured, advertised, and sold for the 
primary purpose of reproducing television programming," 
and "[ v ]irtually all television programming is copyrighted 
material." 659 F. 2d, at 975. While we agree with the first 
of these propositions, 43 the second is problematic. The key 
question is not the amount of television ro ammingthat is 
copyr1g ted, but rat er tlie amoun o TR usa e that is in-
fr_!ngj~g.44 Moreover, t e parties and their amici have ar-
gued vigorously about both the amount of television pro-
gramming that is covered by copyright and the amount for 
which permission to copy has been given. The proportion of 
VTR recording that is infring!ng is primarily a questi.Qn of 
.faCt, 46 ana-the District Court specifically declined to make 
43 Although VTRs also may be used to watch prerecorded video cassettes 
and to make home motion pictures, these uses do not require a tuner such 
as the Betamax contains. See n. 3, supra. The Studios do not object to 
Sony's sale of VTRs without tuners. Brief for Respondents 5, n. 9. In 
considering the noninfringing uses of the Betamax, therefore, those uses 
that would remain possible without the Betamax's built-in tuner should not 
be taken into account. 
44 N oninfringing uses would include, for example, recording works that 
have never been protected by copyright, recording works that have en-
tered the public domain, recording with permission of the copyright owner, 
and, of course, any recording that qualifies as fair use. See, e. g., 
Bruzzone v. Miller Brewing Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. 809 (ND Cal. 1979) (use of 
home VTR for market research studies). 
46 Sony asserts that much or most television broadcasting is available for 
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findings on the "percentage of legal versus illegal home-use 
recording." 480 F. Supp., at 468. In light of our view of the 
law, resolution of this factual question is essential. We 
therefore remand for further consideration by the District 
Court. 
VI 
The Court of Appeals, having found Sony liable, remanded 
for the District Court to reconsider the propriety of injunc-
tive or other relief. Because of our disposition of the issue of 
liability, we, too, do not decide what remedy would be appro-
priate if liability were found. We concur, however, in the 
Court of Appeals' suggestion that some form of limited in-
junction, or an award of damages or continuing royalties in 
lieu of injunctive relief, may well be an appropriate means of 
balancing the equities in this case. 46 Although we express no 
home recording because (1) no copyright owners other than the Studios 
have brought infringement actions, and (2) much televised material is ineli-
gible for copyright protection because videotapes of the broadcasts are not 
kept. The first of these assertions is irrelevant; Sony's liability does not 
turn on the fact that only two copyright owners thus far have brought suit. 
The amount of infringing use must be determined through consideration of 
the television market as a whole. Sony's second assertion is based on a 
faulty premise; the Copyright Office permits audiovisual works transmit-
ted by television to be registered by deposit of sample frames plus a de-
scription of the work. See 37 CFR §§ 202.20(c)(2)(ii) and 202.21(g) (1982). 
Moreover, although an infringement action cannot be brought unless the 
work is registered, 17 U. S. C. § 411(a), registration is not a condition of 
copyright protection. § 408(a). Copying an unregistered work is still in-
fringement. Cf. § 506(a) (liability for criminal copyright infringement; not 
conditioned on prior registration). 
44 0ther Nations have imposed royalties on the manufacturers of prod-
ucts used to infringe copyright. See, e. g., Copyright Laws and Treaties 
of the World (UNESCO/BNA 1982) (English translation), reprinting Fed-
eral Act On Copyright in Works of Literature and Art and on Related 
Rights (Austria), § 42(5)-(7), and An Act dealing with Copyright and Re-
lated Rights (Federal Republic of Germany), Art. 53(5). A study pro-
duced for the Commission of European Communities has recommended 
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view on the merits of any particular proposal, we are certain 
that, if Sony is found liable in this case, the District Court 
will be able to fashion appropriate relief. The District Court 
may conclude, of course, that a continuing royalty or other 
equitable relief is not feasible in this case. The Studios then 
would be relegated to statutory damages for proven in-
stances of infringement. But the difficulty of fashioning re-
lief, and the possibility that complete relief may be unavail-
able, cannot affect our interpretation of the statute. 
Like so many other problems created by the interaction of 
copyright law with a new technology, "[t]here can be no 
really satisfactory solution to the problem presented here, 
until Congress acts." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Ai-
ken, 422 U. S., at 167 (THE CHIEF JUSTICE, dissenting). 
But in the absence of a congressional solution, courts cannot 
avoid difficult problems by refusing to apply the law. We 
must "take the Copyright Act ... as we find it," Fortnightly 
Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 401-402 (1968), and 
"do as little damage as possible to traditional copyright prin-
ciples ... until the Congress legislates." Id., at 404 (dis-
senting opinion). 
VII 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. No costs are allowed. 
It is so ordered. 
A. Dietz, Copyright Law in the European Community 135 (1978). While 
these royalty systems ordinarily depend on the existence of authors' col-
lecting societies, see id., at 119, 136, such collecting societies are a familiar 
part of our copyright law. See generally Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U. S. 1, 4-5 (1979). Fashioning relief 
of this sort, of course, might require bringing other copyright owners into 
court through certification of a class or otherwise. 
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting. ~ 
A restatement of the facts and judicial history of this case / /?" • " 
is necessary, in my view, for a proper focus upon the issues. ~ P' ~
Respondents' position is hardly so "unprecedented," ante, at 
2, in the copyright law, nor does it really embody a "gross 
generalization," ante, at 17, or a "novel theory of liability," 
ante, at 18, and the like, as the Court, in belittling their 
claims, describes the efforts of respondents. 
I 
The introduction of the home videotape recorder (VTR) 
upon the market has enabled millions of Americans to make 
recordings of television programs in their homes, for future 
and repeated viewing at their own convenience. While this 
practice has proved highly popular with owners of television 
sets and VTRs, it understandably has been a matter of con-
cern for the holders of copyrights in the recorded programs. 
A result is the present litigation, raising the issues whether 
the home recording of a copyrighted television program is an 
infringement of the copyright, and, if so, whether the manu-
facturers and distributors of VTRs are liable as contributory 
infringers. I would hope that these questions ultimately will 
be considered seriously and in depth by the Congress and be 
resolved there, despite the fact that the Court's decision to-
day provides little incentive for congressional action. Our 
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task in the meantime, however, is to resolve these issues as 
best we can in the light of ill-fitting existing copyright law. 
It is no answer, of course, to say and stress, as the Court 
does, this Court's "consistent deference to Congress" when-
ever "major technological innovations" appear. Ante, at 12. 
Perhaps a better and more accurate description is that the 
Court has tended to evade the hard issues when they arise in 
the area of copyright law. I see no reason for the Court to 
be particularly pleased with this tradition or to continue it. 
Indeed, it is fairly clear from the legislative history of the 
1976 Act that Congress meant to change the old pattern and 
enact a statute that would cover new technologies, as well as 
old. 
II 
In 1976, respondents Universal City Studios, Inc., and 
Walt Disney Productions (Studios) brought this copyright in-
fringement action in the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California against, among others, petition-
ers Sony Corporation, a Japanese corporation, and Sony Cor-
poration of America, a New York corporation, the manufac-
turer and distributor, respectively, of the Betamax VTR. 
The Studios sought damages, profits, and a wide-ranging in-
junction against further sales or use of the Betamax or 
Betamax tapes. 
The Betamax, like other VTRs, presently is capable of re-
cording television broadcasts off the air on videotape cas-
settes, and playing them back at a later time. 1 Two kinds of 
1 The Betamax has three primary components: a tuner that receives tele-
vision ("RF") signals broadcast over the airwaves; an adapter that con-
verts the RF signals into audio-video signals; and a recorder that places 
the audio-video signals on magnetic tape. Sony also manufactures VTRs 
without built-in tuners; these are capable of playing back prerecorded 
tapes and recording home movies on videotape, but cannot record off the 
air. Since the Betamax has its own tuner, it can be used to record off one 
channel while another channel is being watched. 
The Betamax is available with auxiliary features, including a timer, a 
pause control, and a fast-forward control; these allow Betamax owners to 
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Betamax usage are at issue here. 2 The first is "time-shift-
ing," whereby the user records a program in order to watch it 
at a later time, and then records over it, and thereby erases 
the program, after a single viewing. The second is "library-
building," in which the user records a program in order to 
keep it for repeated viewing over a longer term. Sony's ad-
vertisements, at various times, have suggested that Betamax 
users "record favorite shows" or "build a library." Sony's 
Betamax advertising has never contained warnings about 
copyright infringement, although a warning does appear in 
the Betamax operating instructions. 
The Studios produce copyrighted "movies" and other 
works that they release to theaters and license for television 
broadcast. They also rent and sell their works on film and 
on prerecorded videotapes and videodiscs. License fees for 
television broadcasts are set according to audience ratings, 
compiled by rating services that do not measure any play-
backs of videotapes. The Studios make the serious claim 
that VTR recording may result in a decrease in their reve-
nue from licensing their works to television and from market-
ing them in other ways. 
Mter a 5-week trial, the District Court, with a detailed 
opinion, ruled that home VTR recording did not infringe the 
Studios' copyrights under either the Act of March 4, 1909 
(1909 Act), 35 Stat. 1075, as amended (formerly codified as 17 
U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1976 ed.)), or the Copyright Revision Act 
of 1976 (1976 Act), 90 Stat. 2541, 17 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. 
(1982 ed.). 3 The District Court also held that even if home 
record programs without being present, to avoid (if they are present) re-
cording commercial messages, and to skip over commercials while playing 
back the recording. Videotape is reusable; the user erases its record by 
recording over it. 
2 This case involves only the home recording for home use of television 
programs broadcast free over the airwaves. No issue is raised concerning 
cable or pay television, or the sharing or trading of tapes. 
8 At the trial, the Studios proved 32 individual instances where their 
copyrighted works were recorded on Betamax VTRs. Two of these in-
81-1687-DISSENT 
4 SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC. 
VTR recording were an infringement, Sony could not be held 
liable under theories of direct infringement, contributory in-
fringement, or vicarious liability. Finally, the court con-
cluded that an injunction against sales of the Betamax would 
be inappropriate even if Sony were liable under one or more 
of those theories. 480 F. Supp. 429 (1979). 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed in virtually every respect. 659 F. 2d 963 (1981). 
It held that the 1909 Act and the 1976 Act contained no im-
plied exemption for "home use" recording, that such record-
ing was not "fair use," and that the use of the Betamax to 
record the Studios' copyrighted works infringed their copy-
rights. The Court of Appeals also held Sony liable for con-
tributory infringement, reasoning that Sony knew and antici-
pated that the Betamax would be used to record copyrighted 
material off the air, and that Sony, indeed, had induced, 
caused, or materially contributed to the infringing conduct. 
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District 
Court for appropriate relief; it suggested that the District 
Court could consider the award of damages or a continuing 
royalty in lieu of an injunction. I d., at 976. 
III 
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, 
empowers Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries." This Nation's initial copyright statute was 
passed by the First Congress. Entitled "An Act for the en-
couragement of learning," it gave an author "the sole right 
and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending" 
stances occurred after January 1, 1978, the primary effective date of the 
1976 Act; all the others occurred while the 1909 Act was still effective. 
My analysis focuses primarily on the 1976 Act, but, as is shown below, the 
principles governing copyright protection for these works are the same 
under either Act. 
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his "map, chart, book or books" for a period of 14 years. Act 
of May 31, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 124. Since then, as the technol-
ogy available to authors for creating and preserving their 
writings has changed, the governing statute has changed 
with it. By many amendments, and by complete revisions in 
1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976,4 authors' rights have been ex-
panded to provide protection to any "original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression," includ-
ing "motion pictures and other audiovisual works." 17 
U. S. C. § 102(a). 5 
• Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436; Act of July 8, 1870, §§ 85-111, 
16 Stat. 212-217; Act of Mar. 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075 (formerly codified as 17 
U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1976 ed.)); Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 
2541 (codified as 17 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. (1982 ed.). 
5 Section 102(a) provides: 
"Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now 
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, 
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device. Works of authorship include the following categories: 
"(1) literary works; 
"(2) musical works, including any accompanying words; 
"(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; 
"(4) pantomimes and choreographic works; 
"(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; 
"(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and 
"(7) sound recordings." 
Definitions of terms used in § 102(a)(6) are provided by § 101: 
"Audiovisual works" are "works that consist of a series of related images 
which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or de-
vices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with 
accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material ob-
jects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied." And "mo-
tion pictures" are "audiovisual works consisting of a series of related im-
ages which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion, 
together with accompanying sounds, if any." Most commercial television 
programs, if fixed on film or tape at the time of broadcast or before, qualify 
as "audiovisual works." Since the categories set forth in § 102(a) are not 
mutually exclusive, a particular television program may also qualify for 
protection as a dramatic, musical, or other type of work. 
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Section 106 of the 1976 Act grants the owner of a copyright 
a variety of exclusive rights in the copyrighted work, 6 includ-
ing the right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or 
phonorecords." 7 This grant expressly is made subject to 
§§ 107-118, which create a number of exemptions and limita-
tions on the copyright owner's rights. The most important 
of these sections, for present purposes, is § 107; that section 
states that "the fair use of a copyrighted work ... is not an 
infringement of copyright." 8 
• Section 106 provides: 
"Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this 
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: 
"(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
"(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
"(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending; 
"(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform 
the copyrighted work publicly; and 
"(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi-
vidual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the 
copyrighted work publicly." 
'A ''phonorecord" is defined by § 101 as a reproduction of sounds other 
than sounds accompanying an audiovisual work, while a "copy'' is a re-
production of a work in any form other than a phonorecord. 
8 Section 107 provides: 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords 
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy-
right. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include--
"(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
81-1687-DISSENT 
SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC. 7 
The 1976 Act, like its predecessors, 9 does not give the 
copyright owner full and complete control over all possible 
uses of his work. If the work is put to some use not enumer-
ated in § 106, the use is not an infringement. See Fort-
nightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 393-395 
(1968). Thus, before considering whether home videotaping 
comes within the scope of the fair use exemption, one first 
must inquire whether the practice appears to violate the ex-
clusive right, granted in the first instance by § 106(1), "to 
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords." 
A 
Although the word "copies" is in the plural in § 106(1), 
there can be no question that under the Act the making of 
"( 4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work." 
Section 101 makes it clear that the four factors listed in this section are 
"illustrative and not limitative." 
9 The 1976 Act was the product of a revision effort lasting more than 20 
years. Spurred by the recognition that "significant developments in tech-
nology and communications" had rendered the 1909 Act inadequate, S. 
Rep. No. 94-473, p. 47 (1975); see H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 47 (1976), 
Congress in 1955 authorized the Copyright Office to prepare a series of 
studies on all aspects of the existing copyright law. Thirty-four studies 
were prepared and presented to Congress. The Register of Copyrights 
drafted a comprehensive report with recommendations, House Committee 
on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, Report of the Register of Copy-
rights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (Comm. Print 1961) (Register's 1961 Report), and general revision 
bills were introduced near the end of the 88th Congress in 1964. H. R. 
11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong. , 2d Sess. (1964). The Register issued a second 
report in 1965, with revised recommendations. House Committee on the 
Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, Pt. 6, Supplementary Report of the 
Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright 
Law: 1965 Revision Bill, 89th Cong. , 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1965) (Regis-
ter's Supplementary Report). Action on copyright revision was delayed 
from 1967 to 1974 by a dispute on cable television, see generally Second 
Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revi-
sion of the U. S. Copyright Law: 1975 Revision Bill, ch. V, pp. 2-26 (Draft 
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even a single unauthorized copy is prohibited. The Senate 
and House Reports explain: "The references to 'copies or 
phonorecords,' although in the plural, are intended here and 
throughout the bill to include the singular (1 U. S. C. § 1)." 10 
S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 58 (1975) (1975 Senate Report); H. R. 
Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 61 (1976) (1976 House Report). The 
Reports then describe the reproduction right established by 
§ 106(1): 
"[T]he right 'to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies 
or phonorecords' means the right to produce a material 
object in which the work is duplicated, transcribed, imi-
tated, or simulated in a fixed form from which it can be 
'perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.' 
As under the present law, a copyrighted work would be 
infringed by reproducing it in whole or in any substantial 
part, and by duplicating it exactly or by imitation or 
simulation." 1975 Senate Report 58; 1976 House Report 
61. 
The making of even a single videotape recording at home falls 
within this definition; the VTR user produces a material ob-
ject from which the copyrighted work later can be perceived. 
Unless Congress intended a special exemption for the making 
of a single copy for personal use, I must conclude that VTR 
recording is contrary to the exclusive rights granted by 
§ 106(1). 
The 1976 Act and its accompanying reports specify in some 
detail the situations in which a single copy of a copyrighted 
work may be made without infringement concerns. Section 
108(a), for example, permits a library or archives "to repro-
Oct.-Dec. 1975) (Register's Second Supplementary Report), but a compro-
mise led to passage of the present Act in 1976. 
10 1 U. S. C. § 1 provides in relevant part: 
"In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the con-
text indicates otherwise . . . words importing the plural include the 
singular .... " 
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duce no more than one copy or phonorecord of a work" for a 
patron, but only under very limited conditions; an entire 
work, moreover, can be copied only if it cannot be obtained 
elsewhere at a fair price. 11 § 108(e); see also § 112(a) (broad-
caster may "make no more than one copy or phonorecord of a 
particular transmission program," and only under certain 
conditions). In other respects, the making of single copies is 
permissible only within the limited confines of the fair use 
doctrine. The Senate report, in a section headed "Single and 
multiple copying," notes that the fair use doctrine would per-
mit a teacher to make a single copy of a work for use in the 
classroom, but only if the work was not a "sizable" one such 
as a novel or treatise. 1975 Senate Report 63-64; accord, 
1976 House Report 68-{)9, 71. Other situations in which the 
making of a single copy would be fair use are described in the 
House and Senate reports. 12 But neither the statute nor its 
legislative history suggests any intent to create a general ex-
emption for a single copy made for personal or private use. 
Indeed, it appears that Congress considered and rejected 
the very possibility of a special private use exemption. The 
issue was raised early in the revision process, in one of the 
studies prepared for Congress under the supervision of the 
Copyright Office. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works 
11 The library photocopying provisions of § 108 do not excuse any person 
who requests "a copy" from a library if the requester's use exceeds fair 
use. § 108(f)(2). Moreover, a library is absolved from liability for the un-
supervised use of its copying equipment provided that the equipment bears 
a notice informing users that "the making of a copy'' may violate the copy-
right law. § 108(f)(1). 
12 For example, "the making of a single copy or phonorecord by an indi-
vidual as a free service for a blind person" would be a fair use, as would "a 
single copy reproduction of an excerpt from a copyrighted work by a callig-
rapher for a single client" or "a single reproduction of excerpts from a copy-
righted work by a student calligrapher or teacher in a learning situation." 
1975 Senate Report 6&-67; see 1976 House Report 73-74. Application of 
the fair use doctrine in these situations, of course, would be unnecessary if 
the 1976 Act created a general exemption for the making of a single copy. 
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(1958), reprinted in Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
Copyright Law Revision, Studies Prepared for the Sub-
committee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 86th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1960) (Latman Fair Use Study). This 
study found no reported case supporting the existence of an 
exemption for private use, although it noted that "the pur-
pose and nature of a private use, and in some cases the small 
amount taken, might lead a court to apply the general princi-
ples of fair use in such a way as to deny liability." I d., at 12. 
After reviewing a number of foreign copyright laws that con-
tained explicit statutory exemptions for private or personal 
use, id., at 25, Professor Latman outlined several approaches 
that a revision bill could take to the general issue of exemp-
tions and fair use. One of these was the adoption of particu-
larized rules to cover specific situations, including "the field 
of personal use." !d., at 33. 13 
Rejecting the latter alternative, the Register of Copy-
rights recommended that the revised copyright statute sim-
ply mention the doctrine of fair use and indicate its general 
scope. The Register opposed the adoption of rules and ex-
emptions to cover specific situations, 14 preferring, instead, to 
13 Professor Latman made special mention of the "personal use" issue be· 
cause the area was one that 
"has become disturbed by recent developments . . . . Photoduplication 
devices may make authors' and publishers' groups apprehensive. The 
Copyright Charter recently approved by [the International Confederation 
of Societies of Authors and Composers] emphasizes the concern of authors 
over 'private' uses which, because of technological developments, are said 
to be competing seriously with the author's economic interests." Latman 
Fair Use Study 33--34. 
14 The one exemption proposed by the Register, permitting a library to 
make a single photocopy of an out-of-print work and of excerpts that a re-
quester certified were needed for research, met with opposition and was 
not included in the bills initially introduced in Congress. See Register's 
1961 Report 26; H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Regis-
ter's Supplementary Report 26. A library copying provision was restored 
to the bill in 1969, after pressure from library associations. Register's 
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rely on the judge-made fair use doctrine to resolve new prob-
lems as they arose. See Register's 1961 Report 25; Regis-
ter's Supplementary Report 27-28. 
The Register's approach was reflected in the first copy-
right revision bills, drafted by the Copyright Office in 1964. 
These bills, like the 1976 Act, granted the copyright owner 
the exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted work, sub-
ject only to the exceptions set out in later sections. H. R. 
11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., §5(a) (1964). The pri-
mary exception was fair use, § 6, containing language virtu-
ally identical to § 107 of the 1976 Act. Although the copy-
right revision bills underwent change in many respects from 
their first introduction in 1964 to their final passage in 1976, 
these portions of the bills did not change. 16 I can con-
clude only that Congress, like the Register, intended to rely 
on the fair use doctrine, and not on a per se exemption for 
private use, to separate permissible copying from the 
Second Supplementary Report, ch. III, pp. 10-11; seeS. 543, 91st Cong., 
1st Sess., § 108 (Comm. Print Dec. 10, 1969); 1975 Senate Report 48. 
'"The 1964 bills provided that the fair use of copyrighted material for 
purposes "such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholar-
ship, or research" was not an infringement of copyright, and listed four 
"factors to be considered" in determining whether any other particular use 
was fair. H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., § 6 (1964). Revised 
bills, drafted by the Copyright Office in 1965, contained a fair use provision 
merely mentioning the doctrine but not indicating its scope: "Notwith-
standing the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work is 
not an infringement of copyright." H. R. 4347/S. 1006, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess., § 107 (1965). The House Judiciary Committee restored the provi-
sion to its earlier wording, H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 5, 
58 (1966), and the language adopted by the Committee remained in the bill 
in later Congresses. See H. R. 2512/S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 
(1967); S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1969); S. 644, 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess., § 107 (1971); S. 1361, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1973); H. R. 
2223/S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1975). With a few additions by 
the House Judiciary Committee in 1976, see 1976 House Report 5; H. R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 94-1733, p. 70 (1976), the same language appears in§ 107 of 
the 1976 Act. 
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impermissible. 16 
When Congress intended special and protective treatment 
for private use, moreover, it said so explicitly. One such ex-
plicit statement appears in § 106 itself. The copyright own-
'
8 In Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d 
1345 (1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975), decided 
during the process of the revision of the copyright statutes, the Court of 
Claims suggested that copying for personal use might be outside the scope 
of copyright protection under the 1909 Act. The court reasoned that be-
cause "hand copying" for personal use has always been regarded as permis-
sible, and because the practice of making personal copies continued after 
typewriters and photostat machines were developed, the making of per-
sonal copies by means other than hand copying should be permissible as 
well. /d., at 84-88, 487 F. 2d, at 1350-1352. 
There appear to me to be several flaws in this reasoning. First, it is 
by no means clear that the making of a "hand copy'' of an entire work is 
permissible; the most that can be said is that there is no reported case 
on the subject, possibly because no copyright owner ever thought it worth-
while to sue. See Latman Fair Use Study 11-12; 3M. Nimmer, Copyright 
§ 13.05[E][4][a] (1982). At least one early treatise asserted that infringe-
ment would result ''if an individual made copies for his personal use, even 
in his own handwriting, as there is no rule of law excepting manuscript 
copies from the law of infringment." A. Well, American Copyright Law 
§ 1066 (1917). Second, hand copying or even copying by typewriter is self-
limiting. The drudgery involved in making hand copies ordinarily ensures 
that only necessary and fairly small portions of a work are taken; it is un-
likely that any user would make a hand copy as a substitute for one that 
could be purchased. The harm to the copyright owner from hand copying 
thus is minimal. The recent advent of inexpensive and readily available 
copying machines, however, has changed the dimensions of the problem. 
See Register's Second Supplementary Report ch. III, p. 3; Hearings on 
H. R. 2223 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the 
Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess., 194 (1975) (1975 House Hearings) (remarks of Rep. Danielson); 
id., at 234 (statement of Robert W. Cairns); id., at 250 (remarks of Rep. 
Danielson); id., at 354 (testimony of Irwin Karp); id., at 467 (testimony of 
Rondo Cameron); id., at 1795 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of 
Copyrights). Thus, "[t]he supposition that there is no tort involved in a 
scholar copying a copyrighted text by hand does not much advance the 
question of machine copying." B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copy-
right 101-102 (1967). 
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er's exclusive right to perform a copyrighted work, in con-
trast to his right to reproduce the work in copies, is limited. 
Section 106(4) grants a copyright owner the exclusive right to 
perform the work "publicly," but does not afford the owner 
protection with respect to private performances by others. 
A motion picture is "performed" whenever its images are 
shown or its sounds are made audible. § 101. Like "sing-
[ing] a copyrighted lyric in the shower," Twentieth Century 
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 155 (1975), watching 
television at home with one's family and friends is now con-
sidered a performance. 1975 Senate Report 5~0; 1976 
House Report 63. 17 Home television viewing nevertheless 
does not infringe any copyright-but only because § 106(4) 
contains the word "publicly." 18 See generally 1975 Senate 
Report 60-61; 1976 House Report 63--64; Register's 1961 Re-
port 29-30. No such distinction between public and private 
uses appears in § 106(1)'s prohibition on the making of 
copies. 19 
17 In a trio of cases, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 
398 (1968); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 
415 U. S. 394, 403-405 (1974); and Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. 
Aiken, 422 U. S. 151 (1975), this Court had held that the reception of a 
radio or television broadcast was not a "perfonnance" under the 1909 Act. 
The Court's "narrow construction" of the word ''perfonn" was "completely 
overturned by the [1976 Act] and its broad definition of 'perfonn' in section 
101." 1976 House Report 87. 
18 A work is perfonned "publicly" if it takes place "at a place open to the 
public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a 
nonnal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered." § 101. 
19 One purpose of the exemption for private perfonnances was to permit 
the home viewing of lawfully made videotapes. The Register noted in 
1961 that "[n]ew technical devices will probably make it practical in the fu-
ture to reproduce televised motion pictures in the home. We do not be-
lieve the private use of such a reproduction can or should be precluded by 
copyright." Register's 1961 Report 30 (emphasis added). The Register 
did not suggest that the private making of a reproduction of a televised 
motion picture would be permitted by the copyright law. The Register 
later reminded Congress that "[i]n general the concept of 'perfonnance' 
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Similarly, an explicit reference to private use appears in 
§ 108. Under that section, a library can make a copy for a 
patron only for specific types of private use: "private study, 
scholarship, or research."~ §§ 108(d)(1) and (e)(l); see 37 
CFR §201.14(b) (1982). Limits also are imposed on the ex-
tent of the copying and the type of institution that may make 
copies, and the exemption expressly is made inapplicable to 
motion pictures and certain other types of works. § 108(h). 
These limitations would be wholly superfluous if an entire 
copy of any work could be made by any person for private 
use. 21 
B 
The District Court in this case nevertheless concluded that 
the 1976 Act contained an implied exemption for "home-use 
recording." 480 F. Supp., at 444 446. The court relied pri-
marily on the legislative history of a 1971 amendment to the 
1909 Act, a reliance that this Court today does not duplicate. 
Ante, at 11, n. 11. That amendment, however, was ad-
dressed to the specific problem of commercial piracy of sound 
recordings. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, 85 Stat. 391 (1971 Amend-
ment). The House Report on the 1971 Amendment, in a sec-
tion entitled "Home Recording," contains the following 
statement: 
must be distinguished sharply from the reproduction of copies." Regis-
ter's Supplementary Report 22. 
00 During hearings on this provision, Representative Danielson inquired 
whether it would apply to works of fiction such as "Gone With the Wind," 
or whether it was limited to "strictly technical types of information." The 
uncontradicted response was that it would apply only in "general terms of 
science . . . [and] the useful arts." 1975 House Hearings 251 (testimony of 
Robert W. Cairns); cf. id., at 300 (statement of Harry Rosenfield) (''We are 
not asking . . . for the right to copy 'Gone With the Wind'"). 
21 The mention in the Senate and House Reports of situations in which 
copies for private use would be permissible under the fair use doctrine-for 
example, the making of a free copy for a blind person, 1975 Senate Report 
66; 1975 House Report 73, or the "recordings of performances by music stu-
dents for purposes of analysis and criticism," 1975 Senate Report 63-
would be superfluous as well. See n. 12, supra. 
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"In approving the creation of a limited copyright in 
sound recordings it is the intention of the Committee 
that this limited copyright not grant any broader rights 
than are accorded to other copyright proprietors under 
the existing title 17. Specifically, it is not the intention 
of the Committee to restrain the home recording, from 
broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded per-
formances, where the home recording is for private use 
and with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capital-
izing commercially on it. This practice is common and 
unrestrained today, and the record producers and per-
formers would be in no different position from that of the 
owners of copyright in recorded musical compositions 
over the past 20 years." H. R. Rep. No. 92-487, p. 7 
(1971) (1971 House Report). 
Similar statements were made during House hearings on the 
bill 22 and on the House floor, 23 although not in the Senate pro-
22 The following exchange took place during the testimony of Barbara 
Ringer, then Assistant Register of Copyrights: 
"[Rep.] Biester. . .. I can tell you I must have a small pirate in my own 
home: My son has a cassette tape recorder, and as a particular record be-
comes a hit, he will retrieve it onto his little set .... [T]his legislation, of 
course, would not point to his activities, would it? 
"Miss Ringer. I think the answer is clearly, 'No, it would not.' I have 
spoken at a couple of seminars on video cassettes lately, and this question 
is usually asked: 'What about the home recorders?' The answer I have 
given and will give again is that this is something you cannot control. You 
simply cannot control it. My own opinion, whether this is philosophical 
dogma or not, is that sooner or later there is going to be a crunch here. 
But that is not what this legislation is addressed to, and I do not see the 
crunch coming in the immediate future .... I do not see anybody going 
into anyone's home and preventing this sort of thing, or forcing legisla-
tion that would engineer a piece of equipment not to allow home taping.'' 
Hearings on S. 646 and H. R. 6927 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 22-23 (1971) 
(1971 House Hearings). 
28 Shortly before passage of the bill, a colloquy took place between Rep-
resentative Kastenmeier, chairman of the House subcommittee that pro-
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ceedings. In concluding that these statements created a 
general exemption for home recording, the District Court, in 
my view, paid too little heed to the context in which the 
statements were made, and failed to consider the limited pur-
pose of the 1971 Amendment and the structure of the 1909 
Act. 
Unlike television broadcasts and other types of motion pic-
tures, sound recordings were not protected by copyright 
prior to the passage of the 1971 Amendment. Although the 
underlying musical work could be copyrighted, the 1909 Act 
provided no protection for a particular performer's rendition 
of the work. Moreover, copyrighted musical works that had 
been recorded for public distribution were subject to a "com-
pulsory license": any person was free to record such a work 
upon payment of a 2-cent royalty to the copyright owner. 
§ 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075-1076. While reproduction without pay-
ment of the royalty was an infringement under the 1909 Act, 
damages were limited to three times the amount of the un-
paid royalty. § 25(e), 35 Stat. 1081-1082; Shapiro, Bernstein 
& Co. v. Goody, 248 F. 2d 260, 262-263, 265 (CA2 1957), cert. 
denied, 355 U. S. 952 (1958). It was observed that the prac-
duced the bill, and Representative Kazen, who was not on the committee: 
"Mr. Kazen. Am I correct in assuming that the bill protects copy-
righted material that is duplicated for commercial purposes only? 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Yes. 
"Mr. Kazen. In other words, if your child were to record off of a pro-
gram which comes through the air on the radio or television, and then used 
it for her own personal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this use would not 
be included under the penalties of this bill? 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. This is not included in the bill. I am glad the gen-
tleman raises the point. 
"On page 7 of the report, under 'Home Recordings,' Members will note 
that under the bill the same practice which prevails today is called for; 
namely, this is considered both presently and under the proposed law to be 
fair use. The child does not do this for commercial purposes. This is 
made clear in the report." 117 Cong. Rec. 34748-34749 (1971). 
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tical effect of these provisions was to legalize record piracy. 
See S. Rep. No. 92-72, p. 4 (1971); 1971 House Report 2. 
In order to suppress this piracy, the 1971 Amendment ex-
tended copyright protection beyond the underlying work and 
to the sound recordings themselves. Congress chose, how-
ever, to provide only limited protection: owners of copyright 
in sound recordings were given the exclusive right "[t]o re-
produce [their works] and distribute [them] to the public." 
1971 Amendment, § 1(a), 85 Stat. 391 (formerly codified as 17 
U. S. C. § 1(f) (1976 ed.)). 24 This right was merely the right 
of commercial distribution. See 117 Cong. Rec. 34748--34749 
(1971) (colloquy of Reps. Kazen & Kastenmeier) ("the bill 
protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for commer-
cial purposes only"). 
Against this background, the statements regarding home 
recording under the 1971 Amendment appear in a very differ-
ent light. If home recording was "common and unre-
strained" under the 1909 Act, see 1971 House Report 7, it 
was because sound recordings had no copyright protection 
and the owner of a copyright in the underlying musical work 
could collect no more than a 2-cent royalty plus 6 cents in 
damages for each unauthorized use. With so little at stake, 
it is not at all surprising that the Assistant Register "d[id] 
not see anybody going into anyone's home and preventing 
this sort of thing." 1971 House Hearings 23. 
But the references to home sound recording in the 1971 
Amendment's legislative history demonstrate no congres-
24 The 1909 Act's grant of an exclusive right to "copy,"§ 1(a), was of no 
assistance to the owner of a copyright in a sound recording, because are-
production of a sound recording was technically considered not to be a 
"copy." See 1971 House Hearings 18 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, As-
sistant Register of Copyrights); 1971 Amendment, § 1(e), 85 Stat. 391 (for-
merly codified as 17 U. S. C. § 26 (1976 ed.)) ("For the purposes of [speci-
fied sections, not including § 1(a)], but not for any other purpose, a 
reproduction of a [sound recording] shall be considered to be a copy 
thereof"). This concept is carried forward into the 1976 Act, which 
distinguishes between "copies" and "phonorecords." Seen. 7, supra. 
• 
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sional intent to create a generalized home use exemption 
from copyright protection. Congress, having recognized 
that the 1909 Act had been unsuccessful in controlling home 
sound recording, addressed only the specific problem of com-
mercial record piracy. To quote Assistant Register Ringer 
again, home use was "not what this legislation [was] ad-
dressed to." 1971 House Hearings 22. 25 
While the 1971 Amendment narrowed the sound record-
ings loophole in then existing copyright law, motion pictures 
and other audiovisual works have been accorded full copy-
right protection since at least 1912, see Act of Aug. 24, 1912, 
37 Stat. 488, and perhaps before, see Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 
240 (CA3 1903), app. dism'd, 195 U. S. 625 (1904). Congress 
continued this protection in the 1976 Act. Unlike the sound 
recording rights created by the 1971 Amendment, the re-
production rights associated with motion pictures under 
§ 106(1) are not limited to reproduction for public distribu-
tion; the copyright owner's right to reproduce the work ex-
ists independently, and the "mere duplication of a copy may 
constitute an infringement even if it is never distributed." 
Register's Supplementary Report 16; see 1975 Senate Report 
57 and 1976 House Report 61. Moreover, the 1976 Act was 
intended as a comprehensive treatment of all aspects of copy-
right law. The reports accompanying the 1976 Act, unlike 
the 1971 House Report, contain no suggestion that home-use 
recording is somehow outside the scope of this all-inclusive 
211 During consideration of the 1976 Act, Congress, of course, was well 
aware of the limited nature of the protection granted to sound recordings 
under the 1971 Amendment. See 1975 House Hearings 113 (testimony of 
Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights) (1971 Amendment "created a 
copyright in a sound recording .. . but limited it to the particular situation 
of so-called piracy''); id., at 1380 (letter from John Lorenz, Acting Librar-
ian of Congress) (under 1971 Amendment "only the unauthorized reproduc-
tion and distribution to the public of copies of the sound recording is pro-
hibited. Thus, the duplication of sound recordings for private, personal 
use and the performance of sound recordings through broadcasting or 
other means are outside the scope of the amendment"). 
-
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statute. It was clearly the intent of Congress that no addi-
tional exemptions were to be implied. 26 
I therefore find in the 1976 Act no implied exemption to 
cover the home taping of television programs, whether it be 
for a single copy, for private use, or for home use. Taping a 
copyrighted television program is infringement unless it is 
permitted by the fair use exemption contained in § 107 of the 
1976 Act. I now turn to that issue. 
IV 
Fair Use 
The doctrine of fair use has been called, with some justifi-
cation, "the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright." 
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F. 2d 661, 662 (CA2 
1939); see Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder 
Newspapers, Inc., 626 F. 2d 1171, 1174 (CA51980); Meeropol 
v. Nizer, 560 F. 2d 1061, 1068 (CA2 1977), cert. denied, 434 
U. S. 1013 (1978). Although courts have constructed lists of 
factors to be considered in determining whether a particular 
use is fair, 27 no fixed criteria have emerged by which that 
211 Representative Kastenmeier, the principal House sponsor of the 1976 
revision bill and chainnan of the House subcommittee that produced it, 
made this explicit on the opening day of the House hearings: 
"[F]rom time to time, certain areas have not been covered in the bill. 
But is it not the case, this being a unified code, that the operation of the bill 
does apply whether or not we specifically deal with a subject or not? ... 
"Therefore, we can really not fail to deal with an issue. It will be dealt 
with one way or the other. The code, title 17, will cover it. So we have 
made a conscious decision even by omission. . . . 
"By virtue of passing this bill, we will deal with every issue. Whether 
we deal with it completely or not for the purpose of resolving the issues 
involved is the only question, not whether it has dealt with the four corners 
of the bill because the four corners of the bill will presume to deal with ev-
erything in copyright." 1975 House Hearings 115. 
27 The precise phrase "fair use" apparently did not enter the case law 
until 1869, see Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (No. 8,136) (CC 
Mass.), but the doctrine itself found early expression in Folsom v. Marsh, 
9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (CC Mass. 1841). Justice Story was faced there 
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determination can be made. This Court thus far has pro-
vided no guidance; although fair use issues have come here 
twice, on each occasion the Court was equally divided and 
no opinion was forthcoming. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. 
United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d 1345 (1973), aff'd, 420 
U. S. 376 (1975); Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F. 2d 532 (CA9 
1956), aff'd sub nom. CBS, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U. S. 43 
(1958). 
Nor did Congress provide clear rules when it codified the 
fair use doctrine in the 1976 Act; it simply incorporated a list 
of factors "to be considered": the "purpose and character of 
the use," the "nature of the copyrighted work," the "amount 
and substantiality of the portion used," and, perhaps the 
most important, the "effect of the use upon the potential mar-
ket for or value of the copyrighted work" (emphasis sup-
plied). § 107. No particular weight, however, was assigned 
to any of these, and the list was not intended to be exclusive. 
The House and Senate Reports explain that § 107 does no 
more than give "statutory recognition" to the fair use doc-
trine; it was intended "to restate the present judicial doctrine 
with the "intricate and embarrassing questio[n]" whether a biography con-
taining copyrighted letters was "a justifiable use of the original materials, 
such as the law recognizes as no infringement of the copyright of the plain-
tiffs." I d., at 344, 348. In determining whether the use was permitted, it 
was necessary, said Justice Story, to consider "the nature and objects of 
the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the 
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or 
supersede the objects, of the original work. . . . Much must, in such 
cases, depend upon the nature of the new work, the value and extent of the 
copies, and the degree in which the original authors may be injured 
thereby." Id., at 348-349. 
Similar lists were compiled by later courts. E. g., Tennessee Fabricat-
ing Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F. 2d 279, 283 (CA5), cert. denied, 398 
U. S. 928 (1970); Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F. 2d 73, 
85 (CA6 1943); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 
137 F. Supp. 348 (SD Cal. 1955); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P. F. Collier 
& $on Co., 26 U. S. P. Q. 40, 43 (SDNY 1934); Hill v. Whalen & Martell, 
Inc., 220 F . 359, 360 (SDNY 1914). 
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of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." 
1976 House Report 66. See 1975 Senate Report 62; S. Rep. 
No. 93-983, p. 116 (1974); H. R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 32 (1967); H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 
61 (1966). 
A 
Despite this absence of clear standards, the fair use doc-
trine plays a crucial role in the law of copyright. The pur-
pose of copyright protection, in the words of the Constitu-
tion, is to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 
Copyright is based on the belief that by granting authors the 
exclusive rights to reproduce their works, they are given an 
incentive to create, and that "encouragement of individual ef-
fort by personal gain is the best way to advance public wel-
fare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science 
and the useful Arts."' Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 219 
(1954). The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards 
the individual author in order to benefit the public. Twenti-
eth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1975); 
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127-128 (1932); see 
H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1909). 
There are situations, nevertheless, in which strict enforce-
ment of this monopoly would inhibit the very "Progress of 
Science and useful Arts" that copyright is intended to pro-
mote. An obvious example is the researcher or scholar 
whose own work depends on the ability to refer to and to 
quote the work of prior scholars. Obviously, no author could 
create a new work if he were first required to repeat the re-
search of every author who had gone before him. 28 The 
scholar, like the ordinary user, of course could be left to bar-
gain with each copyright owner for permission to quote from 
28 "The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our 
predecessors. 'A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see far-
ther than the giant himself.' " Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copy-
right: I, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 511 (1945). 
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or refer to prior works. But there is a crucial difference be-
tween the scholar and the ordinary user. When the ordinary 
user decides that the owner's price is too high, and forgoes 
use of the work, only the individual is the loser. When the 
scholar forgoes the use of a prior work, not only does his own 
work suffer, but the public is deprived of his contribution to 
knowledge. The scholar's work, in other words, produces 
external benefits from which everyone profits. In such a 
case, the fair use doctrine acts as a form of subsidy-albeit at 
the first author's expense-to permit the second author to 
make limited use of the first author's work for the public 
good. See Latman Fair Use Study 31; Gordon, Fair Use as 
Market Failure: A Structural Analysis of the Betamax Case 
and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1630 (1982). 
A similar subsidy may be appropriate in a range of areas 
other than pure scholarship. The situations in which fair use 
is most commonly recognized are listed in§ 107 itself; fair use 
may be found when a work is used "for purposes such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching, ... scholarship, 
or research." The House and Senate Reports expand on this 
list somewhat, 29 and other examples may be found in the case 
law. 30 Each of these uses, however, reflects a common 
21 Quoting from the Register's 1961 Report, the Senate and House Re-
ports give examples of possible fair uses: 
"'quotation of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration 
or comment; quotation of short passages in a scholarly or technical work, 
for illustration or clarification of the author's observations; use in a parody 
of some of the content of the work parodied; summary of an address or arti-
cle, with brief quotations, in a news report; reproduction by a library of a 
portion of a work to replace part of a damaged copy; reproduction by a 
teacher or student of a small part of a work to illustrate a lesson; reproduc-
tion of a work in legislative or judicial proceedings or reports; incidental 
and fortuitous reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast, of a work located 
in the scene of an event being recorded.'" 1975 Senate Report 61-62; 1976 
House Report 65. 
80 See, e. g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 
Inc., 626 F. 2d 1171 (CA5 1980) (comparative advertising). 
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theme: each is a productive use, resulting in some added ben-
efit to the public beyond that produced by the first author's 
work. 31 The fair use doctrine, in other words, permits works 
to be used for "socially laudable purposes." See Copyright 
Office, Briefing Papers on Current Issues, reprinted in 1975 
House Hearings 2051, 2055. I am aware of no case in which 
the reproduction of a coyprighted work for the sole benefit of 
the user has been held to be fair use. 32 
I do not suggest, of course, that every productive use is a 
fair use. A finding of fair use still must depend on the facts 
of the individual case, and on whether, under the circum-
stances, it is reasonable to expect the user to bargain with 
the copyright owner for use of the work. The fair use doc-
trine must strike a balance between the dual risks created by 
the copyright system: on the one hand, that depriving au-
thors of their monopoly will reduce their incentive to create, 
81 Professor Seltzer has characterized these lists of uses as ''reflect[ing] 
what in fact the subject matter of fair use has in the history of its adjudica-
tion consisted in: it has always had to do with the use by a second author of 
a first author's work." L. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright 
24 (1978) (emphasis removed). He distinguishes "the mere reproduction 
of a work in order to use it for its intrinsic purpose-to make what might be 
called the 'ordinary' use of it." When copies are made for "ordinary'' use 
of the work, "ordinary infringement has customarily been triggered, not 
notions of fair use" (emphasis in original). Ibid. See also M. Nimmer, 
Copyright§ 13.05[A][1] (1982) ("Use of a work in each of the foregoing con-
texts either necessarily or usually involves its use in a derivative work"). 
82 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d 
1345 (1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975), in-
volved the photocopying of scientific journal articles; the Court of Claims 
stressed that the libraries performing the copying were "devoted solely to 
the advancement and dissemination of medical knowledge," 203 Ct. Cl., at 
91, 487 F. 2d, at 1354, and that "medical science would be seriously hurt if 
such library photocopying were stopped." ld., at 95, 487 F. 2d, at 1356. 
The issue of library copying is now covered by § 108 of the 1976 Act. 
That section, which Congress regarded as "authoriz[ing] certain photo-
copying practices which may not qualify as a fair use," 1975 Senate Report 
67; 1976 House Report 74, permits the making of copies only for "private 
study, scholarship, or research." § 108(d)(l) and (e)(1). 
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and, on the other, that granting authors a complete monopoly 
will reduce the creative ability of others. 33 The inquiry is 
necessarily a flexible one, and the endless variety of situa-
tions that may arise precludes the formulation of exact rules. 
But when a user reproduces an entire work and uses it for its 
original purpose, with no added benefit to the public, the doc-
trine of fair use usually does not apply. There is then no 
need whatsoever to provide the ordinary user with a fair use 
subsidy at the author's expense. 
The making of a videotape recording for home viewing is 
an ordinary rather than a productive use of the Studios' copy-
righted works. The District Court found that "Betamax 
owners use the copy for the same purpose as the original. 
They add nothing of their own." 480 F. Supp., at 453. Al-
though applying the fair use doctrine to home VTR record-
ing, as Sony argues, may increase public access to material 
broadcast free over the public airwaves, I think Sony's argu-
ment misconceives the nature of copyright. Copyright gives 
the author a right to limit or even to cut off access to his 
work. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127 (1932). 
A VTR recording creates no public benefit sufficient to jus-
tify limiting this right. Nor is this right extinguished by the 
copyright owner's choice to make the work available over the 
airwaves. Section 106 of the 1976 Act grants the copyright 
owner the exclusive right to control the performance and the 
reproduction of his work, and the fact that he has licensed a 
single television performance is really irrelevant to the exist-
ence of his right to control its reproduction. Although a tele-
vision broadcast may be free to the viewer, this fact is 
33 In the words of Lord Mansfield: "[W]e must take care to guard against 
two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have 
employed their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived 
of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the 
other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the 
progress of the arts be retarded." Sayre v. Moore, 1 East 361 n. (b), 102 
Eng. Rep. 139, 140 n. (b) (K. B. 1785). See Register's Supplementary 
Report 13. 
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equally irrelevant; a book borrowed from the public library 
may not be copied any more freely than a book that is 
purchased. 
It may be tempting, as, in my view, the Court today is 
tempted, to stretch the doctrine of fair use so as to permit 
unfettered use of this new technology in order to increase ac-
cess to television programming. But such an extension risks 
eroding the very basis of copyright law, by depriving authors 
of control over their works and consequently of their incen-
tive to create. 34 Even in the context of highly productive 
educational uses, Congress has avoided this temptation; in 
passing the 1976 Act, Congress made it clear that off-the-air 
videotaping was to be permitted only in very limited situa-
tions. See 1976 House Report 71; 1975 Senate Report 64. 
And, the Senate report adds, "[t]he committee does not in-
tend to suggest ... that off-the-air recording for convenience 
would under any circumstances, be considered 'fair use."' 
I d., at 66. I cannot disregard these admonitions. 
114 This point was brought home repeatedly by the Register of Copy-
rights. Mentioning the "multitude of technological developments" since 
passage of the 1909 Act, including "remarkable developments in the use 
of video tape," Register's Supplementary Report xiv-xv, the Register 
cautioned: 
"I realize, more clearly now than I did in 1961, that the revolution in 
communications has brought with it a serious challenge to the author's 
copyright. This challenge comes not only from the ever-growing commer-
cial interests who wish to use the author's works for private gain. An 
equally serious attack has come from people with a sincere interest in the 
public welfare who fully recognize . . . 'that the real heart of civilization 
.. . owes its existence to the author'; ironically, in seeking to make the au-
thor's works widely available by freeing them from copyright restrictions, 
they fail to realize that they are whittling away the very thing that nur-
tures authorship in the first place. An accommodation among conflicting 
demands must be worked out, true enough, but not by denying the funda-
mental constitutional directive: to encourage cultural progress by securing 
the author's exclusive rights to him for a limited time." Id., at xv; see 
1975 House Hearings 117 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of 
Copyrights). 
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B 
I recognize, nevertheless, that there are situations where 
permitting even an unproductive use would have no effect on 
the author's incentive to create, that is, where the use would 
not affect the value of, or the market for, the author's work. 
Photocopying an old newspaper clipping to send to a friend 
may be an example; pinning a quotation on one's bulletin 
board may be another. In each of these cases, the effect on 
the author is truly de minimis. Thus, even though these 
uses provide no benefit to the public at large, no purpose is 
served by preserving the author's monopoly, and the use may 
be regarded as fair. 
Courts should move with caution, however, in depriving 
authors of protection from unproductive "ordinary'' uses. 
As has been noted above, even in the case of a productive 
use, § 107(4) requires consideration of "the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work" (emphasis added). "[A] particular use which may 
seem to have little or no economic impact on the author's 
rights today can assume tremendous importance in times to 
come." Register's Supplementary Report 14. Although 
such a use may seem harmless when viewed in isolation, 
"[i]solated instances of minor infringements, when multiplied 
many times, become in the aggregate a major inroad on copy-
right that must be prevented." 1975 Senate Report 65. 
I therefore conclude that, at least when the proposed use is 
an unproductive one, a copyright owner need prove only a po-
tential for harm to the market for or the value of the copy-
righted work. See 3M. Nimmer, Copyright§ 13.05[E][4][c], 
p. 1~ (1982). Proof of actual harm, or even probable 
harm, may be impossible in an area where the effect of a new 
technology is speculative, and requiring such proof would 
present the "real danger . . . of confining the scope of an au-
thor's rights on the basis of the present technology so that, as 
the years go by, his copyright loses much of its value because 
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of unforeseen technical advances." Register's Supplemen-
tary Report 14. Infringement thus would be found if the 
copyright owner demonstrates a reasonable possibility that 
harm will result from the proposed use. When the use is one 
that creates no benefit to the public at large, copyright pro-
tection should not be denied on the basis that a new technol-
ogy that may result in harm has not yet done so. 
The Studios have identified a number of ways in which 
VTR recording could damage their copyrights. VTR re-
cording could reduce their ability to market their works in 
movie theaters and through the rental or sale of pre-recorded 
videotapes or videodiscs; it also could reduce their rerun au-
dience, and consequently the license fees available to them 
for repeated showings. Moreover, advertisers may be will-
ing to pay for only "live" viewing audiences, if they believe 
VTR viewers will delete commercials or if rating services are 
unable to measure VTR use; if this is the case, VTR record-
ing could reduce the license fees the Studios are able to 
charge even for first-run showings. Library-building may 
raise the potential for each of the types of harm identified by 
the Studios, and time-shifting may raise the potential for sub-
stantial harm as well. 85 
36 A VTR owner who has taped a favorite movie for repeated viewing 
will be less likely to rent or buy a tape containing the same movie, watch a 
televised rerun, or pay to see the movie at a theater. Although time-shift-
ing may not replace theater or rerun viewing or the purchase of prere-
corded tapes or discs, it may well replace rental usage; a VTR user who has 
recorded a first-run movie for later viewing will have no need to rent a 
copy when he wants to see it. Both library-builders and time-shifters may 
avoid commercials; the library builder may use the pause control to record 
without them, and all users may fast-forward through commercials on 
playback. 
The Studios introduced expert testimony that both time-shifting and 
librarying would tend to decrease their revenue from copyrighted works. 
See 480 F. Supp., at 440. The District Court's findings also show substan-
tial library-building and avoidance of commercials. Both sides submitted 
surveys showing that the average Betamax user owns between 25 and 32 
tapes. The Studios' survey showed that at least 40% of users had more 
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Although the District Court found no likelihood of hann 
from VTR use, 480 F. Supp., at 468, I conclude that it ap-
plied an incorrect substantive standard and misallocated the 
burden of proof. The District Court reasoned that the Stu-
dios had failed to prove that library-building would occur "to 
any significant extent," id., at 467; that the Studios' prere-
corded videodiscs could compete with VTR recordings and 
were "arguably ... more desirable," ibid; that it was "not 
clear that movie audiences will decrease," id., at 468; and 
that the practice of deleting commercials "may be too te-
dious" for many viewers, ibid. To the extent any decrease 
in advertising revenues would occur, the court concluded that 
the Studios had "marketing alternatives at hand to recoup 
some of that predicted loss." I d., at 452. Because the Stu-
dios' prediction of hann was "based on so many assumptions 
and on a system of marketing which is rapidly changing," the 
court was "hesitant to identify 'probable effects' of home-use 
copying." Ibid. 
The District Court's reluctance to engage in prediction in 
this area is understandable, but, in my view, the court was 
mistaken in concluding that the Studios should bear the risk 
created by this uncertainty. The Studios have demon-
strated a potential for hann, which has not been, and could 
not be, refuted at this early stage of technological 
development. 
The District Court's analysis of hann, moreover, failed to 
consider the effect of VTR recording on "the potential mar-
ket for or the value of the copyrighted work," as required by 
§ 107(4).36 The requirement that a putatively infringing use 
than 10 tapes in a "library"; Sony's survey showed that more than 40% of 
users planned to view their tapes more than once; and both sides' surveys 
showed that commercials were avoided at least 25% of the time. I d., at 
438-439. 
36 Concern over the impact of a use upon ''potential" markets is to be 
found in cases decided both before and after § 107 lent Congress' imprima-
tur to the judicially-created doctrine of fair use. See, e. g., Iowa State 
University Research Foundation, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 
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of a copyrighted work, to be "fair," must not impair a "poten-
tial" market for the work has two implications. First, an in-
fringer cannot prevail merely by demonstrating that the 
copyright holder suffered no net harm from the infringer's ac-
tion. Indeed, even a showing that the infringement has re-
sulted in a net benefit to the copyright holder will not suffice. 
Rather, the infringer must demonstrate that he had not im-
paired the copyright holder's ability to demand compensation 
from (or to deny access to) any group who would otherwise be 
willing to pay to see or hear the copyrighted work. Second, 
the fact that a given market for a copyrighted work would not 
be available to the copyright holder were it not for the in-
fringer's activities does not permit the infringer to exploit 
that market without compensating the copyright holder. 
See Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc. v. 
American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F. 2d 57 (CA2 1980). 
In this case, the Studios and their amici demonstrate that 
the advent of the the VTR technology created a potential 
market for their copyrighted programs. That market con-
sists of those persons who find it impossible or inconvenient 
to watch the programs at the time they are broadcast, and 
who wish to watch them at other times. These persons are 
willing to pay for the privilege of watching copyrighted work 
at their convenience, as is evidenced by the fact that they are 
willing to pay for VTRs and tapes; undoubtedly, most also 
621 F. 2d 57, 60 (CA21980) ("the effect of the use on the copyright holder's 
potential market for the work"); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F. 2d 1061, 1070 
(CA2 1977) ("A key issue in fair use cases is whether the defendant's work 
tends to diminish or prejudice the potential sale of plaintiff's work"), cert. 
denied, 434 U. S. 1013 (1978); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 
203 Ct. Cl. 74, 88, 487 F. 2d 1345, 1352 (1973) ("the effect of the use on a 
copyright owner's potential market for and value of his work"), aff'd by an 
equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975); Encyclopaedia Britannica 
Educational Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1173 (WDNY 1982) 
("[T]he concern here must be focused on a copyrighted work's potential 
market. It is perfectly possible that plaintiffs' profits would have been 
greater, but for the kind of videotaping in question") (emphasis in original). 
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would be willing to pay some kind of royalty to copyright 
holders. The Studios correctly argue that they have been 
deprived of the ability to exploit this sizable market. 
It is thus apparent from the record and from the findings of 
the District Court that time-shifting does have a substantial 
adverse effect upon the "potential market for" the Studios' 
copyrighted works. Accordingly, even under the formula-
tion of the fair use doctrine advanced by Sony, time-shifting 
cannot be deemed a fair use. 
v 
Contributory Infringement 
From the Studios' perspective, the consequences of home 
VTR recording are the same as if a business had taped the 
Studios' works off the air, duplicated the tapes, and sold or 
rented them to members of the public for home viewing. 
The distinction is that home VTR users do not record for 
commercial advantage; the commercial benefit accrues to the 
manufacturers and distributors of the Betamax. I thus must 
proceed to discuss whether these manufacturers and distrib-
utors can be held contributorily liable if the product they sell 
is used to infringe. 
It is well established that liability for copyright infringe-
ment can be imposed on persons other than those who actu-
ally carry out the infringing activity. Kalem Co. v. Harper 
Brothers, 222 U. S. 55, 62-63 (1911); 3 M. Nimmer, Copy-
right § 12.04[A] (1982); see Twentieth Century Music Corp. 
v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 160, n. 11 (1975); Buck v. Jewell-La-
Salle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 198 (1931). Although the 
liability provision of the 1976 Act provides simply that "[a]ny-
one who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner ... is an infringer of the copyright," 17 U. S. C. 
§ 501(a), the House and Senate Reports demonstrate that 
Congress intended to retain judicial doctrines of contributory 
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infringement. 1975 Senate Report 57; 1976 House Report 
61.37 
The doctrine of contributory copyright infringement, how-
ever, is not well-defined. One of the few attempts at defini-
tion appears in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Art-
ists Management, Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159 (CA2 1971). In that 
case the Second Circuit stated that "one who, with knowl-
edge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially 
contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held 
liable as a 'contributory' infringer." Id., at 1162 (footnote 
omitted). While I have no quarrel with this general state-
ment, it does not easily resolve the present case; the District 
Court and the Court of Appeals, both purporting to apply it, 
reached diametrically opposite results. 
A 
In absolving Sony from liability, the District Court rea-
soned that Sony had no direct involvement with individual 
Betamax users, did not participate in any off-the-air copying, 
and did not know that such copying was an infringement of 
the Studios' copyright. 480 F. Supp., at 460. I agree with 
the Gershwin court that contributory liability may be im-
posed even when there has been no direct contact between 
the defendant and the infringer. The defendant in Gershwin 
was a concert promoter operating through local concert asso-
ciations that it sponsored; it had no contact with the infring-
ing performers themselves. 443 F. 2d, at 1162-1163. See 
also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S., at 
87 This intent is manifested further by provisions of the 1976 Act that 
exempt from liability persons who, while not participating directly in any 
infringing activity, could otherwise be charged with contributory infringe-
ment. See § 108(f)(1) (library not liable "for the unsupervised use of re-
producing equipment located on its premises," provided that certain 
warnings are posted); § 110(6) ("governmental body'' or "nonprofit agricul-
tural or horticultural organization" not liable for infringing performance by 
concessionaire "in the course of an annual agricultural or horticultural fair 
or exhibition"). 
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160, n. 11. Moreover, a finding of contributory infringement 
has never depended on actual knowledge of particular in-
stances of infringement; it is sufficient that the defendant 
have reason to know that infringement is taking place. 443 
F. 2d, at 1162; see Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. 
Mark-FiRecords, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (SDNY 1966).38 In 
the so-called "dance hall" cases, in which questions of con-
tributory infringement arise with some frequency, propri-
etors of entertainment establishments routinely are held lia-
ble for unauthorized performances on their premises, even 
when they have no knowledge that copyrighted works are 
being performed. In effect, the proprietors in those cases 
are charged with constructive knowledge of the 
performances. 89 
38 In Screen Gems, on which the Gershwin court relied, the court held 
that liability could be imposed on a shipper of unauthorized "bootleg" 
records and a radio station that broadcast advertisements of the records, 
provided they knew or should have known that the records were infring-
ing. The court concluded that the records' low price and the manner in 
which the records were marketed could support a finding of "constructive 
knowledge" even if actual knowledge were not shown. 
38 See, e. g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & 
Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d 1213 (CA11977); Dreamland Ball Room, 
Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F. 2d 354 (CA71929); M. Witmark & 
Sons v. Tremont Social & Athletic Club, 188 F. Supp. 787, 790 (Mass. 
1960); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S., at 157; 
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 198-199 (1931); 3 M. 
Nimmer, Copyright§ 12.04[A], pp. 12-35 (1982). 
Courts have premised liability in these cases on the notion that the de-
fendant had the ability to supervise or control the infringing activities, see, 
e. g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F. 2d 304, 307 
(CA21963); KECA Music, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72, 74 
(WD Mo. 1977). This notion, however, is to some extent fictional; the de-
fendant cannot escape liability by instructing the performers not to play 
copyrighted music, or even by inserting a provision to that effect into the 
performers' contract. Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse 
Racing & Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d, at 1214--1215; KECA Music, 
Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp., at 75; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. 
v. Veltin, 47 F. Supp. 648, 649 (WD La. 1942). Congress expressly re-
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Nor is it necessary that the defendant be aware that the 
infringing activity violates the copyright laws. Section 
504(c)(2) of the 1976 Act provides for a reduction in statutory 
damages when an infringer proves he "was not aware and 
had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an 
infringement of copyright," but the statute establishes no 
general exemption for those who believe their infringing ac-
tivities are legal. Moreover, such an exemption would be 
meaningless in a case such as this, in which prospective relief 
is sought; once a court has established that the copying at 
issue is infringement, the defendants are necessarily aware of 
that fact for the future. It is undisputed in this case that 
Sony had reason to know the Betarnax would be used by 
some owners to tape copyrighted works off the air. See 480 
F. Supp., at 459, 460. 
The District Court also concluded that Sony had not 
caused, induced, or contributed materially to any infringing 
activities of Betamax owners. 480 F. Supp., at 460. In a 
case of this kind, however, causation can be shown indirectly; 
it does not depend on evidence that particular Betamax own-
ers relied on particular advertisements. In an analogous 
case decided just two Terms ago, this Court approved a 
lower court's conclusion that liability for contributory trade-
mark infringement could be imposed on a manufacturer who 
"suggested, even by implication" that a retailer use the man-
ufacturer's goods to infringe the trademark of another. 
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 
jected a proposal to exempt proprietors from this type of liability under the 
1976 Act. See 1975 Senate Report 141-142; 1976 House Report 159-160; 
1975 House Hearings 1812-1813 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of 
Copyrights); id. , at 1813 (colloquy between Rep. Pattison and Barbara 
Ringer). 
The Court's attempt to distinguish these cases on the ground of "con-
trol," ante, at 18, is unpersuasive. The direct infringer ordinarily is not 
employed by the person held liable; instead, he is an independent contrac-
tor. Neither is he always an agent of the person held liable; Screen Gems 
makes this apparent. 
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U. S. 844, 851 (1982); see id., at 860 (concurring opinion). I 
think this standard is equally appropriate in the copyright 
context. 
The District Court found that Sony has advertised the 
Betamax as suitable for off-the-air recording of "favorite 
shows," "novels for television," and "classic movies," 480 F. 
Supp., at 436, with no visible warning that such recording 
could constitute copyright infringement. It is only with the 
aid of the Betamax or some other VTR, that it is possible to-
day for home television viewers to infringe copyright by re-
cording off-the-air. Off-the-air recording is not only a fore-
seeable use for the Betamax, but indeed is its intended use. 
Under the circumstances, I agree with the Court of Appeals 
that if off-the-air recording is an infringement of copyright, 
Sony has induced and materially contributed to the infringing 
conduct of Betamax owners. 40 
B 
Sony argues that the manufacturer or seller of a product 
used to infringe is absolved from liability whenever the prod-
uct can be put to any substantial noninfringing use. Brief 
for Petitioners 41-42. The District Court so held, borrowing 
the "staple article of commerce" doctrine governing liability 
for contributory infringement of patents. See 35 U. S. C. 
§ 271.41 This Court today is much less positive. See ante, at 
"'My conclusion respecting contributory infringement does not include 
the retailer defendants. The District Court found that one of the retailer 
defendants had assisted in the advertising campaign for the Betamax, but 
made no other findings respecting their knowledge of the Betamax's in-
tended uses. I cannot agree with the Court of Appeals, at least on this 
record, that the retailers "are sufficiently engaged in the enterprise to be 
held accountable," 659 F. 2d, at 976. In contrast, the advertising agency 
employed to promote the Betamax was far more actively engaged in the 
advertising campaign, and petitioners have not argued that its liability dif-
fers in any way from that of Sony Corporation and Sony Corporation of 
America. 
41 The "staple article of commerce" doctrine protects those who manufac-
ture products incorporated into or used with patented inventions-for ex-
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22. I do not agree that this technical judge-made doctrine of 
patent law, based in part on considerations irrelevant to the 
field of copyright, see generally Dawson Chemical Co. v. 
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U. S. 176, 187-199 (1980), should be 
imported wholesale into copyright law. Despite their com-
mon constitutional source, see U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 8, 
patent and copyright protections have not developed in a par-
allel fashion, and this Court in copyright cases in the past has 
borrowed patent concepts only sparingly. See Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 345-346 (1908). 
I recognize, however, that many of the concerns underly-
ing the "staple article of commerce" doctrine are present in 
copyright law as well. As the District Court noted, if liabil-
ity for contributory infringement were imposed on the manu-
facture.r or seller of every product used to infringe-a type-
writer, a camera, a photocopying machine-the "wheels of 
commerce" would be blocked. 480 F. Supp., at 461; see also 
Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U. S., at 62. 
I therefore conclude that if a significant portion of the 
product's use is non infringing, the manufacturers and sellers 
cannot be held contributorily liable for the product's infring-
ing uses. See ante, at 22. If virtually all of the product's 
use, however, is to infringe, contributory liability may be im-
ample, the paper and ink used with patented printing machines, Henry v. 
A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1 (1912), or the dry ice used with patented refrig-
eration systems, Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp., 283 U. S. 27 
(1931). Because a patent-holder has the right to control the use of the pat-
ented item as well as its manufacture, see Motion Picture Patents Co. v. 
Universal Film Co., 243 U. S. 502, 509-510 (1917); 35 U. S. C. 271(a), 
such protection for the manufacturer of the incorporated product is neces-
sary to prevent patent-holders from extending their monopolies by sup-
pressing competition in unpatented components and supplies suitable for 
use with the patented item. See Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas 
Co., 448 U. S. 176, 197-198 (1980). The doctrine of contributory patent 
infringement has been the subject of attention by the courts and by Con-
gress, see id., at 202-212, and has been codified since 1952, 66 Stat. 792, 
but was never mentioned during the copyright law revision process as hav-
ing any relevance to contributory copyright infringement. 
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posed; if no one would buy the product for noninfringing pur-
poses alone, it is clear that the manufacturer is purposely 
profiting from the infringement, and that liability is appropri-
ately imposed. In such a case, the copyright owner's monop-
oly would not be extended beyond its proper bounds; the 
manufacturer of such a product contributes to the infringing 
activities of others and profits directly thereby, while pro-
viding no benefit to the public sufficient to justify the 
infringement. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that Sony should be held 
liable for contributory infringement, reasoning that "[ v ]ideo-
tape recorders are manufactured, advertised, and sold for the 
primary purpose of reproducing television programming," 
and "[ v ]irtually all television programming is copyrighted 
material." 659 F. 2d, at 975. While I agree with the first of 
these propositions, 42 the second, for me, is problematic. The 
key question is not the amount of television programming 
that is copyrighted, but rather the amount of VTR usage that 
is infringing.43 Moreover, the parties and their amici have 
argued vigorously about both the amount of television pro-
gramming that is covered by copyright and the amount for 
which permission to copy has been given. The proportion of 
VTR recording that is infringing is ultimately a question of 
42 Although VTRs also may be used to watch prerecorded video cassettes 
and to make home motion pictures, these uses do not require a tuner such 
as the Betamax contains. See n. 1, supra. The Studios do not object to 
Sony's sale of VTRs without tuners. Brief for Respondents 5, n. 9. In 
considering the noninfringing uses of the Betamax, therefore, those uses 
that would remain possible without the Betamax's built-in tuner should not 
be taken into account. 
43 Noninfringing uses would include, for example, recording works that 
are not protected by copyright, recording works that have entered the 
public domain, recording with permission of the copyright owner, and, of 
course, any recording that qualifies as fair use. See, e. g., Bruzzone v. 
Miller Brewing Co., 202 U.S. P. Q. 809 (ND Cal. 1979) (use of home VTR 
for market research studies). 
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fact, 44 and the District Court specifically declined to make 
findings on the "percentage of legal versus illegal home-use 
recording." 480 F. Supp., at 468. In light of my view of the 
law, resolution of this factual question is essential. I there-
fore would remand the case for further consideration of this 
by the District Court. 
VI 
The Court has adopted an approach very different from the 
one I have outlined. It is my view that the Court's approach 
alters dramatically the doctrines of fair use and contributory 
infringement as they have been developed by Congress and 
the courts. Should Congress choose to respond to the 
Court's decision, the old doctrines can be resurrected. As it 
stands, however, the decision today erodes much of the co-
herence that these doctrines have struggled to achieve. 
The Court's disposition of the case turns on its conclusion 
that time-shifting is a fair use. Because both parties agree 
that time-shifting is the primary use of VTRs, that conclu-
sion, if correct, would settle the issue of Sony's liability under 
almost any definition of contributory infringement. The 
Court concludes that time-shifting is fair use for two reasons. 
Each is seriously flawed . 
.. Sony asserts that much or most television broadcasting is available for 
home recording because (1) no copyright owner other than the Studios has 
brought an infringement action, and (2) much televised material is ineligi-
ble for copyright protection because videotapes of the broadcasts are not 
kept. The first of these assertions is irrelevant; Sony's liability does not 
turn on the fact that only two copyright owners thus far have brought suit. 
The amount of infringing use must be determined through consideration of 
the television market as a whole. Sony's second assertion is based on a 
faulty premise; the Copyright Office permits audiovisual works transmit-
ted by television to be registered by deposit of sample frames plus a de-
scription of the work. See 37 CFR §§ 202.20(c)(2)(ii) and 202.21(g) (1982). 
Moreover, although an infringement action cannot be brought unless the 
work is registered, 17 U. S. C. § 411(a), registration is not a condition of 
copyright protection. § 408(a). Copying an unregistered work still may 
be infringement. Cf. § 506(a) (liability for criminal copyright infringe-
ment; not conditioned on prior registration). 
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The Court's first reason for concluding that time-shifting is 
fair use is its claim that many copyright holders have no ob-
jection to time-shifting, and that "respondents have no right 
to prevent other copyright holders from authorizing it for 
their programs." Ante, at 23. The Court explains that a 
finding of contributory infringement would "inevitably frus-
trate the interests of broadcasters in reaching the portion of 
their audience that is available only through time-shifting." 
Ante, at 26. Such reasoning, however, simply confuses the 
question of liability with the difficulty of fashioning an appro-
priate remedy. It may be that an injunction prohibiting the 
sale of VTRs would harm the interests of copyright holders 
who have no objection to others making copies of their pro-
grams. But such concerns should and would be taken into 
account in fashioning an appropriate remedy once liability has 
been found. Remedies may well be available that would not 
interfere with authorized time-shifting at all. The Court of 
Appeals mentioned the possibility of a royalty payment that 
would allow VTR sales and time-shifting to continue un-
abated, and the parties may be able to devise other narrowly 
tailored remedies once liability is found. Sony may be able, 
for example, to build a VTR that enables broadcasters to 
scramble the signal of individual programs and "jam" the un-
authorized recording of them. Even were an appropriate 
remedy not available at this time, the Court should not mis-
construe copyright holders' rights in a manner that pre-
vents enforcement of them when, through development of 
better techniques, an appropriate remedy becomes 
available. 45 
46 Even if concern with remedy were appropriate at the liability stage, 
the Court's use of the District Court's findings is somewhat cavalier. The 
Court relies heavily on testimony by representatives of professional sports 
leagues to the effect that they have no objection to VTR recording. The 
Court never states, however, whether the sports leagues are copyright 
holders, and if so, whether they have exclusive copyrights to sports broad-
casts. Of course, one who does not hold an exclusive copyright does not 
have authority to consent to copying. 
81-1687-DISSENT 
SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC. 39 
The Court's second stated reason for finding that Sony is 
not liable for contributory infringement is its conclusion that 
even unauthorized time-shifting is fair use. Ante, at 28. 
This conclusion is even more troubling. The Court begins by 
suggesting that the fair use doctrine operates as a general 
"equitable rule of reason." That interpretation 
mischaracterizes the doctrine, and simply ignores the lan-
guage of the statute. Section 107 establishes the fair use 
doctrine "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news re-
porting, teaching, ... scholarship, or research." These are 
all productive uses. It is true that the legislative history 
states repeatedly that the doctrine must be applied flexibly 
on a case-by-case basis, but those references were only in the 
context of productive uses. Such a limitation on fair use 
comports with its purpose, which is to facilitate the creation 
of new works. There is no indication that the fair use doc-
trine has any application for purely personal consumption on 
Assuming that the various sports leagues do have exclusive copyrights 
in some of their broadcasts, the amount of authorized time-shifting still 
would not be overwhelming. Sony's own survey indicated that only 7.3 
percent of all Betamax use is to record sports events of all kinds. Def. 
Exh. OT, Table 20. Because Sony's witnesses did not represent all forms 
of sports events, moreover, this figure provides only a tenuous basis for 
this Court to engage in fact-finding of its own. 
The only witness at trial who was clearly an exclusive copyright owner 
and who expressed no objection to unauthorized time-shifting was the 
owner of the copyright in Mister Rogers' Neighborhood. But the Court 
cites no evidence in the record to the effect that anyone makes VTR copies 
of that program. The simple fact is that the District Court made no find-
ings on the amount of authorized time-shifting that takes place. The 
Court seems to recognize this gap in its reasoning, and phrases its argu-
ment as a hypothetical. The Court states: "If there are millions of owners 
of VTR's who make copies of televised sports events, religious broadcasts, 
and educational programs such as Mister Rogers' Neighborhood, and if the 
proprietors of those programs welcome the practice," the sale of VTR's 
"should not be stifled" in order to protect respondent's copyrights. Ante, 
at 26 (emphasis supplied). Given that the Court seems to recognize that 
its argument depends on findings that have not been made, it seems that a 
remand is inescapable. 
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the scale involved in this case,46 and the Court's application of 
it here deprives fair use of the major cohesive force that has 
guided evolution of the doctrine in the past. 
Having bypassed the initial hurdle for establishing that a 
use is fair, the Court then purports to apply to time-shifting 
the factors explicitly stated in the statute. The first of the 
four statutory factors is "the purpose and character of the 
use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or 
is for nonprofit educational purposes." § 107(1). The Court 
confidently describes time-shifting as a noncommercial, non-
profit activity. It is clear, however, that personal use of 
programs that have been copied without permission is not the 
type of nonprofit activity that § 107(1) envisions. For fair 
use purposes, nonprofit activity refers to a productive en-
deavor the primary benefit of which does not accrue to the 
individual actor involved. Time-shifting, in contrast, in-
volves none of the humanitarian impulse that § 107(1) seeks to 
encourage. It is likewise something of a mischaracterization 
of time-shifting to describe it as noncommercial in the sense 
that that term is used in the statute. As one commentator 
has observed, time-shifting is noncommercial in the same 
sense that stealing jewelry and wearing it-instead of resell-
ing it-is noncommercial. 47 Pur~ly consumptive uses are 
certainly not what the fair use doctrine was designed to pro-
tect, and the awkwardness of applying the statutory lan-
guage to time-shifting only makes clearer that fair use was 
designed to apply to uses that are productive. 
46 As has been explained, some uses of time-shifting, such as copying 
an old newspaper clipping for a friend, are fair use because of their de 
minimis effect on the copyright holder. The scale of copying involved in 
this case, of course, is of an entirely different magnitude, precluding appli-
cation of such an exception. 
47 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing before Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. 1250 (1982) (memo-
randum of Prof. Laurence H. Tribe). 
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The next two statutory factors are all but ignored by the 
Court-though certainly not because they have no applicabil-
ity. The second factor-"the nature of the copyrighted 
work"-strongly supports the view that time-shifting is an 
infringing use. The rationale guiding application of this fac-
tor is that certain types of works, typically those involving 
"more of diligence than of originality or inventiveness," New 
York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. 
Supp. 217, 221 (NJ 1977), require less copyright protection 
than other original works. Thus, for example, informational 
works, such as news reports, that readily lend themselves to 
productive use by others, are less protected than creative 
works of entertainment. Sony's own surveys indicate that 
entertainment shows account for more than 80 percent of the 
programs recorded by Betamax owners. 48 
The third statutory factor-"the amount and substantiality 
of the portion used"-is even more devastating to the Court's 
interpretation. It is undisputed that virtually all VTR own-
ers record entire works, see 480 F. Supp., at 454, thereby 
creating an exact substitute for the copyrighted original. 
Fair use is intended to allow individuals engaged in produc-
tive uses to copy small portions of original works that will fa-
cilitate their own productive endeavors. Time-shifting 
bears no resemblance to such activity, and the complete 
duplication that it involves might alone be sufficient to pre-
clude a finding of fair use. It is little wonder that the Court 
has chosen to ignore this aspect of the statute. 49 
48 See A Survey of Betamax Owners, R. 2353, Def. Exh. OT, Table 20, 
cited in Brief for Respondents 52. 
49 The Court's one oblique acknowledgement of this third factor, ante, at 
29, seems to suggest that the fact that time-shifting involves copying com-
plete works is not very significant because the viewers already have been 
asked to watch the initial broadcast free. This suggestion misses the 
point. As has been noted, a book borrowed from a public library may not 
be copied any more freely than one that has been purchased. An invita-
tion to view a showing is completely different from an invitation to copy a 
copyrighted work. 
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The fourth factor requires an evaluation of "the effect of 
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work." This is the factor upon which the Court has 
focused, but once again, the Court has misread the statute. 
As mentioned above, the statute requires a court to consider 
the effect of the use on the potential market for the copy-
righted work. The Court has struggled mightily to show 
that VTR use has not reduced the value of the Studios' copy-
righted works in their present markets. Even if true, that 
showing only begins the proper inquiry. The development 
of the VTR has created a new market for the works produced 
by the Studios. That market consists of those persons who 
desire to view television programs at times other than when 
they are broadcast, and who therefore purchase VTR record-
ers to enable them to time-shift. 50 Because time-shifting of 
the Studios' copyrighted works involves the copying of them, 
however, the Studios are entitled to share in the benefits of 
that new market that currently go to Sony through Betamax 
sales. Respondents therefore can show harm from VTR use 
simply by showing that the value of their copyrights would 
increase if they were compensated for the copies that are 
used in the new market. The existence of this effect is self-
evident. 
Because of the Court's conclusion concerning the legality of 
time-shifting, it never addresses the amount ofnoninfringing 
use that is required. Thus, it is difficult to discuss how the 
Court's test for contributory infringement would operate in 
practice under a proper analysis of time-shifting. One as-
pect of the test as it is formulated by the Court, however, 
particularly deserves comment. The Court explains that a 
110 The Court implicitly has recognized that this market is very signifi-
cant. The central concern underlying the Court's entire opinion is that 
there is a large audience who would like very much to be able to view pro-
grams at times other than when they are broadcast. Ante, at 26. The 
Court simply misses the implication of its own concerns. 
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manufacturer of a product is not liable for contributory in-
fringement as long as the product is "capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses." Ante, at 22 (emphasis supplied). Such 
a definition essentially eviscerates the concept of contribu-
tory infringement. Only the most unimaginative manufac-
turer would be unable to demonstrate that a image-duplicat-
ing product is "capable" of substantial noninfringing uses. 
Surely Congress desires to prevent the manufacture of prod-
ucts that are used almost exclusively to infringe copyrights; 
the fact that noninfringing uses exist presumably would have 
little bearing on that desire. 
More importantly, the rationale for the Court's narrow 
standard of contributory infringment reveals that, once 
again, the Court has confused the issue of liability with that 
of remedy. The Court finds that a narrow definition of con-
tributory infringement is necessary in order to protect "the 
rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated 
areas of commerce." Ante, at 22. But application of the 
contributory infringement doctrine need create such a con-
cern only if the remedy attendant upon a finding of liability 
were an injunction against the manufacture of the product in 
question. The issue of an appropriate remedy is not before 
the Court at this time, but it seems likely that an injunction is 
not the remedy that would be ordered. It is unfortunate 
that the Court has allowed its concern over a remedy to infect 
its analysis of liability. 
VII 
The Court of Appeals, having found Sony liable, remanded 
for the District Court to consider the propriety of injunctive 
or other relief. Because of my conclusion as to the issue of 
liability, I, too, would not decide here what remedy would be 
appropriate if liability were found. I concur, however, in 
the Court of Appeals' suggestion that an award of damages, 
or continuing royalties, or even some form of limited injunc-
tion, may well be an appropriate means of balancing the equi-
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ties in this case. 51 Although I express no view on the merits 
of any particular proposal, I am certain that, if Sony were 
found liable in this case, the District Court would be able to 
fashion appropriate relief. The District Court might con-
clude, of course, that a continuing royalty or other equitable 
relief is not feasible. The Studios then would be relegated to 
statutory damages for proved instances of infringement. 
But the difficulty of fashioning relief, and the possibility that 
complete relief may be unavailable, should not affect our in-
terpretation of the statute. 
Like so many other problems created by the interaction of 
copyright law with a new technology, "[t]here can be no 
really satisfactory solution to the problem presented here, 
until Congress acts." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. 
Aiken, 422 U. S., at 167 (dissenting opinion). But in the ab-
sence of a congressional solution, courts cannot avoid difficult 
problems by refusing to apply the law. We must "take the 
Copyright Act ... as we find it," Fortnightly Corp. v. 
United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 401-402 (1968), and "do as lit-
tle damage as possible to traditional copyright principles . . . 
until the Congress legislates." I d., at 404 (dissenting 
opinion). 
"
1 Other Nations have imposed royalties on the manufacturers of prod-
ucts used to infringe copyright. See, e. g., Copyright Laws and Treaties 
of the World (UNESCO/BNA 1982) (English translation), reprinting Fed-
eral Act On Copyright in Works of Literature and Art and on Related 
Rights (Austria), § 42(5}-(7), and An Act dealing with Copyright and Re-
lated Rights (Federal Republic of Germany), Art. 53(5). A study pro-
duced for the Commission of European Communities has recommended 
that these requirements "serve as a pattern" for the European community. 
A. Dietz, Copyright Law in the European Community 135 (1978). While 
these royalty systems ordinarily depend on the existence of authors' col-
lecting societies, see id., at 119, 136, such collecting societies are a familiar 
part of our copyright law. See generally Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, Inc ., 441 U. S. 1, 4-5 (1979). Fashioning relief 
of this sort, of course, might require bringing other copyright owners into 
court through certification of a class or otherwise. 
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[January-, 1984] 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL 
joins, dissenting. 
A restatement of the facts and judicial history of this case 
is necessary, in my view, for a proper focus upon the issues. 
Respondents' position is hardly so "unprecedented," ante, at 
2, in the copyright law, nor does it really embody a "gross 
generalization," ante, at 17, or a "novel theory of liability," 
ante, at 18, and the like, as the Court, in belittling their 
claims, describes the efforts of respondents. 
I 
The introduction of the home videotape recorder (VTR) 
upon the market has enabled millions of Americans to make 
recordings of television programs in their homes, for future 
and repeated viewing at their own convenience. While this 
practice has proved highly popular with owners of television 
sets and VTRs, it understandably has been a matter of con-
cern for the holders of copyrights in the recorded programs. 
A result is the present litigation, raising the issues whether 
the home recording of a copyrighted television program is an 
infringement of the copyright, and, if so, whether the manu-
facturers and distributors of VTRs are liable as contributory 
infringers. I would hope that these questions ultimately will 
be considered seriously and in depth by the Congress and be 
resolved there, despite the fact that the Court's decision to-
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day provides little incentive for congressional action. Our 
task in the meantime, however, is to resolve these issues as 
best we can in the light of ill-fitting existing copyright law. 
It is no answer, of course, to say and stress, as the Court 
does, this Court's "consistent deference to Congress" when-
ever "major technological innovations" appear. Ante, at 12. 
Perhaps a better and more accurate description is that the 
Court has tended to evade the hard issues when they arise in 
the area of copyright law. I see no reason for the Court to 
be particularly pleased with this tradition or to continue it. 
Indeed, it is fairly clear from the legislative history of the 
1976 Act that Congress meant to change the old pattern and 
enact a statute that would cover new technologies, as well as 
oldr 
II 
In 1976, respondents Universal City Studios, Inc., and 
Walt Disney Productions (Studios) brought this copyright in-
fringement action in the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California against, among others, petition-
ers Sony Corporation, a Japanese corporation, and Sony Cor-
poration of America, a New York corporation, the manufac-
turer and distributor, respectively, of the Betamax VTR. 
The Studios sought damages, profits, and a wide-ranging in-
junction against further sales or use of the Betamax or 
Betamax tapes. 
The Betamax, like other VTRs, presently is capable of re-
cording television broadcasts off the air on videotape cas-
settes, and playing them back at a later time.' Two kinds of 
1 The Betamax has three primary components: a tuner that receives tele-
vision ("RF") signals broadcast over the airwaves; an adapter that con-
verts the RF signals into audio-video signals; and a recorder that places 
the audio-video signals on magnetic tape. Sony also manufactures VTRs 
without built-in tuners; these are capable of playing back prerecorded 
tapes and recording home movies on videotape, but cannot record off the 
air. Since the Betamax has its own tuner, it can be used to record off one 
channel while another channel is being watched. 
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Betamax usage are at issue here. 2 The first is "time-shift-
ing," whereby the user records a program in order to watch it 
at a later time, and then records over it, and thereby erases 
the program, after a single viewing. The second is "library-
building," in which the user records a program in order to 
keep it for repeated viewing over a longer term. Sony's ad-
vertisements, at various times, have suggested that Betamax 
users "record favorite shows" or "build a library." Sony's 
Betamax advertising has never contained warnings about 
copyright infringement, although a warning does appear in 
the Betamax operating instructions. 
The Studios produce copyrighted "movies" and other 
works that they release to theaters and license for television 
broadcast. They also rent and sell their works on film and 
on prerecorded videotapes and videodiscs. License fees for 
television broadcasts are set according to audience ratings, 
compiled by rating services that do not measure any play-
backs of videotapes. The Studios make the serious claim 
that VTR recording may result in a decrease in their reve-
nue from licensing their works to television and from market-
ing them in other ways. 
After a 5-week trial, the District Court, with a detailed 
opinion, ruled that home VTR recording did not infringe the 
Studios' copyrights under either the Act of March 4, 1909 
(1909 Act), 35 Stat. 1075, as amended (formerly codified as 17 
U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1976 ed.)), or the Copyright Revision Act 
of 1976 (1976 Act), 90 Stat. 2541, 17 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. 
The Betamax is available with auxiliary features, including a timer, a 
pause control, and a fast-forward control; these allow Betamax owners to 
record programs without being present, to avoid (if they are present) re-
cording commercial messages, and to skip over commercials while playing 
back the recording. Videotape is reusable; the user erases its record by 
recording over it. 
2 This case involves only the home recording for home use of television 
programs broadcast free over the airwaves. No issue is raised concerning 
cable or pay television, or the sharing or trading of tapes. 
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(1982 ed.). 3 The District Court also held that even if home 
VTR recording were an infringement, Sony could not be held 
liable under theories of direct infringement, contributory in-
fringement, or vicarious liability. Finally, the court con-
cluded that an injunction against sales of the Betamax would 
be inappropriate even if Sony were liable under one or more 
of those theories. 480 F. Supp. 429 (1979). 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed in virtually every respect. 659 F. 2d 963 (1981). 
It held that the 1909 Act and the 1976 Act contained no im-
plied exemption for "home use" recording, that such record-
ing was not "fair use," and that the use of the Betamax to 
record the Studios' copyrighted works infringed their copy-
rights. The Court of Appeals also held Sony liable for con-
tributory infringement, reasoning that Sony knew and antici-
pated that the Betamax would be used to record copyrighted 
material off the air, and that Sony, indeed, had induced, 
caused, or materially contributed to the infringing conduct. 
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District 
Court for appropriate relief; it suggested that the District 
Court could consider the award of damages or a continuing 
royalty in lieu of an injunction. I d., at 976. 
III 
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, 
empowers Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries." This Nation's initial copyright statute was 
passed by the First Congress. Entitled "An Act for the en-
couragement of learning," it gave an author "the sole right 
8 At the trial, the Studios proved 32 individual instances where their 
copyrighted works were recorded on Betamax VTRs. Two of these in-
stances occurred after January 1, 1978, the primary effective date of the 
1976 Act; all the others occurred while the 1909 Act was still effective. 
My analysis focuses primarily on the 1976 Act, but the principles govern-
ing copyright protection for these works are the same under either Act. 
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and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending" 
his "map, chart, book or books" for a period of 14 years. Act 
of May 31, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 124. Since then, as the technol-
ogy available to authors for creating and preserving their 
writings has changed, the governing statute has changed 
with it. By many amendments, and by complete revisions in 
1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976,4 authors' rights have been ex-
panded to provide protection to any "original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression," includ-
ing "motion pictures and other audiovisual works." 17 
U. S. C. § 102(a).5 
• Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436; Act of July 8, 1870, §§ 8&-111, 
16 Stat. 212-217; Act of Mar. 4, 1909,35 Stat. 1075 (formerly codified as 17 
U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1976 ed.)); Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 
2541 (codified as 17 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. (1982 ed.). 
~Section 102(a) provides: 
"Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now 
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, 
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device. Works of authorship include the following categories: 
"(1) literary works; 
"(2) musical works, including any accompanying words; 
"(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; 
"(4) pantomimes and choreographic works; 
"(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; 
"(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and 
"(7) sound recordings." 
Definitions of terms used in § 102(a)(6) are provided by § 101: 
"Audiovisual works" are "works that consist of a series of related images 
which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or de-
vices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with 
accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material ob-
jects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied." And "mo-
tion pictures" are "audiovisual works consisting of a series of related im-
ages which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion, 
together with accompanying sounds, if any." Most commercial television 
programs, if fixed on film or tape at the time of broadcast or before, qualify 
as "audiovisual works." Since the categories set forth in § 102(a) are not 
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Section 106 of the 1976 Act grants the owner of a copyright 
a variety of exclusive rights in the copyrighted work, 6 includ-
ing the right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or 
phonorecords." 7 This grant expressly is made subject to 
§§ 107-118, which create a number of exemptions and limita-
tions on the copyright owner's rights. The most important 
of these sections, for present purposes, is § 107; that section 
states that "the fair use of a copyrighted work ... is not an 
infringement of copyright." 8 
mutually exclusive, a particular television program may also qualify for 
protection as a dramatic, musical, or other type of work. 
6 Section 106 provides: 
"Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this 
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: 
"(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
"(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
"(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending; 
"(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform 
the copyrighted work publicly; and 
"(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi-
vidual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the 
copyrighted work publicly." 
' A "phonorecord" is defined by § 101 as a reproduction of sounds other 
than sounds accompanying an audiovisual work, while a "copy" is a re-
production of a work in any form other than a phonorecord. 
8 Section 107 provides: 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords 
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy-
right. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
"(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
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The 1976 Act, like its predecessors, 9 does not give the 
copyright owner full and complete control over all possible 
uses of his work. If the work is put to some use not enumer-
ated in § 106, the use is not an infringement. See Fort-
nightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 393-395 
(1968). Thus, before considering whether home videotaping 
comes within the scope of the fair use exemption, one first 
must inquire whether the practice appears to violate the ex-
clusive right, granted in the first instance by § 106(1), "to 
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords." 
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work." 
Section 101 makes it clear that the four factors listed in . this section are 
"illustrative and not limitative." 
9 The 1976 Act was the product of a revision effort lasting more than 20 
years. Spurred by the recognition that "significant developments in tech-
nology and communications" had rendered the 1909 Act inadequate, S. 
Rep. No. 94-473, p. 47 (1975); see H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 47 (1976), 
Congress in 1955 authorized the Copyright Office to prepare a series of 
studies on all aspects of the existing copyright law. Thirty-four studies 
were prepared and presented to Congress. The Register of Copyrights 
drafted a comprehensive report with recommendations, House Committee 
on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, Report of the Register of Copy-
rights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (Comm. Print 1961) (Register's 1961 Report), and general revision 
bills were introduced near the end of the 88th Congress in 1964. H. R. 
11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). The Register issued a second 
report in 1965, with revised recommendations. House Committee on the 
Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, Pt. 6, Supplementary Report of the 
Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright 
Law: 1965 Revision Bill, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1965) (Regis-
ter's Supplementary Report). Action on copyright revision was delayed 
from 1967 to 1974 by a dispute on cable television, see generally Second 
Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revi-
sion of the U. S. Copyright Law: 1975 Revision Bill, ch. V, pp. 2-26 (Draft 
Oct.-Dec. 1975) (Register's Second Supplementary Report), but a compro-
mise led to passage of the present Act in 1976. 
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A 
Although the word "copies" is in the plural in § 106(1), 
there can be no question that under the Act the making of 
even a single unauthorized copy is prohibited. The Senate 
and House Reports explain: "The references to 'copies or 
phonorecords,' although in the plural, are intended here and 
throughout the bill to include the singular (1 U. S. C. § 1)." 10 
S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 58 (1975) (1975 Senate Report); H. R. 
Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 61 (1976) (1976 House Report). The 
Reports then describe the reproduction right established by 
§ 106(1): 
"[T]he right 'to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies 
or phonorecords' means the right to produce a material 
object in which the work is duplicated, transcribed, imi-
tated, or simulated in a fixed form from which it can be 
'perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.' 
As under the present law, a copyrighted work would be 
infringed by reproducing it in whole or in any substantial 
part, and by duplicating it exactly or by imitation or 
simulation." 1975 Senate Report 58; 1976 House Report 
61. 
The making of even a single videotape recording at home falls 
within this definition; the VTR user produces a material ob-
ject from which the copyrighted work later can be perceived. 
Unless Congress intended a special exemption for the making 
of a single copy for personal use, I must conclude that VTR 
recording is contrary to the exclusive rights granted by 
§ 106(1). 
The 1976 Act and its accompanying reports specify in some 
detail the situations in which a single copy of a copyrighted 
10 1 U. S. C. § 1 provides in relevant part: 
"In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the con-
text indicates otherwise . . . words importing the plural include the 
singular .... " 
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work may be made without infringement concerns. Section 
108(a), for example, permits a library or archives "to repro-
duce no more than one copy or phonorecord of a work" for a 
patron, but only under very limited conditions; an entire 
work, moreover, can be copied only if it cannot be obtained 
elsewhere at a fair price. 11 § 108(e); see also § 112(a) (broad-
caster may "make no more than one copy or phonorecord of a 
particular transmission program," and only under certain 
conditions). In other respects, the making of single copies is 
permissible only within the limited confines of the fair use 
doctrine. The Senate report, in a section headed "Single and 
multiple copying," notes that the fair use doctrine would per-
mit a teacher to make a single copy of a work for use in the 
classroom, but only if the work was not a "sizable" one such 
as a novel or treatise. 1975 Senate Report 63-64; accord, 
1976 House Report 6~9, 71. Other situations in which the 
making of a single copy would be fair use are described in the 
House and Senate reports. 12 But neither the statute nor its 
legislative history suggests any intent to create a general ex-
emption for a single copy made for personal or private use. 
Indeed, it appears that Congress considered and rejected 
the very possibility of a special private use exemption. The 
issue was raised early in the revision process, in one of the 
11 The library photocopying provisions of § 108 do not excuse any person 
who requests "a copy" from a library if the requester's use exceeds fair 
use. § 108(f)(2). Moreover, a library is absolved from liability for the un-
supervised use of its copying equipment provided that the equipment bears 
a notice informing users that "the making of a copy" may violate the copy-
right law. § 108(f)(1). 
12 For example, "the making of a single copy or phonorecord by an indi-
vidual as a free service for a blind person" would be a fair use, as would "a 
single copy reproduction of an excerpt from a copyrighted work by a callig-
rapher for a single client" or "a single reproduction of excerpts from a copy-
righted work by a student calligrapher or teacher in a learning situation." 
1975 Senate Report 66--67; see 1976 House Report 73-74. Application of 
the fair use doctrine in these situations, of course, would be unnecessary if 
the 1976 Act created a general exemption for the making of a single copy. 
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studies prepared for Congress under the supervision of the 
Copyright Office. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works 
(1958), reprinted in Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
Copyright Law Revision, Studies Prepared for the Sub-
committee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 86th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1960) (Latman Fair Use Study). This 
study found no reported case supporting the existence of an 
exemption for private use, although it noted that "the pur-
pose and nature of a private use, and in some cases the small 
amount taken, might lead a court to apply the general princi-
ples of fair use in such a way as to deny liability." I d., at 12. 
After reviewing a number of foreign copyright laws that con-
tained explicit statutory exemptions for private or personal 
use, id., at 25, Professor Latman outlined several approaches 
that a revision bill could take to the general issue of exemp-
tions and fair use. One of these was the adoption of particu-
larized rules to cover specific situations, including "the field 
of personal use." Id., at 33. 13 
Rejecting the latter alternative, the Register of Copy-
rights recommended that the revised copyright statute sim-
ply mention the doctrine of fair use and indicate its general 
scope. The Register opposed the adoption of rules and ex-
emptions to cover specific situations, 14 preferring, instead, to 
13 Professor Latman made special mention of the "personal use" issue be-
cause the area was one that 
"has become disturbed by recent developments . . . . Photoduplication 
devices may make authors' and publishers' groups apprehensive. The 
Copyright Charter recently approved by [the International Confederation 
of Societies of Authors and Composers] emphasizes the concern of authors 
over 'private' uses which, because of technological developments, are said 
to be competing seriously with the author's economic interests." Latman 
Fair Use Study 33-34. 
"The one exemption proposed by the Register, permitting a library to 
make a single photocopy of an out-of-print work and of excerpts that a re-
quester certified were needed for research, met with opposition and was 
not included in the bills initially introduced in Congress. See Register's 
1961 Report 26; H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Regis-
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rely on the judge-made fair use doctrine to resolve new prob-
lems as they arose. See Register's 1961 Report 25; Regis-
ter's Supplementary Report 27-28. 
The Register's approach was reflected in the first copy-
right revision bills, drafted by the Copyright Office in 1964. 
These bills, like the 1976 Act, granted the copyright owner 
the exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted work, sub-
ject only to the exceptions set out in later sections. H. R. 
11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., § 5(a) (1964). The pri-
mary exception was fair use, § 6, containing language virtu-
ally identical to § 107 of the 1976 Act. Although the copy-
right revision bills underwent change in many respects from 
their first introduction in 1964 to their final passage in 1976, 
these portions of the bills did not change. 15 I can con-
clude only that Congress, like the Register, intended to rely 
on the fair use doctrine, and not on a per se exemption for 
ter's Supplementary Report 26. A library copying provision was restored 
to the bill in 1969, after pressure from library associations. Register's 
Second Supplementary Report, ch. III, pp. 10-11; see S. 543, 91st Cong., 
1st Sess., § 108 (Comm. Print Dec. 10, 1969); 1975 Senate Report 48. 
15 The 1964 bills provided that the fair use of copyrighted material for 
purposes "such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholar-
ship, or research" was not an infringement of copyright, and listed four 
"factors to be considered" in determining whether any other particular use 
was fair. H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., §6 (1964). Revised 
bills, drafted by the Copyright Office in 1965, contained a fair use provision 
merely mentioning the doctrine but not indicating its scope: "Notwith-
standing the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work is 
not an infringement of copyright." H. R. 4347/S. 1006, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess., § 107 (1965). The House Judiciary Committee restored the provi-
sion to its earlier wording, H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 5, 
58 (1966), and the language adopted by the Committee remained in the bill 
in later Congresses. See H. R. 2512/S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 
(1967); S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1969); S. 644, 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess., § 107 (1971); S. 1361, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1973); H. R. 
2223/S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1975). With a few additions by 
the House Judiciary Committee in 1976, see 1976 House Report 5; H. R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 94-1733, p. 70 (1976), the same language appears in§ 107 of 
the 1976 Act. 
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private use, to separate permissible copying from the 
impermissible.'6 
When Congress intended special and protective treatment 
for private use, moreover, it said so explicitly. One such ex-
16 In Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d 
1345 (1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975), decided 
during the process of the revision of the copyright statutes, the Court of 
Claims suggested that copying for personal use might be outside the scope 
of copyright protection under the 1909 Act. The court reasoned that be-
cause ''hand copying" for personal use has always been regarded as permis-
sible, and because the practice of making personal copies continued after 
typewriters and photostat machines were developed, the making of per-
sonal copies by means other than hand copying should be permissible as 
well. Id., at 84--88, 487 F. 2d, at 1350-1352. 
There appear to me to be several flaws in this reasoning. First, it is 
by no means clear that the making of a "hand copy" of an entire work is 
permissible; the most that can be said is that there is no reported case 
on the subject, possibly because no copyright owner ever thought it worth-
while to sue. See Latman Fair Use Study 11-12; 3M. Nimmer, Copyright 
§ 13.05[E][4][a] (1982). At least one early treatise asserted that infringe-
ment would result ''if an individual made copies for his personal use, even 
in his own handwriting, as there is no rule of law excepting manuscript 
copies from the law ofinfringment." A. Weil, American Copyright Law 
§ 1066 (1917). Second, hand copying or even copying by typewriter is self-
limiting. The drudgery involved in making hand copies ordinarily ensures 
that only necessary and fairly small portions of a work are taken; it is un-
likely that any user would make a hand copy as a substitute for one that 
could be purchased. The harm to the copyright owner from hand copying 
thus is minimal. The recent advent of inexpens.ive and readily available 
copying machines, however, has changed the dimensions of the problem. 
See Register's Second Supplementary Report ch. III, p. 3; Hearings on 
H. R. 2223 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the 
Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess., 194 (1975) (1975 House Hearings) (remarks of Rep. Danielson); 
id., at 234 (statement of Robert W. Cairns); id., at 250 (remarks of Rep. 
Danielson); id., at 354 (testimony of Irwin Karp); id., at 467 (testimony of 
Rondo Cameron); id., at 1795 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of 
Copyrights). Thus, "[t]he supposition that there is no tort involved in a 
scholar copying a copyrighted text by hand does not much advance the 
question of machine copying." B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copy-
right 101-102 (1967). 
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plicit statement appears in § 106 itself. The copyright own-
er's exclusive right to perform a copyrighted work, in con-
trast to his right to reproduce the work in copies, is limited. 
Section 106(4) grants a copyright owner the exclusive right to 
perform the work "publicly," but does not afford the owner 
protection with respect to private performances by others. 
A motion picture is "performed" whenever its images are 
shown or its sounds are made audible. § 101. Like "sing-
[ing] a copyrighted lyric in the shower," Twentieth Century 
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 155 (1975), watching 
television at home with one's family and friends is now con-
sidered a performance. 1975 Senate Report 59-60; 1976 
House Report 63. 17 Home television viewing nevertheless 
does not infringe any copyright-but only because § 106(4) 
contains the word "publicly." 18 See generally 1975 Senate 
Report 60-61; 1976 House Report 63--64; Register's 1961 Re-
port 29--30. No such distinction between public and private 
uses appears in § 106(1)'s prohibition on the making of 
copies. 19 
17 In a trio of cases, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 
398 (1968); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 
415 U. S. 394, 403-405 (1974); and Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. 
Aiken, 422 U. S. 151 (1975), this Court had held that the reception of a 
radio or television broadcast was not a "performance" under the 1909 Act. 
The Court's "narrow construction" of the word "perform" was "completely 
overturned by the [1976 Act] and its broad definition of 'perform' in section 
101." 1976 House Report 87. 
18 A work is performed "publicly" if it takes place "at a place open to the 
public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a 
normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered." § 101. 
19 One purpose of the exemption for private performances was to permit 
the home viewing of lawfully made videotapes. The Register noted in 
1961 that "[n]ew technical devices will probably make it practical in the fu-
ture to reproduce televised motion pictures in the home. We do not be-
lieve the private use of such a reproduction can or should be precluded by 
copyright." Register's 1961 Report 30 (emphasis added). The Register 
did not suggest that the private making of a reproduction of a televised 
motion picture would be permitted by the copyright law. The Register 
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Similarly, an explicit reference to private use appears in 
§ 108. Under that section, a library can make a copy for a 
patron only for specific types of private use: "private study, 
scholarship, or research." 20 §§ 108(d)(1) and (e)(l); see 37 
CFR §201.14(b) (1982). Limits also are imposed on the ex-
tent of the copying and the type of institution that may make 
copies, and the exemption expressly is made inapplicable to 
motion pictures and certain other types of works. § 108(h). 
These limitations would be wholly superfluous if an entire 
copy of any work could be made by any person for private 
use. 21 
B 
The District Court in this case nevertheless concluded that 
the 1976 Act contained an implied exemption for "home-use 
recording." 480 F. Supp., at 444 446. The court relied pri-
marily on the legislative history of a 1971 amendment to the 
1909 Act, a reliance that this Court today does not duplicate. 
Ante, at 11, n. 11. That amendment, however, was ad-
dressed to the specific problem of commercial piracy of sound 
recordings. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, 85 Stat. 391 (1971 Amend-
ment). The House Report on the 1971 Amendment, in a sec-
later reminded Congress that "[i]n general the concept of 'performance' 
must be distinguished sharply from the reproduction of copies." Regis-
ter's Supplementary Report 22. 
20 During hearings on this provision, Representative Danielson inquired 
whether it would apply to works of fiction such as "Gone With the Wind," 
or whether it was limited to "strictly technical types of information." The 
uncontradicted response was that it would apply only in "general terms of 
science ... [and] the useful arts." 1975 House Hearings 251 (testimony of 
Robert W. Cairns); cf. id., at 300 (statement of Harry Rosenfield) ("We are 
not asking . .. for the right to copy 'Gone With the Wind' "). 
21 The mention in the Senate and House Reports of situations in which 
copies for private use would be permissible under the fair use doctrine-for 
example, the making of a free copy for a blind person, 1975 Senate Report 
66; 1975 House Report 73, or the "recordings of performances by music stu-
dents for purposes of analysis and criticism," 1975 Senate Report 63-
would be superfluous as well. See n. 12, supra. 
.. 
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tion entitled "Home Recording," contains the following 
statement: 
"In approving the creation of a limited copyright in 
sound recordings it is the intention of the Committee 
that this limited copyright not grant any broader rights 
than are accorded to other copyright proprietors under 
the existing title 17. Specifically, it is not the intention 
of the Committee to restrain the home recording, from 
broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded per-
formances, where the home recording is for private use 
and with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capital-
izing commercially on it. This practice is common and 
unrestrained today, and the record producers and per-
formers would be in no different position from that of the 
owners of copyright in recorded musical compositions 
over the past 20 years." H. R. Rep. No. 92-487, p. 7 
(1971) (1971 House Report). 
Similar statements were made during House hearings on the 
bill 22 and on the House floor, 28 although not in the Senate pro-
22 The following exchange took place during the testimony of Barbara 
Ringer, then Assistant Register of Copyrights: 
"[Rep.] Biester. . .. I can tell you I must have a small pirate in my own 
home. My son has a cassette tape recorder, and as a particular record be-
comes a hit, he will retrieve it onto his little set .... [T]his legislation, of 
course, would not point to his activities, would it? 
"Miss Ringer. I think the answer is clearly, 'No, it would not.' I have 
spoken at a couple of seminars on video cassettes lately, and this question 
is usually asked: 'What about the home recorders?' The answer I have 
given and will give again is that this is something you cannot control. You 
simply cannot control it. My own opinion, whether this is philosophical 
dogma or not, is that sooner or later there is going to be a crunch here. 
But that is not what this legislation is addressed to, and I do not see the 
crunch coming in the immediate future. . . . I do not see anybody going 
into anyone's home and preventing this sort of thing, or forcing legisla-
tion that would engineer a piece of equipment not to allow home taping.'' 
Hearings on S. 646 and H. R. 6927 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 22-23 (1971) 
(1971 House Hearings). 
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ceedings. In concluding that these statements created a 
general exemption for home recording, the District Court, in 
my view, paid too little heed to the context in which the 
statements were made, and failed to consider the limited pur-
pose of the 1971 Amendment and the structure of the 1909 
Act. 
Unlike television broadcasts and other types of motion pic-
tures, sound recordings were not protected by copyright 
prior to the passage of the 1971 Amendment. Although the 
underlying musical work could be copyrighted, the 1909 Act 
provided no protection for a particular performer's rendition 
of the work. Moreover, copyrighted musical works that had 
been recorded for public distribution were subject to a "com-
pulsory license": any person was free to record such a work 
upon payment of a 2-cent royalty to the copyright owner. 
§ 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075-1076. While reproduction without pay-
ment of the royalty was an infringement under the 1909 Act, 
damages were limited to three times the amount of the un-
paid royalty. § 25(e), 35 Stat. 1081-1082; Shapiro, Bernstein 
& Co. v. Goody, 248 F. 2d 260, 262-263,265 (CA21957), cert. 
denied, 355 U. S. 952 (1958). It was observed that the prac-
za Shortly before passage of the bill, a colloquy took place between Rep-
resentative Kastenmeier, chairman of the House subcommittee that pro-
duced the bill, and Representative Kazen, who was not on the committee: 
"Mr. Kazen. Am I correct in assuming that the bill protects copy-
righted material that is duplicated for commercial purposes only? 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Yes. 
"Mr. Kazen. In other words, if your child were to record off of a pro-
gram which comes through the air on the radio or television, and then used 
it for her own personal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this use would not 
be included under the penalties of this bill? 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. This is not included in the bill. I am glad the gen-
tleman raises the point. 
"On page 7 of the report, under 'Home Recordings,' Members will note 
that under the bill the same practice which prevails today is called for; 
namely, this is considered both presently and under the proposed law to be 
fair use. The child does not do this for commercial purposes. This is 
made clear in the report." 117 Cong. Rec. 34748-34749 (1971). 
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tical effect of these provisions was to legalize record piracy. 
See S. Rep. No. 92-72, p. 4 (1971); 1971 House Report 2. 
In order to suppress this piracy, the 1971 Amendment ex-
tended copyright protection beyond the underlying work and 
to the sound recordings themselves. Congress chose, how-
ever, to provide only limited protection: owners of copyright 
in sound recordings were given the exclusive right "[t]o re-
produce [their works] and distribute [them] to the public." 
1971 Amendment, § 1(a), 85 Stat. 391 (formerly codified as 17 
U. S. C. § 1(f) (1976 ed.)). 24 This right was merely the right 
of commercial distribution. See 117 Cong. Rec. 34 7 48-34 7 49 
(1971) (colloquy of Reps. Kazen & Kastenmeier) ("the bill 
protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for commer-
cial purposes only"). 
Against this background, the statements regarding home 
recording under the 1971 Amendment appear in a very differ-
ent light. If home recording was "common and unre-
strained" under the 1909 Act, see 1971 House Report 7, it 
was because sound recordings had no copyright protection 
and the owner of a copyright in the underlying musical work 
could collect no more than a 2-cent royalty plus 6 cents in 
damages for each unauthorized use. With so little at stake, 
it is not at all surprising that the Assistant Register "d[id] 
not see anybody going into anyone's home and preventing 
this sort of thing." 1971 House Hearings 23. 
But the references to home sound recording in the 1971 
Amendment's legislative history demonstrate no congres-
24 The 1909 Act's grant of an exclusive right to "copy,"§ 1(a), was of no 
assistance to the owner of a copyright in a sound recording, because a re-
production of a sound recording was technically considered not to be a 
"copy." See 1971 House Hearings 18 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, As-
sistant Register of Copyrights); 1971 Amendment, § 1(e), 85 Stat. 391 (for-
merly codified as 17 U. S. C. § 26 (1976 ed.)) ("For the purposes of [speci-
fied sections, not including § 1(a)], but not for any other purpose, a 
reproduction of a [sound recording] shall be considered to be a copy 
thereof"). This concept is carried forward into the 1976 Act, which 
distinguishes between "copies" and "phonorecords." Seen. 7, supra. 
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sional intent to create a generalized home use exemption 
from copyright protection. Congress, having recognized 
that the 1909 Act had been unsuccessful in controlling home 
sound recording, addressed only the specific problem of com-
mercial record piracy. To quote Assistant Register Ringer 
again, home use was "not what this legislation [was] ad-
dressed to." 1971 House Hearings 22.25 
While the 1971 Amendment narrowed the sound record-
ings loophole in then existing copyright law, motion pictures 
and other audiovisual works have been accorded full copy-
right protection since at least 1912, see Act of Aug. 24, 1912, 
37 Stat. 488, and perhaps before, see Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 
240 (CA3 1903), app. dism'd, 195 U. S. 625 (1904). Congress 
continued this protection in the 1976 Act. Unlike the sound 
recording rights created by the 1971 Amendment, the re-
production rights associated with motion pictures under 
§ 106(1) are not limited to reproduction for public distribu-
tion; the copyright owner's right to reproduce the work ex-
ists independently, and the "mere duplication of a copy may 
constitute an infringement even if it is never distributed." 
Register's Supplementary Report 16; see 1975 Senate Report 
57 and 1976 House Report 61. Moreover, the 1976 Act was 
intended as a comprehensive treatment of all aspects of copy-
right law. The reports accompanying the 1976 Act, unlike 
the 1971 House Report, contain no suggestion that home-use 
recording is somehow outside the scope of this all-inclusive 
:IS During consideration of the 1976 Act, Congress, of course, was well 
aware of the limited nature of the protection granted to sound recordings 
under the 1971 Amendment. See 1975 House Hearings 113 (testimony of 
Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights) (1971 Amendment "created a 
copyright in a sound recording ... but limited it to the particular situation 
of so-called piracy''); id., at 1380 (letter from John Lorenz, Acting Librar-
ian of Congress) (under 1971 Amendment "only the unauthorized reproduc-
tion and distribution to the public of copies of the sound recording is pro-
hibited. Thus, the duplication of sound recordings for private, personal 
use and the performance of sound recordings through broadcasting or 
other means are outside the scope of the amendment"). 
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statute. It was clearly the intent of Congress that no addi-
tional exemptions were to be implied. 26 
I therefore find in the 1976 Act no implied exemption to 
cover the home taping of television programs, whether it be 
for a single copy, for private use, or for home use. Taping a 
copyrighted television program is infringement unless it is 
permitted by the fair use exemption contained in § 107 of the 
1976 Act. I now turn to that issue. 
IV 
Fair Use 
The doctrine of fair use has been called, with some justifi-
cation, "the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright." 
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F. 2d 661, 662 (CA2 
1939); see Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder 
Newspapers, Inc., 626 F. 2d 1171, 1174 (CA51980); Meeropol 
v. Nizer, 560 F. 2d 1061, 1068 (CA2 1977), cert. denied, 434 
U. S. 1013 (1978). Although courts have constructed lists of 
factors to be considered in determining whether a particular 
use is fair, 27 no fixed criteria have emerged by which that 
211 Representative Kastenmeier, the principal House sponsor of the 1976 
revision bill and chairman of the House subcommittee that produced it, 
made this explicit on the opening day of the House hearings: 
"[F]rom time to time, certain areas have not been covered in the bill. 
But is it not the case, this being a unified code, that the operation of the bill 
does apply whether or not we specifically deal with a subject or not? ... 
"Therefore, we can really not fail to deal with an issue. It will be dealt 
with one way or the other. The code, title 17, will cover it. So we have 
made a conscious decision even by omission. . . . 
"By virtue of passing this bill, we will deal with every issue. Whether 
we deal with it completely or not for the purpose of resolving the issues 
involved is the only question, not whether it has dealt with the four corners 
of the bill because the four corners of the bill will presume to deal with ev-
erything in copyright." 1975 House Hearings 115. 
Z7 The precise phrase "fair use" apparently did not enter the case law 
until 1869, see Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (No. 8,136) (CC 
Mass.), but the doctrine itself found early expression in Folsom v. Marsh, 
9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (CC Mass. 1841). Justice Story was faced there 
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determination can be made. This Court thus far has pro-
vided no guidance; although fair use issues have come here 
twice, on each occasion the Court was equally divided and 
no opinion was forthcoming. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. 
United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d 1345 (1973), aff'd, 420 
U. S. 376 (1975); Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F. 2d 532 (CA9 
1956), aff'd sub nom. CBS, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U. S. 43 
(1958). 
Nor did Congress provide definitive rules when it codified 
the fair use doctrine in the 1976 Act; it simply incorporated a 
list of factors "to be considered": the "purpose and character 
of the use," the "nature of the copyrighted work," the 
"amount and substantiality of the portion used," and, perhaps 
the most important, the "effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work" (emphasis sup-
plied). § 107. No particular weight, however, was assigned 
to any of these, and the list was not intended to be exclusive. 
The House and Senate Reports explain that § 107 does no 
more than give "statutory recognition" to the fair use doc-
trine; it was intended "to restate the present judicial doctrine 
with the "intricate and embarrassing questio[n]" whether a biography con-
taining copyrighted letters was "a justifiable use of the original materials, 
such as the law recognizes as no infringement of the copyright of the plain-
tiffs." I d., at 344, 348. In determining whether the use was permitted, it 
was necessary, said Justice Story, to consider "the nature and objects of 
the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the 
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or 
supersede the objects, of the original work. . . . Much must, in such 
cases, depend upon the nature of the new work, the value and extent of the 
copies, and the degree in which the original authors may be injured 
thereby." Id., at 348-349. 
Similar lists were compiled by later courts. See, e. g., Tennessee Fabri-
cating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F. 2d 279, 283 (CA5), cert. denied, 
398 U. S. 928 (1970); Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F. 2d 
73, 85 (CA61943); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 
137 F. Supp. 348 (SD Cal. 1955); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P. F. Collier 
& Son Co., 26 U. S. P. Q. 40, 43 (SDNY 1934); Hill v. Whalen & Martell, 
Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (SDNY 1914). 
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of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." 
1976 House Report 66. See 1975 Senate Report 62; S. Rep. 
No. 93-983, p. 116 (1974); H. R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 32 (1967); H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 
61 (1966). 
A 
Despite this absence of clear standards, the fair use doc-
trine plays a crucial role in the law of copyright. The pur-
pose of copyright protection, in the words of the Constitu-
tion, is to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 
Copyright is based on the belief that by granting authors the 
exclusive rights to reproduce their works, they are given an 
incentive to create, and that "encouragement of individual ef-
fort by personal gain is the best way to advance public wel-
fare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science 
and the useful Arts."' Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 219 
(1954). The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards 
the individual author in order to benefit the public. Twenti-
eth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1975); 
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127-128 (1932); see 
H. R. Rep. Nu. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1909). 
There are situations, nevertheless, in which strict enforce-
ment of this monopoly would inhibit the very "Progress of 
Science and useful Arts" that copyright is intended to pro-
mote. An obvious example is the researcher or scholar 
whose own work depends on the ability to refer to and to 
quote the work of prior scholars. Obviously, no author could 
create a new work if he were first required to repeat the re-
search of every author who had gone before him. 28 The 
scholar, like the ordinary user, of course could be left to bar-
gain with each copyright owner for permission to quote from 
or refer to prior works. But there is a crucial difference be-
28 "The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our 
predecessors. 'A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see far-
ther than the giant himself."' Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copy-
right: I, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 511 (1945). 
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tween the scholar and the ordinary user. When the ordinary 
user decides that the owner's price is too high, and forgoes 
use of the work, only the individual is the loser. When the 
scholar forgoes the use of a prior work, not only does his own 
work suffer, but the public is deprived of his contribution to 
knowledge. The scholar's work, in other words, produces 
external benefits from which everyone profits. In such a 
case, the fair use doctrine acts as a form of subsidy-albeit at 
the first author's expense-to permit the second author to 
make limited use of the first author's work for the public 
good. See Latman Fair Use Study 31; Gordon, Fair Use as 
Market Failure: A Structural Analysis of the Betamax Case 
and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1630 (1982). 
A similar subsidy may be appropriate in a range of areas 
other than pure scholarship. The situations in which fair use 
is most commonly recognized are listed in § 107 itself; fair use 
may be found when a work is used "for purposes such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching, ... scholarship, 
or research." The House and Senate Reports expand on this 
list somewhat, 29 and other examples may be found in the case 
law.80 Each of these uses, however, reflects a common 
theme: each is a productive use, resulting in some added ben-
29 Quoting from the Register's 1961 Report, the Senate and House Re-
ports give examples of possible fair uses: 
" 'quotation of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration 
or comment; quotation of short passages in a scholarly or technical work, 
for illustration or clarification of the author's observations; use in a parody 
of some of the content of the work parodied; summary of an address or arti-
cle, with brief quotations, in a news report; reproduction by a library of a 
portion of a work to replace part of a damaged copy; reproduction by a 
teacher or student of a small part of a work to illustrate a lesson; reproduc-
tion of a work in legislative or judicial proceedings or reports; incidental 
and fortuitous reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast, of a work located 
in the scene of an event being recorded.'" 1975 Senate Report 61~2; 1976 
House Report 65. 
80 See, e. g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers , 
Inc., 626 F. 2d 1171 (CA5 1980) (comparative advertising). 
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efit to the public beyond that produced by the first author's 
work. 81 The fair use doctrine, in other words, permits works 
to be used for "socially laudable purposes." See Copyright 
Office, Briefing Papers on Current Issues, reprinted in 1975 
House Hearings 2051, 2055. I am aware of no case in which 
the reproduction of a copyrighted work for the sole benefit of 
the user has been held to be fair use. 32 
I do not suggest, of course, that every productive use is a 
fair use. A finding of fair use still must depend on the facts 
of the individual case, and on whether, under the circum-
stances, it is reasonable to expect the user to bargain with 
the copyright owner for use of the work. The fair use doc-
trine must strike a balance between the dual risks created by 
the copyright system: on the one hand, that depriving au-
thors of their monopoly will reduce their incentive to create, 
and, on the other, that granting authors a complete monopoly 
81 Professor Seltzer has characterized these lists of uses as "reflect[ing] 
what in fact the subject matter of fair use has in the history of its adjudica-
tion consisted in: it has always had to do with the use by a second author of 
a first author's work." L. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright 
24 (1978) (emphasis removed). He distinguishes "the mere reproduction 
of a work in order to use it for its intrinsic purpose-to make what might be 
called the 'ordinary' use of it." When copies are made for "ordinary'' use 
of the work, "ordinary infringement has customarily been triggered, not 
notions of fair use" (emphasis in original). Ibid. See also M. Nimmer, 
Copyright§ 13.05[A][1] (1982) ("Use of a work in each of the foregoing con-
texts either necessarily or usually involves its use in a derivative work"). 
82 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d 
1345 (1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975), in-
volved the photocopying of scientific journal articles; the Court of Claims 
stressed that the libraries performing the copying were "devoted solely to 
the advancement and dissemination of medical knowledge," 203 Ct. Cl. , at 
91 , 487 F. 2d, at 1354, and that "medical science would be seriously hurt if 
such library photocopying were stopped." ld., at 95, 487 F. 2d, at 1356. 
The issue of library copying is now covered by § 108 of the 1976 Act. 
That section, which Congress regarded as "authoriz[ing] certain photo-
copying practices which may not qualify as a fair use," 1975 Senate Report 
67; 1976 House Report 74, permits the making of copies only for "private 
study, scholarship, or research." §§ 108(d)(1) and (e)(1). 
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will reduce the creative ability of others. 33 The inquiry is 
necessarily a flexible one, and the endless variety of situa-
tions that may arise precludes the formulation of exact rules. 
But when a user reproduces an entire work and uses it for its 
original purpose, with no added benefit to the public, the doc-
trine of fair use usually does not apply. There is then no 
need whatsoever to provide the ordinary user with a fair use 
subsidy at the author's expense. 
The making of a videotape recording for home viewing is 
an ordinary rather than a productive use of the Studios' copy-
righted works. The District Court found that "Betamax 
owners use the copy for the same purpose as the original. 
They add nothing of their own." 480 F. Supp., at 453. Al-
though applying the fair use doctrine to home VTR record-
ing, as Sony argues, may increase public access to material 
broadcast free over the public airwaves, I think Sony's argu-
ment misconceives the nature of copyright. Copyright gives 
the author a right to limit or even to cut off access to his 
work. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127 (1932). 
A VTR recording creates no public benefit sufficient to jus-
tify limiting this right. Nor is this right extinguished by the 
copyright owner's choice to make the work available over the 
airwaves. Section 106 of the 1976 Act grants the copyright 
owner the exclusive right to control the performance and the 
reproduction of his work, and the fact that he has licensed a 
single television performance is really irrelevant to the exist-
ence of his right to control its reproduction. Although a tele-
vision broadcast may be free to the viewer, this fact is 
equally irrelevant; a book borrowed from the public library 
33 In the words of Lord Mansfield: "[W]e must take care to guard against 
two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have 
employed their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived 
of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the 
other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the 
progress of the arts be retarded." Sayre v. Moore, 1 East 361 n. (b), 102 
Eng. Rep. 139, 140 n. (b) (K. B. 1785). See Register's Supplementary 
Report 13. 
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may not be copied any more freely than a book that is 
purchased. 
It may be tempting, as, in my view, the Court today is 
tempted, to stretch the doctrine of fair use so as to permit 
unfettered use of this new technology in order to increase ac-
cess to television programming. But such an extension risks 
eroding the very basis of copyright law, by depriving authors 
of control over their works and consequently of their incen-
tive to create. 34 Even in the context of highly productive 
educational uses, Congress has avoided this temptation; in 
passing the 1976 Act, Congress made it clear that off-the-air 
videotaping was to be permitted only in very limited situa-
tions. See 1976 House Report 71; 1975 Senate Report 64. 
And, the Senate report adds, "[t]he committee does not in-
tend to suggest ... that off-the-air recording for convenience 
would under any circumstances, be considered 'fair use.'" 
I d., at 66. I cannot disregard these admonitions. 
84 This point was brought home repeatedly by the Register of Copy-
rights. Mentioning the "multitude of technological developments" since 
passage of the 1909 Act, including "remarkable developments in the use 
of video tape," Register's Supplementary Report xiv-xv, the Register 
cautioned: 
"I realize, more clearly now than I did in 1961, that the revolution in 
communications has brought with it a serious challenge to the author's 
copyright. This challenge comes not only from the ever-growing commer-
cial interests who wish to use the author's works for private gain. An 
equally serious attack has come from people with a sincere interest in the 
public welfare who fully recognize . . . 'that the real heart of civilization 
. . . owes its existence to the author '; ironically, in seeking to make the au-
thor's works widely available by freeing them from copyright restrictions, 
they fail to realize that they are whittling away the very thing that nur-
tures authorship in the first place. An accommodation among conflicting 
demands must be worked out, true enough, but not by denying the funda-
mental constitutional directive: to encourage cultural progress by securing 
the author's exclusive rights to him for a limited time." Id., at xv; see 
1975 House Hearings 117 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of 
Copyrights). 
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B 
I recognize, nevertheless, that there are situations where 
permitting even an unproductive use would have no effect on 
the author's incentive to create, that is, where the use would 
not affect the value of, or the market for, the author's work. 
Photocopying an old newspaper clipping to send to a friend 
may be an example; pinning a quotation on one's bulletin 
board may be another. In each of these cases, the effect on 
the author is truly de minimis. Thus, even though these 
uses provide no benefit to the public at large, no purpose is 
served by preserving the author's monopoly, and the use may 
be regarded as fair. 
Courts should move with caution, however, in depriving 
authors of protection from unproductive "ordinary'' uses. 
As has been noted above, even in the case of a productive 
use, § 107(4) requires consideration of "the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work" (emphasis added). "[A] particular use which may 
seem to· have little or no economic impact on the author's 
rights today can assume tremendous importance in times to 
come." Register's Supplementary Report 14. Although 
such a use may seem harmless when viewed in isolation, 
"[i]solated instances of minor infringements, when multiplied 
many times, become in the aggregate a major inroad on copy-
right that must be prevented." 1975 Senate Report 65. 
I therefore conclude that, at least when the proposed use is 
an unproductive one, a copyright owner need prove only a po-
tential for harm to the market for or the value of the copy-
righted work. See 3M. Nimmer, Copyright§ 13.05[E][4][c], 
p. 13-84 (1982). Proof of actual harm, or even probable 
harm, may be impossible in an area where the effect of a new 
technology is speculative, and requiring such proof would 
present the "real danger ... of confining the scope of an au-
thor's rights on the basis of the present technology so that, as 
the years go by, his copyright loses much of its value because 
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of unforeseen technical advances." Register's Supplemen-
tary Report 14. Infringement thus would be found if the 
copyright owner demonstrates a reasonable possibility that 
harm will result from the proposed use. When the use is one 
that creates no benefit to the public at large, copyright pro-
tection should not be denied on the basis that a new technol-
ogy that may result in harm has not yet done so. 
The Studios have identified a number of ways in which 
VTR recording could damage their copyrights. VTR re-
cording could reduce their ability to market their works in 
movie theaters and through the rental or sale of pre-recorded 
videotapes or videodiscs; it also could reduce their rerun au-
dience, and consequently the license fees available to them 
for repeated showings. Moreover, advertisers may be will-
ing to pay for only "live" viewing audiences, if they believe 
VTR viewers will delete commercials or if rating services are 
unable to measure VTR use; if this is the case, VTR record-
ing could reduce the license fees the Studios are able to 
charge even for first-run showings. Library-building may 
raise the potential for each of the types of harm identified by 
the Studios, and time-shifting may raise the potential for sub-
stantial harm as well. 35 
36 A VTR owner who has taped a favorite movie for repeated viewing 
will be less likely to rent or buy a tape containing the same movie, watch a 
televised rerun, or pay to see the movie at a theater. Although time-shift-
ing may not replace theater or rerun viewing or the purchase of prere-
corded tapes or discs, it may well replace rental usage; a VTR user who has 
recorded a first-run movie for later viewing will have no need to rent a 
copy when he wants to see it. Both library-builders and time-shifters may 
avoid commercials; the library builder may use the pause control to record 
without them, and all users may fast-forward through commercials on 
playback. 
The Studios introduced expert testimony that both time-shifting and 
librarying would tend to decrease their revenue from copyrighted works. 
See 480 F. Supp., at 440. The District Court's findings also show substan-
tial library-building and avoidance of commercials. Both sides submitted 
surveys showing that the average Betamax user owns between 25 and 32 
tapes. The Studios' survey showed that at least 40% of users had more ' 
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Although the District Court found no likelihood of harm 
from VTR use, 480 F. Supp., at 468, I conclude that it ap-
plied an incorrect substantive standard and misallocated the 
burden of proof. The District Court reasoned that the Stu-
dios had failed to prove that library-building would occur "to 
any significant extent," id., at 467; that the Studios' prere-
corded videodiscs could compete with VTR recordings and 
were "arguably ... more desirable," ibid; that it was "not 
clear that movie audiences will decrease," id., at 468; and 
that the practice of deleting commercials "may be too te-
dious" for many viewers, ibid. To the extent any decrease 
in advertising revenues would occur, the court concluded that 
the Studios had "marketing alternatives at hand to recoup 
some of that predicted loss." I d., at 452. Because the Stu-
dios' prediction of harm was "based on so many assumptions 
and on a system of marketing which is rapidly changing," the 
court was "hesitant to identify 'probable effects' of home-use 
copying." Ibid. 
The District Court's reluctance to engage in prediction in 
this area is understandable, but, in my view, the court was 
mistaken in concluding that the Studios should bear the risk 
created by this uncertainty. The Studios have demon-
strated a potential for harm, which has not been, and could 
not be, refuted at this early stage of technological 
development. 
The District Court's analysis of harm, moreover, failed to 
consider the effect of VTR recording on "the potential mar-
ket for or the value of the copyrighted work," as required by 
§ 107(4).36 The requirement that a putatively infringing use 
than 10 tapes in a "library"; Sony's survey showed that more than 40% of 
users planned to view their tapes more than once; and both sides' surveys 
showed that commercials were avoided at least 25% of the time. Id., at 
438-439. 
36 Concern over the impact of a use upon "potential" markets is to be 
found in cases decided both before and after § 107 lent Congress' imprima-
tur to the judicially-created doctrine of fair use. See, e. g., Iowa State 
University Research Foundation, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 
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of a copyrighted work, to be "fair," must not impair a "poten-
tial" market for the work has two implications. First, an in-
fringer cannot prevail merely by demonstrating that the 
copyright holder suffered no net harm from the infringer's ac-
tion. Indeed, even a showing that the infringement has re-
sulted in a net benefit to the copyright holder will not suffice. 
Rather, the infringer must demonstrate that he had not im-
paired the copyright holder's ability to demand compensation 
from (or to deny access to) any group who would otherwise be 
willing to pay to see or hear the copyrighted work. Second, 
the fact that a given market for a copyrighted work would not 
be available to the copyright holder were it not for the in-
fringer's activities does not permit the infringer to exploit 
that market without compensating the copyright holder. 
See Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc. v. 
American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F. 2d 57 (CA2 1980). 
In this case, the Studios and their amici demonstrate that 
the advent of the the VTR technology created a potential 
market for their copyrighted programs. That market con-
sists of those persons who find it impossible or inconvenient 
to watch the programs at the time they are broadcast, and 
who wish to watch them at other times. These persons are 
willing to pay for the privilege of watching copyrighted work 
at their convenience, as is evidenced by the fact that they are 
willing to pay for VTRs and tapes; undoubtedly, most also 
621 F. 2d 57, 60 (CA21980) ("the effect of the use on the copyright holder's 
potential market for the work"); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F . 2d 1061, 1070 
(CA2 1977) ("A key issue in fair use cases is whether the defendant's work 
tends to diminish or prejudice the potential sale of plaintiff's work"), cert. 
denied, 434 U. S. 1013 (1978); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 
203 Ct. Cl. 74, 88, 487 F. 2d 1345, 1352 (1973) ("the effect of the use on a 
copyright owner's potential market for and value of his work"), aff'd by an 
equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975); Encyclopaedia Britannica 
Educational Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1173 (WDNY 1982) 
("[T]he concern here must be focused on a copyrighted work's potential 
market. It is perfectly possible that plaintiffs' profits would have been 
greater, but for the kind of videotaping in question") (emphasis in original). 
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would be willing to pay some kind of royalty to copyright 
holders. The Studios correctly argue that they have been 
deprived of the ability to exploit this sizable market. 
It is thus apparent from the record and from the findings of 
the District Court that time-shifting does have a substantial 
adverse effect upon the "potential market for" the Studios' 
copyrighted works. Accordingly, even under the formula-
tion of the fair use doctrine advanced by Sony, time-shifting 
cannot be deemed a fair use. 
v 
Contributory Infringement 
From the Studios' perspective, the consequences of home 
VTR recording are the same as if a business had taped the 
Studios' works off the air, duplicated the tapes, and sold or 
rented them to members of the public for home viewing. 
The distinction is that home VTR users do not record for 
commercial advantage; the commercial benefit accrues to the 
manufacturer and distributors of the Betamax. I thus must 
proceed to discuss whether the manufacturer and distribu-
tors can be held contributorily liable if the product they sell is 
used to infringe. 
It is well established that liability for copyright infringe-
ment can be imposed on persons other than those who actu-
ally carry out the infringing activity. Kalem Co. v. Harper 
Brothers, 222 U. S. 55, 62-63 (1911); 3 M. Nimmer, Copy-
right § 12.04[A] (1982); see Twentieth Century Music Corp. 
v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 160, n. 11 (1975); Buck v. Jewell-La-
Salle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 198 (1931). Although the 
liability provision of the 1976 Act provides simply that "[a]ny-
one who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner ... is an infringer of the copyright," 17 U. S. C. 
§ 501(a), the House and Senate Reports demonstrate that 
Congress intended to retain judicial doctrines of contributory 
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infringement. 1975 Senate Report 57; 1976 House Report 
61.37 
The doctrine of contributory copyright infringement, how-
ever, is not well-defined. One of the few attempts at defini-
tion appears in Gershurin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Art-
ists Management, Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159 (CA2 1971). In that 
case the Second Circuit stated that "one who, with knowl-
edge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially 
contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held 
liable as a 'contributory' infringer." ld., at 1162 (footnote 
omitted). While I have no quarrel with this general state-
ment, it does not easily resolve the present case; the District 
Court and the Court of Appeals, both purporting to apply it, 
reached diametrically opposite results. 
A 
In absolving Sony from liability, the District Court rea-
soned that Sony had no direct involvement with individual 
Betamax users, did not participate in any off-the-air copying, 
and did not know that such copying was an infringement of 
the Studios' copyright. 480 F. Supp., at 460. I agree with 
the Gershurin court that contributory liability may be im-
posed even when there has been no direct contact between 
the defendant and the infringer. The defendant in Gershurin 
was a concert promoter operating through local concert asso-
ciations that it sponsored; it had no contact with the infring-
ing performers themselves. 443 F. 2d, at 1162-1163. See 
also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S., at 
37 This intent is manifested further by provisions of the 1976 Act that 
exempt from liability persons who, while not participating directly in any 
infringing activity, could otherwise be charged with contributory infringe-
ment. See § 108(f)(1) (library not liable "for the unsupervised use of re-
producing equipment located on its premises," provided that certain 
warnings are posted); § 110(6) ("governmental body" or "nonprofit agricul-
tural or horticultural organization" not liable for infringing performance by 
concessionaire "in the course of an annual agricultural or horticultural fair 
or exhibition"). 
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160, n. 11. Moreover, a finding of contributory infringement 
has never depended on actual knowledge of particular in-
stances of infringement; it is sufficient that the defendant 
have reason to know that infringement is taking place. 443 
F. 2d, at 1162; see Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. 
Mark-FiRecords, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (SDNY 1966).38 In 
the so-called "dance hall" cases, in which questions of con-
tributory infringement arise with some frequency, propri-
etors of entertainment establishments routinely are held lia-
ble for unauthorized performances on their premises, even 
when they have no knowledge that copyrighted works are 
being performed. In effect, the proprietors in those cases 
are charged with constructive knowledge of the 
performances. 39 
88 In Screen Gems, on which the Gershwin court relied, the court held 
that liability could be imposed on a shipper of unauthorized "bootleg" 
records and a radio station that broadcast advertisements of the records, 
provided they knew or should have known that the records were infring-
ing. The court concluded that the records' low price and the manner in 
which the records were marketed could support a finding of "constructive 
knowledge" even if actual knowledge were not shown. 
89 See, e. g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & 
Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d 1213 (CA11977); Dreamland Ball Room, 
Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F. 2d 354 (CA71929); M. Witmark & 
Sons v. Tremont Social & Athletic Club, 188 F. Supp. 787, 790 (Mass. 
1960); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S., at 157; 
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 198-199 (1931); 3 M. 
Nimmer, Copyright § 12.04[A], pp. 12-35 (1982). 
Courts have premised liability in these cases on the notion that the de-
fendant had the ability to supervise or control the infringing activities, see, 
e. g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F. 2d 304, 307 
(CA21963); KECA Music, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72, 74 
(WD Mo. 1977). This notion, however, is to some extent fictional; the de-
fendant cannot escape liability by instructing the performers not to play 
copyrighted music, or even by inserting a provision to that effect into the 
performers' contract. Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse 
Racing & Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d, at 1214-1215; KECA Music, 
Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp., at 75; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. 
v. Veltin, 47 F. Supp. 648, 649 (WD La. 1942). Congress expressly re-
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Nor is it necessary that the defendant be aware that the 
infringing activity violates the copyright laws. Section 
504(c)(2) of the 1976 Act provides for a reduction in statutory 
damages when an infringer proves he "was not aware and 
had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an 
infringement of copyright," but the statute establishes no 
general exemption for those who believe their infringing ac-
tivities are legal. Moreover, such an exemption would be 
meaningless in a case such as this, in which prospective relief 
is sought; once a court has established that the copying at 
issue is infringement, the defendants are necessarily aware of 
that fact for the future. It is undisputed in this case that 
Sony had reason to know the Betamax would be used by 
some owners to tape copyrighted works off the air. See 480 
F. Supp., at 459-460. 
The District Court also concluded that Sony had not 
caused, induced, or contributed materially to any infringing 
activities of Betamax owners. 480 F. Supp., at 460. In a 
case of this kind, however, causation can be shown indirectly; 
it does not depend on evidence that particular Betamax own-
ers relied on particular advertisements. In an analogous 
case decided just two Terms ago, this Court approved a 
lower court's conclusion that liability for contributory trade-
mark infringement could be imposed on a manufacturer who 
"suggested, even by implication" that a retailer use the man-
ufacturer's goods to infringe the trademark of another. 
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 
jected a proposal to exempt proprietors from this type of liability under the 
1976 Act. See 1975 Senate Report 141-142; 1976 House Report 159-160; 
1975 House Hearings 1812-1813 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of 
Copyrights); id., at 1813 (colloquy between Rep. Pattison and Barbara 
Ringer). 
The Court's attempt to distinguish these cases on the ground of "con-
trol," ante, at 18, is obviously unpersuasive. The direct infringer ordi-
narily is not employed by the person held liable; instead, he is an independ-
ent contractor. Neither is he always an agent of the person held liable; 
Screen Gems makes this apparent. 
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U. S. 844, 851 (1982); see id., at 860 (concurring opinion). I 
think this standard is equally appropriate in the copyright 
context. 
The District Court found that Sony has advertised the 
Betamax as suitable for off-the-air recording of "favorite 
shows," "novels for television," and "classic movies," 480 F. 
Supp., at 436, with no visible warning that such recording 
could constitute copyright infringement. It is only with the 
aid of the Betamax or some other VTR, that it is possible to-
day for home television viewers to infringe copyright by re-
cording off-the-air. Off-the-air recording is not only a fore-
seeable use for the Betamax, but indeed is its intended use. 
Under the circumstances, I agree with the Court of Appeals 
that if off-the-air recording is an infringement of copyright, 
Sony has induced and materially contributed to the infringing 
conduct of Betamax owners . .w 
B 
Sony argues that the manufacturer or seller of a product 
used to infringe is absolved from liability whenever the prod-
uct can be put to any substantial noninfringing use. Brief 
for Petitioners 41-42. The District Court so held, borrowing 
the "staple article of commerce" doctrine governing liability 
for contributory infringement of patents. See 35 U. S. C. 
40 My conclusion respecting contributory infringement does not include 
the retailer defendants. The District Court found that one of the retailer 
defendants had assisted in the advertising campaign for the Betamax, but 
made no other findings respecting their knowledge of the Betamax's in-
tended uses. I do not agree with the Court of Appeals, at least on this 
record, that the retailers "are sufficiently engaged in the enterprise to be 
held accountable," 659 F. 2d, at 976. In contrast, the advertising agency 
employed to promote the Betamax was far more actively engaged in the 
advertising campaign, and petitioners have not argued that the agency's 
liability differs in any way from that of Sony Corporation and Sony Cor-
poration of America. 
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§ 271. 41 This Court today is much less positive. See ante, at 
22. I do not agree that this technical judge-made doctrine of 
patent law, based in part on considerations irrelevant to the 
field of copyright, see generally Dawson Chemical Co. v. 
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U. S. 176, 187-199 (1980), should be 
imported wholesale into copyright law. Despite their com-
mon constitutional source, see U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 8, 
patent and copyright protections have not developed in a par-
allel fashion, and this Court in copyright cases in the past has 
borrowed patent concepts only sparingly. See Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 345-346 (1908). 
I recognize, however, that many of the concerns underly-
ing the "staple article of commerce" doctrine are present in 
copyright law as well. As the District Court noted, if liabil-
ity for contributory infringement were imposed on the manu-
facturer or seller of every product used to infringe-a type-
writer, a camera, a photocopying machine-the "wheels of 
commerce" would be blocked. 480 F. Supp., at 461; see also 
Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U. S., at 62. 
I therefore conclude that if a significant portion of the 
product's use is noninfringing, the manufacturers and sellers 
41 The "staple article of commerce" doctrine protects those who manufac-
ture products incorporated into or used with patented inventions-for ex-
ample, the paper and ink used with patented printing machines, Henry v. 
A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1 (1912), or the dry ice used with patented refrig-
eration systems, Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp., 283 U. S. 27 
(1931). Because a patent-holder has the right to control the use of the pat-
ented item as well as its manufacture, see Motion Picture Patents Co. v. 
Universal Film Co., 243 U. S. 502, 50~10 (1917); 35 U. S. C. 271(a), 
such protection for the manufacturer of the incorporated product is neces-
sary to prevent patent-holders from extending their monopolies by sup-
pressing competition in unpatented components and supplies suitable for 
use with the patented item. See Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas 
Co., 448 U. S. 176, 197-198 (1980). The doctrine of contributory patent 
infringement has been the subject of attention by the courts and by Con-
gress, see id., at 202-212, and has been codified since 1952, 66 Stat. 792, 
but was never mentioned during the copyright law revision process as hav-
ing any relevance to contributory copyright infringement. 
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cannot be held contributorily liable for the product's infring-
ing uses. See ante, at 22. If virtually all of the product's 
use, however, is to infringe, contributory liability may be im-
posed; if no one would buy the product for noninfringing pur-
poses alone, it is clear that the manufacturer is purposely 
profiting from the infringement, and that liability is appropri-
ately imposed. In such a case, the copyright owner's monop-
oly would not be extended beyond its proper bounds; the 
manufacturer of such a product contributes to the infringing 
activities of others and profits directly thereby, while pro-
viding no benefit to the public sufficient to justify the 
infringement. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that Sony should be held 
liable for contributory infringement, reasoning that "[ v ]ideo-
tape recorders are manufactured, advertised, and sold for the 
primary purpose of reproducing television programming," 
and "[ v ]irtually all television programming is copyrighted 
material." 659 F. 2d, at 975. While I agree with the first of 
these propositions, 42 the second, for me, is problematic. The 
key question is not the amount of television programming 
that is copyrighted, but rather the amount of VTR usage that 
is infringing.43 Moreover, the parties and their amici have 
argued vigorously about both the amount of television pro-
gramming that is covered by copyright and the amount for 
42 Although VTRs also may be used to watch prerecorded video cassettes 
and to make home motion pictures, these uses do not require a tuner such 
as the Betamax contains. See n. 1, supra. The Studios do not object to 
Sony's sale of VTRs without tuners. Brief for Respondents 5, n. 9. In 
considering the noninfringing uses of the Betamax, therefore, those uses 
that would remain possible without the Betamax's built-in tuner should not 
be taken into account. 
43 N oninfringing uses would include, for example, recording works that 
are not protected by copyright, recording works that have entered the 
public domain, recording with permission of the copyright owner, and, of 
course, any recording that qualifies as fair use. See, e. g., Bruzzone v. 
Miller Brewing Co., 202 U.S. P. Q. 809 (ND Cal. 1979) (use of home VTR 
for market research studies). 
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which permission to copy has been given. The proportion of 
VTR recording that is infringing is ultimately a question of 
fact, 44 and the District Court specifically declined to make 
findings on the "percentage of legal versus illegal home-use 
recording." 480 F. Supp., at 468. In light of my view of the 
law, resolution of this factual question is essential. I there-
fore would remand the case for further consideration of this 
by the District Court. 
VI 
The Court has adopted an approach very different from the 
one I have outlined. It is my view that the Court's approach 
alters dramatically the doctrines of fair use and contributory 
infringement as they have been developed by Congress and 
the courts. Should Congress choose to respond to the 
Court's decision, the old doctrines can be resurrected. As it 
stands, howev~r, the decision today erodes much of the co-
herence that these doctrines have struggled to achieve. 
The Court's disposition of the case turns on its conclusion 
that time-shifting is a fair use. Because both parties agree 
that time-shifting is the primary use of VTRs, that conclu-
sion, if correct, would settle the issue of Sony's liability under 
almost any definition of contributory infringement. The 
" Sony asserts that much or most television broadcasting is available for 
home recording because (1) no copyright owner other than the Studios has 
brought an infringement action, and (2) much televised material is ineligi-
ble for copyright protection because videotapes of the broadcasts are not 
kept. The first of these assertions is irrelevant; Sony's liability does not 
turn on the fact that only two copyright owners thus far have brought suit. 
The amount of infringing use must be determined through consideration of 
the television market as a whole. Sony's second assertion is based on a 
faulty premise; the Copyright Office permits audiovisual works transmit-
ted by television to be registered by deposit of sample frames plus a de-
scription of the work. See 37 CFR §§ 202.20(c)(2)(ii) and 202.21(g) (1982). 
Moreover, although an infringement action cannot be brought unless the 
work is registered, 17 U. S. C. § 411(a) , registration is not a condition of 
copyright protection. § 408(a). Copying an unregistered work still may 
be infringement. Cf. § 506(a) (liability for criminal copyright infringe-
ment; not conditioned on prior registration). 
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Court concludes that time-shifting is fair use for two reasons. 
Each is seriously flawed. 
The Court's first reason for concluding that time-shifting is 
fair use is its claim that many copyright holders have no ob-
jection to time-shifting, and that "respondents have no right 
to prevent other copyright holders from authorizing it for 
their programs." Ante, at 23. The Court explains that a 
finding of contributory infringement would "inevitably frus-
trate the interests of broadcasters in reaching the portion of 
their audience that is available only through time-shifting." 
Ante, at 26. Such reasoning, however, simply confuses the 
question of liability with the difficulty of fashioning an appro-
priate remedy. It may be that an injunction prohibiting the 
sale of VTRs would harm the interests of copyright holders 
who have no objection to others making copies of their pro-
grams. But such concerns should and would be taken into 
account in fashioning an appropriate remedy once liability has 
been found. Remedies may well be available that would not 
interfere with authorized time-shifting at all. The Court of 
Appeals mentioned the possibility of a royalty payment that 
would allow VTR sales and time-shifting to continue un-
abated, and the parties may be able to devise other narrowly 
tailored remedies. Sony may be able, for example, to build a 
VTR that enables broadcasters to scramble the signal of indi-
vidual programs and "jam" the unauthorized recording of 
them. Even were an appropriate remedy not available at 
this time, the Court should not misconstrue copyright hold-
ers' rights in a manner that prevents enforcement of them 
when, through development of better techniques, an appro-
priate remedy becomes available. 45 
45 Even if concern with remedy were appropriate at the liability stage, 
the Court's use of the District Court's findings is somewhat cavalier. The 
Court relies heavily on testimony by representatives of professional sports 
leagues to the effect that they have no objection to VTR recording. The 
Court never states, however, whether the sports leagues are copyright 
holders, and if so, whether they have exclusive copyrights to sports broad-
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The Court's second stated reason for finding that Sony is 
not liable for contributory infringement is its conclusion that 
even unauthorized time-shifting is fair use. Ante, at 28. 
This conclusion is even more troubling. The Court begins by 
suggesting that the fair use doctrine operates as a general 
"equitable rule of reason." That interpretation mis-
haracterizes the doctrine, and simply ignores the language of 
the statute. Section 107 establishes the fair use doctrine 
"for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching, ... scholarship, or research." These are all pro-
ductive uses. It is true that the legislative history states re-
peatedly that the doctrine must be applied flexibly on a case-
by-case basis, but those references were only in the context 
of productive uses. Such a limitation on fair use comports 
with its purpose, which is to facilitate the creation of new 
casts. Of course, one who does not hold an exclusive copyright does not 
have authority to consent to copying. 
Assuming that the various sports leagues do have exclusive copyrights 
in some of their broadcasts, the amount of authorized time-shifting still 
would not be overwhelming. Sony's own survey indicated that only 7.3 
percent of all Betamax use is to record sports events of all kinds. Def. 
Exh. OT, Table 20. Because Sony's witnesses did not represent all forms 
of sports events, moreover, this figure provides only a tenuous basis for 
this Court to engage in fact-finding of its own. 
The only witness at trial who was clearly an exclusive copyright owner 
and who expressed no objection to unauthorized time-shifting was the 
owner of the copyright in Mister Rogers' Neighborhood. But the Court 
cites no evidence in the record to the effect that anyone makes VTR copies 
of that program. The simple fact is that the District Court made no find-
ings on the amount of authorized time-shifting that takes place. The 
Court seems to recognize this gap in its reasoning, and phrases its argu-
ment as a hypothetical. The Court states: "If there are millions of owners 
of VTR's who make copies of televised sports events, religious broadcasts, 
and educational programs such as Mister Rogers' Neighborhood, and if the 
proprietors of those programs welcome the practice," the sale of VTR's 
"should not be stifled" in order to protect respondent's copyrights. Ante, 
at 26 (emphasis supplied). Given that the Court seems to recognize that 
its argument depends on findings that have not been made, it seems that a 
remand is inescapable. 
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works. There is no indication that the fair use doctrine has 
any application for purely personal consumption on the scale 
involved in this case, 46 and the Court's application of it here 
deprives fair use of the major cohesive force that has guided 
evolution of the doctrine in the past. 
Having bypassed the initial hurdle for establishing that a 
use is fair, the Court then purports to apply to time-shifting 
the four factors explicitly stated in the statute. The first is 
"the purpose and character of the use, including whether 
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes." § 107(1). The Court confidently describes 
time-shifting as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity. It is 
clear, however, that personal use of programs that have been 
copied without permission is not what § 107(1) protects. The 
intent of the section is to encourage users to engage in activi-
ties the primary benefit of which accrues to others. Time-
shifting involves no such humanitarian impulse. It is like-
wise something of a mischaracterization of time-shifting to 
describe it as noncommercial in the sense that that term is 
used in the statute. As one commentator has observed, . 
time-shifting is noncommercial in the same sense that steal-
ing jewelry and wearing it-instead of reselling it-is non-
commercial. 47 Purely consumptive uses are certainly not 
what the fair use doctrine was designed to protect, and the 
awkwardness of applying the statutory language to time-
shifting only makes clearer that fair use was designed to pro-
tect only uses that are productive. 
46 As has been explained, some uses of time-shifting, such as copying 
an old newspaper clipping for a friend, are fair use because of their de 
minimis effect on the copyright holder. The scale of copying involved in 
this case, of course, is of an entirely different magnitude, precluding appli-
cation of such an exception. 
'
7 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing before Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. 1250 (1982) (memo-
randum of Prof. Laurence H. Tribe). 
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The next two statutory factors are all but ignored by the 
Court-though certainly not because they have no applicabil-
ity. The second factor-"the nature of the copyrighted 
work"-strongly supports the view that time-shifting is an 
infringing use. The rationale guiding application of this fac-
tor is that certain types of works, typically those involving 
"more of diligence than of originality or inventiveness," New 
York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. 
Supp. 217, 221 (NJ 1977), require less copyright protection 
than other original works. Thus, for example, informational 
works, such as news reports, that readily lend themselves to 
productive use by others, are less protected than creative 
works of entertainment. Sony's own surveys indicate that 
entertainment shows account for more than 80 percent of the 
programs recorded by Betamax owners. 48 
The third statutory factor-"the amount and substantiality 
of the portion used"-is even more devastating to the Court's 
interpretation. It is undisputed that virtually all VTR own-
ers record entire works, see 480 F. Supp., at 454, thereby 
creating an exact substitute for the copyrighted original. 
Fair use is intended to allow individuals engaged in produc-
tive uses to copy small portions of original works that will fa-
cilitate their own productive endeavors. Time-shifting 
bears no resemblance to such activity, and the complete 
duplication that it involves might alone be sufficient to pre-
clude a finding of fair use. It is little wonder that the Court 
has chosen to ignore this statutory factor. 49 
48 See A Survey of Betamax Owners, R. 2353, Def. Exh. OT, Table 20, 
cited in Brief for Respondents 52. 
49 The Court's one oblique acknowledgement of this third factor, ante, at 
29, seems to suggest that the fact that time-shifting involves copying com-
plete works is not very significant because the viewers already have been 
asked to watch the initial broadcast free. This suggestion misses the 
point. As has been noted, a book borrowed from a public library may not 
be copied any more freely than one that has been purchased. An invita-
tion to view a showing is completely different from an invitation to copy a 
copyrighted work. 
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The fourth factor requires an evaluation of "the effect of 
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work." This is the factor upon which the Court fo-
cuses, but once again, the Court has misread the statute. 
As mentioned above, the statute requires a court to consider 
the effect of the use on the potential market for the copy-
righted work. The Court has struggled mightily to show 
that VTR use has not reduced the value of the Studios' copy-
righted works in their present markets. Even if true, that 
showing only begins the proper inquiry. The development 
of the VTR has created a new market for the works produced 
by the Studios. That market consists of those persons who 
desire to view television programs at times other than when 
they are broadcast, and who therefore purchase VTR record-
ers to enable them to time-shift. 50 Because time-shifting of 
the Studios' copyrighted works involves the copying of them, 
however, the Studios are entitled to share in the benefits of 
that new market. Those benefits currently go to Sony 
through Betamax sales. Respondents therefore can show 
harm from VTR use simply by showing that the value of their 
copyrights would increase if they were compensated for the 
copies that are used in the new market. The existence of 
this effect is self-evident. 
Because of the Court's conclusion concerning the legality of 
time-shifting, it never addresses the amount of noninfringing 
use that a manufacturer must show to absolve itself from li-
ability as a contributory infringer. Thus, it is difficult to dis-
cuss how the Court's test for contributory infringement 
would operate in practice under a proper analysis of time-
shifting. One aspect of the test as it is formulated by the 
50 The Court implicitly has recognized that this market is very signifi-
cant. The central concern underlying the Court's entire opinion is that 
there is a large audience who would like very much to be able to view pro-
grams at times other than when they are broadcast. Ante, at 26. The 
Court simply misses the implication of its own concerns. 
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Court, however, particularly deserves comment. The Court 
explains that a manufacturer of a product is not liable for con-
tributory infringement as long as the product is "capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses." Ante, at 22 (emphasis sup-
plied). Such a definition essentially eviscerates the concept 
of contributory infringement. Only the most unimaginative 
manufacturer would be unable to demonstrate that a image-
duplicating product is "capable" of substantial noninfringing 
uses. Surely Congress desired to prevent the sale of prod-
ucts that are used almost exclusively to infringe copyrights; 
the fact that noninfringing uses exist presumably would have 
little bearing on that desire. 
More importantly, the rationale for the Court's narrow 
standard of contributory infringment reveals that, once 
again, the Court has confused the issue of liability with that 
of remedy. The Court finds that a narrow definition of con-
tributory infringement is necessary in order to protect "the 
rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated 
areas of commerce." Ante, at 22. But application of the 
contributory infringement doctrine implicates such rights 
only if the remedy attendant upon a finding of liability were 
an injunction against the manufacture of the product in ques-
tion. The issue of an appropriate remedy is not before the 
Court at this time, but it seems likely that a broad injunction 
is not the remedy that would be ordered. It is unfortunate 
that the Court has allowed its concern over a remedy to infect 
its analysis of liability. 
VII 
The Court of Appeals, having found Sony liable, remanded 
for the District Court to consider the propriety of injunctive 
or other relief. Because of my conclusion as to the issue of 
liability, I, too, would not decide here what remedy would be 
appropriate if liability were found. I concur, however, in 
the Court of Appeals' suggestion that an award of damages, 
or continuing royalties, or even some form of limited injunc-
tion, may well be an appropriate means of balancing the equi-
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ties in this case. 51 Although I express no view on the merits 
of any particular proposal, I am certain that, if Sony were 
found liable in this case, the District Court would be able to 
fashion appropriate relief. The District Court might con-
clude, of course, that a continuing royalty or other equitable 
relief is not feasible. The Studios then would be relegated to 
statutory damages for proved instances of infringement. 
But the difficulty of fashioning relief, and the possibility that 
complete relief may be unavailable, should not affect our in-
terpretation of the statute. 
Like so many other problems created by the interaction of 
copyright law with a new technology, "[t]here can be no 
really satisfactory solution to the problem presented here, 
until Congress acts." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. 
Aiken, 422 U. S., at 167 (dissenting opinion). But in the ab-
sence of a congressional solution, courts cannot avoid difficult 
problems by refusing to apply the law. We must "take the 
Copyright Act ... as we find it," Fortnightly Corp. v. 
United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 401-402 (1968), and "do as lit-
tle damage as possible to traditional copyright principles . . . 
until the Congress legislates." I d., at 404 (dissenting 
opinion). 
51 Other Nations have imposed royalties on the manufacturers of prod-
ucts used to infringe copyright. See, e. g., Copyright Laws and Treaties 
of the World (UNESCO/BNA 1982) (English translation), reprinting Fed-
eral Act On Copyright in Works of Literature and Art and on Related 
Rights (Austria), § 42(5)-(7), and An Act dealing with Copyright and Re-
lated Rights (Federal Republic of Germany), Art. 53(5). A study pro-
duced for the Commission of European Communities has recommended 
that these requirements "serve as a pattern" for the European community. 
A. Dietz, Copyright Law in the European Community 135 (1978). While 
these royalty systems ordinarily depend on the existence of authors' col-
lecting societies, see id., at 119, 136, such collecting societies are a familiar 
part of our copyright law. See generally Broadcast Music , Inc . v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U. S. 1, ~ (1979). Fashioning relief 
of this sort, of course, might require bringing other copyright owners into 
court through certification of a class or otherwise. 
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contributory infringers. The validity of that holding de-
pends on whether the primary use of that sort of equipment 
is an infringing use. The District Court found that the pri-
mary t!_Se of the video tape recording equipment involved in 
this case w~r "home use recording." Its explanation of 
that use 2 makes it clear that it satisfies three critical criteria: 
(1) the alleged infringer did not make more than one copy of 
any copyrighted work; (2) he made no public performance or 
other public use of the copy; and (3) he made no commercial 
use of it. In my opinion, conduct that meets these three con-
ditions is not prohibited by the statute. Before commenting 
specifically on the home use of video tape recorders, how-
ever, I shall briefly review a series of other innovations that 
led to revisions in the statutory protection Congress has pro-
vided for the authors of original compositions pursuant to Ar-
ticle I, clause 8 of the Constitution. This history reveals a 
2
" 'Home-use' recording as used in this opinion is the operation of the 
Betamax in a private home to record a program for subsequent home view-
ing. The progt:ams involved in this lawsuit are broadcast free to the public 
over public ai~aves. The court heard extensive testimony from defend-
ant William Griffiths and four non-defendant individuals about this activ-
ity, and the court's declaration of non-infringement is limited to this home 
use-situation. 
"It is important to note the limits of this holding. Neither pay nor cable 
television stations are plaintiffs in this suit and no defendant recorded the 
signals from either. The court is not ruling on tape swapping, organized 
or informal. The court is not ruling no tape duplication within the home or 
outside, by individuals, groups or corporations. Nor is the court ruling on 
off-the-air recording for use outside the home. e. g., by teachers for class-
rooms, corporations for employees, etc. No defendant engaged in any of 
these activities and the facts necessary to determine their legality are not 
before this court. 
"The ramifications of this new technology are greater than the bound-
aries of this lawsuit. A court ·reviewing the limited claims of specified par-
ties in a particular factual setting cannot and should not undertake the role 
of a government commission or legislative body exploring and evaluating 
all the uses and consequences of the videotape recorder." App. to Pet. for 
Cert. 5&--56 . 
. -
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remarkable consistency in the way that two themes have re-
occurred. First, the Court has repeatedly declined to ex-
tend copyright protection until after Congress has evaluated 
the new development and enacted amendatory legislation; 
second, no interested party has ever seriously suggested that 
a penalty, or any form of statutory liability, should be im-
posed upon an individual for making a single copy of any 
copyrighted work for his own private use. 3 
I 
Long before the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909, 
35 Stat. 1075, it was settled that the protection given to copy-
rights in this country is wholly statutory. Wheaton v. Pe-
ters, 33 U. S. (8 Peters) 591, 661-662 (1834). The remedies 
for infringement "are only those prescribed by Congress." 
Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U. S. 123, 151 (1889). 
In 1831 Congress extended copyright protection to musical 
compositions. 4 Stat. 436. This extension did not, of 
course, interfere with the individual's right to play or sing 
copyrighted songs for his own gratification, even though he 
thereby made an "intrinsic use" of the copyrighted material. 4 
3 Both of these themes are reflected in the press release issued by one of 
the respondents after its victo~peals in this case-:- It 
stated, m part: 
"Millions of families in the United States and around the world are now 
involved in videotaping programming in their own homes for their own pri-
vate use. We have no intention, in this or any other litigation, of pursuing 
individuals ~£}~erfere witfi tli~raetice. -
"Wetn'Sfin n 1976, more than five years ago, when 
there were relatively few tape recorders in homes. Since that time we 
have come to realize that the interests of all concerned can be better ac-
commodated by passage of new laws." Excerpt from statement by E. 
Cardon Walker, Chairman of Walt Disney Productions, on November 2, 
1981. ---------=-----
."Singing for one's own gratification without intending thereby to rep-
resent anything, or to amuse any one else, would not, I think, be either a 






4 SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC. 
The copyright statute has never required a license "to sing a 
copyrighted lyric in the shower." Twentieth Century Music 
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 155. 
The development and marketing of .elayer pianos and per-
forated rolls of music at the turn of the century gave rise to 
litigation raising the question whether the use of such rolls 
infringed the copyrights owned by composers and music pub-
lishers. The sale of well over a million rolls in 1902 made it 
evident that the economic issue was significant. Adopting a 
construction of the pre-1909 version of the Copyright Act 
that, as Justice Holmes acknowledged, gave to the music 
"copyright less scope than its rational significance", the 
Court held that the piano rolls were not co ies of copyrighted 
s~ within the meanin[_of the Act. White- mith usic 
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (see Holmes, J., 
concurring, at 19). Quoting from an English case consider-
ing a similar question, the Court noted that the copyright on 
the sheet music did not involve any exclusive right "to the 
performance in private of the music indicated by such 
sheets", id., at 13. The Court assumed that Congress was 
aware of the prevailing view, reflected in an international 
convention to which the United States was not a party, that 
"the manufacture and sale of instruments serving to repro-
duce mechanically the [copyrighted music] are not considered 
as constituting musical infringement." Id., at 14-15. It 
held that the policy considerations at stake '"properly ad-
dressed themselves to the legislative, and not to the judicial, 
branch of the government." I d., at 18. The following year 
Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1909. 
When the 1909 Act was passed, the Librarian of Congress, 
Dr. Herbert Putnam, was following a practice of allowing sin-
terms, nor would the fact of some other person being in the room at the 
time of such singing make it so . ... " Wall v. Taylor, 11 Q.E.D. 102, 
106-107 (1883) (Brett, M.R.). 
We quoted that passage with approval in Twentieth Century Music 
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 155 n. 4. 
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gle copies of copyrighted works to be made at the Library. 5 
Presumably Congress was familiar with this practice. Even 
though the 1909 Act might have been construed literally to 
prescribe the practice, no one seems to have ever challenged 
the activity of individuals who merely made single copies for 
their own use. The matter did not seem to merit serious at-
tention until innovations in copying techniques made it rela-
tively easy to reproduce entire articles or to make multiple 
copies. When the National Institute of Health and the N a-
tiona! Library of Medicine adopted the practice of photocopy-
ing entire articles from medical journals ~d ~p~ them 
to re~tigation did ensue. Wil1Uiinsand Wilkins 
V. United States, 487 F. 2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. i973Yaffirmed by an 
equally divided court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975). 
In that litigation it was expressly ~ed that the making 
of a single copy of a copyrighted article by a scholar for his 
own use was immune from liability-even if literally covered 
by the statute-and that it was the development of the capac-
ity to make photocopies that made the issue significant. 6 In 
5 That practice was described at page 6 in the 1913 edition of the Library 
of Congress Rules and Practice governing the use and issue of books as 
follows: 
"Photo-duplicates of books, newspapers, maps, etc., can be furnished at a 
reasonable rate by means of the photostat, installed in the Chief Clerk's 
Office. Apply to the Chief Clerk for a schedule of charges." 
Dr. Putnam, of course, made an important contribution to the drafting of 
the 1909 statute. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 213. 
6 "Some forms of ~ying, at the very _least of portions of a work, ~e 
univers~y deemed immune from liability, although the very words are re-
producea m more than de minimis <ltiantity. Furthermore, it is almost 
unanimously accepted that a scholar can make a handwritten copy of an en-
tire copyrighted article for his own use, and in the era before photoduplica-
tion it was not uncommon (and not seriously questioned) that he could have 
his secretary make a typed copy for his personal use and files. These cus-
tomary facts of copyright-life are amon our 'vens. The issuewenow 
have 1s the comp ex one o w ether photocopying, m he form done by NIH 
and NLM, should be accorded the same treatment-not the ministerial 
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his brief in this Qourt, the Solicitor General of the United 
States stated:7 
"The congressional understanding, as well as the longg 
standing library custom, is that the making of a single 
copy of an~ article for private use is a fai!:._,use, even 
if the copy is made purely for personal pleasure." 
The brief appended the following footnote at that point: 
"'Anyone may copy copyrighted materials for purposeu 
of private study and review.' Cohen, 'Fair Use in the 
Law of Copyright,' ASCAP, Copyright Law Symposium 
(No. 6, 1955), 43, 58.'' 8 
The issue, however, was not resolved by the litigation 
which terminated in 1975, but rather was later addressed by 
Congress when it revised the Copyright Act in the following 
year. In § 108 of the 1976 revision, Congress e~~~ a sn.~­
Cial statutory exemption for library co ng. a exemp-
tion twice raws an exp ic1t 1stinction between the re-
production of multiple copies and the "reproduction or 
distribution of a single copy.'' 9 Nothing in that amendment 
'copying' (as of course it does in dictionary terms)." 487 F. 2d at 1350. 
7 See Brief for the United States, No. 73-1279, October Term, 1974, pp. 
20-21. 
8 I d., at 21, n. 30. Earlier in his brief, the Solicitor General had stated: 
"Prior to the 1909 Copyright Act, the exclusive rights granted to the au-
thor of a published work did not include the right to copy the work. 
Harper v. Shoppell, 26 Fed. 519 (C.Ct., S. D. N. Y.). The 1909 Act reor-
ganized the provisions of the prior law, but was not intended to expand its 
coverage (H.Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 4). 
"It was assumed, both before and after the enactment of the Copyright ( 
Act of 1909, that the exclusive rights of the copyright owner did not include 
the right to control the copying of the copyrighted material for personal 
use." Id., at 16-17, n. 26. ~
9 § 108 provides, in pertinent part: 
"(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringe-
ment of copyright for a library or archives, or any of its employees acting 
,• 
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implies that Congress intended to proscribe the reproduction 
of "no more than one copy" for an individual's private non-
commercial use. 
A similar sequence of events followed the development of 
technology that made it possible to retransmit television pro-
grams by cable orb microwave systems. ln1960, United 
Artists Television, Inc., the owner of a number of copyrights 
on motion pictures, sought to enjoin the operator of a commu-
nity antenna television system (CATV) from intercepting and 
retransmitting signals carrying its copyrighted productions. 
The Court held that the CATV operator did not "perform" 
within the scope of their employment, to reproduce no more than one copy 
or phonorecord of a work, or to distribute such copy or phonorecord, under 
the conditions specified by this section, if-
(1) the reproduction or distribution is made without any purpose of di-
rect or indirect commercial advantage; 
(2) the collections of the library or archives are (i) open to the public, or 
(ii) available not only to researchers affiliated with the library or archives 
or with the institution of which it is a part, but also to other persons doing 
research in a specialized field; and 
(3) the reproduction or distribution of the work includes a notice of 
copyright. 
"(g) The rights of reproduction and distribution under this section ex-
tend to the isolated and unrelated reproduction or distribution of a single 
copy or phonorecord of the same material on separate occasions, but do not 
extend to cases where the library or archives, or its employee-
(!) is aware or has substantial reason to believe that it is engaging in the 
related or concerted reproduction or distribution of multiple copies or pho-
norecords of the same material, whether made on one occasion or over a 
period of time, and whether intended for aggregate use by one or more in-
dividuals or for separate use by the individual members of a group; or 
(2) engages in the systematic reproduction or distribution of single or 
multiple copies of phonorecords of material described in subsection (d); 
Provided, That nothing in this cause prevents a library or archives from 
participating in interlibrary arrangements that do not have, as their pur-
pose or effect that the library or archives receiving such copies or phono-
records for distribution does so in such aggregate quantities as to substi-
tute for a subscription to or purchase of such work." 
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the copyrighted works in the "manner envisioned by the Con-
gress that enacted the law in 1909." Fortnightly Corp. v. 
United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 395 (1968). Although the 
Court was sharply divided on the question whether that was 
a fair reading of the statutory language, there was complete 
agreement on the proposition that Congress was far better 
equipped than the Court to fashion a fair resolution of the 
problems presented by the sophisticated techn · 1-
opments that had occurred in recent ye 
The Fortnightly case was followe y Tele rom ter Co 
v. CBS, 415 U. S. 394, in which the Cou cons1d the 
copyright holders' argument that ATV syst iluted the 
commercial value of the market for 1censed television pro-
grams. Recognizing that the retransmissions by CATV sys-
tems would au ent the size of the otential audience for a 
broadcast-much as would the v1 eo tape recording of pro-
grams for later home viewing-the Court concluded: 
"These shifts in current business and commercial rela-
tionships, while of significance with respect to the orga-
nization and growth of the communications industry, 
simply cannot be controlled by means of litigation based 
' .... - -------
10 "We have been invited by the Solicitor General in an amicus curiae 
brief to render a compromise decision in this case that would, it is said, 
accommodate various competing considerations of copyright, communica-
tions, and antitrust policy. We decline the invitation. That job is for 
C~ss." [footnotes omitted] 392 U. S. at 401. 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Fortas wrote: 
"Our major object, I suggest, sh~to do as little damage as possible to 
traditional copyright principles and to business relationships, until the 
Congress legislates and relieves the embarrassment which we and the in-
terested parties face." Id., at 404. 
At the end of his opinion, he added: 
"The task of caring for CATV is one for the Congress. Our ax, being a 
rule of law, must cut straight, sharp, and deep; and perhaps this is a situa-
tion that calls for the compromise of theory and for the architectural im-
provisation which only legislation can accomplish." Id., at 408. 
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on copyright legislation enacted more than half a century 
ago, when neither broadcast television nor CATV was I 
yet conceived. Detailed regulation of these relation-
ships, and any ultimate resolution of the many sensitive 
and important problems in this field, must be left to Con-
gress." !d., at 414. 
In due course Congress did enact legislation that regulates 
the complex relationships among copyright holders, commer-
cial television stations, and CATV system operators in a com-
prehensive and detailed way that could not possibly have 
been fashioned by a court. 11 
The technological change that most close! parallels the in-
novatio t at gave nse to IS 'ti at10n was t e development 
of the au 10 ape recorder. That device made it simple for 
any individUal to make copies of c5>mig_!lte~ s~gs played on 
the radio. Because the practice that became known as "rec-
ord piracy" became so widespread, the recording industry 
persuaded Con ess to enact a special statute extending 
copyr1g protection to soun reco 1 s. egis ative 
history of e oun ecor ·n'lg men ment of 1971, 85 Stat. 
391, makes it perfectly clear that Congress did not then be-
11 The statutory provisions themselves, see 17 U. S. C. § 111, are much 
too long to quote in full, but their complexity is indicated in the following 
paragraph from Judge Markey's opinion in Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. 
Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F. 2d 125, 129 (CA2 1982): 
"Under the congressionally mandated scheme, television broadcast sta-
tions like WOR-TV continue to pay license or royalty fees directly to copy-
right owners like Doubleday, while CATV systems pay license fees under 
their compulsory licenses to the United States Copyright Office in accord 
with formulae provided in 17 U. S. C. § 111(d)(2)(B). The fees paid by 
CATV systems are distributed to copyright owners like Doubleday by 
Copyright Royalty Tribunal (Tribunal), as provided for in 17 U. S. C. 
§ 111(d)(5). The Congressional scheme thus provided for compensation 
from CATV systems to copyright owners measured by the number of cable 
viewers or potential viewers, and placed the responsibility for payment of 
that compensation on the CATV systems." (footnotes omitted) 
81-1687-MEMORANDUM 
10 SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC. 
lieve that t~ single copy of a copyrighted song for pri-
vate use was an infringement, and did not intend to proscribe 
that sort o okl-\'1·tttt.fi..--... 
The ouse Repo s unambiguous: 
"In approving the creation of a limited copyright in 
sound recordings it is the intention of the Committee 
that this limited copyright not grant any broader rights 
than are accorded to other copyright proprietors under 
the existing title 17. Specifically, it is not the intention 
of the Committee to restrain the home recorain , from 
broa casts or rom tapes or records, of recorded perfor-
mances, where the home recordin is for rivate use and 
with no purpose of repr ucmg or ot erwise ca italizing 
com,!Eercia y on I . IS prac Ice IS common and unre-
strained today, and the record producers and performers 
would be in no different position from that of the owners 
of copyright in recorded musical compositions over the 
past 20 years." H. Rep. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 
7, reprinted in [1971] U. S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 
pp. 1566, 1572. 
This subject had been expressly considered during the 
House Committee hearings. As the District Court noted in 
this case, Representative Beister of Pennsylvania engaged in 
the following dialogue about off-the-air recording with Ms. 
Barbara Ringer, then Assistant Register of Copyrights: 
"Mr. Beister. I do not know that I can add very much 
to the questions which you have been asked so far. 
"I can tell you I must have a small pirate in my own 
home. 
"My son has a cassette tape recorder, and as a particu-
lar record becomes a hit, he will retrieve it onto his little 
set. 
"Now, he may retrieve in addition something else onto 
his recording, but nonetheless, he does retrieve the basic 
~ 
·~ 
trz.-v_ lef 7 I . 
81-1687-MEMORANDUM 
SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC. 11 
sound, and this legislation, of course, would not point to 
his activities, would it? 
"Miss Ringer. I think the answer is clearly, 'No, it 
would not.' 
"I have spoken at a couple of seminars on video cas-
settes lately, and this question is usually asked: 'What 
about the home recorders?' 
"The answer I have given and will give again is that 
this is something you cannot control. You simply can-
not control it." Hearings on S. 646 before the Sub-
comm. No.3 of the House Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong., 
1st Sess. 22 (June 9 and 10, 1971). 
That this was the opinion of the sponsors of the legislation is 
confirmed by the following colloquy when the 1971 amend-
ment was being discussed on the floor of the House of 
Representatives. 
"Mr. Kazen. Am I correct in assuming that the bill 
protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for com-
mercial purposes only? 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Yes. 
"Mr. Kazen. In other words, if your child were to 
record off of a program which comes through the air on 
the radio or television, and then used it for her own per-
sonal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this would not be 
included under the penalties of this bill? 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. This is not included in the bill. I 
am glad the gentleman raises the point. 
"On page 7 of the report, under 'Home Recordings,' 
Members will note that under the bill the same practice 
which prevails today is called for; namely, this is consid-
ered both presently and under the proposed law to be fair 
use. The child does not do this for commercial pur-
poses. This is made clear in the report." 117 Cong. 
Rec. 34, 748 (1971) (emphasis added). 12 
12 Representative Kastenmeier's views of whether the copyright laws 
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In its periodic revisions of the copyright laws, • Cong;,ess 
has confronted one technological innovation after another, 
but it has never ex ressed any specific intent to treat the re-
production of a copyrighte work as an 1 m emen 1 ese 
three c s e e : t e user rna e no more than one 
copy; (2) he made ~~c~e of the copy; and (3) he made 
no commercial use of it. -what is perhaps most remarkable 
a~ew of legislative responses to technological 
changes in the copyright field is the complete absence of any 
specific consideration of the problems generated by the 
development of the video tape recorder. Is there reason to 
believe Congress intended the non-commercial, home use of 
such recorders to have different legal consequences than the 
private use of audio tape recorders? Congress has never ex-
pressed any such intent. Moreover, an examination of the 
statutory langua~ is entirely consistent with the conclusion 
thaT such nome use should not be regarded as an infringe-
ment unless and until Congress expressly so directs. 
prohibit home taping do not appear to have changed significantly over the 
past decade. In hearings held in 1982, after the Court of Appeals' decision 
in this case, he engaged in the following colloquy with a representative of 
the National Music Publishers Association: 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Thank you, Mr. Baumgarten. Do I take it as your 
legal opinion as part of this panel that some 30 or 40 million people in their 
homes producing billions of works are now and have been infringing copy-
right laws? 
"Mr. Baumgarten. Yes. 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. They are all infringers? 
"Mr. Baumgarten. Yes. 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Subject in all respects to whatever the law-
"Mr. Baumgarten. Whatever relief the court considers appropriate. I 
think we saw at the ninth circuit that that would be fashioned in an equita-
ble amount. 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. There would be a lot of Americans who I think 
would be chagrined to learn that that is the case." Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice 
of House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 4783 et al. , 97th Cong. , 2d 
Sess. , at 540. 
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II 
The Copyright Act does not give a copyright holder control 
over all possible uses of his copyrighted work. An unli-
censed use of the copyright is not an infringement unless it 
conflicts with one of the specific exclusive rights conferred by 
the statute. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 
U. S. 151, 154-155. In order to determine whether the 
copying of a television program constitutes an infringement, 
it is therefore necessary to examine the s:e_ecific exclusi_ye 
ri\ht~nted to the owner of a copyright. 
ection 106 of the Act provides: 
"Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of 
copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do 
and to authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyr~hted work in copies or 
phonorecorcrs; ' 
~) to prepare derivative works based upon the copy-
righted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copy-
righted work to the public by sale or other transfer of 
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and cho-
reographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and 
other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted 
work publicly; and 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and cho-
reographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural works, including the individual images of a 
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the 
copyrighted work publicly." 
It is immediately apparent that subparagraphs (2) and (3) 
have no application to the home use of videotape recorders, 
although they, of course, would preclude the commercial 
exploitation of taped copies, and subparagraph (3) would ap-
pear to prohibit trading or lending of copies. Subparagraphs 
#I 
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(4) and (5) both explicitly apply to motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works, but both of those sections merely grant 
the right "to perform" or "to display the copyrighted work 
publicly." Thus, the only sub aragraph that is eve gu-
ably applicable is the first. It gives the owner the exclusive 
riglif"to reproduce t hecopyrighted work in copies or phono-
records." (Emphasis added). Although the use of the plu-
ral word "copies" obviously encompasses the singular as well, 
see 1 U. S. C. § 1, the fact that Congress did select the plural 
form repeatedly, not only in the Act itself, but also in the 
Committee Reports, does tend to identify the problem that 
they were most concerned about-namely the reproduction 
of a copyrighted work for commercial purposes which, of 
course, would normally be in multiple copies. 13 
What is especially significant about the text of § 106 is that 
it pr.2_Yides ~ basis_for distinguishing between the taping of a 
copyright~d song broadcast over ffie ra<lio and the taping...of a 
copyr"ighted television program. If the House Committee 
Report on the 19 1 amen ment was correct in expressing the 
opinion that the private use of an audio tape recorder is not 
infringement, 14 that opinion applies equally to the private use 
of a video tape recorder. 15 
'
3 We have also tended to speak in the plural. Thus, in Bobs Merrill Co. 
v. Strauss, 210 U. S. 339 (1908), the Court referred to the author's "right 
to multiply copies of his work" id., at 347, to the "exclusive right to the 
multiplication of the copies" ibid; to the copyright owner's "right to multi-
ply and sell his production" id., at 350; and to the main purpose of the stat-
ute "to secure the right of multiplying copies of the work" id., at 351; and to 
"this right of multiplication." Ibid. 
" Contrary to the opinion expressed in the House Committee Report, 
Professor Nimmer takes the rather surprising position that audio home re-
cording for private use does violate the statute. He argues, inter alia, 
that the Committee Report is simply wrong: 
"Although the House report offers the opinion that home recording does 
not infringe the copyright in underlying works, this statement is nothing 
more than the House's view in 1971 of the meaning of the 1909 Act. The 
[Footnote 15 is on p. 15} 
#I 
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It is not necessary, however, to insist upon a literalist 
reading of§ 106 in order to interpret the statute in light of its 
historic purpose-to prohibit unfair commercial exploitation 
of the monopoly rights granted to the author, composer, or 
publisher. 16 For the definition of the exclusive rights in § 106 
is prefaced by the words "subject to sections 107 through 
118." Those sections describe a variety of uses of copy-
righted material that "are not infringements of copyright not-
withstanding the provisions of § 106. 17 One of the more illu-
observation does not have the force of a statement of legislative intent." 
Nimmer, Copyright Liability for Audio Home Recording: Dispelling the 
Betamax Myth, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1505, 1509-1510 (1982). 
Later he added: 
"No one has claimed that the pre-1971 copyright statutes contained any 
provision other than the doctrine of fair use for exempting home recording 
from copyright infringement of the musical works thereby produced. 
Since the House report states that the purpose of the Amendment is to ex-
tend the same protection to sound recordings, it is clear that the Amend-
ment did not create a new exemption for home recording. The most one 
can fairly attribute to the House report, then, is an opinion that home re-
16 Even Professor Nimmer, the scholar taking the most extreme position 
concerning the scope of copyright protection for sound recordings, see n. 
14, ante, agrees with this proposition: 
"Although the Betamax case involved video home recording, the finding of 
contributory infringement and the imposition of a continuing royalty would 
apply equally well to the manufacturers and sellers of audio home record-
ing equipment." !d., at 1526. 
16 "An author who possesses an unlimited copyright may preclude others 
from copying his creation for commercial purposes without permission. In 
other words, to encourage people to devote themselves to intellectual and 
artistic creation, Congress may guarantee to authors and inventors a re-
ward in the form of control over the sale or commercial use of copies of 
their works. " Goldstein v. California, 412 U. S. 546, 555. 
17 Thus, for example, § 110 provides in part: 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the following are not in-
fringements of copyright: 
(5) communication of a transmission embodying a performance or dis-
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minating of those sections legislative 
endorsement of the doctrine "fair use." 
The 1909 Act did not hav a 11fair use" pr ision. More-
over, that Act's compendiu of exclusive ghts-"to print, 
reprint, publish, copy, and v opyrighted work" 18-
was plainly broad enough to encompass the making of a single 
copy for purely private use. Yet the statute was never so 
construed. The courts simply refused to read the statute lit-
erally in every situation. When Congress amended the stat-
ute in 1976, it indicated that it "intended to restate the 
present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or 
enlarge it in any way." House Report No. 94-1476, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess., p. 66. Congress therefore codified § 107 in 
a form that does not set forth categorical defenses, such as 
for example those found in the provisions of the Robinson-
Patman Act. Rather, it identifies factors that enable the 
Court to apply a "rule of reason" analysis to particular claims 
of infringement. 19 It is that sort of analysis-rather than any 
belief that an infringing act has been neutralized by an affir-
play of a work by the public reception of the transmission on a single re-
ceiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes, unless-
(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or 
(B) the transmission thus received is further transmitted to the public;" 
And § 111(a) provides, in part: 
"The secondary transmission of a primary transmission embodying a per-
formance or display of a work is not an infringement of copyright if-
(1) the secondary transmission is not made by a cable system, and con-
sists entirely of the relaying, by the management of a hotel, apartment 
house, or similar establishment, of signals transmitted by a broadcast sta-
tion licensed by the Federal Communications Commission, within the local 
service area of such station, to the private lodgings of guests or residents 
of such establishment, and no direct charge is made to see or hear the sec-
ondary transmission;" 
17 u. s. c. § 111. 
18 Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075. 
19 The essence of the section is captured in these comments from the 
House Report on the fair use section: 
"Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doc-
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mative defense-that would defeat a suggestion that singing 
a copyrighted song in the shower is an infringing use. 
The f~buttresses the historic understand-
ing that jt i~ecourts' role to ush the copyr1g mo op-
oly toftSlogi~ai e~eme. In de ·ng the coverage o the 
1976 ct, Congressnas asked the courts to continue to exer-
cise judgment, restraint, and common sense. 
III 
It would be most surprising if the 1976 Congress would (2;.J. ~. ~ 
have considered it reasonable to prohibit the purely private v-~ 
home use of a video tape recorder. Three powerful consider-~
ations support this conclusion. 
First is the fact that the allegedly unlawful activity takes 
trine over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever 
emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no gen-
erally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question 
must be decided on its own facts .... 
"The Committee has amended the first of the criteria to be considered-
the purpose and character of the use' -to state explicitly that this factor 
includes a consideration of 'whether such use is of a commercial nature or is 
for non-profit educational purposes.' This amendment is not intended to 
be interpreted as any sort of not-for-profit limitation on educational uses of 
copyrighted works. It is an express recognition that, as under the present 
law, the commercial or non-profit character of an activity, while not conclu-
sive with respect to fair use, can and should be weighed along with other 
factors in fair use decisions .... 
General intention behind the provision 
"The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers some guid-
ance to users in determining when the principles of the doctrine apply. 
However, the endless variety of situations and combinations of circum-
stances that can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact 
rules in the statute. The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of 
the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the 
doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological 
change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and 
some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the 
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis." House Report 
No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 65--{i6. 
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place entirely within the privacy of the home. It would 
plainly be unconstitutional toprohibit a person from singing a 
copyrighted song in the shower or jotting down a copyrighted 
poem he hears over the radio. Special constitutional values 
are implicated whenever the government seeks to regulate 
such an activity. 20 Those values would surely be weighed 
carefully by Congress before adopting a statute that so intru-
sively regulates noncommercial conduct within the home. 
This con~cy is magnified by the nature of the 
activity at issue in this case. A television program is 
beamed into the living rooms of millions of viewers at no 
charge; the alleged infringer uses a timer and a Betamax sim-
ply to watch it at a more convenient time. It is unlikely that 
the average citizen-or the average Representative-would 
see any moral or economic distinction between watching the 
program "live" and watching it later with the assistance of a 
new technology. Surely the citizen should be entitled to 
more notice than this statute has provided before such a dis-
tinction is made the basis for a judicial determination that he 
has trampled on the federally protected rights of the owner of 
the copyri , 1 vi ted him to view the program freely. 21 
My s ond conce relates to the most common response to -----=-----
20 "Whate ay be the justifications for other statutes regulating ob-
scenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own home. If 
the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no busi-
ness telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read 
or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at 
the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds." 
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 565-566 (1969). 
21 My interpretation of the statute does not draw any distinction between 
making a single copy in the home for private noncommercial "time-shifting" 
purposes and making such a copy for "librarying" purposes. No such dis-
tinction was drawn in the legislative history of the 1971 Amendments, or in 
the language or history of the 1976 Act. Concededly, rampant librarying 
for home reviewing might have more effect on some broadcasters' ability to 
exploit their product commercially than simple time-shifting. Yet nothing 
in the record before us demonstrates that such librarying is more likely to 
occur in the television context than in the audiotape context, or that it is 
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the first-the admission that, of course, no one, wo!;!ld eyer 
pro§.ecute .lh_e i!.!,hijn1il~ng a single .c..opy a( home. See 
n. 3, supra:-=Tl:\is respon.§.e TmPiies that Congress intended 
to prohibit certain c u t, eXpecl~tion 
wou not e e orced a ain t tlie prima iol tor' a ll for the 
purpose of al o n lawsuits against any cor orati_g.n that 
supp 1es e technologtca means for IS conduct. We 
should no£ hgh£rystr'etch an ambiguous statute on the as-
sumption that Congress intended to make behavior that is 
engaged in by millions of citizens into a violation of federal 
law, all the while intending the violation to go unpunished. 
Such laws have an enormous potential to breed disrespect for 
fundamental societal institutions. Congress should not be as-
sumed to create them on the sly. 
It is significant that the Act does not purport to create 
"safe" violations. It plainly provides that every act of in-
fringement-even if performed in complete good faith-gives 
rise to a minimum statutory liability of $100. 22 That com-
mand cannot simply be transformed into a matter of indiffer-
ence because the copyright owners do not intend to collect 
the heavy tribute that is their due. 
The problem of remedying the supposed violation by the 
primary infringer leads directly to my third concern: the 
problem of remedying the supposed contributory infringe-
ment. As I have noted, the respondents do not seek a dec-
presently having any effect on broadcaster revenues. Of course, if wide-
spread economic damage is shown likely, Congress may well conclude that 
some sort of response, such as a tape tax, is necessary. I would be aston-
ished, however, if that corrective action took the form of a pronouncement 
that noncommercial librarying for personal use in the home is an infringe-
ment of copyright. 
22 Section 504(c)(2) provides, in part: 
"In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the 
court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe 
that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in 
its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not 
less than $100." 
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laration that home taping violates the law for the purpose of 
collecting $100 from the home taper. Rather, they seek such 
a declaration in order to obtain relief from petitioner, an al-
leged contributory infringer. Even if we assume, as there-
spondents suggest, that a finding that home use violates the 
copyright law gives rise to remedies against the petitioner, 
one surely must wonder about what those remedies are. 
In their complaint, respondents pray for an injunction 
against the further manufacture or sale of video cassette re-
corders. They do so despite the fact that they have suffered 
no tangible harm. 23 They claim the injunction is required by 
the potential future impact of this innovation. Surely that 
impact can be more precisely gauged by legislators than by 
this Court, on this record. 
Not surprisingly, neither scholars nor the Court of Appeals 
take the prayer for an injunction against manufacture and 
sale very seriously. Instead, it is widely suggested that a 
trial court, exercising equitable powers, can establish a "com-
pulsory licensing" system. The details of such a system are 
never spelled out clearly. It would, of necessity, require 
every manufacturer of videocassette recorders and every 
manufacturer of videocassettes to be joined as defendants in 
a single lawsuit and assessed some arbitrary tax on their 
28 "Plaintiffs admitted that at the time of trial, no existing contract, li-
cense or advantageous business relationship of either Universal or Disney 
had been injured, interfered with or disrupted by the sale or use of Beta-
max and Betamax tapes or by any other activity of any defendant. This 
includes without limitation plaintiffs' theatrical, television, 8 or 16 mm, and 
video-disc products. 
"In addition, plaintiffs conceded that neither the sale nor the use of 
Betamax and Betamax tapes had by the time of trial caused Universal or 
Disney any measurable monetary damage, economic loss or revenue loss. 
1978 was a very successful year for both Universal and Disney. It was 
Disney's eleventh consecutive year of increased profit and the most profit-
able year in history for Universal Pictures' Theatrical Division. 
Universal's television revenues had increased steadily over the three years 
prior to trial and Disney received its highest television income in 1978." 
Opinion of District Court, Pet. for Cert. 50. 
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sales. The proceeds of the "equitable excise tax" would then 
have to be allocated by the court-equitably, to be sure-
among the untold numbers of copyright holders who license 
works for broadcast over the public airwaves. Each would 
join as a co-plaintiff. Nielsen would be appointed as a special 
master. 
There should be a strong presumption against the judicial 
creation of elaborate remedial structures that supplement 
specific remedies established by Congress. Indeed, in two 
recent unanimous opinions we effectively endorsed such a 
presumption. In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport 
Workers Union of America, 451 U. S. 77 (1981), we stated: 
"In almost any statutory scheme, there may be a need 
for judicial interpretation of ambiguous or incomplete 
prov1s1ons. But the authority to construe a statute is 
fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a 
new rule or to provide a new remedy which Congres has 
decided not to adopt." Id ., at 97. 
And in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 
451 U. S. 630 (1981), we concluded: 
"The policy questions presented by petitioner's 
claimed right ... are far-reaching. In declining to pro-
vide [that] right ... , we neither reject the validity of 
those arguments nor adopt the views of those oppos-
ing. . . . Rather, we recognize that, regardless of the 
merits of the conflicting arguments, this is a matter for 
Congress, not the courts, to resolve. 
"The range of factors to be weighed in deciding 
whether a right to contribution should exist demon-
strates the inappropriateness of judicial resolution of this 
complex issue. Ascertaining what is 'fair' in this setting 
calls for inquiry into the entire spectrum of antitrust 
law, not simply the elements of a particular case or cate-
gory of cases. ~' Id., at 647. 
We concluded that case with a quotation from Diamond v. 
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Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 317 (1980): 
"The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high pol-
icy for resolution within the legislative process after the 
kind of investigation, examination, and study that legis-
lative bodies can provide and courts cannot. That proc-
ess involves the balancing of competing values and inter-
ests, which in our democratic system is the business of 
elected representatives. Whatever their validity, the 
contentions now pressed on us should be addressed to 
the political branches of the Government, the Congress 
and the Executive, and not to the courts." 
IV 
It must be emphasized how narrow the issue presented in 
this case is. The individual defendant, William Griffiths, did 
not sell his tapes to other people. He did not rent them out 
to other people. He did not trade them with other people. 
He did not lend them to other people. He did not make 
copies of them. He did not play them publicly. All he did 
was record, in his home, programs that were broadcast to the 
public at large. 
Respondents argue that an abstract theoretician's view of 
the copyright monopoly allows them to control the way Wil-
liam Griffiths watches television. In the name of that 
abstract vision, they ask the federal courts to establish a bu-
reaucracy more complex than anything Congress has estab-
lished in the field of copyright to date, in order that they may 
levy an excise tax on a burgeoning new industry. 
The issue posed by this innovative new technology is simi-
lar to the question that was presented by the development of 
player pianos, sophisticated copying machines, cable televi-
sion systems and audio tape recorders. In each of those situ-
ations Congress, rather than the Court, has made the policy 
decisions that are required to accommodate the competing in-
terests of all parties. A similar course should be followed 
. · 
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here. The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be 
reversed . 
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JuSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioners manufacture and sell home video tape record-
ers. Repondents own the copyrights on some of the televi-
sion programs that are broadcast on the public airwaves. 
Some members of the general public use video tape recorders 
sold by petitioners to record some of these broadcasts, as 
well as a large number of other broadcasts. The question 
presented is whether the sale of petitioners' copying equip-
ment to the general public violates any of the rights con-
ferred upon respondents by the Copyright Act. 
Respondents commenced this copyright infringment action 
against petitioners in the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California in 1976. Respondents alleged 
that some individuals had used Betamax video tape recorders 
(VTR's) to record some of respondents' copyrighted works 
which had been exhibited on commercially sponsored televi-
sion and contended that these individuals had thereby 
infringed respondents' copyrights. Respondents further 
maintained that petitioners were liable for the copyright 
infringment allegedly committed by Betamax consumers be-
cause of petitioners' marketing of the Betamax VTR's. 1 Re-
'The respondents also asserted causes of action under state law and 
§ 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 441, 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a). 
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spondents sought no relief against any Betamax consumer. 
Instead, they sought money damages and an equitable ac-
counting of profits from petitioners, as well as an injunction 
against the manufacture and marketing of Betamax VTR's. 
After a lengthy trial, the District Court denied respond-
ents all the relief they sought and entered judgment for peti-
tioners. 480 F. Supp. 429 (1979). The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's 
judgment on respondent's copyright claim, holding petition-
ers liable for contributory infringment and ordering the Dis-
trict Court to fashion appropriate relief. 659 F. 2d 963 
(1981). We granted certiorari, 457 U. S. 1116 (1982); since 
we had not completed our study of the case last Term, we or-
dered reargument,-- U. S. -- (1983). We now reverse. 
An explanation of our rejection of respondents' unprece-
dented attempt to impose copyright liability upon the distrib-
utors of copying equipment requires a quite detailed recita-
tion of the findings of the District Court. In summary, those 
findings reveal that the average member of the public uses a 
VTR principally to record a program he cannot view as it is 
being televised and then to watch it once at a later time. 
This practice, known as "time-shifting," enlarges the televi-
sion viewing audience. For that reason, a significant 
amount of television programming may be used in this man-
ner without objection from the owners of the copyrights on 
the programs. For the same reason, even the two respond-
ents in this case, who do assert objections to time-shifting in 
this litigation, were unable to prove that the practice has im-
paired the commercial value of their copyrights or has cre-
ated any likelihood of future harm. Given these findings, 
there is no basis in the Copyright Act upon which respond-
ents can hold petitioners liable for distributing VTR's to the 
general public. The Court of Appeals' holding that respond-
ents are entitled to enjoin the distribution of VTR's, to collect 
These claims are not before this Court. 
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royalties on the sale of such equipment, or to obtain other re-
lief, if affirmed, would enlarge the scope of respondents' stat-
utory monopolies to encompass control over an article of com-
merce that is not the subject of copyright protection. Such 
an expansion of the copyright privilege is beyond the limits of 
the grants authorized by Congress. 
I 
The two respondents in this action, Universal Studios, Inc. 
and Walt Disney Productions, produce and hold the copy-
rights on a substantial number of motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works. In the current marketplace, they can 
exploit their rights in these works in a number of ways: by 
authorizing theatrical exhibitions, by licensing limited 
showings on cable and network television, by selling syndica-
tion rights for repeated airings on local television stations, 
and marketing programs on prerecorded videotapes or video-
discs. Some works are suitable for exploitation through all 
of these avenues, while the market for other works is more 
limited. 
Petitioner Sony manufactures millions of Betamax video 
tape recorders and markets these devices through numerous 
retail establishments, some of which are also petitioners in 
this action. 2 Sony's Betamax VTR is a mechanism consist-
ing of three basic components: (1) a tuner, which receives 
electromagnetic signals transmitted over the television band 
of the public airwaves and separates them into audio and vi-
sual signals; (2) a recorder, which records such signals on a 
2 The four retailers are Carter, Hawley, Hales, Stores, Inc.; Associated 
Dry Goods Corp.; Federated Department Stores, Inc.; and Henry's Cam-
era Corp. The principal defendants are Sony Corporation, the manufac-
turer of the equipment, and its wholly owned subsidiary, Sony Corporation 
of America. The advertising agency of Doyle, Dane, Burnbock, Inc., also 
involved in marketing the Betamax, is also a petitioner. An individual 
VTR user, Willis Griffiths, was named as a defendant in the District Court, 
but respondent sought no relief against him. Griffiths is not a petitioner. 
For convenience, we shall refer to petitioners collectively as Sony. 
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magnetic tape; and (3) an adapter, which converts the audio 
and visual signals on the tape into a composite signal that can 
be received by a television set. 
Several capabilities of the machine are noteworthy. The 
separate tuner in the Betamax enables it to record a broad-
cast off one station while the television set is tuned to another 
channel, permitting the viewer, for example, to watch two 
simultaneous news broadcasts by watching one "live" and re-
cording the other for later viewing. Tapes may be reused, 
and programs that have been recorded may be erased either 
before or after viewing. A timer in the Betamax can be used 
to activate and deactivate the equipment at predetermined 
times, enabling an intended viewer to record programs that 
are transmitted when he or she is not at home. Thus a per-
son may watch a program at home in the evening even 
though it was broadcast while the viewer was at work during 
the afternoon. The Betamax is also equipped with a pause 
button and a fast-forward control. The pause button, when 
depressed, deactivates the recorder until it is released, thus 
enabling a viewer to omit a commercial advertisement from 
the recording, provided, of course, that the viewer is present 
when the program is recorded. The fast forward control en-
ables the viewer of a previously recorded program to run the 
tape rapidly when a segment he or she does not desire to see 
is being played back on the television screen. 
The respondents and Sony both conducted surveys of the 
way the Betamax machine was used by several hundred own-
ers during a sample period in 1978. Although there were 
some differences in the surveys, they both showed that the 
primary use of the machine for most owners was "time-shift-
ing,"-the practice of recording a program to view it once at 
a later time, and thereafter erasing it. Time-shifting en-
ables viewers to see programs they otherwise would miss be-
cause they are not at home, are occupied with other tasks, or 
are viewing a program on another station at the time of a 
broadcast that they desire to watch. Both surveys also 
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showed, however, that a substantial number of interviewees 
had accumulated libraries of tapes. 3 Sony's survey indi-
cated that over 80% of the interviewees watched at least as 
much regular television as they had before owning a 
Betamax. 4 Respondents offered no evidence of decreased 
television viewing by Betamax owners. 5 
3 As evidence of how a VTR may be used, respondents offered the testi-
mony of William Griffiths. Griffiths, although named as an individual de-
fendant, was a client of plaintiffs' law firm. The District Court summa-
rized his testimony as follows: 
"He owns approximately 100 tapes. When Griffiths bought his Betamax, 
he intended not only to time-shift (record, play-back and then erase) but 
also to build a library of cassettes. Maintaining a library, however, 
proved too expensive, and he is now erasing some earlier tapes and reusing 
them. 
"Griffiths copied about 20 minutes of a Universal motion picture called 
'Never Give An Inch,' and two episodes from Universal television series 
entitled 'Baa Baa Black Sheep' and 'Holmes and Yo Yo.' He would have 
erased each of these but for the request of plaintiffs' counsel that it be kept. 
Griffiths also testified that he had copied but already erased Universal 
films called 'Alpha Caper' (erased before anyone saw it) and 'Amelia Ear-
hart.' At the time of his deposition Griffiths did not intend to keep any 
Universal film in his library. 
"Griffiths has also recorded documentaries, news broadcasts, sporting 
events and political programs such as a rerun of the Nixon/Kennedy de-
bate.'' 480 F. Supp., at 436--437. 
Four other witnesses testified to having engaged in similar activity. 
• The District Court summarized some of the findings in these surveys as 
follows: 
"According to plaintiffs' survey, 75.4% of the VTR owners use their ma-
chines to record for time-shifting purposes half or most of the time. De-
fendants' survey showed that 96% of the Betamax owners had used the ma-
chine to record programs they otherwise would have missed. 
"When plaintiffs asked interviewees how many cassettes were in their li-
brary, 55.8% said there were 10 or fewer. In defendants' survey, of the 
total programs viewed by interviewees in the past month, 70.4% had been 
viewed only that one time and for 57.9%, there were no plans for further 
viewing.'' 480 F. Supp., at 438. 
5 "81.9% of the defendants' interviewees watched the same amount or 
more of regular television as they did before owning a Betamax. 83.2% 
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Sony introduced considerable evidence describing televi-
sion programs that could be copied without objection from 
any copyright holder, with special emphasis on sports, reli-
gious, and educational programming. For example, their 
survey indicated that 7.3% of all Betamax use is to record 
sports events, and representatives of professional baseball, 
football, basketball, and hockey testified that they had no ob-
jection to the recording of their televised events for home 
use. 6 
Respondents offered opinion evidence concerning the fu-
ture impact of the unrestricted sale of VTR's on the commer-
cial value of their copyrights. The District Court found, 
however, that they had failed to prove any likelihood of fu-
ture harm from the use of VTR's for time-shifting. Id., at 
469. 
The District Court's Decision 
The lengthy trial of the case in the District Court con-
cerned the private, home use of VTR's for recording pro-
grams broadcast on the public airwaves without charge to the 
viewer. 7 No issue concerning the transfer of tapes to other 
persons, the use of home-recorded tapes for public perform-
ances, or the copying of programs transmitted on pay or ca-
ble television systems was raised. See 480 F. Supp. 429, 
432-433, 442 (1979). 
The District Court concluded that noncommercial home use 
recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves was 
a fair use of copyrighted works and did not constitute copy-
reported their frequency of movie going was unaffected by Betamax." 480 
F. Supp., at 439. 
• See Def. Exh. OT, Table 20; Tr. 2447-2450, 2480, 248&-2487, 2515-
2516, 2530-2534. 
7 The trial also briefly touched upon demonstrations of the Betamax by 
the retailer petitioners which were alleged to be infringments by respond-
ents. The District Court held against respondents on this claim, 480 F . 
Supp., at 45&-457, the Court of Appeals affirmed this holding, 659 F . 2d, at 
976, and respondents did not cross-petition on this issue. 
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right infringement. It emphasized the fact that the material 
was broadcast free to the public at large, the noncommercial 
character of the use, and the private character of the activity 
conducted entirely within the home. Moreover, the court 
found that the purpose of this use served the public interest 
in increasing access to television programming, an interest 
that "is consistent with the First Amendment policy of pro-
viding the fullest possible access to information through the 
public airwaves. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 102." 480 F. 
Supp., at 454.8 Even when an entire copyrighted work was 
recorded, the District Court regarded the copying as fair use 
"because there is no accompanying reduction in the market 
for 'plaintiff's original work."' Ibid. 
As an independent ground of decision, the District Court 
also concluded that Sony could not be held liable as a con-
tributory infringer even if the home use of a VTR was consid-
ered an infringing use. The District Court noted that Sony 
had no direct involvement with any Betamax purchasers who 
recorded copyrighted works off the air. Sony's advertising 
was silent on the subject of possible copyright infringement, 
but its instruction booklet contained the following statement: 
"Television programs, films, videotapes and other ma-
terials may be copyrighted. Unauthorized recording of 
such material may be contrary to the provisions of the 
United States copyright laws." !d., at 436. 
The District Court assumed that Sony had constructive 
knowledge of the probability that the Betamax machine 
would be used to record copyrighted programs, but found 
that Sony merely sold a "product capable of a variety of 
8 The court also found that this "access is not just a matter of conve-
nience, as plaintiffs have suggested. Access has been limited not simply 
by inconvenience but by the basic need to work. Access to the better pro-
gram has also been limited by the competitive practice of counterprogram-
ming." 480 F. Supp., at 454. 
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uses, some of them allegedly infringing." I d., at 461. It 
reasoned: 
"Selling a staple article of commerce e. g., a type-
writer, a recorder, a camera, a photocopying machine 
technically contributes to any infringing use subse-
quently made thereof, but this kind of 'contribution,' if 
deemed sufficient as a basis for liability, would expand 
the theory beyond precedent and arguably beyond judi-
cial management. 
"Commerce would indeed be hampered if manufactur-
ers of staple items were held liable as contributory in-
fringers whenever they 'constructively' knew that some 
purchasers on some occasions would use their product 
for a purpose which a court later deemed, as a matter of 
first impression, to be an infringement." Ibid. 
Finally, the District Court discussed the respondents' 
prayer for injunctive relief, noting that they had asked for an 
injunction either preventing the future sale of Betamax ma-
chines, or requiring that the machines be rendered incapable 
of recording copyrighted works off the air. The court stated 
that it had "found no case in which the manufacturers, dis-
tributors, retailers, and advertisors of the instrument en-
abling the infringement were sued by the copyright holders," 
and that the request for relief in this case "is unique." 480 
F. Supp., at 465. 
It concluded that an injunction was wholly inappropriate 
because any possible harm to respondents was outweighed by 
the fact that "the Betamax could still legally be used to 
record noncopyrighted material or material whose owners 
consented to the copying. An injunction would deprive the 
public of the ability to use the Betamax for this noninfringing 
off-the-air recording." 480 F. Supp., at 468. 
The Court of Appeals' Decision 
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's judg-
ment on respondents' copyright claim. It did not set aside 
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any of the District Court's findings of fact. Rather, it con-
cluded as a matter of law that the home use of a VTR was not 
a fair use because it was not a "productive use." 9 It there-
fore held that it was unnecessary for plaintiffs to prove any 
harm to the potential market for the copyrighted works, but 
then observed that it seemed clear that the cumulative effect 
of mass reproduction made possible by VTR's would tend to 
diminish the potential market for respondents' works. 659 
F. 2d, at 974. 
On the issue of contributory infringement, the Court of Ap-
peals first rejected the analogy to staple articles of commerce 
such as tape recorders or photocopying machines. It noted 
that such machines "may have substantial benefit for some 
purposes" and do not "even remotely raise· copyright prob-
lems." Id., at 975. VTR's, however, are sold "for the pri-
mary purpose of reproducing television programming" and 
"virtually all" such programming is copyrighted material. 
Ibid. The Court of Appeals concluded, therefore, that 
VTR's were not suitable for any substantial noninfringing use 
even if some copyright owners elect not to enforce their 
rights. 
The Court of Appeals also rejected the District Court's re-
liance on Sony's lack of knowledge that home use constituted 
infringement. Assuming that the statutory provisions defin-
ing the remedies for infringement applied also to the non-
statutory tort of contributory infringement, the court stated 
that a defendant's good faith would merely reduce his dam-
ages liability but would not excuse the infringing conduct. 
It held that Sony was chargeable with knowledge of the 
homeowner's infringing activity because the reproduction of 
copyrighted materials was either "the most conspicuous use" 
or "the major use" of the Betamax product. Ibid. 
9 "Without a 'productive use', i. e. when copyrighted material is repro-
duced for its intrinsic use, the mass copying of the sort involved in this case 
precludes an application of fair use." 659 F. 2d, at 971-972. 
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On the matter of relief, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that "statutory damages may be appropriate," that the Dis-
trict Court should reconsider its determination that an in-
junction would not be an appropriate remedy; and, referring 
to "the analogous photocopying area," suggested that a con-
tinuing royalty pursuant to a judicially created compulsory li-
cense may very well be an acceptable resolution of the relief 
issue. 659 F. 2d, at 976. 
II 
Article I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that: 
"The Congress shall have Power . . . to Promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are 
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special 
private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by 
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is 
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and in-
ventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the 
public access to the products of their genius after the limited 
period of exclusive control has expired. 
"The copyright law, like the patent statute, makes re-
ward to the owner a secondary consideration. In Fox 
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127, Chief Justice 
Hughes spoke as follows respecting the copyright mo-
nopoly granted by Congress, 'The sole interest of the 
United States and the primary object in conferriqg the 
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the pub-
lic from the labors of authors.' It is said that reward to 
the author or artist serves to induce release to the public 
of the products of his creative genius." United States v. 
Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 158. 
As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress 
that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the 
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limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to in-
ventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their 
work product. Because this task involves a difficult balance 
between the interests of authors and inventors in the control 
and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one 
hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of 
ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand, our pat-
ent and copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly. 10 
From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in 
response to significant changes in technology. 11 Indeed, it 
10 In its report accompanying the comprehensive revision of the Copy-
right Act in 1909, the Judiciary Committee of the House of Represent-
atives explained this balance: 
"The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of 
the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in 
his writings, ... but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be 
served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing 
to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings. 
"In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider ... two questions: 
First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit 
the public, and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be detri-
mental to the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under the 
proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that out-
weighs the evils of the temporary monopoly." H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909). 
11 Thus, for example, the development and marketing of player pianos 
and perforated roles of music, see White Smith Music Publishing Co. v. 
Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (1908), preceded the enactment of the Copyright 
Act of 1909; innovations in copying techniques gave rise to the statutory 
exemption for library copying embodied in § 108 of the 1976 revision of the 
Copyright law; the development of the technology that made it possible to 
retransmit television programs by cable or by microwave systems, see 
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390 (1968), and Telepromp-
ter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U. S. 394 (1974) , prompted the enactment of the 
complex provisions set forth in 17 U. S. C. § 111 (d)(2)(B) and § 111(d)(5) 
after years of detailed congressional study, see Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. 
Doubleday Sports, Inc ., 691 F. 2d 125, 129 (CA2 1982). 
By enacting the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, 85 Stat. 391, 
Congress also provided the solution to the "record piracy" problems that 
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was the invention of a new form of copying equipment-the 
printing press-that gave rise to the original need for copy-
right protection. 12 Repeatedly, as new developments have 
occurred in this country, it has been the Congress that has 
fashioned the new rules that new technology made necessary. 
Thus, long before the enactment of the Copyright Act of 
1909, 35 Stat. 1075, it was settled that the protection given to 
copyrights is wholly statutory. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U. S. 
(8 Peters) 591, 661-662 (1834). The remedies for infringe-
ment "are only those prescribed by Congress." Thompson 
v. Hubbard, 131 U. S. 123, 151 (1889). 
The judiciary's reluctance to expand the protections af-
forded by the copyright without explicit legislative guidance 
is a recurring theme. See, e. g., Teleprompter Corp. v. 
CBS, 415 U. S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Art-
ists, 392 U. S. 390 (1968); Williams and Wilkins v. United 
States, 487 F. 2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affirmed by an equally 
divided court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975); White-Smith Music Pub-
lishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (1908). Sound policy, 
as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Con-
gress when major technological innovations alter the market 
for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional 
had been created by the development of the audio tape recorder. Sony 
argues that the legislative history of that Act, see especially H. Rep. No. 
487, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 7, indicates that Congress did not intend to 
prohibit the private home use of either audio or video tape recording equip-
ment. In view of our disposition of the contributory infringement issue, 
we express no opinion on that question. 
12 "Copyright protection became necessary with the invention of the 
printing press and had its early beginnings in the British censorship laws. 
The fortunes of the law of copyright have always been closely connected 
with freedom of expression, on the one hand, and with technological im-
provements in means of dissemination, on the other. Successive ages 
have drawn different balances among the interest of the writer in the con-
trol and exploitation of his intellectual property, the related interest of the 
publisher, and the competing interest of society in the untrammeled dis-
semination of ideas." Foreword to B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of 
Copyright vii-viii (1967). 
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authority and the institutional ability to accomodate fully the 
varied permutations of competing interests that are inev-
itably implicated by such new technology. 
In a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly 
marked our course, we must be circumspect in construing the 
scope of rights created by a legislative enactment which 
never contemplated such a calculus of interests. In doing so, 
we are guided by Justice Stewart's exposition of the correct 
approach to ambiguities in the law of copyright: 
"The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory 
monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required 
by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing 
claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be 
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must 
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public 
availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The 
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair 
return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate 
aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity 
for the general public good. 'The sole interest of the 
United States and the primary object in conferring the 
monopoly,' this Court has said, 'lie in the general bene-
fits derived by the public from the labors of authors.' 
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127. See Ken-
dall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 327-328; Grant v. Ray-
mond, 6 Pet. 218, 241-242. When technological change 
has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright 
Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose." 
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 
156 (footnotes omitted). 
Copyright protection "subsists . . . in original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 
U. S. C. § 102(a). This protection has never accorded the 
copyright owner complete control over all possible uses of his 
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work. 13 Rather, the Copyright Act grants the copyright 
holder "exclusive" rights to use and to authorize the use of his 
work in five qualified ways, including reproduction of the 
copyrighted work in copies. . I d., § 106. 14 All reproductions 
of the work, however, are not within the exclusive domain of 
the copyright owner; some are in the public domain. Any in-
dividual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a "fair use;" 
the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right to 
such a use. Compare id., § 106 with id., § 107. 
'
3 See, e. g., White Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 
1, 19 (1908); cf. Deep South Packing Co. v. Lathram Corp., 406 U. S. 518, 
530-531 (1972). While the law has never recognized an author's right to 
absolute control of his work, the natural tendency of legal rights to express 
themselves in absolute terms to the exclusion of all else is particularly pro-
nounced in the history of the constitutionally sanctioned monopolies of the 
copyright and the patent. See e. g., United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, 334 U. S. 131, 156-158 (1948) (copyright owners claiming right to tie 
license of one film to license of another under copyright law); Fox Film 
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 106 (1932) (copyright owner claiming copyright 
renders it immune from state taxation of copyright royalties); Hobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 349-351 (1908) (copyright owner 
claiming that a right to fix resale price of his works within the scope of his 
copyright); International Business Machines v. United States, 298 U. S. 
131 (1936) (patentees claiming right to tie sale of unpatented article to lease 
of patented device). 
14 Section 106 of the Act provides: 
" 'Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this 
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to 
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform 
the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi-
vidual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the 
copyrighted work publicly." 
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"Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the 
copyright owner," that is, anyone who trespasses into his ex-
clusive domain by using or authorizing the use of the copy-
righted work in one of the five ways set forth in the statute, 
"is an infringer of the copyright." I d., § 501(a). Con-
versely, anyone who is authorized by the copyright owner to 
use the copyrighted work in a way specified in the statute or 
who makes a fair use of the work is not an infringer of the 
copyright with respect to such use. 
The Copyright Act provides the owner of a copyright with 
a potent arsenal of remedies against an infringer of his 
work, including an injunction to restrain the infringer from 
violating his rights, the impoundment and destruction of all 
reproductions of his work made in violation of his rights, a 
recovery of his actual damages and any additional profits re-
alized by the infringer or a recovery of statutory damages, 
and attorneys fees. I d., §§ 502-505. 15 
The two respondents in this case do not seek relief against 
the Betamax users who have allegedly infringed their copy-
rights. Moreover, this is not a class action on behalf of all 
copyright owners who license their works for television 
broadcast, and respondents have no right to invoke whatever 
rights other copyright holders may have to bring infringe-
ment actions based on Betamax copying of their works. 16 As 
16 Moreover, anyone who willfully infringes the copyright to reproduce a 
motion picture for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial 
gain is subject to criminal penalties of one year imprisonment and a $25,000 
fine for the first offense and two years imprisonment and a $50,000 fine for 
each subsequent offense, 17 U. S. C. § 506(a), and the fruits and instru-
mentalities of the crime are forfeited upon conviction, id., § 506(b). 
16 In this regard, we reject respondent's attempt to cast this action as 
comparable to a class action because of the positions taken by amici with 
copyright interests and their attempt to treat the statements made by 
amici as evidence in this case. See Brief for Respondent, at 1, and n. 1, 6, 
52, 53 and n. 116. The stated desires of amici concerning the outcome of 
this or any litigation are no substitute for a class action, are not evidence in 
the case, and do not influence our decision; we examine an amicus curiae 
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was made clear by their own evidence, the copying of the re-
spondents' programs represents a small portion of the total 
use ofVTR's. It is, however, the taping of respondents own 
copyrighted programs that provides them with standing to 
charge Sony with contributory infringement. To prevail, 
they have the burden of proving that users of the Betamax 
have infringed their copyrights and that Sony should be held 
responsible for that infringement. 
III 
'The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable 
for infringment committed by another. In contrast, the Pat-
ent Act expressly brands anyone who "actively induces 
infringment of a patent" as an infringer, 35 U. S. C. § 271(b), 
and further imposes liability on certain individuals labeled 
"contributory" infringers, id., §271(c). The absence of such 
express language in the copyright statute does not preclude 
the imposition of liability for copyright infringments on cer-
tain parties who have not themselves engaged in the infring-
ing activity. 17 For vicarious liability is imposed in virtually 
brief solely for whatever aid it provides in analyzing the legal questions be-
fore us. 
17 As the District Court correctly observed, however, "the lines between 
direct infringement, contributory infringment, and vicarious liability are 
not clearly drawn .... " 480 F. Supp. 457-458. The lack of clarity in this 
area may, in part, be attributable to the fact that an infringer is not merely 
one who uses a work without authorization by the copyright owner, but 
also one who authorizes the use of a copyrighted work without actual au-
thority from the copyright owner. 
We note the parties' statements that the questions of petitioners' liabil-
ity under the "doctrines" of "direct infringement" and "vicarious liability'' 
are not nominally before this Court. Compare Respondents' Brief, at 9, n. 
22, 41, n. 90 with Petitioners' Reply Brief, at 1, n. 2. We also observe, 
however, that reasoned analysis of respondents' unprecedented contribu-
tory infringement claim necessarily entails consideration of arguments and 
caselaw which may also be forwarded under the other labels, and indeed 
the parties to a large extent rely upon such arguments and authority in 
support of their respective positions on the issue of contributory 
infringement. 
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all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringe-
ment is merely a species of the broader problem of identify-
ing the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual 
accountable for the actions of another. 
Such circumstances were plainly present in Kalem Co. v. 
Harper Brothers, 222 U. S. 55 (1911), the copyright decision 
of this Court on which respondents place their principal reli-
ance. In Kalem, the Court held that the producer of an un-
authorized film dramatization of the copyrighted book Ben 
Hur was liable for his sale of the motion picture to jobbers, 
who in turn arranged for the commercial exhibition of the 
film. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, explained: 
"The defendant not only expected but invoked by ad-
vertisement the use of its films for dramatic reproduc-
tion of the story. That was the most conspicuous pur-
pose for which they could be used, and the one for which 
especially they were made. If the defendant did not 
contribute to the infringement it is impossible to do so 
except by taking part in the final act. It is liable on 
principles recognized in every part of the law." 222 
U.S., at 63. 
The use for which the item sold in Kalem had been "espe-
cially" made was, of course, to display the performance that 
had already been recorded upon it. The producer had per-
sonally appropriated the copyright owner's protected work 
and, as the owner of the tangible medium of expression upon 
which the protected work was recorded, authorized that use 
by his sale of the film to jobbers. But that use of the film 
was not his to authorize: the copyright owner possessed the 
exclusive right to authorize public performances of his work. 
Further, the producer personally advertised the unau-
thorized public performances, dispelling any possible doubt 
as to the use of the film which he had authorized. 
Respondents argue that Kalem stands for the proposition 
that supplying the "means" to accomplish an infringing activ-
ity and encouraging that activity through adverstisement are 
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sufficient to establish liability for copyright infringement. 
This argument rests on a gross generalization that cannot 
withstand scrutiny. The producer in Kalem did not merely 
provide the "means" to accomplish an infringing activity; the 
producer supplied the work itself, albeit in a new medium of 
expression. Petitioners in the instant case do not supply 
Betamax consumers with respondents' works; respondents 
do. Petitioners supply a piece of equipment that is generally 
capable of copying the entire range of programs that may be 
televised: those that are uncopyrighted, those that are copy-
righted but may be copied without objection from the copy-
right holder, and those that the copyright holder would pre-
fer not to have copied. The Betamax can be used to make 
authorized or unauthorized uses of copyrighted works, but 
the range of its potential use is much broader than the par-
ticular infringing use of the film Ben Hur involved in Kalem. 
Kalem does not support respondents' novel theory of 
liability. 
Justice Holmes stated that the producer had "contributed" 
to the infringement of the copyright, and the label "contribu-
tory infringement" has been applied in a number of lower 
court copyright cases involving an ongoing relationship be-
tween the direct infringer and the contributory infringer at 
the time the infringing conduct occured. In such cases, as in 
other situations in which the imposition of vicarious liablity is 
manifestly just, the "contributory" infringer was in a position 
to control the use of copyrighted works by others and had au-
thorized the use without permission from the copyright 
owner. 18 This case, however, plainly does not fall in that cat-
'
8 The so-called "dance hall cases," Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State 
Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Ass'n, 554 F. 2d 1213 (CAl 1977) 
(racetrack retained infringer to supply music to paying customers); KECA 
MUSIC, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F . Supp. 72 (W. D. Mo. 1977) 
(cocktail lounge hired musicians to supply music to paying customers); 
Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F. 2d 354 (CA7 
1929) (dance hall hired orchestra to supply music to paying customers) are 
often contrasted with the so-called landlord-tenant cases, in which land-
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egory. The only contact between Sony and the users of the 
Betamax that is disclosed by this record occurred at the mo-
ment of sale. The District Court expressly found that "no 
lords who leased premises to a direct infringer for a fixed rental and did not 
participate directly in any infringing activity were found not to be liable for 
contributory infringement. E . g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F. 2d 686 (CA2 
1938). 
In Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F. 2d 304 (CA2 
1963) the owner of twenty-three chain stores retained the direct infringer 
to run its record departments. The relationship was structured as a li-
censing arrangement, so that the defendant bore none of the business risk 
of running the department. Instead, it received 10% or 12% of the direct 
infringer's gross receipts. The Court of Appeals concluded: 
"[The dance-hall cases] and this one lie closer on the spectrum to the em-
ployer-employee model, than to the landlord-tenant model. On the par-
ticular facts before us, ... Green's relationship to its infringing licensee, as 
well as its strong concern for the financial success of the phonograph record 
concession, renders it liable for the unauthorized sales of the 'bootleg' 
records. 
"[T]he imposition of vicarious liability in the case before us cannot be 
deemed unduly harsh or unfair. Green has the power to police carefully 
the conduct of its concessionaire; our judgment will simply encourage it to 
do so, thus placing responsibility where it can and should be effectively ex-
ercised." I d., at 308 (emphasis in original). 
In Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc ., 
443 F . 2d 1159 (CA2 1971), the direct infringers retained the contributory 
infringer to manage their performances. The contributory infringer 
would contact each direct infringer, obtain the titles of the musical compo-
sitions to be performed, print the programs, and then sell the programs to 
its own local organizations for distribution at the time of the direct infringe-
ment. Id., at 1161. The Court of Appeals emphasized that the contribu-
tory infringer had actual knowledge that the artists it was managing were 
performing copyrighted works, was in a position to police the infringing 
conduct of the artists, and derived substantial benefit from the actions of 
the primary infringers. Id., at 1163. 
In Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-FiRecords , Inc., 256 F. 
Supp. 399 (S. D. N. Y. 1966), the direct infringer manufactured and sold 
bootleg records. In denying a motion for summary judgment, the District 
Court held that the infringer's advertising agency, the radio stations that 
advertised the infringer's works, and the service agency that boxed and 
mailed the infringing goods could all be held liable, if at trial it could be 
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employee of Sony, Sonam or DDBI had either direct involve-
ment with the allegedly infringing activity or direct contact 
with purchasers of Betamax who recorded copyrighted works 
off-the-air." 480 F. Supp., at 460. And it further found 
that "there was no evidence that any of the copies made by 
Griffiths or the other individual witnesses in this suit were 
influenced or encouraged by [Sony's] advertisements." 
lbid. 19 
If vicarious liability is to be imposed on petitioners in this 
case, it must rest on the fact that they have sold equipment 
with constructive knowledge of the fact that their customers 
may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copy-
righted material. There is no precedent in the law of copy-
right for the imposition of vicarious liability on such a theory. 
The closest analogy is provided by the patent law cases to 
which it is appropriate to refer because of the historic kinship 
between patent law and copyright law. 20 
demonstrated that they knew or should have known that they were dealing 
in illegal goods. 
19 The broad verbal formulae which have been used to describe ordinary 
claims of contributory infringement, see, e. g. , Gershwin Publishing Corp. 
v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159, 1162 (CA2 1971) 
("[O)ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or 
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held lia-
ble as a 'contributory' infringer."); see also, Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Ives Laboratories, Inc ., 456 U. S. 844, 851 (1982), cannot reasonably be ap-
plied literally in the context of respondents' unprecedented copyright 
claim. Manufacturers and distributors of numerous devices undoubtably 
have constructive knowledge that their products may be used by some of 
their customers to violate the rights of others. Such distributors would 
neatly fit the wording of these formulae, but imposing liability on them 
merely for marketing the devices that were misused by their customers 
would represent a radical extension of traditional notions of legal respon-
sibility. Indeed, the Court of Appeals recognized that the sale of "cam-
eras or photocopying machines" would "not even remotely raise copyright 
problems." 659 F . 2d, at 975. 
20 E. g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 158 (1948); 
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 106, 131 (1932); Wheaton and Donald-
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In the Patent Code both the concept of infringement and 
the concept of contributory infringement are expressly de-
fined by statute. 21 The prohibition against contributory in-
fringement is confined to the knowing sale of a component es-
pecially made for use in connection with a particular patent. 
There is no suggestion in the statute that one patentee may 
object to the sale of a product that might be used in connec-
tion with other patents. Moreover, the Act expressly pro-
vides that the sale of a "staple article or commodity of com-
merce suitable for substantial noninfringing use" is not 
contributory infringement. 
When a charge of contributory infringement is predicated 
entirely on the sale of an article of commerce that is used by 
the law, naturally, are not identical twins, and we exercise the caution 
which we have expressed in the past in applying doctrine formulated in one 
area to the other. See generally, Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 217-218 
(1954); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 345 (1908). 
21 35 U. S. C. § 271 provides: 
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without author-
ity makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States 
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. 
"(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as 
an infringer. 
"(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, 
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing 
a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing 
the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringe-
ment of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce 
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory 
infringer. 
"(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or 
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed 
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his hav-
ing done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which 
if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory 
infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform 
acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory 
infrigement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against 
infringement or contributory infringement." 
-
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the purchaser to infringe a patent, the public interest in ac-
cess to that article of commerce is necessarily implicated. A 
finding of contributory infringement does not, of course, re-
move the article from the market altogether; it does, how-
ever, give the patentee effective control over the sale of that 
item. Indeed, a finding of contributory infringement is nor-
mally the functional equivalent of holding that the disputed 
article is within the monopoly granted to the patentee. 22 
For that reason, in contributory infringement cases arising 
under the patent laws the Court has always recognized the 
critical importance of not allowing the patentee to extend his 
monopoly beyond the limits of his specific grant. These 
cases deny the patentee any right to control the distribution 
of unpatented articles unless they are "unsuited for any com-
mercial noninfringing use." Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm 
& Hass Co., 448 U. S. 176, 198 (1980). Unless a commodity 
"has no use except through practice of the patented method," 
ibid, the patentee has no right to claim that its distribution 
constitutes contributory infringment. "To form the basis for 
contributory infringement the item must almost be uniquely 
suited as a component of the patented invention." P. Rosen-
berg, Patent Law Fundamentals § 17.02[2] (1982). "[A] sale 
of an article which though adapted to an infringing use is also 
adapted to other and lawful uses, is not enough to make the 
seller a contributory infringer. Such a rule would block the 
wheels of commerce." Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1, 
48 (1912), overruled on other grounds, Motion Picture Pat-
22 It seems extraordinary to suggest that the Copyright Act confers upon 
all copyright owners collectively, much less the two respondents in this 
case, the exclusive right to distribute VTR's simply because they may be 
used to infringe copyrights. That, however, is the logical implication of 
their claim. The request for an injunction below indicates that respondents 
seek, in effect, to declare VTR's contraband. Their suggestion in this 
Court that a continuing royalty pursuant to a judicially created compulsory 
license would be an acceptable remedy merely indicates that respondents, 
for their part, would be willing to license their claimed monopoly interest in 
VTR's to petitioners in return for a royalty. 
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ents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 517 
(1917). 
Although there are substantial differences between the 
patent and copyright laws, there is no reason to grant the 
copyright holder any broader right to bar noninfringing activ-
ities than the patent holder. Indeed, the copyright holder 
should have a lesser right, for by precluding noninfringing 
uses he may not only block the wheels of commerce, but also 
might impose an unjustified tax on the free marketplace of 
ideas and interfere with the opportunities of other copyright 
holders to authorize exploitation of the devices for their own 
purposes. 
Under our cases, as well as the text of the Patent Code, 
the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of 
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if 
the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable 
purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses. 
IV 
The question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of 
commercially significant noninfringing uses. In order to re-
solve that question, we need not explore all the different po-
tential uses of the machine and determine whether or not 
they would constitute infringement. Rather, we need only 
consider whether on the basis of the facts as found by the dis-
trict court a significant number of them would be non-infring-
ing. Moreover, in order to resolve this case we need not 
give precise content to the question of how much use is com-
mercially significant. For one potential use of the Betamax 
plainly satisfies this standard, however it is understood: pri-
vate, noncommercial time-shifting in the home. It does so 
both (A) because respondents have no right to prevent other 
copyright holders from authorizing it for their programs, and 
(B) because the District Court's factual findings reveal that 
even the unauthorized home time-shifting of respondents' 
programs is legitimate fair use. 
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A. Authorized Time Shifting 
Each of the respondents owns a large inventory of valuable 
copyrights, but in the total spectrum of television program-
ming their combined market share is small. The exact per-
centage is not specified, but it is well below 10%.23 If they 
were to prevail, the outcome of this litigation would have a 
significant impact on both the producers and the viewers of 
the remaining 90% of the programming in the Nation. No 
doubt, many other producers share respondents' concern 
about the possible consequences of unrestricted copying. 
Nevertheless the findings of the District Court make it clear 
that time-shifting may enlarge the total viewing audience and 
that many producers are willing to allow private time-shifting 
to continue, at least for an experimental time period. 24 
The District Court found: 
"Even if it were deemed that home-use recording of 
copyrighted material constituted infringement, the Beta-
max could still legally be used to record noncopyrighted 
material or material whose owners consented to the 
copying. An injunction would deprive the public of the 
ability to use the Betamax for this noninfringing off-the-
air recording. 
23 The record suggests that Disney's programs at the time of trial con-
sisted of approximately one hour a week of network television and one syn-
dicated series. Universal's percentage in the Los Angeles market on com-
mercial television stations was under 5%. See Tr. 532-533, 549-550. 
24 The District Court did not make any explicit findings with regard to 
how much broadcasting is wholly uncopyrighted. The record does include 
testimony that at least one movie-My Man Godfrey-falls within that cat-
egory, Tr. 2300-2301, and certain broadcasts produced by the federal gov-
ernment are also uncopyrighted. See 17 U. S. C. § 105. Cf. Schappner 
v. Foley, 667 F . 2d 102 (CADC 1981) (explaining distinction between work 
produced by the government and work commissioned by the government). 
To the extent such broadcasting is now significant, it further bolsters our 
conclusion. Moreover, since copyright protection is not perpetual, the 
number of audiovisual works in the public domain necessarily increases 
each year. 
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"Defendants introduced considerable testimony at 
trial about the potential for such copying of sports, reli-
gious, educational and other programming. This in-
cluded testimony from representatives of the Offices of 
the Commissioners of the National Football, Basketball, 
Baseball and Hockey Leagues and Associations, the Ex-
ecutive Director of National Religious Broadcasters and 
various educational communications agencies. Plaintiffs 
attack the weight of the testimony offered and also con-
tend that an injunction is warranted because infringing 
uses outweigh noninfringing uses." 
"Whatever the future percentage of legal versus ille-
gal home-use recording might be, an injunction which 
seeks to deprive the public of the very tool or article of 
commerce capable of some noninfringing use would be an 
extremely harsh remedy, as well as one unprecedented 
in copyright law." 480 F. Supp., at 468. 
Although the District Court made these statements in the 
context of considering the propriety of injunctive relief, the 
statements constitute a finding that the evidence concerning 
"sports, religious, educational, and other programming" was 
sufficient to establish a significant quantity of broadcasting 
whose copying is now authorized, and a significant potential 
for future authorized copying. That finding is amply sup-
ported by the record. In addition to the religious and sports 
officials identified explicitly by the District Court, 25 two items 
in the record deserve specific mention. 
25 See Tr. 2447-2450 (Alexander Hadden, Major League Baseball); Tr. 
2480, 2486-2487 (Jay Moyer, National Football League); Tr. 2515-2516 
(David Stern, National Basketball Association); Tr. 2530-2534 (Gilbert 
Stein, National Hockey League); Tr. 2543-2552 (Thomas Hansen, National 
Collegiate Athletic Association); Tr. 2565-2572 (Benjamin Armstrong, Na-
tional Religious Broadcasters). Those officials were authorized to be the 
official spokespersons for their respective institutions in this litigation. 
Tr. 2432, 2479, 2509-2510, 2530, 2538, 2563. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 
30(b)(6). 
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First is the testimony of John Kenaston, the station man-
ager of Channel 58, an educational station in Los Angeles 
affiliated with the Public Broadcasting Service. He ex-
plained and authenticated the station's published guide .to its 
programs. 26 For each program, the guide tells whether un-
limited home taping is authorized, home taping is authorized 
subject to certain restrictions (such as erasure within seven 
days), or home taping is not authorized at all. The Spring 
1978 edition of the guide described 107 programs. Sixty-two 
of those programs or 58% authorize some home taping. 
Twenty-one of them or almost 20% authorize unrestricted 
home taping. ?:1 
Second is the testimony of Fred Rogers, president of the 
corporation that produces and owns the copyright on Mr. 
Rogers' Neighborhood. The program is carried by more 
public television stations than any other program. Its audi-
ence numbers over 3,000,000 families a day. He testified 
that he had absolutely no objection to home taping for non-
commercial use and expressed the opinion that it is a real 
service to families to be able to record children's programs 
and to show them at appropriate times. 28 
26 Tr. 2863-2902; Def. Exh. PI. 
Z7 See also Tr. 2833-2844 (similar testimony by executive director of New 
Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority). Cf. Tr. 2592-2605 (testimony by 
chief of New York Education Department's Bureau of Mass Communica-
tions approving home taping for educational purposes). 
28 "Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the 
'Neighborhood' at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that 
it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and show 
them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the advent of all 
of this new technology that allows people to tape the 'Neighborhood' off-
the-air, and I'm speaking for the 'Neighborhood' because that's what I 
produce, that they then become much more active in the programming of 
their family's television life. Very frankly, I am opposed to people being 
programmed by others. My whole approach in broadcasting has always 
been 'You are an important person just the way you are. You can make 
healthy decisions.' Maybe I'm going on too long, but I just feel that any-
thing that allows a person to be more active in the control of his or her life, 
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If there are millions of owners of VTR's who make copies of 
televised sports events, religious broadcasts, and educational 
programs such as Mister Rogers' Neighborhood, and if the 
proprietors of those programs welcome the practice, the busi-
ness of supplying the equipment that makes such copying fea-
sible should not be stifled simply because the equipment is 
used by some individuals to make unauthorized reproductions 
of respondents' works. The respondents do not represent a 
class composed of all copyright holders. Yet a finding of con-
tributory infringement would inevitably frustrate the inter-
ests of broadcasters in reaching the portion of their audience 
that is available only through time-shifting. 
Of course, the fact that other copyright holders may wel-
come the practice of time-shifting does not mean that re-
spondents should be deemed to have granted a license to copy 
their programs. Third party conduct would be wholly irrele-
vant in an action for direct infringement of respondents' 
copyrights. But in an action for contributory infringement 
against the seller of copying equipment, the copyright holder 
may not prevail unless the relief that he seeks affects only his 
programs, or unless he speaks for virtually all copyright hold-
ers with an interest in the outcome. In this case, the record 
makes it perfectly clear that there are many important pro-
ducers of national and local television programs who find 
nothing objectionable about the enlargement in the size of the 
television audience that results from the practice of time-
shifting for private home use. 29 The seller of the equipment 
in a healthy way, is important." T. R. 2920-2921. See also Def. Exh. PI, 
p. 85. 
29 It may be rare for large numbers of copyright owners to authorize 
duplication of their works without demanding a fee from the copier. In 
the context of public broadcasting, however, the user of the copyrighted 
work is not required to pay a fee for access to the underlying work. The 
traditional method by which copyright owners capitalize upon the televi-
sion medium-commercially sponsored free public broadcast over the pub-
lic airwaves-is predicated upon the assumption that compensation for the 
'. 
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that expands those producers' audiences cannot be a con-
tributory infringer if, as is true in this case, it has had no di-
rect involvement with any infringing activity. 
B. Unauthorized Time-Shifting 
Even unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work are not nec-
essarily infringing. An unlicensed use of the copyright is not 
an infringement unless it conflicts with one of the specific ex-
clusive rights conferred by the copyright statute. Twentieth 
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 154-155. 
Moreover, the definition of exclusive rights in § 106 of the 
present Act is prefaced by the words "subject to sections 107 
through 118." Those sections describe a variety of uses of 
copyrighted material that "are not infringements of copyright 
notwithstanding the provisions of § 106." The most perti-
nent in this case is § 107, the legislative endorsement of the 
doctrine of "fair use." 30 
value of displaying the works will be received in the form of advertising 
revenues. 
In the context of television programming, some producers evidently be-
lieve that permitting home viewers to make copies of their works off the air 
actually enhances the value of their copyrights. Irrespective of their rea-
sons for authorizing the practice, they do so, and in significant enough 
numbers to create a substantial market for a non-infringing use of the Sony 
VTR's. No one could dispute the legitimacy of that market if the produc-
ers had authorized home taping of their programs in exchange for a license 
fee paid directly by the home user. The legitimacy of that market is not 
compromised simply because these producers have authorized home taping 
of their programs without demanding a fee from the home user. The copy-
right law does not require a copyright owner to charge a fee for the use of 
his works, and as this record clearly demonstrates, the owner of a copy-
right may well have economic or noneconomic reasons for permitting cer-
tain kinds of copying to occur without receiving direct compensation from 
the copier. It is not the role of the courts to tell copyright holders the best 
way for them to exploit their copyrights: even if respondents' competitors 
were ill-advised in authorizing home videotaping, that would not change 
the fact that they have created a substantial market for a paradigmatic 
non-infringing use of petitioners' product. 
30 The Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, did not have a "fair use" pro-
vision. Although that Act's compendium of exclusive rights "to print, re-
print, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work" was broad enough to 
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That section identifies various factors 31 that enable a Court 
to apply an "equitable rule of reason" analysis to particular 
claims of infringement. 32 Although not conclusive, the first 
encompass virtually all potential interactions with a copyrighted work, the 
statute was never so construed. The courts simply refused to read the 
statute literally in every situation. When Congress amended the statute 
in 1976, it indicated that it ''intended to restate the present judicial doc-
trine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." House 
Report No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 66. 
81 Section 107 provides: 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords 
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy-
right. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
"(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work." 17 U. S. C. § 107. 
32 The nature of the section is explained in these comments from the 
House Report on the fair use section: 
"Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doc-
trine over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever 
emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no gen-
erally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question 
must be decided on its own facts .... 
General intention behind the provision 
"The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers some guid-
ance to users in determining when the principles of the doctrine apply. 
However, the endless variety of situations and combinations of circum-
stances that can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact 
rules in the statute. The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of 
the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the 
doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological 
change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and 
some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the 
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis." H. Rep. No. 
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factor requires that "the commercial or nonprofit character of 
an activity" be weighed in any fair use decision. 33 If the 
Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or 
profit-making purpose, such use would presumptively be un-
fair. The contrary presumption is appropriate here, how-
ever, because the District Court's findings plainly establish 
that time-shifting for private home use must be characterized 
as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity. Moreover, when one 
considers the nature of a televised copyrighted audiovisual 
work, see 17 U. S. C. § 107(2), and that timeshifting merely 
enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been in-
vited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that 
the entire work is reproduced, see id., at § 107(3), does not 
have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair 
use. 
This is not, however, the end of the inquiry because Con-
gress has also directed us to consider "the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work." I d., at§ 107(4). The purpose of copyright is to cre-
ate incentives for creative effort. Even copying for noncom-
mercial purposes may impair the copyright holder's ability to 
obtain the rewards that Congress intended him to have. 
But a use that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential 
market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work need not 
be prohibited in order to protect the author's incentive to cre-
ate. The prohibition of such noncommercial uses would 
94-1476, pp. 65--66. 
33 "The Committee has amended the first of the criteria to be consid-
ered-'the purpose and character of the use'-to state explicitly that this 
factor includes a consideration of 'whether such use is of a commercial na-
ture or is for non-profit educational purposes.' This amendment is not in-
tended to be interpreted as any sort of not-for-profit limitation on educa-
tional uses of copyrighted works. It is an express recognition that, as 
under the present law, the commercial or non-profit character of an activ-
ity, while not conclusive with respect to fair use, can and should be 
weighed along with other factors in fair use decisions. " H. Rep. No. 
94-1476, p. 66. 
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merely inhibit access to ideas without any countervailing 
benefit. 34 
Thus, although every commercial use of copyrighted mate-
rial is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly 
privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright, noncom-
mercial uses are a different matter. A challenge to a non-
commercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either 
that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become 
widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market 
for the copyrighted work. Actual present harm need not be 
shown; such a requirement would leave the copyright holder 
with no defense against predictable damage. Nor is it neces-
sary to show with certainty that future harm will result. 
What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists. 
If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood 
may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, 
the likelihood must be demonstrated. 
In this case, respondents failed to carry their burden with 
regard to home time-shifting. The District Court described 
respondents' evidence as follows: 
"Plaintiffs' experts admitted at several points in the 
trial that the time-shifting without librarying would re-
sult in 'not a great deal of harm.' Plaintiffs' greatest 
concern about time-shifting is with 'a point of important 
philosophy that transcends even commercial judgment.' 
They fear that with any Betamax usage, 'invisible 
34 Cf. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted as Study 
No. 14 in Senate Judiciary Committee, Copyright Law Revision, Studies 
Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 
86th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 30 (1960): 
"In certain situations, the copyright owner suffers no substantial harm 
from the use of the work. . . . Here again, is the partial marriage be-
tween the doctrine of fair use and the legal maxim de minimis non curat 
lex." 
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boundaries' are passed: 'the copyright owner has lost 
control over his program.'" 480 F. Supp., at 467. 
Later in its opinion, the District Court observed: 
"Most of plaintiffs' predictions of harm hinge on specula-
tion about audience viewing patterns and ratings, a 
measurement system which Sidney Sheinberg, MCA's 
president, calls a 'black art' because of the significant 
level of imprecision involved in the calculations." I d., at 
469. 35 
There was no need for the District Court to say much about 
past harm. "Plaintiffs have admitted that no actual harm to 
their copyrights has occurred to date." I d., at 451. 
On the question of potential future harm from time-shift-
ing, the District Court offered a more detailed analysis of the 
evidence. It rejected respondents' "fear that persons 
'watching' the original telecast of a program will not be meas-
ured in the live audience and the ratings and revenues will 
decrease," by observing that current measurement technol-
ogy allows the Betamax audience to be reflected. I d., at 
466. 36 It rejected respondents' prediction "that live televi-
35 See also 480 F. Supp., at 451: 
"It should be noted, however, that plaintiffs' argument is more complicated 
and speculative than was the plaintiff's in Williams & Wilkins. . . . Here, 
plaintiffs ask the court to find harm based on many more assumptions .... 
As is discussed more fully in Part IV, infra, some of these assumptions are 
based on neither fact nor experience, and plaintiffs admit that they are to 
some extent inconsistent and illogical." 
36 "There was testimony at trial, however, that Nielsen Ratings has al-
ready developed the ability to measure when a Betamax in a sample home 
is recording the program. Thus, the Betamax will be measured as a part 
of the live audience. The later diary can augment that measurement with 
information about subsequent viewing." 480 F. Supp., at 466. 
In a separate section, the District Court rejected plaintiffs' suggestion 
that the commercial attractiveness of television broadcasts would be dimin-
ished because Betamax owners would use the pause button or fast-forward 
control to avoid viewing advertisements: 
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sion or movie audiences will decrease as more people watch 
Betamax tapes as an alternative," with the observation that 
"[t]here is no factual basis for [the underlying] assumption." 
Ibid. 37 It rejected respondents' "fear that time-shifting will 
reduce audiences for telecast reruns," and concluded instead 
that "given current market practices, this should aid plain-
tiffs rather than harm them." Ibid. 38 And it declared that 
respondents' suggestion "that theater or film rental exhi-
bition of a program will suffer because of time-shift recording 
of that program" "lacks merit." 480 F. Supp., at 467. 39 
"It must be remembered, however, that to omit commercials, Betamax 
owners must view the program, including the commercials, while record-
ing. To avoid commercials during playback, the viewer must fast-forward 
and, for the most part, guess as to when the commercial has passed. For 
most recordings, either practice may be too tedious. As defendants' sur-
vey showed, 92% of the programs were recorded with commercials and 
only 25% of the owners fast-forward through them. Advertisers will have 
to make the same kinds of judgments they do now about whether persons 
viewing televised programs actually watch the advertisements which inter-
rupt them." Id., at 468. 
37 "Here plaintiffs assume that people will view copies when they would 
otherwise be watching television or going to the movie theater. There is 
no factual basis for this assumption. It seems equally likely that Betamax 
owners will play their tapes when there is nothing on television they wish 
to see and no movie they want to attend. Defendants' survey does not 
show any negative effect of Betamax ownership on television viewing or 
theater attendance." Ibid. 
38 "The underlying assumptions here are particularly difficult to accept. 
Plaintiffs explain that the Betamax increases access to the original tele-
vised material and that the more people there are in this original audience, 
the fewer people the rerun will attract. Yet current marketing practices, 
including the success of syndication, show just the opposite. Today, the 
larger the audience for the original telecast, the higher the price plaintiffs 
can demand from broadcasters from rerun rights. There is no survey 
within the knowledge of this court to show that the rerun audience is com-
prised of persons who have not seen the program. In any event, if ratings 
can reflect Betamax recording, original audiences may increase and, given 
market practices, this should aid plaintiffs rather than harm them." Ibid. 
39 "This suggestion lacks merit. By definition, time-shift recording en-
tails viewing and erasing, so the program will no longer be on tape when 
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After completing that review, the District Court restated 
its overall conclusion several times, in several different ways. 
"Harm from time-shifting is speculative and, at best, mini-
mal." Ibid. "The audience benefits from the time-shifting 
capability have already been discussed. It is not implausible 
that benefits could also accrue to plaintiffs, broadcasters, and 
advertisers, as the Betamax makes it possible for more per-
sons to view their broadcasts." Ibid. "No likelihood of 
harm was shown at trial, and plaintiffs admitted that there 
had been no actual harm to date." Id., at 468-469. "Testi-
mony at trial suggested that Betamax may require adjust-
ments in marketing strategy, but it did not establish even a 
likelihood of harm." I d., at 469. "Television production by 
plaintiffs today is more profitable than it has ever been, and, 
in five weeks of trial, there was no concrete evidence to sug-
gest that the Betamax will change the studios' financial pic-
ture." Ibid. 
The District Court's conclusions are buttressed by the fact 
that to the extent time-shifting expands public access to 
freely broadcast television programs, it yields societal bene-
fits. Earlier this year, in Community Television of South-
ern California v. Gottfried, -- U. S. --, --- --, n. 
12 (1983), we acknowledged the public interest in making 
television broadcasting more available. Concededly, that in-
terest is not unlimited. But it supports an interpretation of 
the concept of "fair use" that requires the copyright holder to 
demonstrate some likelihood of harm before he may condemn 
a private act of time-shifting as a violation of federal law. 
the later theater run begins. Of course, plaintiffs may fear that the 
Betamax will keep the tapes long enough to satisfy all their interest in the 
program and will, therefore , not patronize later theater exhibitions. To 
the extent this practice involves librarying, it is addressed in section V.C., 
infra. It should also be noted that there is no evidence to suggest that the 
public interest in later theatrical exhibitions of motion pictures will be re-
duced any more by Betamax recording than it already is by the television 
broadcast of the film. " 480 F. Supp. , at 467. 
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When these factors are all weighed in the "rule of reason" 
balance, we must conclude that this record amply supports 
the District Court's conclusion that home time-shifting is fair 
use. In light of the findings of the District Court regarding 
the state of the empirical data, it is clear that the Court of 
Appeals erred in holding that the statute as presently writ-
ten bars such conduct. 40 
40 The Court of Appeals chose not to engage in any "equitable rule of rea-
son" analysis in this case. Instead, it assumed that the category of "fair 
use" is rigidly circumscribed by a requirement that every such use must be 
"productive." It therefore concluded that copying a television program 
merely to enable the viewer to receive information or entertainment that 
he would otherwise miss because of a personal scheduling conflict could 
never be fair use. That understanding of "fair use" was erroneous. 
Congress has plainly instructed us that fair use analysis calls for a sensi-
tive balancing of interests. The distinction between "productive" and "un-
productive" uses may be helpful in calibrating the balance, but it cannot be 
wholly determinative. Although copying to promote a scholarly endeavor 
certainly has a stronger claim to fair use than copying to avoid interrupting 
a poker game, the question is not simply two-dimensional. For one thing, 
it is not true that all copyrights are fungible. Some copyrights govern ma-
terial with broad potential secondary markets. Such material may well 
have a broader claim to protection because of the greater potential for com-
mercial harm. Copying a news broadcast may have a stronger claim to 
fair use than copying a motion picture. And, of course, not all uses are 
fungible. Copying for commercial gain has a much weaker claim to fair 
use than copying for personal enrichment. But the notion of social "pro-
ductivity" cannot be a complete answer to this analysis. A teacher who 
copies to prepare lecture notes is clearly productive. But so is a teacher 
who copies for the sake of broadening his personal understanding of his 
specialty. Or a legislator w.ho copies for the sake of broadening her under-
standing of what her constituents are watching; or a constituent who copies 
a news program to help make a decision on how to vote. 
Making a copy of a copyrighted work for the convenience of a blind per-
son is expressly identified by the House Committee Report as an example 
of fair use, with no suggestion that anything more than a purpose to enter-
tain or to inform need motivate the copying. In a hospital setting, using a 
VTR to enable a patient to see programs he would otherwise miss has no 
productive purpose other than contributing to the psychological well-being 
of the patient. Virtually any time-shifting that increases viewer access to 
television programming may result in a comparable benefit. The statu-
/ 
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In summary, the record and findings of the District Court 
lead us to two conclusions. First, Sony demonstrated a sig-
nificant likelihood that substantial numbers of copyright hold-
ers who license their works for broadcast on free television 
would not object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by 
private viewers. And second, respondents failed to demon-
strate that time-shifting would cause any likelihood of non-
minimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, 
their copyrighted works. The Betamax is, therefore, capa-
ble of substantial noninfringing uses. Sony's sale of such 
equipment to the general public does not constitute contribu-
tory infringement of respondent's copyrights. 
v 
"The direction of Art. I is that Congress shall have the 
power to promote the progress of science and the useful 
arts. When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the 
sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can come only 
from Congress." Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram 
Corp., 406 U. S. 518, 530 (1972). 
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that 
the elected representatives of the millions of people who 
watch television every day have made it unlawful to copy a 
program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat 
prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copy-
ing possible. 
It may well be that Congress will take a fresh look at this 
new technology, just as it so often has examined other inno-
vations in the past. But it is not our job to apply laws that 
have not yet been written. Applying the copyright statute, 
as it now reads, to the facts as they have been developed in 
tory language does not identify any dicohotomy between productive and 
nonproductive time-shifting, but does require consideration of the eco-
nomic consequences of copying. 
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this case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be 
reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
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JusTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioners manufacture and sell home video tape record-
ers. Repondents own the copyrights on some of the televi-
sion programs that are broadcast on the public airwaves. 
Some members of the general public use video tape recorders 
sold by petitioners to record some of these broadcasts, as 
well as a large number of other broadcasts. The question 
presented is whether the sale of petitioners' copying equip-
ment to the general public violates any of the rights con-
ferred upon respondents by the Copyright Act. 
Respondents commenced this copyright infringment action 
against petitioners in the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California in 1976. Respondents alleged 
that some individuals had used Betamax video tape recorders 
(VTR's) to record some of respondents' copyrighted works 
which had been exhibited on commercially sponsored televi-
sion and contended that these individuals had thereby 
infringed respondents' copyrights. Respondents further 
maintained that petitioners were liable for the copyright 
infringment allegedly committed by Betamax consumers be-
cause of petitioners' marketing of the Betamax VTR's. 1 Re-
1 The respondents also asserted causes of action under state law and 
§ 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 441, 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a). 
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spondents sought no relief against any Betamax consumer. 
Instead, they sought money damages and an equitable ac-
counting of profits from petitioners, as well as an injunction 
against the manufacture and marketing of Betamax VTR's. 
After a lengthy trial, the District Court denied respond-
ents all the relief they sought and entered judgment for peti-
tioners. 480 F. Supp. 429 (1979). The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's 
judgment on respondent's copyright claim, holding petition-
ers liable for contributory infringment and ordering the Dis-
trict Court to fashion appropriate relief. 659 F. 2d 963 
(1981). We granted certiorari, 457 U. S. 1116 (1982); since 
we had not completed our study of the case last Term, we or-
dered reargument,-- U. S. -- (1983). We now reverse. 
An explanation of our rejection of respondents' unprece-
dented attempt to impose copyright liability upon the distrib-
utors of copying equipment requires a quite detailed recita-
tion of the findings of the District Court. In summary, those 
findings reveal that the average member of the public uses a 
VTR principally to record a program he cannot view as it is 
being televised and then to watch it once at a later time. 
This practice, known as "time-shifting," enlarges the televi-
sion viewing audience. For that reason, a significant 
amount of television programming may be used in this man-
ner without objection from the owners of the copyrights on 
the programs. For the same reason, even the two respond-
ents in this case, who do assert objections to time-shifting in 
this litigation, were unable to prove that the practice has im-
paired the commercial value of their copyrights or has cre-
ated any likelihood of future harm. Given these findings, 
there is no basis in the Copyright Act upon which respond-
ents can hold petitioners liable for distributing VTR's to the 
general public. The Court of Appeals' holding that respond-
ents are entitled to enjoin the distribution of VTR's, to collect 
These claims are not before this Court. 
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royalties on the sale of such equipment, or to obtain other re-
lief, if affirmed, would enlarge the scope of respondents' stat-
utory monopolies to encompass control over an article of com-
merce that is not the subject of copyright protection. Such 
an expansion of the copyright privilege is beyond the limits of 
the grants authorized by Congress. 
I 
The two respondents in this action, Universal Studios, Inc. 
and Walt Disney Productions, produce and hold the copy-
rights on a substantial number of motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works. In the current marketplace, they can 
exploit their rights in these works in a number of ways: by 
authorizing theatrical exhibitions, by licensing limited 
showings on cable and network television, by selling syndica-
tion rights for repeated airings on local television stations, 
and marketing programs on prerecorded videotapes or video-
discs. Some works are suitable for exploitation through all 
of these avenues, while the market for other works is more 
limited. 
Petitioner Sony manufactures millions of Betamax video 
tape recorders and markets these devices through numerous 
retail establishments, some of which are also petitioners in 
this action. 2 Sony's Betamax VTR is a mechanism consist-
ing of three basic components: (1) a tuner, which receives 
electromagnetic signals transmitted over the television band 
of the public airwaves and separates them into audio and vi-
sual signals; (2) a recorder, which records such signals on a 
2 The four retailers are Carter, Hawley, Hales, Stores, Inc.; Associated 
Dry Goods Corp.; Federated Department Stores, Inc.; and Henry's Cam-
era Corp. The principal defendants are Sony Corporation, the manufac-
turer of the equipment, and its wholly owned subsidiary, Sony Corporation 
of America. The advertising agency of Doyle, Dane, Burn bock, Inc., also 
involved in marketing the Betamax, is also a petitioner. An individual 
VTR user, Willis Griffiths , was named as a defendant in the District Court, 
but respondent sought no relief against him. Griffiths is not a petitioner. 
For convenience, we shall refer to petitioners collectively as Sony. 
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magnetic tape; and (3) an adapter, which converts the audio 
and visual signals on the tape into a composite signal that can 
be received by a television set. 
Several capabilities of the machine are noteworthy. The 
separate tuner in the Betamax enables it to record a broad-
cast off one station while the television set is tuned to another 
channel, permitting the viewer, for example, to watch two 
simultaneous news broadcasts by watching one "live" and re-
cording the other for later viewing. Tapes may be reused, 
and programs that have been recorded may be erased either 
before or after viewing. A timer in the Betamax can be used 
to activate and deactivate the equipment at predetermined 
times, enabling an intended viewer to record programs that 
are transmitted when he or she is not at home. Thus a per-
son may watch a program at home in the evening even 
though it was broadcast while the viewer was at work during 
the afternoon. The Betamax is also equipped with a pause 
button and a fast-forward control. The pause button, when 
depressed, deactivates the recorder until it is released, thus 
enabling a viewer to omit a commercial advertisement from 
the recording, provided, of course, that the viewer is present 
when the program is recorded. The fast forward control en-
ables the viewer of a previously recorded program to run the 
tape rapidly when a segment he or she does not desire to see 
is being played back on the television screen. 
The respondents and Sony both conducted surveys of the 
way the Betamax machine was used by several hundred own-
ers during a sample period in 1978. Although there were 
some differences in the surveys, they both showed that the 
primary use of the machine for most owners was "time-shift-
ing,"-the practice of recording a program to view it once at 
a later time, and thereafter erasing it. Time-shifting en-
ables viewers to see programs they otherwise would miss be-
cause they are not at home, are occupied with other tasks, or 
are viewing a program on another station at the time of a 
broadcast that they desire to watch. Both surveys also 
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showed, however, that a substantial number of interviewees 
had accumulated libraries of tapes. 3 Sony's survey indi-
cated that over 80% of the interviewees watched at least as 
much regular television as they had before owning a 
Betamax. 4 Respondents offered no evidence of decreased 
television viewing by Betamax owners. 5 
3 As evidence of how a VTR may be used, respondents offered the testi-
mony of William Griffiths. Griffiths, although named as an individual de-
fendant, was a client of plaintiffs' law firm. The District Court summa-
rized his testimony as follows: 
"He owns approximately 100 tapes. When Griffiths bought his Betamax, 
he intended not only to time-shift (record, play-back and then erase) but 
also to build a library of cassettes. Maintaining a library, however, 
proved too expensive, and he is now erasing some earlier tapes and reusing 
them. 
"Griffiths copied about 20 minutes of a Universal motion picture called 
'Never Give An Inch,' and two episodes from Universal television series 
entitled 'Baa Baa Black Sheep' and 'Holmes and Yo Yo.' He would have 
erased each of these but for the request of plaintiffs' counsel that it be kept. 
Griffiths also testified that he had copied but already erased Universal 
films called 'Alpha Caper' (erased before anyone saw it) and 'Amelia Ear-
hart.' At the time of his deposition Griffiths did not intend to keep any 
Universal film in his library. 
"Griffiths has also recorded documentaries, news broadcasts, sporting 
events and political programs such as a rerun of the Nixon/Kennedy de-
bate.'' 480 F. Supp., at 436-437. 
Four other witnesses testified to having engaged in similar activity. 
'The District Court summarized some of the findings in these surveys as 
follows: 
"According to plaintiffs' survey, 75.4% of the VTR owners use their ma-
chines to record for time-shifting purposes half or most of the time. De-
fendants' survey showed that 96% of the Betamax owners had used the ma-
chine to record programs they otherwise would have missed. 
"When plaintiffs asked interviewees how many cassettes were in their li-
brary, 55.8% said there were 10 or fewer. In defendants' survey, of the 
total programs viewed by interviewees in the past month, 70.4% had been 
viewed only that one time and for 57.9%, there were no plans for further 
viewing.'' 480 F. Supp., at 438. 
5 "81.9% of the defendants' interviewees watched the same amount or 
more of regular television as they did before owning a Betamax. 83.2% 
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Sony introduced considerable evidence describing televi-
sion programs that could be copied without objection from 
any copyright holder, with special emphasis on sports, reli-
gious, and educational programming. For example, their 
survey indicated that 7.3% of all Betamax use is to record 
sports events, and representatives of professional baseball, 
football, basketball, and hockey testified that they had no ob-
jection to the recording of their televised events for home 
use. 6 
Respondents offered opinion evidence concerning the fu-
ture impact of the unrestricted sale of VTR's on the commer-
cial value of their copyrights. The District Court found, 
however, that they had failed to prove any likelihood of fu-
ture harm from the use of VTR's for time-shifting. ld., at 
469. 
The District Court's Decision 
The lengthy trial of the case in the District Court con-
cerned the private, home use of VTR's for recording pro-
grams broadcast on the public airwaves without charge to the 
viewer. 7 No issue concerning the transfer of tapes to other 
persons, the use of home-recorded tapes for public perform-
ances, or the copying of programs transmitted on pay orca-
ble television systems was raised. See 480 F. Supp. 429, 
432-433, 442 (1979). 
The District Court concluded that noncommercial home use 
recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves was 
a fair use of copyrighted works and did not constitute copy-
reported their frequency of movie going was unaffected by Betamax." 480 
F. Supp., at 439. 
6 See Def. Exh. OT, Table 20; Tr. 2447-2450, 2480, 2486-2487, 251&-
2516, 2530-2534. 
7 The trial also briefly touched upon demonstrations of the Betamax by 
the retailer petitioners which were alleged to be infringments by respond-
ents. The District Court held against respondents on this claim, 480 F. 
Supp. , at 456-457, the Court of Appeals affirmed this holding, 659 F . 2d, at 
976, and respondents did not cross-petition on this issue. 
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right infringement. It emphasized the fact that the material 
was broadcast free to the public at large, the noncommercial 
character of the use, and the private character of the activity 
conducted entirely within the home. Moreover, the court 
found that the purpose of this use served the public interest 
in increasing access to television programming, an interest 
that "is consistent with the First Amendment policy of pro-
viding the fullest possible access to information through the 
public airwaves. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 102." 480 F. 
Supp., at 454. 8 Even when an entire copyrighted work was 
recorded, the District Court regarded the copying as fair use 
"because there is no accompanying reduction in the market 
for 'plaintiff's original work.'" Ibid. 
As an independent ground of decision, the District Court 
also concluded that Sony could not be held liable as a con-
tributory infringer even if the home use of a VTR was consid-
ered an infringing use. The District Court noted that Sony 
had no direct involvement with any Betamax purchasers who 
recorded copyrighted works off the air. Sony's advertising 
was silent on the subject of possible copyright infringement, 
but its instruction booklet contained the following statement: 
"Television programs, films, videotapes and other ma-
terials may be copyrighted. Unauthorized recording of 
such material may be contrary to the provisions of the 
United States copyright laws." !d., at 436. 
The District Court assumed that Sony had constructive 
knowledge of the probability that the Betamax machine 
would be used to record copyrighted programs, but found 
that Sony merely sold a "product capable of a variety of 
8 The court also found that this "access is not just a matter of conve-
nience, as plaintiffs have suggested. Access has been limited not simply 
by inconvenience but by the basic need to work. Access to the better pro-
gram has also been limited by the competitive practice of counterprogram-
ming." 480 F. Supp., at 454. 
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uses, some of them allegedly infringing." Id., at 461. It 
reasoned: 
"Selling a staple article of commerce e. g., a type-
writer, a recorder, a camera, a photocopying machine 
technically contributes to any infringing use subse-
quently made thereof, but this kind of 'contribution,' if 
deemed sufficient as a basis for liability, would expand 
the theory beyond precedent and arguably beyond judi-
cial management. 
"Commerce would indeed be hampered if manufactur-
ers of staple items were held liable as contributory in-
fringers whenever they 'constructively' knew that some 
purchasers on some occasions would use their product 
for a purpose which a court later deemed, as a matter of 
first impression, to be an infringement." Ibid. 
Finally, the District Court discussed the respondents' 
prayer for injunctive relief, noting that they had asked for an 
injunction either preventing the future sale of Betamax ma-
chines, or requiring that the machines be rendered incapable 
of recording copyrighted works off the air. The court stated 
that it had "found no case in which the manufacturers, dis-
tributors, retailers, and advertisors of the instrument en-
abling the infringement were sued by the copyright holders," 
and that the request for relief in this case "is unique." 480 
F. Supp., at 465. 
It concluded that an injunction was wholly inappropriate 
because any possible harm to respondents was outweighed by 
the fact that "the Betamax could still legally be used to 
record noncopyrighted material or material whose owners 
consented to the copying. An injunction would deprive the 
public of the ability to use the Betamax for this noninfringing 
off-the-air recording." 480 F. Supp., at 468. 
The Court of Appeals' Decision 
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's judg-
ment on respondents' copyright claim. It did not set aside 
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any of the District Court's findings of fact. Rather, it con-
cluded as a matter of law that the home use of a VTR was not 
a fair use because it was not a "productive use." 9 It there-
fore held that it was unnecessary for plaintiffs to prove any 
harm to the potential market for the copyrighted works, but 
then observed that it seemed clear that the cumulative effect 
of mass reproduction made possible by VTR's would tend to 
diminish the potential market for respondents' works. 659 
F. 2d, at 974. 
On the issue of contributory infringement, the Court of Ap-
peals first rejected the analogy to staple articles of commerce 
such as tape recorders or photocopying machines. It noted 
that such machines "may have substantial benefit for some 
purposes" and do not "even remotely raise copyright prob-
lems." Id., at 975. VTR's, however, are sold "for the pri-
mary purpose of reproducing television programming" and 
"virtually all" such programming is copyrighted material. 
Ibid. The Court of Appeals concluded, therefore, that 
VTR's were not suitable for any substantial noninfringing use 
even if some copyright owners elect not to enforce their 
rights. 
The Court of Appeals also rejected the District Court's re-
liance on Sony's lack of knowledge that home use constituted 
infringement. Assuming that the statutory provisions defin-
ing the remedies for infringement applied also to the non-
statutory tort of contributory infringement, the court stated 
that a defendant's good faith would merely reduce his dam-
ages liability but would not excuse the infringing conduct. 
It held that Sony was chargeable with knowledge of the 
homeowner's infringing activity because the reproduction of 
copyrighted materials was either "the most conspicuous use" 
or "the major use" of the Betamax product. Ibid. 
' "Without a 'productive use', i. e. when copyrighted material is repro-
duced for its intrinsic use, the mass copying of the sort involved in this case 
precludes an application of fair use." 659 F. 2d, at 971-972. 
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On the matter of relief, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that "statutory damages may be appropriate," that the Dis-
trict Court should reconsider its determination that an in-
junction would not be an appropriate remedy; and, referring 
to "the analogous photocopying area," suggested that a con-
tinuing royalty pursuant to a judicially created compulsory li-
cense may very well be an acceptable resolution of the relief 
issue. 659 F. 2d, at 976. 
II 
Article I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that: 
"The Congress shall have Power . . . to Promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are 
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special 
private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by 
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is 
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and in-
ventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the 
public access to the products of their genius after the limited 
period of exclusive control has expired. 
"The copyright law, like the patent statute, makes re-
ward to the owner a secondary consideration. In Fox 
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127, Chief Justice 
Hughes spoke as follows respecting the copyright mo-
nopoly granted by Congress, 'The sole interest of the 
United States and the primary object in conferring the 
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the pub-
lic from the labors of authors.' It is said that reward to 
the author or artist serves to induce release to the public 
of the products of his creative genius." United States v. 
Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 158. 
As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress 
that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the 
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limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to in-
ventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their 
work product. Because this task involves a difficult balance 
between the interests of authors and inventors in the control 
and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one 
hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of 
ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand, our pat-
ent and copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly. 10 
From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in 
response to significant changes in technology. 11 Indeed, it 
10 In its report accompanying the comprehensive revision of the Copy-
right Act in 1909, the Judiciary Committee of the House of Represent-
atives explained this balance: 
"The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of 
the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in 
his writings, ... but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be 
served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing 
to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings. 
"In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider ... two questions: 
First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit 
the public, and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be detri-
mental to the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under the 
proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that out-
weighs the evils of the temporary monopoly." H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909). 
11 Thus, for example, the development and marketing of player pianos 
and perforated roles of music, see White Smith Music Publishing Co. v. 
Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (1908), preceded the enactment of the Copyright 
Act of 1909; innovations in copying techniques gave rise to the statutory 
exemption for library copying embodied in § 108 of the 1976 revision of the 
Copyright law; the development of the technology that made it possible to 
retransmit television programs by cable or by microwave systems, see 
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390 (1968), and Telepromp-
ter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U. S. 394 (1974), prompted the enactment of the 
complex provisions set forth in 17 U. S. C. § 111 (d)(2)(B) and § 111(d)(5) 
after years of detailed congressional study, see Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. 
Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F. 2d 125, 129 (CA2 1982). 
By enacting the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, 85 Stat. 391, 
Congress also provided the solution to the "record piracy" problems that 
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was the invention of a new form of copying equipment-the 
printing press-that gave rise to the original need for copy-
right protection. 12 Repeatedly, as new developments have 
occurred in this country, it has been the Congress that has 
fashioned the new rules that new technology made necessary. 
Thus, long before the enactment of the Copyright Act of 
1909, 35 Stat. 1075, it was settled that the protection given to 
copyrights is wholly statutory. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U. S. 
(8 Peters) 591, 661-662 (1834). The remedies for infringe-
ment "are only those prescribed by Congress." Thompson 
v. Hubbard, 131 U. S. 123, 151 (1889). 
The judiciary's reluctance to expand the protections af-
forded by the copyright without explicit legislative guidance 
is a recurring theme. See, e. g., Teleprompter Corp. v. 
CBS, 415 U. S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Art-
ists, 392 U. S. 390 (1968); Williams and Wilkins v. United 
States, 487 F. 2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affirmed by an equally 
divided court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975); White-Smith Music Pub-
lishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (1908). Sound policy, 
as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Con-
gress when major technological innovations alter the market 
for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional 
had been created by the development of the audio tape recorder. Sony 
argues that the legislative history of that Act, see especially H. Rep. No. 
487, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 7, indicates that Congress did not intend to 
prohibit the private home use of either audio or video tape recording equip-
ment. In view of our disposition of the contributory infringement issue, 
we express no opinion on that question. 
12 "Copyright protection became necessary with the invention of the 
printing press and had its early beginnings in the British censorship laws. 
The fortunes of the law of copyright have always been closely connected 
with freedom of expression, on the one hand, and with technological im-
provements in means of dissemination, on the other. Successive ages 
have drawn different balances among the interest of the writer in the con-
trol and exploitation of his intellectual property, the related interest of the 
publisher, and the competing interest of society in the untrammeled dis-
semination of ideas." Foreword to B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of 
Copyright vii-viii (1967). 
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authority and the institutional ability to accomodate fully the 
varied permutations of competing interests that are inev-
itably implicated by such new technology. 
In a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly 
marked our course, we must be circumspect in construing the 
scope of rights created by a legislative enactment which 
never contemplated such a calculus of interests. In doing so, 
we are guided by Justice Stewart's exposition of the correct 
approach to ambiguities in the law of copyright: 
"The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory 
monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required 
by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing 
claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be 
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must 
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public 
availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The 
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair 
return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate 
aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity 
for the general public good. 'The sole interest of the 
United States and the primary object in conferring the 
monopoly,' this Court has said, 'lie in the general bene-
fits derived by the public from the labors of authors.' 
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127. See Ken-
dall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 327-328; Grant v. Ray-
mond, 6 Pet. 218, 241-242. When technological change 
has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright 
Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose." 
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 
156 (footnotes omitted). 
Copyright protection "subsists . . . in original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 
U. S. C. § 102(a). This protection has never accorded the 
copyright owner complete control over all possible uses of his 
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work. 13 Rather, the Copyright Act grants the copyright 
holder "exclusive" rights to use and to authorize the use of his 
work in five qualified ways, including reproduction of the 
copyrighted work in copies. I d., § 106. 14 All reproductions 
of the work, however, are not within the exclusive domain of 
the copyright owner; some are in the public domain. Any in-
dividual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a "fair use;" 
the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right to 
such a use. Compare id., § 106 with id., § 107. 
'
8 See, e. g., White Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 
1, 19 (1908); cf. Deep South Packing Co. v. Lathram Corp., 406 U. S. 518, 
530-531 (1972). While the law has never recognized an author's right to 
absolute control of his work, the natural tendency of legal rights to express 
themselves in absolute terms to the exclusion of all else is particularly pro-
nounced in the history of the constitutionally sanctioned monopolies of the 
copyright and the patent. See e. g., United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, 334 U. S. 131, 156-158 (1948) (copyright owners claiming right to tie 
license of one film to license of another under copyright law); Fox Film 
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 106 (1932) (copyright owner claiming copyright 
renders it immune from state taxation of copyright royalties); Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 349-351 (1908) (copyright owner 
claiming that a right to fix resale price of his works within the scope of his 
copyright); International Business Machines v. United States, 298 U. S. 
131 (1936) (patentees claiming right to tie sale of unpatented article to lease 
of patented device). 
14 Section 106 of the Act provides: 
"'Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this 
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to 
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform 
the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi-
vidual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the 
copyrighted work publicly." 
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"Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the 
copyright owner," that is, anyone who trespasses into his ex-
clusive domain by using or authorizing the use of the copy-
righted work in one of the five ways set forth in the statute, 
"is an infringer of the copyright." Id., §501(a). Con-
versely, anyone who is authorized by the copyright owner to 
use the copyrighted work in a way specified in the statute or 
who makes a fair use of the work is not an infringer of the 
copyright with respect to such use. 
The Copyright Act provides the owner of a copyright with 
a potent arsenal of remedies against an infringer of his 
work, including an injunction to restrain the infringer from 
violating his rights, the impoundment and destruction of all 
reproductions of his work made in violation of his rights, a 
recovery of his actual damages and any additional profits re-
alized by the infringer or a recovery of statutory damages, 
and attorneys fees. I d., §§ 502--505. 15 
The two respondents in this case do not seek relief against 
the Betamax users who have allegedly infringed their copy-
rights. Moreover, this is not a class action on behalf of all 
copyright owners who license their works for television 
broadcast, and respondents have no right to invoke whatever 
rights other copyright holders may have to bring infringe-
ment actions based on Betamax copying of their works. 16 As 
16 Moreover, anyone who willfully infringes the copyright to reproduce a 
motion picture for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial 
gain is subject to criminal penalties of one year imprisonment and a $25,000 
fine for the first offense and two years imprisonment and a $50,000 fine for 
each subsequent offense, 17 U. S. C. § 506(a), and the fruits and instru-
mentalities of the crime are forfeited upon conviction, id., § 506(b). 
16 In this regard, we reject respondent's attempt to cast this action as 
comparable to a class action because of the positions taken by amici with 
copyright interests and their attempt to treat the statements made by 
amici as evidence in this case. See Brief for Respondent, at 1, and n. 1, 6, 
52, 53 and n. 116. The stated desires of amici concerning the outcome of 
this or any litigation are no substitute for a class action, are not evidence in 
the case, and do not influence our decision; we examine an amicus curiae 
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was made clear by their own evidence, the copying of the re-
spondents' programs represents a small portion of the total 
use of VTR's. It is, however, the taping of respondents own 
copyrighted programs that provides them with standing to 
charge Sony with contributory infringement. To prevail, 
they have the burden of proving that users of the Betamax 
have infringed their copyrights and that Sony should be held 
responsible for that infringement. 
III 
The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable 
for infringment committed by another. In contrast, the Pat-
ent Act expressly brands anyone who "actively induces 
infringment of a patent" as an infringer, 35 U. S. C. § 271(b), 
and further imposes liability on certain individuals labeled 
"contributory" infringers, id., §271(c). The absence of such 
express language in the copyright statute does not preclude 
the imposition of liability for copyright infringments on cer-
tain parties who have not themselves engaged in the infring-
ing activity. 17 For vicarious liability is imposed in virtually 
brief solely for whatever aid it provides in analyzing the legal questions be-
fore us. 
17 As the District Court correctly observed, however, "the lines between 
direct infringement, contributory infringment, and vicarious liability are 
not clearly drawn . ... " 480 F. Supp. 457-458. The lack of clarity in this 
area may, in part, be attributable to the fact that an infringer is not merely 
one who uses a work without authorization by the copyright owner, but 
also one who authorizes the use of a copyrighted work without actual au-
thority from the copyright owner. 
We note the parties' statements that the questions of petitioners' liabil-
ity under the "doctrines" of "direct infringement" and "vicarious liability'' 
are not nominally before this Court. Compare Respondents' Brief, at 9, n. 
22, 41, n. 90 with Petitioners' Reply Brief, at 1, n. 2. We also observe, 
however, that reasoned analysis of respondents' unprecedented contribu-
tory infringement claim necessarily entails consideration of arguments and 
caselaw which may also be forwarded under the other labels, and indeed 
the parties to a large extent rely upon such arguments and authority in 
support of their respective positions on the issue of contributory 
infringement. 
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all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringe-
ment is merely a species of the broader problem of identify-
ing the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual 
accountable for the actions of another. 
Such circumstances were plainly present in Kalem Co. v. 
Harper Brothers, 222 U. S. 55 (1911), the copyright decision 
of this Court on which respondents place their principal reli-
ance. In Kalem, the Court held that the producer of an un-
authorized film dramatization of the copyrighted book Ben 
Hur was liable for his sale of the motion picture to jobbers, 
who in turn arranged for the commercial exhibition of the 
film. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, explained: 
"The defendant not only expected but invoked by ad-
vertisement the use of its films for dramatic reproduc-
tion of the story. That was the most conspicuous pur-
pose for which they could be used, and the one for which 
especially they were made. If the defendant did not 
contribute to the infringement it is impossible to do so 
except by taking part in the final act. It is liable on 
principles recognized in every part of the law." 222 
U.S., at 63. 
The use for which the item sold in Kalem had been "espe-
cially" made was, of course, to display the performance that 
had already been recorded upon it. The producer had per-
sonally appropriated the copyright owner's protected work 
and, as the owner of the tangible medium of expression upon 
which the protected work was recorded, authorized that use 
by his sale of the film to jobbers. But that use of the film 
was not his to authorize: the copyright owner possessed the 
exclusive right to authorize public performances of his work. 
Further, the producer personally advertised the unau-
thorized public performances, dispelling any possible doubt 
as to the use of the film which he had authorized. 
Respondents argue that Kalem stands for the proposition 
that supplying the "means" to accomplish an infringing activ-
ity and encouraging that activity through adverstisement are 
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sufficient to establish liability for copyright infringement. 
This argument rests on a gross generalization that cannot 
withstand scrutiny. The producer in Kalem did not merely 
provide the "means" to accomplish an infringing activity; the 
producer supplied the work itself, albeit in a new medium of 
expression. Petitioners in the instant case do not supply 
Betamax consumers with respondents' works; respondents 
do. Petitioners supply a piece of equipment that is generally 
capable of copying the entire range of programs that may be 
televised: those that are uncopyrighted, those that are copy-
righted but may be copied without objection from the copy-
right holder, and those that the copyright holder would pre-
fer not to have copied. The Betamax can be used to make 
authorized or unauthorized uses of copyrighted works, but 
the range of its potential use is much broader than the par-
ticular infringing use of the film Ben Hur involved in Kalem. 
Kalem does not support respondents' novel theory of 
liability. 
Justice Holmes stated that the producer had "contributed" 
to the infringement of the copyright, and the label "contribu-
tory infringement" has been applied in a number of lower 
court copyright cases involving an ongoing relationship be-
tween the direct infringer and the contributory infringer at 
the time the infringing conduct occured. In such cases, as in 
other situations in which the imposition of vicarious liablity is 
manifestly just, the "contributory" infringer was in a position 
to control the use of copyrighted works by others and had au-
thorized the use without permission from the copyright 
owner. 18 This case, however, plainly does not fall in that cat-
18 The so-called "dance hall cases," Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State 
Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Ass'n, 554 F. 2d 1213 (CAl 1977) 
(racetrack retained infringer to supply music to paying customers); KECA 
MUSIC, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72 (W. D. Mo. 1977) 
(cocktail lounge hired musicians to supply music to paying customers); 
Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F. 2d 354 (CA7 
1929) (dance hall hired orchestra to supply music to paying customers) are 
often contrasted with the so-called landlord-tenant cases, in which land-
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egory. The only contact between Sony and the users of the 
Betamax that is disclosed by this record occurred at the mo-
ment of sale. The District Court expressly found that "no 
lords who leased premises to a direct infringer for a fixed rental and did not 
participate directly in any infringing activity were found not to be liable for 
contributory infringement. E. g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F. 2d 686 (CA2 
1938). 
In Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F. 2d 304 (CA2 
1963) the owner of twenty-three chain stores retained the direct infringer 
to run its record departments. The relationship was structured as a li-
censing arrangement, so that the defendant bore none of the business risk 
of running the department. Instead, it received 10% or 12% of the direct 
infringer's gross receipts. The Court of Appeals concluded: 
"[The dance-hall cases] and this one lie closer on the spectrum to the em-
ployer-employee model, than to the landlord-tenant model. On the par-
ticular facts before us, ' . . . Green's relationship to its infringing licensee, as 
well as its strong concern for the financial success of the phonograph record 
concession, renders it liable for the unauthorized sales of the 'bootleg' 
records. 
"[T]he imposition of vicarious liability in the case before us cannot be 
deemed unduly harsh or unfair. Green has the power to police carefully 
the conduct of its concessionaire; our judgment will simply encourage it to 
do so, thus placing responsibility where it can and should be effectively ex-
ercised." Id., at 308 (emphasis in original). 
In Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 
443 F. 2d 1159 (CA2 1971), the direct infringers retained the contributory 
infringer to manage their performances. The contributory infringer 
would contact each direct infringer, obtain the titles of the musical compo-
sitions to be performed, print the programs, and then sell the programs to 
its own local organizations for distribution at the time of the direct infringe-
ment. Id ., at 1161. The Court of Appeals emphasized that the contribu-
tory infringer had actual knowledge that the artists it was managing were 
performing copyrighted works, was in a position to police the infringing 
conduct of the artists, and derived substantial benefit from the actions of 
the primary infringers. I d., at 1163. 
In Screen Gems-Columbia Music , Inc . v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. 
Supp. 399 (S. D. N. Y. 1966), the direct infringer manufactured and sold 
bootleg records. In denying a motion for summary judgment, the District 
Court held that the infringer's advertising agency, the radio stations that 
advertised the infringer's works, and the service agency that boxed and 
mailed the infringing goods could all be held liable, if at trial it could be 
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employee of Sony, Sonam or DDBI had either direct involve-
ment with the allegedly infringing activity or direct contact 
with purchasers of Betamax who recorded copyrighted works 
off-the-air." 480 F. Supp., at 460. And it further found 
that "there was no evidence that any of the copies made by 
Griffiths or the other individual witnesses in this suit were 
influenced or encouraged by [Sony's] advertisements." 
lbid. 19 
If vicarious liability is to be imposed on petitioners in this 
case, it must rest on the fact that they have sold equipment 
with constructive knowledge of the fact that their customers 
may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copy-
righted material. There is no precedent in the law of copy-
right for the imposition of vicarious liability on such a theory. 
The closest analogy is provided by the patent law cases to 
which it is appropriate to refer because of the historic kinship 
between patent law and copyright law. 20 
demonstrated that they knew or should have known that they were dealing 
in illegal goods. 
'"The broad verbal formulae which have been used to describe ordinary 
claims of contributory infringement, see, e. g., Gershwin Publishing Corp. 
v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159, 1162 (CA2 1971) 
("[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or 
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held lia-
ble as a 'contributory' infringer."); see also, Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S. 844, 851 (1982), cannot reasonably be ap-
plied literally in the context of respondents' unprecedented copyright 
claim. Manufacturers and distributors of numerous devices undoubtably 
have constructive knowledge that their products may be used by some of 
their customers to violate the rights of others. Such distributors would 
neatly fit the wording of these formulae, but imposing liability on them 
merely for marketing the devices that were misused by their customers 
would represent a radical extension of traditional notions of legal respon-
sibility. Indeed, the Court of Appeals recognized that the sale of "cam-
eras or photocopying machines" would "not even remotely raise copyright 
problems." 659 F. 2d, at 975. 
20 E. g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 158 (1948); 
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 106, 131 (1932); Wheaton and Donald-
son v. Peters and Grigg, 33 U. S. 591, 657--{)58 (1834). The two areas of 
• 
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In the Patent Code both the concept of infringement and 
the concept of contributory infringement are expressly de-
fined by statute. 21 The prohibition against contributory in-
. fringement is confined to the knowing sale of a component es-
pecially made for use in connection with a particular patent. 
There is no suggestion in the statute that one patentee may 
object to the sale of a product that might be used in connec-
tion with other patents. Moreover, the Act expressly pro-
vides that the sale of a "staple article or commodity of com-
merce suitable for substantial noninfringing use" is not 
contributory infringement. 
When a charge of contributory infringement is predicated 
entirely on the sale of an article of commerce that is used by 
the law, naturally, are not identical twins, and we exercise the caution 
which we have expressed in the past in applying doctrine formulated in one 
area to the other. See generally, Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 217-218 
(1954); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 345 (1908). 
21 35 U. S. C. § 271 provides: 
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without author-
ity makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States 
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. 
"(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as 
an infringer. 
"(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, 
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing 
a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing 
the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringe-
ment of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce 
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory 
infringer. 
"(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or 
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed 
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his hav-
ing done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which 
if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory 
infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform 
acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory 
infrigement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against 
infringement or contributory infringement." 
-
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the purchaser to infringe a patent, the public interest in ac-
cess to that article of commerce is necessarily implicated. A 
finding of contributory infringement does not, of course, re-
move the article from the market altogether; it does, how-
ever, give the patentee effective control over the sale of that 
item. Indeed, a finding of contributory infringement is nor-
mally the functional equivalent of holding that the disputed 
article is within the monopoly granted to the patentee. 22 
For that reason, in contributory infringement cases arising 
under the patent laws the Court has always recognized the 
critical importance of not allowing the patentee to extend his 
monopoly beyond the limits of his specific grant. These 
cases deny the patentee any right to control the distribution 
of unpatented articles unless they are "unsuited for any com-
mercial noninfringing use." Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm 
& Hass Co., 448 U. S. 176, 198 (1980). Unless a commodity 
"has no use except through practice of the patented method," 
ibid, the patentee has no right to claim that its distribution 
constitutes contributory infringment. "To form the basis for 
contributory infringement the item must almost be uniquely 
suited as a component of the patented invention." P. Rosen-
berg, Patent Law Fundamentals§ 17.02[2] (1982). "[A] sale 
of an article which though adapted to an infringing use is also 
adapted to other and lawful uses, is not enough to make the 
seller a contributory infringer. Such a rule would block the 
wheels of commerce." Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1, 
48 (1912), overruled on other grounds, Motion Picture Pat-
22 1t seems extraordinary to suggest that the Copyright Act confers upon 
all copyright owners collectively, much less the two respondents in this 
case, the exclusive right to distribute VTR's simply because they may be 
used to infringe copyrights. That, however, is the logical implication of 
their claim. The request for an injunction below indicates that respondents 
seek, in effect, to declare VTR's contraband. Their suggestion in this 
Court that a continuing royalty pursuant to a judicially created compulsory 
license would be an acceptable remedy merely indicates that respondents, 
for their part, would be willing to license their claimed monopoly interest in 
VTR's to petitioners in return for a royalty. 
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ents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 517 
(1917). 
Although there are substantial differences between the 
patent and copyright laws, there is no reason to grant the 
copyright holder any broader right to bar noninfringing activ-
ities than the patent holder. Indeed, the copyright holder 
should have a lesser right, for by precluding noninfringing 
uses he may not only block the wheels of commerce, but also 
might impose an unjustified tax on the free marketplace of 
ideas and interfere with the opportunities of other copyright 
holders to authorize exploitation of the devices for their own 
purposes. 
Under our cases, as well as the text of the Patent Code, 
the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of 
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if 
the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable 
purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses. 
IV 
The question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of 
commercially significant noninfringing uses. In order to re-
solve that question, we need not explore all the different po-
tential uses of the machine and determine whether or not 
they would constitute infringement. Rather, we need only 
consider whether on the basis of the facts as found by the dis-
trict court a significant number of them would be non-infring-
ing. Moreover, in order to resolve this case we need not 
give precise content to the question of how much use is com-
mercially significant. For one potential use of the Betamax 
plainly satisfies this standard, however it is understood: pri-
vate, noncommercial time-shifting in the home. It does so 
both (A) because respondents have no right to prevent other 
copyright holders from authorizing it for their programs, and 
(B) because the District Court's factual findings reveal that 
even the unauthorized home time-shifting of respondents' 
programs is legitimate fair use. 
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A. Authorized Time Shifting 
Each of the respondents owns a large inventory of valuable 
copyrights, but in the total spectrum of television program-
ming their combined market share is small. The exact per-
centage is not specified, but it is well below 10%.23 If they 
were to prevail, the outcome of this litigation would have a 
significant impact on both the producers and the viewers of 
the remaining 90% of the programming in the Nation. No 
doubt, many other producers share respondents' concern 
about the possible consequences of unrestricted copying. 
Nevertheless the findings of the District Court make it clear 
that time-shifting may enlarge the total viewing audience and 
that many producers are willing to allow private time-shifting 
to continue, at least for an experimental time period. 24 
The District Court found: 
"Even if it were deemed that home-use recording of 
copyrighted material constituted infringement, the Beta-
max could still legally be used to record noncopyrighted 
material or material whose owners consented to the 
copying. An injunction would deprive the public of the 
ability to use the Betamax for this noninfringing off-the-
air recording. 
23 The record suggests that Disney's programs at the time of trial con-
sisted of approximately one hour a week of network television and one syn-
dicated series. Universal's percentage in the Los Angeles market on com-
mercial television stations was under 5%. See Tr. 532-533, 549-550. 
"' The District Court did not make any explicit findings with regard to 
how much broadcasting is wholly uncopyrighted. The record does include 
testimony that at least one movie-My Man Godfrey-falls within that cat-
egory, Tr. 2300-2301, and certain broadcasts produced by the federal gov-
ernment are also uncopyrighted. See 17 U. S. C. § 105. Cf. Schappner 
v. Foley, 667 F. 2d 102 (CADC 1981) (explaining distinction between work 
produced by the government and work commissioned by the government). 
To the extent such broadcasting is now significant, it further bolsters our 
conclusion. Moreover, since copyright protection is not perpetual, the 
number of audiovisual works in the public domain necessarily increases 
each year. 
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"Defendants introduced considerable testimony at 
trial about the potential for such copying of sports, reli-
gious, educational and other programming. This in-
cluded testimony from representatives of the Offices of 
the Commissioners of the N ation:al Football, Basketball, 
Baseball and Hockey Leagues and Associations, the Ex-
ecutive Director of National Religious Broadcasters and 
various educational communications agencies. Plaintiffs 
attack the weight of the testimony offered and also con-
tend that an injunction is warranted because infringing 
uses outweigh noninfringing uses." 
"Whatever the future percentage of legal versus ille-
gal home-use recording might be, an injunction which 
seeks to deprive the public of the very tool or article of 
commerce capable of some noninfringing use would be an 
extremely harsh remedy, as well as one unprecedented 
in copyright law." 480 F. Supp., at 468. 
Although the District Court made these statements in the 
context of considering the propriety of injunctive relief, the 
statements constitute a finding that the evidence concerning 
"sports, religious, educational, and other programming" was 
sufficient to establish a significant quantity of broadcasting 
whose copying is now authorized, and a significant potential 
for future authorized copying. That finding is amply sup-
ported by the record. In addition to the religious and sports 
officials identified explicitly by the District Court, 25 two items 
in the record deserve specific mention. 
20 See Tr. 2447- 2450 (Alexander Hadden, Major League Baseball); Tr. 
2480, 2486-2487 (Jay Moyer, National Football League); Tr. 2515-2516 
(David Stern, National Basketball Association); Tr. 2530-2534 (Gilbert 
Stein, National Hockey League); Tr. 2543-2552 (Thomas Hansen, National 
Collegiate Athletic Association); Tr. 2565-2572 (Benjamin Armstrong, Na-
tional Religious Broadcasters). Those officials were authorized to be the 
official spokespersons for their respective institutions in this litigation. 
Tr. 2432, 2479, 2509-2510, 2530, 2538, 2563. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 
30(b)(6). 
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First is the testimony of John Kenaston, the station man-
ager of Channel 58, an educational station in Los Angeles 
affiliated with the Public Broadcasting Service. He ex-
plained and authenticated the station's published guide to its 
programs. 26 For each program, the guide tells whether un-
limited home taping is authorized, home taping is authorized 
subject to certain restrictions (such as erasure within seven 
days), or home taping is not authorized at all. The Spring 
1978 edition of the guide described 107 programs. Sixty-two 
of those programs or 58% authorize some home taping. 
Twenty-one of them or almost 20% authorize unrestricted 
home taping. T1 
Second is the testimony of Fred Rogers, president of the 
corporation that produces and owns the copyright on Mr. 
Rogers' Neighborhood. The program is carried by more 
public television stations than any other program. Its audi-
ence numbers over 3,000,000 families a day. He testified 
that he had absolutely no objection to home taping for non-
commercial use and expressed the opinion that it is a real 
service to families to be able to record children's programs 
and to show them at appropriate times. 28 
211 Tr. 2863-2902; Def. Exh. PI. 
27 See also Tr. 2833-2844 (similar testimony by executive director of New 
Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority). Cf. Tr. 2592-2605 (testimony by 
chief of New York Education Department's Bureau of Mass Communica-
tions approving home taping for educational purposes). 
28 "Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the 
'Neighborhood' at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that 
it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and show 
them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the advent of all 
of this new technology that allows people to tape the 'Neighborhood' off-
the-air, and I'm speaking for the 'Neighborhood' because that's what I 
produce, that they then become much more active in the programming of 
their family's television life. Very frankly, I am opposed to people being 
programmed by others. My whole approach in broadcasting has always 
been 'You are an important person just the way you are. You can make 
healthy decisions.' Maybe I'm going on too long, but I just feel that any-
thing that allows a person to be more active in the control of his or her life, 
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If there are millions of owners of VTR's who make copies of 
televised sports events, religious broadcasts, and educational 
programs such as Mister Rogers' Neighborhood, and if the 
proprietors of those programs welcome the practice, the busi-
ness of supplying the equipment that makes such copying fea-
sible should not be stifled simply because the equipment is 
used by some individuals to make unauthorized reproductions 
of respondents' works. The respondents do not represent a 
class composed of all copyright holders. Yet a finding of con-
tributory infringement would inevitably frustrate the inter-
ests of broadcasters in reaching the portion of their audience 
that is available only through time-shifting. 
Of course, the fact that other copyright holders may wel-
come the practice of time-shifting does not mean that re-
spondents should be deemed to have granted a license to copy 
their programs. Third party conduct would be wholly irrele-
vant in an action for direct infringement of respondents' 
copyrights. But in an action for contributory infringement 
against the seller of copying equipment, the copyright holder 
may not prevail unless the relief that he seeks affects only his 
programs, or unless he speaks for virtually all copyright hold-
ers with an interest in the outcome. In this case, the record 
makes it perfectly clear that there are many important pro-
ducers of national and local television programs who find 
nothing objectionable about the enlargement in the size of the 
television audience that results from the practice of time-
shifting for private home use. 29 The seller of the equipment 
in a healthy way, is important." T. R. 2920-2921. See also Def. Exh. PI, 
p. 85. 
29 It may be rare for large numbers of copyright owners to authorize 
duplication of their works without demanding a fee from the copier. In 
the context of public broadcasting, however, the user of the copyrighted 
work is not required to pay a fee for access to the underlying work. The 
traditional method by which copyright owners capitalize upon the televi-
sion medium---<!ommercially sponsored free public broadcast over the pub-
lic airwaves-is predicated upon the assumption that compensation for the 
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that expands those producers' audiences cannot be a con-
tributory infringer if, as is true in this case, it has had no di-
rect involvement with any infringing activity. 
B. Unauthorized Time-Shifting 
Even unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work are not nec-
essarily infringing. An unlicensed use of the copyright is not 
an infringement unless it conflicts with one of the specific ex-
clusive rights conferred by the copyright statute. Twentieth 
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 154-155. 
Moreover, the definition of exclusive rights in § 106 of the 
present Act is prefaced by the words "subject to sections 107 
through 118." Those sections describe a variety of uses of 
copyrighted material that "are not infringements of copyright 
notwithstanding the provisions of § 106." The most perti-
nent in this case is § 107, the legislative endorsement of the 
doctrine of "fair use." 30 
value of displaying the works will be received in the form of advertising 
revenues. 
In the context of television programming, some producers evidently be-
lieve that permitting home viewers to make copies of their works off the air 
actually enhances the value of their copyrights. Irrespective of their rea-
sons for authorizing the practice, they do so, and in significant enough 
numbers to create a substantial market for a non-infringing use of the Sony 
VTR's. No one could dispute the legitimacy of that market if the produc-
ers had authorized home taping of their programs in exchange for a license 
fee paid directly by the home user. The legitimacy of that market is not 
compromised simply because these producers have authorized home taping 
of their programs without demanding a fee from the home user. The copy-
right law does not require a copyright owner to charge a fee for the use of 
his works, and as this record clearly demonstrates, the owner of a copy-
right may well have economic or noneconomic reasons for permitting cer-
tain kinds of copying to occur without receiving direct compensation from 
the copier. It is not the role of the courts to tell copyright holders the best 
way for them to exploit their copyrights: even if respondents' competitors 
were ill-advised in authorizing home videotaping, that would not change 
the fact that they have created a substantial market for a paradigmatic 
non-infringing use of petitioners' product. 
00 The Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, did not have a "fair use" pro-
vision. Although that Act's compendium of exclusive rights "to print, re-
print, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work" was broad enough to 
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That section identifies various factors 31 that enable a Court 
to apply an "equitable rule of reason" analysis to particular 
claims of infringement. 32 Although not conclusive, the first 
encompass virtually all potential interactions with a copyrighted work, the 
statute was never so construed. The courts simply refused to read the 
statute literally in every situation. When Congress amended the statute 
in 1976, it indicated that it ''intended to restate the present judicial doc-
trine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." House 
Report No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 66. 
31 Section 107 provides: 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords 
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy-
right. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
"(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work." 17 U. S. C. § 107. 
32 The nature of the section is explained in these comments from the 
House Report on the fair use section: 
"Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doc-
trine over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever 
emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no gen-
erally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question 
must be decided on its own facts. . . . 
General intention behind the provision 
"The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers some guid-
ance to users in determining when the principles of the doctrine apply. 
However, the endless variety of situations and combinations of circum-
stances that can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact 
rules in the statute. The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of 
the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the 
doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological 
change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and 
some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the 
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis." H. Rep. No. 
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factor requires that "the commercial or nonprofit character of 
an activity" be weighed in any fair use decision. 33 If the 
Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or 
profit-making purpose, such use would presumptively be un-
fair. The contrary presumption is appropriate here, how-
ever, because the District Court's findings plainly establish 
that time-shifting for private home use must be characterized 
as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity. Moreover, when one 
considers the nature of a televised copyrighted audiovisual 
work, see 17 U. S. C. § 107(2), and that timeshifting merely 
enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been in-
vited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that 
the entire work is reproduced, see id., at § 107(3), does not 
have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair 
use. 
This is not, however, the end of the inquiry because Con-
gress has also directed us to consider "the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work." !d., at§ 107(4). The purpose of copyright is to cre-
ate incentives for creative effort. Even copying for noncom-
mercial purposes may impair the copyright holder's ability to 
obtain the rewards that Congress intended him to have. 
But a use that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential 
market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work need not 
be prohibited in order to protect the author's incentive to cre-
ate. The prohibition of such noncommercial uses would 
94-1476, pp. 65-66. 
33 "The Committee has amended the first of the criteria to be consid-
ered-'the purpose and character of the use'-to state explicitly that this 
factor includes a consideration of 'whether such use is of a commercial na-
ture or is for non-profit educational purposes.' This amendment is not in-
tended to be interpreted as any sort of not-for-profit limitation on educa-
tional uses of copyrighted works. It is an express recognition that, as 
under the present law, the commercial or non-profit character of an activ-
ity, while not conclusive with respect to fair use, can and should be 
weighed along with other factors in fair use decisions." H. Rep. No. 
94-1476, p. 66. 
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merely inhibit access to ideas without any countervailing 
benefit. 34 
Thus, although every commercial use of copyrighted mate-
rial is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly 
privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright, noncom-
mercial uses are a different matter. A challenge to a non-
commercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either 
that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become 
widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market 
for the copyrighted work. Actual present harm need not be 
shown; such a requirement would leave the copyright holder 
with no defense against predictable damage. Nor is it neces-
sary to show with certainty that future harm will result. 
What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists. 
If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood 
may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, 
the likelihood must be demonstrated. 
In this case, respondents failed to carry their burden with 
regard to home time-shifting. The District Court described 
respondents' evidence as follows: 
"Plaintiffs' experts admitted at several points in the 
trial that the time-shifting without librarying would re-
sult in 'not a great deal of harm.' Plaintiffs' greatest 
concern about time-shifting is with 'a point of important 
philosophy that transcends even commercial judgment.' 
They fear that with any Betamax usage, 'invisible 
.. Cf. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted as Study 
No. 14 in Senate Judiciary Committee, Copyright Law Revision, Studies 
Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 
86th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 30 (1960): 
"In certain situations, the copyright owner suffers no substantial harm 
from the use of the work. . . . Here again, is the partial marriage be-
tween the doctrine of fair use and the legal maxim de minimis non curat 
lex." 
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boundaries' are passed: 'the copyright owner has lost 
control over his program."' 480 F. Supp., at 467. 
Later in its opinion, the District Court observed: 
"Most of plaintiffs' predictions of harm hinge on specula-
tion about audience viewing patterns and ratings, a 
measurement system which Sidney Sheinberg, MCA's 
president, calls a 'black art' because of the significant 
level of imprecision involved in the calculations." I d. , at 
469. 35 
There was no need for the District Court to say much about 
past harm. "Plaintiffs have admitted that no actual harm to 
their copyrights has occurred to date." Id., at 451. 
On the question of potential future harm from time-shift-
ing, the District Court offered a more detailed analysis of the 
evidence. It rejected respondents' "fear that persons 
'watching' the original telecast of a program will not be meas-
ured in the live audience and the ratings and revenues will 
decrease," by observing that current measurement technol-
ogy allows the Betamax audience to be reflected. I d., at 
466. 36 It rejected respondents' prediction "that live televi-
36 See also 480 F. Supp., at 451: 
"It should be noted, however, that plaintiffs' argument is more complicated 
and speculative than was the plaintiff's in Williams & Wilkins. . . . Here, 
plaintiffs ask the court to find harm based on many more assumptions .... 
As is discussed more fully in Part IV, infra, some of these assumptions are 
based on neither fact nor experience, and plaintiffs admit that they are to 
some extent inconsistent and illogical." 
36 "There was testimony at trial, however, that Nielsen Ratings has al-
ready developed the ability to measure when a Betamax in a sample home 
is recording the program. Thus, the Betamax will be measured as a part 
of the live audience. The later diary can augment that measurement with 
information about subsequent viewing." 480 F. Supp., at 466. 
In a separate section, the District Court rejected plaintiffs' suggestion 
that the commercial attractiveness of television broadcasts would be dimin-
ished because Betamax owners would use the pause button or fast-forward 
control to avoid viewing advertisements: 
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sion or movie audiences will decrease as more people watch 
Betamax tapes as an alternative," with the observation that 
"[t]here is no factual basis for [the underlying] assumption." 
Ibid. 37 It rejected respondents' "fear that time-shifting will 
reduce audiences for telecast reruns," and concluded instead 
that "given current market practices, this should aid plain-
tiffs rather than harm them." Ibid. 38 And it declared that 
respondents' suggestion "that theater or film rental exhi-
bition of a program will suffer because of time-shift recording 
of that program" "lacks merit." 480 F. Supp., at 467. 39 
"It must be remembered, however, that to omit commercials, Betamax 
owners must view the program, including the commercials, while record-
ing. To avoid commercials during playback, the viewer must fast-forward 
and, for the most part, guess as to when the commercial has passed. For 
most recordings, either practice may be too tedious. As defendants' sur-
vey showed, 92% of the programs were recorded with commercials and 
only 25% of the owners fast-forward through them. Advertisers will have 
to make the same kinds of judgments they do now about whether persons 
viewing televised programs actually watch the advertisements which inter-
rupt them." Id., at 468. 
87 "Here plaintiffs assume that people will view copies when they would 
otherwise be watching television or going to the movie theater. There is 
no factual basis for this assumption. It seems equally likely that Betamax 
owners will play their tapes when there is nothing on television they wish 
to see and no movie they want to attend. Defendants' survey does not 
show any negative effect of Betamax ownership on television viewing or 
theater attendance." Ibid. 
38 "The underlying assumptions here are particularly difficult to accept. 
Plaintiffs explain that the Betamax increases access to the original tele-
vised material and that the more people there are in this original audience, 
the fewer people the rerun will attract. Yet current marketing practices, 
including the success of syndication, show just the opposite. Today, the 
larger the audience for the original telecast, the higher the price plaintiffs 
can demand from broadcasters from rerun rights. There is no survey 
within the knowledge of this court to show that the rerun audience is com-
prised of persons who have not seen the program. In any event, if ratings 
can reflect Betamax recording, original audiences may increase and, given 
market practices, this should aid plaintiffs rather than harm them." Ibid. 
39 "This suggestion lacks merit. By definition, time-shift recording en-
tails viewing and erasing, so the program will no longer be on tape when 
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After completing that review, the District Court restated 
its overall conclusion several times, in several different ways. 
"Harm from time-shifting is speculative and, at best, mini-
mal." Ibid. "The audience benefits from the time-shifting 
capability have already been discussed. It is not implausible 
that benefits could also accrue to plaintiffs, broadcasters, and 
advertisers, as the Betamax makes it possible for more per-
sons to view their broadcasts." Ibid. "No likelihood of 
harm was shown at trial, and plaintiffs admitted that there 
had been no actual harm to date." I d., at 468-469. "Testi-
mony at trial suggested that Betamax may require adjust-
ments in marketing strategy, but it did not establish even a 
likelihood of harm." I d., at 469. "Television production by 
plaintiffs today is more profitable than it has ever been, and, 
in five weeks of trial, there was no concrete evidence to sug-
gest that the Betamax will change the studios' financial pic-
ture." Ibid. 
The District Court's conclusions are buttressed by the fact 
that to the extent time-shifting expands public access to 
freely broadcast television programs, it yields societal bene-
fits. Earlier this year, in Community Television of South-
ern California v. Gottfried, -- U. S. --, --- --, n. 
12 (1983), we acknowledged the public interest in making 
television broadcasting more available. Concededly, that in-
terest is not unlimited. But it supports an interpretation of 
the concept of "fair use" that requires the copyright holder to 
demonstrate some likelihood of harm before he may condemn 
a private act of time-shifting as a violation of federal law. 
the later theater run begins. Of course, plaintiffs may fear that the 
Betamax will keep the tapes long enough to satisfy all their interest in the 
program and will, therefore, not patronize later theater exhibitions. To 
the extent this practice involves librarying, it is addressed in section V.C., 
infra. It should also be noted that there is no evidence to suggest that the 
public interest in later theatrical exhibitions of motion pictures will be re-
duced any more by Betamax recording than it already is by the television 
broadcast of the film." 480 F. Supp., at 467. 
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When these factors are all weighed in the "rule of reason" 
balance, we must conclude that this record amply supports 
the District Court's conclusion that home time-shifting is fair 
use. In light of the findings of the District Court regarding 
the state of the empirical data, it is clear that the Court of 
Appeals erred in holding that the statute as presently writ-
ten bars such conduct. 40 
40 The Court of Appeals chose not to engage in any "equitable rule of rea-
son" analysis in this case. Instead, it assumed that the category of "fair 
use" is rigidly circumscribed by a requirement that every such use must be 
"productive." It therefore concluded that copying a television program 
merely to enable the viewer to receive information or entertainment that 
he would otherwise miss because of a personal scheduling conflict could 
never be fair use. That understanding of "fair use" was erroneous. 
Congress has plainly instructed us that fair use analysis calls for a sensi-
tive balancing of interests. The distinction between "productive" and "un-
productive" uses may be helpful in calibrating the balance, but it cannot be 
wholly determinative. Although copying to promote a scholarly endeavor 
certainly has a stronger claim to fair use than copying to avoid interrupting 
a poker game, the question is not simply two-dimensional. For one thing, 
it is not true that all copyrights are fungible. Some copyrights govern ma-
terial with broad potential secondary markets. Such material may well 
have a broader claim to protection because of the greater potential for com-
mercial harm. Copying a news broadcast may have a stronger claim to 
fair use than copying a motion picture. And, of course, not all uses are 
fungible. Copying for commercial gain has a much weaker claim to fair 
use than copying for personal enrichment. But the notion of social "pro-
ductivity" cannot be a complete answer to this analysis. A teacher who 
copies to prepare lecture notes is clearly productive. But so is a teacher 
who copies for the sake of broadening his personal understanding of his 
specialty. Or a legislator w.ho copies for the sake of broadening her under-
standing of what her constituents are watching; or a constituent who copies 
a news program to help make a decision on how to vote. 
Making a copy of a copyrighted work for the convenience of a blind per-
son is expressly identified by the House Committee Report as an example 
of fair use, with no suggestion that anything more than a purpose to enter-
tain or to inform need motivate the copying. In a hospital setting, using a 
VTR to enable a patient to see programs he would otherwise miss has no 
productive purpose other than contributing to the psychological well-being 
of the patient. Virtually any time-shifting that increases viewer access to 
television programming may result in a comparable benefit. The statu-
/ 
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In summary, the record and findings of the District Court 
lead us to two conclusions. First, Sony demonstrated a sig-
nificant likelihood that substantial numbers of copyright hold-
ers who license their works for broadcast on free television 
would not object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by 
private viewers. And second, respondents failed to demon-
strate that time-shifting would cause any likelihood of non-
minimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, 
their copyrighted works. The Betamax is, therefore, capa-
ble of substantial noninfringing uses. Sony's sale of such 
equipment to the general public does not constitute contribu-
tory infringement of respondent's copyrights. 
v 
"The direction of Art. I is that Congress shall have the 
power to promote the progress of science and the useful 
arts. When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the 
sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can come only 
from Congress." Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram 
Corp., 406 U. S. 518, 530 (1972). 
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that 
the elected representatives of the millions of people who 
watch television every day have made it unlawful to copy a 
program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat 
prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copy-
ing possible. 
It may well be that Congress will take a fresh look at this 
new technology, just as it so often has examined other inno-
vations in the past. But it is not our job to apply laws that 
have not yet been written. Applying the copyright statute, 
as it now reads, to the facts as they have been developed in 
tory language does not identify any dicohotomy between productive and 
nonproductive time-shifting, but does require consideration of the eco-
nomic consequences of copying. 
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this case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be 
reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
STYL\ST1C CHANGES THROUGHOUT. 
SEE PAGES~ / - Y). 
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[June-, 1983] 
Memorandum of JUSTICE STEVENS. 
Petitioners (Sony) have manufactured and sold several mil-
lion home video tape recorders to members of the general 
public in recent years. Respondents are owners of copy-
righted motion picture films and television programs. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held 
Sony guilty of the nonstatutory tort of contributory infringe-
ment, and it ordered the District Court to fashion appropri-
ate relief: an injunction against the further sale of the equip-
ment, an award of damages, or a continuing royalty pursuant 
to "a judicially created compulsory license." 659 F. 2d 963, 
976, n. 18 (1981). 
The Court of Appeals' holding raises at least three ques-
tions of copyright law that this Court has never previously 
confronted: (1) whether the act of making a single copy of 
copyrighted work for a private, noncommercial use ever con-
stitutes copyright infringement; (2) whether the manufac-
turer of copying equipment may be held liable for contribu-
tory infringement for advertising and selling the equipment 
to the general public; and (3) whether a judicially imposed 
continuing royalty is a permissible form of relief for contribu-
tory infringment. 
We granted certiorari to address these important ques-
2 7 '83 
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tions. 457 U. S. 1116 (1982). Because certain ultimate 
facts found by the District Court are dispositive of the con-
tributory infringement issue, we need decide only that ques-
tion. In brief, the critical facts are these: the principal use of 
the video tape recorder is to enable its owner to view a pro-
gram he would otherwise miss; this practice, known as "time-
shifting," enlarges the television viewing audience. For that 
reason, a significant number of producers of television pro-
grams have no objection to the copying of their program for 
private home viewing. For the same reason, even the two 
respondents in this case, who do object to time shifting, were 
unable to prove that the practice has caused them any actual 
harm or creates any likelihood of future harm. 
Thus, for two independent and sufficient reasons the sale 
of VTR's to the general public does not constitute contribu-
tory infringement of respondents' copyrights. First, re-
spondents have no right to object to the use of VTR's to copy 
programs produced by others, or to interfere with the sale of 
equipment that makes such copying possible. Second, since 
there is an admitted public interest in increasing access to 
television programming, and since the practice of time-shift-
ing for private home use involves neither a commercial 
exploitation of respondents' copyrights nor any diminution in 
the value of the monopolies granted to them, it is a non-in-
fringing fair use of copyrighted programs. The sale of 
equipment that is primarily used for that purpose is plainly 
not contributory infringement. 1 
1 The questions of direct infringement are relevant only to the extent 
they bear on the question of contributory infringement. For respondents 
have disavowed the existence of any genuine controversy with the individ-
ual user of the Betamax. In a press release issued by one of the respond-
ents after its victory in the Court of Appeals in this case, it stated, in part: 
"Millions of families in the United States and around the world are now 
involved in videotaping programming in their own homes for their own pri-
vate use. We have no intention, in this or any other litigation, of pursuing 
individuals to interfere with this practice. 
. • 
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Although the two grounds of decision are relatively 
straightforward, the importance of the case makes it appro-
priate to set forth the facts and the relevant legal history in 
some detail. 
I 
Sony manufactures the Betamax video tape recorder, a 
piece of equipment having three components: (1) a tuner, 
which receives electromagnetic signals transmitted over the 
airwaves and separates them into audio and visual signals; (2) 
a recorder, which records such signals on magnetic tapes; and 
(3) an adapter, which converts the audio and visual signals on 
the tape back into a composite signal that can be received by 
a television set. At the time of trial, the Betamax was mar-
keted in four models, at retail prices ranging from about $875 
to $1,000. Sony also sold tapes of various sizes, the longest 
being a three-hour tape that sold for about $21.00. Tapes 
may be reused, and programs that have been recorded on 
tape may be erased either before or after viewing. The 
Betamax can be used with different kinds of television sets 
and is capable of recording one show while the set is off, or is 
tuned to another show. Thus, for example, a viewer could 
see two simultaneous news telecasts by watching one and re-
cording the second for later viewing. 
The Betamax is equipped with three devices that affect its 
utility-a timer, a pause button, and a fast-forward control. 
The timer can activiate and deactivate the equipment at pre-
determined times and thus makes it possible to record pro-
grams that are broadcast when the owner is not at home. 
The pause button allows the owner to deactivate the recorder 
"We first initiated this case in 1976, more than five years ago, when 
there were relatively few tape recorders in homes. Since that time we 
have come to realize that the interests of all concerned can be better ac-
commodated by passage of new laws." Excerpt from statement by E. 
Cardon Walker, Chairman of Walt Disney Productions, on November 2, 
1981, quoted in App. to Br. for Petitioners, p. 2 . 
.... • 
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temporarily; thus, if he is watching a program while the ma-
chine is recording, he may omit a commercial advertisement 
by depressing the pause button. The fast-forward control 
enables the viewer of a recorded program to run the tape rap-
idly when a segment he does not desire to see is on the 
screen. 
The trial of the case in the District Court concerned only 
the private, home use of VTR's. 2 See 480 F. Supp. 429, 
432-433 (1979). No issue concerning the transfer of tapes to 
other persons, the use of tapes for public performances, or 
the copying of programs broadcast on cable television sys-
tems was raised. All of the evidence related to programs 
that had been broadcast to the public at large. 
Both plaintiffs and defendants conducted surveys of the 
way the Betamax machine was used by several hundred own-
2 The District Court explained: 
" 'Home-use' recording as used in this opinion is the operation of the 
Betamax in a private home to record a program for subsequent home view-
ing. The programs involved in this lawsuit are broadcast free to the public 
over public airwaves. The court heard extensive testimony from defend-
ant William Griffiths and four non-defendant individuals about this activ-
ity, and the court's declaration of non-infringement is limited to this home 
use-situation. 
"It is important to note the limits of this holding. Neither pay nor cable 
television stations are plaintiffs in this suit and no defendant recorded the 
signals from either. The court is not ruling on tape swapping, organized 
or informal. The court is not ruling no tape duplication within the home or 
outside, by individuals, groups or corporations. Nor is the court ruling on 
off-the-air recording for use outside the home. e. g., by teachers for class-
rooms, corporations for employees, etc. No defendant engaged in any of 
these activities and the facts necessary to determine their legality are not 
before this court. 
"The ramifications of this new technology are greater than the bound-
aries of this lawsuit. A court reviewing the limited claims of specified par-
ties in a particular factual setting cannot and should not undertake the role 
of a government commission or legislative body exploring and evaluating 
all the uses and consequences of the videotape recorder." 480 F. Supp., at 
442. 
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ers during a sample period in 1978. Although there were 
some differences in the surveys, they both showed that the 
primary use of the machine for most owners was for "time-
shifting," i. e., to record programs they otherwise would 
have missed. Both surveys also showed, however, that a 
substantial number of interviewees had accumulated libraries 
of cassettes. 3 Defendants' survey indicated that over 80 
percent of the interviewees watched the same amount or 
more regular television as they had before owning a Beta-
max. 4 Plaintiffs offered no evidence of decreased television 
viewing by Betamax owners. 5 
a The District Court summarized some of the findings in these surveys 
as follows: 
"Plaintiffs' survey found that the average number of cassettes owned by 
the interviewees was 31. 73. 63.9% of plaintiffs' interviewees had less than 
five cassettes with movies on them and 81.1% had less than five cassettes 
with television programs on them. Defendants' interviewees reported an 
average of 25.21 cassettes with material recorded off-the-air. 
"According to plaintiffs' survey, 75.4% of the VTR owners use their ma-
chines to record for time-shifting purposes half or most of the time. De-
fendants' survey showed that 96% of the Betamax owners had used the ma-
chine to record programs they otherwise would have missed. 
"When plaintiffs asked interviewees how many cassettes were in their li-
brary, 55.8% said there were 10 or fewer. In defendants' survey, of the 
total programs viewed by interviewees in the past month, 70.4% had been 
viewed only that one time and for 57.9%, there were no plans for further 
viewing." 480 F. Supp., at 438. 
• "81.9% of the defendants' interviewees watched the same amount or 
more of regular television as they did before owning a Betamax. 83.2% 
reported their frequency of movie going was unaffected by Betamax." 480 
F. Supp., at 439. 
• As evidence of how a VTR may be used, plaintiffs offered the testi-
mony of William Griffiths. Griffiths, although named as an individual de-
fendant, was a client of plaintiffs' law firm. The District Court summa-
rized his testimony as follows: 
"He owns approximately 100 tapes. When Griffiths brought his Betamax, 
he intended not only to time-shift (record, play-back and then erase) but 
also to build a library of cassettes. Maintaining a library, however, 
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Defendants introduced considerable evidence describing 
television programs that could be copied without objection 
from any copyright holder, with special emphasis on sports, 
religious, and educational programming. For example, their 
survey indicated that 7. 3 percent of all Betamax use is to 
record professional sports events, and representatives of pro-
fessional baseball, football, basketball, and hockey testified 
that they had no objection to the recording of their televised 
events for home use. 6 
proved too expensive, and he is now erasing some earlier tapes and reusing 
them. 
"Griffiths copied about 20 minutes of a Universal motion picture called 
'Never Give An Inch,' and two episodes from Universal television series 
entitled 'Baa Baa Black Sheep' and 'Holmes and Yo Yo.' He would have 
erased each of these but for the request of plaintiffs' counsel that it be kept. 
Griffiths also testified that he had copied but already erased Universal 
films called 'Alpha Caper' (erased before anyone saw it) and 'Amelia Ear-
hart.' At the time of his deposition Griffiths did not intend to keep any 
Universal film in his library. 
"Griffiths has also recorded documentaries, news broadcasts, sporting 
events and political programs such as a rerun of the Nixon/Kennedy de-
bate.'' 480 F. Supp., at 43&-437. 
Three other witnesses testified to having engaged in similar activity. 
6 Alexander Hadden, the General Counsel for the Commissioner of 
Baseball, after describing the national telecasts of professional baseball 
games, testified: 
"Q Can you tell us whether Major League Baseball has any objection to 
off-the-air recording by a Betamax owner in the privacy of his home for his 
own personal use of any of the nationally-telecast baseball games which you 
have previously described? 
"A I believe we would have no objection to that limited usage of the re-
cordings of such programs. 
"Q So am I correct, then that if a Betamax owner were to record one of 
the Monday evening or Saturday afternoon nationally-telecast baseball 
games and thereafter replayed the tape for his own enjoyment or that of 
his family Major League Baseball would have no objection to such usage? 
"A I know of none. 
"Q And would your answer be the same if I asked you the same question 
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Each of the plaintiffs proved that it owns a large inventory 
of copyrighted programs and motion pictures. They also 
proved that even after a motion picture has been exhibited in 
the theater market and over network television, the commer-
cial value of the copyright is not exhausted because many 
programs are later televised over local stations, or sold or 
rented to the public on prerecorded cassettes or discs. Fi-
nally, plaintiffs offered opinion evidence concerning the fu-
ture impact of the unrestricted sale of VTR's on the commer-
cial value of their copyrights. The District Court found, 
however, that they had failed to prove any such actual or pro-
spective harm. 
"Plaintiffs admitted that at the time of trial, no exist-
ing contract, license or advantageous business relation-
ship of either Universal or Disney had been injured, in-
terfered with or disrupted by the sale or use of Betamax 
and Betamax tapes or by any other activity of any de-
fendant. This includes without limitation plaintiffs' the-
atrical, television, 8 or 16 mm, and video-disc products. 
"In addition, plaintiffs conceded that neither the sale 
nor the use of Betamax and Betamax tapes had by the 
time of trial caused Universal or Disney any measurable 
monetary damage,. economic loss or revenue loss. 1978 
was a very successful year for both Universal and Dis-
with respect to the Allstar game? 
"A Yes. 
"Q The League championship series? 
"A Yes. 
"Q And the World Series? 
"A Yes." Tr. 2444-2447. 
On cross-examination, he added: 
"A The subject matter of the matter is not one that has been widely dis-
cussed within baseball, but I have consulted with a significant number of 
people on the subject, and people who are entitled to have an informed 
judgment on the matter, and they have concurred in what I have testified 
to." /d., 2447-2448. 
. ~ 
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ney. It was Disney's eleventh consecutive year of in-
creased profit and the most profitable year in history for 
Universal Pictures' Theatrical Division. Universal's 
television revenues had increased steadily over the three 
years prior to trial and Disney received its highest tele-
vision income in 1978." Id., at 439-440. 
With regard to the impact of time-shifting-the primary use 
of the Betamax-the District Court expressly found that the 
practice was more likely to benefit the plaintiffs than to harm 
them: 
"Plaintiffs fear that time-shifting will reduce audiences 
for telecast reruns. The underlying assumptions here 
are particularly difficult to accept. Plaintiffs explain 
that the Betamax increases access to the original tele-
vised material and that the more people there are in this 
original audience, the fewer people the rerun will at-
tract. Yet current marketing practices, including the 
success of syndication, show just the opposite. Today, 
the larger the audience for the original telecast, the 
higher the price plaintiffs can demand from broadcasters 
for rerun rights. There is no survey within the knowl-
edge of this court to show that the rerun audience is com-
prised of persons who have not seen the program. In 
any event, if ratings can reflect Betamax recording, orig-
inal audiences may increase and, given current market 
practices, this should aid plaintiffs rather than harm 
them. 
"The audience benefits from the time-shifting capabil-
ity have already been discussed. It is not implausible 
that benefits could also accrue to plaintiffs, broadcasters, 
and advertisers, as the Betamax makes it possible for 
more persons to view their broadcasts." I d., at 466, 
467 . 
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Summarizing his findings concerning the probable impact 
of Betamax sales on the commercial exploitation of respond-
ents' copyrights, the District Court stated: 
"Testimony at trial suggested that Betamax may require 
adjustments in marketing strategy, but it did not estab-
lish even a likelihood of harm. Nor did the testimony 
invoke concern that denial of monopoly power over 
home-use recording would significantly dissuade authors 
and producers from creating audiovisual material for 
television. 
"In so ruling, this court does not minimize plaintiff's 
concerns. The new technology of videotape recording 
does bring uncertainty and change which, quite natu-
rally, induce fear. History, however, shows that this 
fear may be misplaced. As Lewis Wasserman, Chair-
man of MCA, observed at trial: 
"'[P]eople that have constantly forecast the doom 
of a particular industry in the entertainment indus-
try have historically been wrong. . . . They fore-
cast the doom of radio stations when television de-
veloped on the horizon. Radio stations are more 
profitable today than they have ever been.' 
"Television production by plaintiffs today is more profitable 
than it has ever been, and, in five weeks of trial, there was no 
concrete evidence to suggest that the Betamax will change the 
studios' financial picture. Id., at 469 (emphasis added). 
Largely because of plaintiffs' inability to prove even a like-
lihood of harm, the District Court concluded that noncom-
mercial home use recording of materiaL broadcast over the 
public airwaves was a fair use of copyrighted works and did 
not constitute copyright infringement. It found that conclu-
sion supported by the fact that the material was broadcast 
free to the public at large, by the noncommercial character of 
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the use, and by the private character of the activity con-
ducted entirely within the home. 7 Moreover, the court 
found that the purpose of this use served the public interest 
in increasing access to television programming, an interest 
that "is consistent with the First Amendment policy of pro-
viding the fullest possible access to information through the 
public airwaves. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 102." 8 
Even when an entire copyrighted work was recorded, the 
District Court regarded the copying as fair use "because 
there is no accompanying reduction in the market for 'plain-
tiff's original work."' 480 F. Supp., at 454. 
As an independent ground of decision, the District Court 
also concluded that Sony could not be held liable as a con-
tributory infringer even if the home use of a VTR was consid-
ered infringement. The District Court noted that Sony had 
no direct involvement with any Betamax purchasers who re-
corded copyrighted works off the air. Sony's advertising 
was silent on the subject of possible copyright infringement, 
but its instruction booklet contained the following statement: 
"Television programs, films, videotapes and other ma-
terials may be copyrighted. Unauthorized recording of 
such material may be contrary to the provisions of the 
United States copyright laws." Id., at 436. 
The District Court assumed that Sony had constructive 
knowledge of the probability that the Betamax machine 
7 "Because the use occurs within private homes, enforcement of a prohi-
bition would be highly intrusive and practically impossible. Such intrusion 
is . particularly unwarranted when plaintiffs themselves choose to beam 
their programs into these homes." 480 F. Supp., at 454. 
8 480 F. Supp., at 454. The court also found that this "access is not just 
a matter of convenience, as plainitffs have suggested. Access has been 
limited not simply by inconvenience but by the basic need to work. Access 
to the better program has also been limited by the competitive practice of 
counterprogramming." Ibid. 
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would be used to record copyrighted programs, but given the 
unprecedented character of the issue, concluded that Sony 
"could not know what copyright law required." I d., at 460. 
More importantly, the court found that Sony merely sold a 
"product capable of a variety of uses, some of them allegedly 
infringing." I d., at 461. It reasoned: 
"Selling a staple article of commerce-e. g., a type-
writer, a recorder, a camera, a photocopying machine-
technically contributes to any infringing use subse-
quently made thereof, but this kind of 'contribution,' if 
deemed sufficient as a basis for liability, would expand 
the theory beyond precedent and arguably beyond judi-
cial management. 
"Commerce would indeed be hampered if manufacturers 
of staple items were held liable as contributory infring-
ers whenever they 'constructively' knew that some pur-
chasers on some occasions would use their product for a 
purpose which a court later deemed, as a matter of first 
impression, to be an infringement." Ibid. 
Finally, the District Court discussed the plaintiffs' prayer 
for injunctive relief, noting that they had asked for an injunc-
tion either preventing the future sale of Betamax machines, 
or requiring that the machines be rendered incapable of re-
cording copyrighted works off the air. The court stated that 
it had "found no case in which the manufacturers, distribu-
tors, retailers, and advertisors of the instrument enabling the 
infringement were sued by the copyright holders," and that 
the request for relief in this case "is unique." 480 F. Supp., 
at 465. 
In rejecting this request, the District Court first noted 
that the Betamax was a product that was used "for purposes 
where no infringement would be alleged (e. g., recording ma-
terial which is not copyrighted or where permission to record 
is given)," ibid., and that many uses of the machine would in-
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volve no harm to any copyright. The most obvious example 
was the copying of material which was erased before it was 
ever watched, but, as noted above, the court also explained 
in detail why the practice of time-shifting would not cause 
any harm. After also discussing the speculative character of 
plaintiffs' proof concerning the possible consequences of the 
practice of librarying and the practice of using a fast-forward 
button to avoid viewing advertisements, 9 the court noted 
that any possible harm was outweighed by the fact that "the 
Betamax could still legally be used to record noncopyrighted 
material or material whose owners consented to the copying. 
An injunction would deprive the public of the ability to use 
the Betamax for this noninfringing off-the-air recording." 
480 F. Supp., at 468. 
The Court of Appeals reversed. It did not set aside any of 
the District Court's findings of fact. It concluded as a mat-
ter of law that the home use of a VTR was not a fair use be-
cause it was not a "productive use." 10 It therefore held that 
it was unnecessary for plaintiffs to prove any harm to the po-
tential market for the copyrighted works, but then observed 
that it seemed clear that the cumulative effect of mass re-
production made possible by VTR's would tend to diminish 
the potential market for respondents' works. 659 F. 2d, at 
974. 
On the issue of contributory infringement, the Court of Ap-
peals first rejected the analogy to staple articles of commerce 
such as a tape recorder or a photocopying machine. It noted 
that such machines "may have substantial benefit for some 
purposes" and do not "even remotely raise copyright prob-
lems." Id., at 975. VTR's, however, are sold "for the pri-
• The District Court noted that defendants' evidence had indicated that 
"92% of the programs were recorded with commercials and only 25% of the 
owners fast-forward through them. 480 F. Supp., at 468. 
10 "Without a 'productive use', i. e. when copyrighted material is repro-
duced for its intrinsic use, the mass copying of the sort involved in this case 
precludes an application of fair use." 659 F . 2d, at 971-972. 
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mary purpose of reproducing television programming" and 
"virtually all" such programming is copyrighted material. 
Ibid. The Court of Appeals concluded, therefore, that 
VTR's were not suitable for any substantial noninfringing use 
even if some copyright owners elected not to enforce their 
rights. 
The Court of Appeals also rejected the District Court's re-
liance on Sony's lack of knowledge that home use constituted 
infringement. Assuming that the statutory provisions defin-
ing the remedies for infringement applied also to the non-
statutory tort of contributory infringement, the court stated 
that a defendant's good faith would merely reduce his dam-
ages liability but would not excuse the infringing conduct. 11 
It held that Sony was chargeable with knowledge of the 
homeowner's infringing activity because the reproduction of 
copyrighted materials was either "the most conspicuous use" 
or "the major use" of the Betamax product. Ibid. 
On the matter of relief, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that "statutory damages may be appropriate," that the Dis-
trict Court should reconsider its determination that an in-
junction would not be an appropriate remedy; and, referring 
to "the analagous photocopying area," suggested that a con-
tinuing royalty pursuant to a judicially created compulsory li-
cense may very well be an acceptable resolution of the relief 
issue. 659 F. 2d, at 976. 
II 
Dean Warren's foreword to a notable series of lectures on 
copyright law provides an equally appropriate background 
for our consideration of whether Sony should be deemed a 
contributory infringer of respondents' copyrights: 
11 Section 504(c)(2) provides, in part: 
"In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the 
court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe 
that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in 
its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not 
less than $100." 
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"The protection of property in the products of the mind 
has long presented the challenging problem of balancing 
several important and competing social interests. Al-
though the number of writers and inventors among us is 
small, their contribution to the intellectual and material 
advancement of society is unique and indispensable. 
The importance of that contribution was early recog-
nized in the Constitution, in the grant of power to Con-
gress 'To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.' (U. S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8.) It is 
significant, perhaps, that 'Authors and Inventors' are 
the only callings thus singled out for such special atten-
tion, and it is also significant that the need for balancing 
the interest of the creator and the interests of society is 
emphasized in this constitutional language, which refers 
to the creator's 'exclusive Right' to his creation, but rec-
ognizes the public interest by restricting the duration of 
such rights to 'limited Times.' 
"Copyright protection became necessary with the in-
vention of the printing press and had its early beginnings 
in the British censorship laws. The fortunes of the law 
of copyright have always been closely connected with 
freedom of expression, on the one hand, and with techno-
logical improvements in means of dissemination, on the 
other. Successive ages have drawn different balances 
among the interest of the writer in the control and 
exploitation of his intellectual property, the related in-
terest of the publisher, and the competing interest of so-
ciety in the untrammeled dissemination of ideas.'' 12 
From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in 
response to significant changes in technology. Repeatedly, 
12 Foreword to B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (1967) [here-
after Kaplan]. 
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as such developments have occurred in this country, it has 
been the Congress that fashioned the new rules that new 
technology made necessary. Thus, long before the enact-
ment of the Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, it was set-
tled that the protection given to copyrights in this country is 
wholly statutory. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U. S. (8 Peters) 
591, 661-662 (1834). The remedies for infringement "are 
only those prescribed by Congress." Thompson v. Hub-
bard, 131 U. S. 123, 151 (1889). 
The development and marketing of player pianos and per-
forated rolls of music at the turn of the century gave rise to 
litigation raising the question whether the use of such rolls 
infringed the copyrights owned by composers and music pub-
lishers. The sale of well over a million rolls in 1902 made it 
evident that the economic issue was significant. Adopting a 
construction of the pre-1909 version of the Copyright Act 
that, as Justice Holmes acknowledged, gave to the music 
"copyright less scope than its rational significance," the 
Court held that the piano rolls were not copies of copyrighted 
songs within the meaning of the Act. White-Smith Music 
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (see Holmes, J., 
concurring, at 19). Quoting from an English case consider-
ing a similar question, the Court noted that the copyright on 
the sheet music did not involve any exclusive right "to the 
performance in private of the music indicated by such 
sheets", id., at 13. The Court assumed that Congress was 
aware of the prevailing view, reflected in an international 
convention to which the United States was not a party, that 
"the manufacture and sale of instruments serving to repro-
duce mechanically the [copyrighted music] are not considered 
as constituting musical infringement." ld., at 14-15. It 
held that the policy considerations at stake "properly ad-
dressed themselves to the legislative, and not to the judicial, 
branch of the government." I d., at 18. The following year 
Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1909. 
When the 1909 Act was passed, the Librarian of Congress, 
Dr. Herbert Putnam, was following a practice of allowing sin-
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gle copies of copyrighted works to be made at the Library. 
Even though the 1909 Act might have been construed liter-
ally to prescribe the practice, the activity went unchallenged 
for decades. The matter did not seem to merit serious atten-
tion until innovations in copying techniques made it relatively 
easy to reproduce entire articles or to make multiple copies. 
When the National Institute of Health and the National Li-
brary of Medicine adopted the practice of photocopying entire 
articles from medical journals and supplying them to re-
searchers, litigation did ensue. The courts, however, de-
clined to hold that the development of the new technology 
had changed the traditional understanding. Williams and 
Wilkins v. United States, 487 F. 2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), af-
firmed by an equally divided court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975). 
The problem posed by the new technology was resolved by 
Congress when it revised the Copyright Act in the following 
year. In § 108 of the 1976 revision, Congress enacted a spe-
cial statutory exemption for library copying, distinguishing 
between the reproduction of multiple copies and the re-
production or distribution of a single copy. 
A similar sequence of events followed the development of 
technology that made it possible to retransmit television pro-
grams by cable or by microwave systems. In 1960, United 
Artists Television, Inc., the owner of a number of copyrights 
on motion pictures, sought to enjoin the operator of a commu-
nity antenna television system (CATV) from intercepting and 
retransmitting signals carrying its copyrighted productions. 
The Court held that the CATV operator did not "perform" 
the copyrighted works in the "manner envisioned by the Con-
gress that enacted the law in 1909." Fortnightly Corp. v. 
United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 395 (1968). Although the 
Court was sharply divided on the question whether that was 
a fair reading of the statutory language, there was complete 
agreement on the proposition that Congress was far better 
equipped than the Court to fashion a fair resolution of the 
problems presented by the sophisticated technological devel-
·" 
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opments that had occurred in recent years. 13 
The Fortnightly case was followed by Teleprompter Corp. 
v. CBS, 415 U. S. 394, in which the Court considered the 
copyright holders' argument that CATV systems diluted the 
commercial value of the market for licensed television pro-
grams. Recognizing that the retransmissions by CATV sys-
tems would augment the size of the potential audience for a 
broadcast-much as would the video tape recording of pro-
grams for later home viewing-the Court concluded: 
"These shifts in current business and commercial rela-
tionships, while of significance with respect to the orga-
nization and growth of the communications industry, 
simply cannot be controlled by means of litigation based 
on copyright legislation enacted more than half a century 
ago, when neither broadcast television nor CATV was 
yet conceived. Detailed regulation of these relation-
ships, and any ultimate resolution of the many sensitive 
and important problems in this field, must be left to Con-
gress." /d., at 414. 
In due course Congress did enact legislation that regulates 
the complex relationships among copyright holders, commer-
'""We have been invited by the Solicitor General in an amicus curiae 
brief to render a compromise decision in this case that would, it is said, 
accommodate various competing considerations of copyright, communica-
tions, and antitrust policy. We decline the invitation. That job is for 
Congress." [footnotes omitted] 392 U. S. at 401. 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Fortas wrote: 
"Our major object, I suggest, should be to do as little damage as possible to 
traditional copyright principles and to business relationships, until the 
Congress legislates and relieves the embarrassment which we and the in-
terested parties face." !d., at 404. 
At the end of his opinion, he added: 
"The task of caring for CATV is one for the Congress. Our ax, being a 
rule of law, must cut straight, sharp, and deep; and perhaps this is a situa-
tion that calls for the compromise of theory and for the architectural im-
provisation which only legislation can accomplish." I d., at 408. 
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cial television stations, and CATV system operators in a com-
prehensive and detailed way that could not possibly have 
been fashioned by a court. 14 
This history of deference to Congress when major new 
technology dramatically changes the market for copyrighted 
material must inform our judgment in this important respect. 
A refusal by this Court to embark on a novel lawmaking task 
will merely allow Congress to fashion the controlling rules for 
the future. 
III 
Whereas most novel problems of copyright law require a 
reexamination of the delicate compromise between the copy-
right owner's commercial interest in the legitimate exploita-
tion of his statutory monopoly and the public interest in ac-
cess to ideas and information, the contributory infringement 
issue presented by this case implicates a third interest that 
demands separate recognition: the economic interest in the 
manufacture and sale of an article of commerce that is capa-
ble of substantial noninfringing contributions to the public 
good. 
Neither the 1909 Copyright Act nor the 1976 Copyright 
1'The statutory provisions themselves, see 17 U.S. C. § 111, are much 
too long to quote in full, but their complexity is indicated in the following 
paragraph from Judge Markey's opinion in Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. 
Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F. 2d 125, 129 (CA2 1982): 
"Under the congressionally mandated scheme, television broadcast sta-
tions like WOR-TV continue to pay license or royalty fees directly to copy-
right owners like Doubleday, while CATV systems pay license fees under 
their compulsory licenses to the United States Copyright Office in accord 
with formulae provided in 17 U. S. C. § 111(d)(2)(B). The fees paid by 
CATV systems are distributed to copyright owners like Doubleday by 
Copyright Royalty Tribunal (Tribunal), as provided for in 17 U. S. C. 
§ 111(d)(5). The Congressional scheme thus provided for compensation 
from CATV systems to copyright owners measured by the number of cable 
viewers or potential viewers, and placed the responsibility for payment of 
that compensation on the CATV systems." (footnotes omitted) 
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Act mentions the doctrine of contributory infringement. 16 
From the absence of any explicit discussion, we may infer 
that Congress did not intend any significant change in the ju-
dicially-created doctrine of contributory infringement. 
The lower courts have generally applied the doctrine to 
two categories of persons having a relationship with a direct 
infringer at the time of the direct infringement. One group 
includes persons who employ the direct infringer to engage in 
the activity that proves infringing and who fail to exercise 
their power to ervise and control the acts. 16 The other 
mclu es persons wh articipate .ftif'ee~s agents of the di-
rect infringer in the infringing enterprise. 17 Sony clearly fits 
neither of these molds; its only contact with the witnesses in 
this case was at the moment of sale. The District Court ex-
pressly found that "no employee of Sony, Sonam or DDBI 
had either direct involvement with the allegedly infringing 
activity or direct contact with purchasers of Betamax who re-
corded copyrighted works off-the-air." 480 F. Supp., at 460. 
And it further found that "there was no evidence that any of 
the copies made by Griffiths or the other individual witnesses 
in this suit were influenced or encouraged by [Sony's] ad-
vertisements." Ibid. 
The only case in which this Court has held anyone liable for 
contributory infringement was Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 
222 U. S. 55 (1911). In that case the holder of the copyright 
in the book Ben Hur sued Kalem, the producer and distribu-
15 The doctrine is mentioned briefly in the legislative history of the 1976 
Act: 
"Use of the phrase 'to authorize' [in § 106's list of exclusive rights] is in-
tended to avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory infringers. 
For example, a person who lawfully acquires an authorized copy of a mo-
tion picture would be an infringer if he engages in the business of renting it 
to others for purposes of unauthorized public performance." 1975 Senate 
Report 57; 1976 House Report 61. 
16 [Case cites to be added]. 
17 [Case cites to be added]. 
.· 
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tor of an unauthorized film dramatization of the book. The 
Court upheld a finding that the public exhibition of the film 
by Kalem's customers was a direct infringement of copyright, 
and that the sale of the plagarized film was a contributory in-
fringement. Speaking through Justice Holmes, the Court 
explained: 
"But again it is said that the defendant did not produce 
the representations, but merely sold the films to jobbers, 
and on that ground ought not to be held. In some cases 
where an ordinary article of commerce is sold nice ques-
tions may arise as to the point at which the seller be-
comes an accomplice in a subsequent illegal use by the 
buyer. It has been held that mere indifferent supposi-
tion or knowledge on the part of the seller that the ·buyer 
of spiritous liquor is contemplating such unlawful use is 
not enough to connect him with the possible unlawful 
consequences, Graves v. Johnson, 179 Massachusetts , 
53, but that if the sale was made with a view to the ille-
gal resale the price could not be recovered. Graves v. 
Johnson, 156 Massachusetts, 211. But no such niceties 
are involved here. The defendant not only expected but 
invoked by advertisement the use of its films for dra-
matic reproduction of the story. That was the most con-
spicuous purpose for which they could be used, and the 
one for which especially they were made. If the defend-
ant did not contribute to the infringement it is impossible 
to do so except by taking part in the final act. It is lia-
ble on principles recognized in every part of the law." 
222 U. S., at 62-63. 
The commodity sold in Kalem was the completed copy of a 
particular copyrighted work. The use for which it had been 
"especially'' made was the direct infringement of the plain-
tiff's copyright. In contrast, the Betamax is a piece of equip-
ment that is generally capable of copying any program that 
may be televised-those that are uncopyrighted, those that 
t 
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are copyrighted but which may be copied without any objec-
tion from the copyright holder, and those that the copyright 
holder would prefer not to have copied. Like a camera, it 
may make authorized or unauthorized reproductions, but the 
range of its potential use is much broader than the particular 
infringing use of the film Ben Hur involved in Kalem. In 
order to consider whether the unlawful use of a Betamax is 
sufficiently per~sive to justify excluding it from the mar-
ket, it is useful to consider more generally how the balance 
among competing values has been struck in the most closely 
related area of the law-patent law. 
The Constitutional predicates for the copyright statute and 
the patent statute are one and the same. "To promote the 
Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U. S. Const., 
Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The copyright is designed to provide au-
thors with a sufficient incentive to stimulate their creative 
activity without unnecessarily curtailing the countervailing 
public interest in the free exchange of thought. 18 The mo-
'
8 "Copyright law wants to give any necessary support and encourage-
ment to the creation and dissemination of fresh signals or messages to stir 
human intelligence and sensibilities: it recognizes the importance of these 
excitations for the development of individuals and society. Especially is 
copyright directed to those kinds of signals which are in their nature 'frag-
ile'-so easy of replication that incentive to produce would be quashed by 
the prospect of rampant reproduction by freeloaders. To these signals 
copyright affords what I have called 'headstart,' that is, a group of rights 
amounting to a qualified monopoly running for a limited time. 
"The headstart conferred should be moderate in all its dimensions. 
Magnify the headstart and you may conceivably run the risk of attracting 
too much of the nation's energy into the copyright-protected sectors of the 
economy. But more serious is the danger of hobbling unduly the reception 
and enjoyment of the signals by their potential audience, or of clogging the 
utilization of the signals by other authors in the creation of further or im-
proved signals for additional audiences." Kaplan 74-75. 
.~ 
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nopoly privilege does not necessarily encompass all possible 
rewards that might logically flow from the grant19 particu-
larly if the rewards are more fairly attributable to the expan-
sion of the market brought about by technological advances 
that are unrelated to an author's creativity. 20 The public in-
terest in allowing these advances to evolve in a free commer-
cial market is strongly implicated when a copyright owner 
seeks to enjoin the distribution of an article of commerce. 
In the Patent Code both the concept of infringement and 
the concept of contributory infringement are expressly de-
fined by statute. 21 The prohibition against contributory in-
'
9 See, e. g., White Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 
1; Holmes J ., concurring, at 19, supra. In Deepsouth Packing Co. v. 
Laitram Corp. , 406 U. S. 518, 530, we wrote: 
"Moreover, we must consider petitioner's claim in light of this Nation's 
historical antipathy to monopoly and of repeated congressional efforts to 
preserve and foster competition. As this Court recently said without 
dissent: 
"[I]n rewarding useful invention, the 'rights and welfare of the 
community must be fairly dealt with and effectually guarded.' 
Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 329 (1859). To that end the pre-
requisites to obtaining a patent are strictly observed, and when 
the patent has issued the limitations of its exercise are equally 
strictly enforced.' Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 
225, 230 (1964). 
"It follows that we should not expand patent rights by overruling or modi-
fying our prior cases construing the patent statutes, unless the argument 
for expansion of privilege is based on more than mere inference from 
ambiguous statutory language. We would require a clear and certain sig-
nal from Congress before approving the position of a litigant who, as re-
spondent here, argues that the beachhead of privilege is wider, and the 
area of public use narrower, than courts had previously thought." 
~ "The general problem for the near future is after all a happy one, that 
of dealing with a rapidly expanding market for copyrighted works-and it 
is not impertinent to remind the contestants that this condition has been 
largely brought about by independent scientific invention owing little to 
any of the copyrighted factions .'' Kaplan 110. 
21 35 U. S. C. § 271 provides: 
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fringement is confined to the knowing sale of a component es-
pecially made for use in connection with a particular patent. 
There is no suggestion in the statute that one patentee may 
object to the ·sale of a product that might be used to infringe a 
variety of other patents. 
In contributory infringement cases arising under the pat-
ent laws the Court has recognized the critical importance of 
not allowing the patentee to extend his monopoly beyond the 
limits of his specific grant. These cases deny the patentee 
any right to control the distribution of unpatented articles 
unless they are "unsuited for any commercial noninfringing 
use." Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co., 448 
U. S. 176, 198. Unless a commodity "has no use except 
through practice of the patented method," ibid, the patentee 
has no right to claim that its distribution constitutes con-
tributory infringment. "To form the basis for contributory 
infringement the item must almost be uniquely suited as a 
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without author-
ity makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States 
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. 
"(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as 
an infringer. 
"(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, 
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing 
a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing 
the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringe-
ment of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce 
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory 
infringer. 
"(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or 
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed 
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his hav-
ing done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which 
if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory 
infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform 
acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory 
infrigement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against 
infringement or contributory infringement." 
·" 
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component of the patented invention." P. Rosenberg, Pat-
ent Law Fundamentals § 17.02[2] (1982). "[A] sale of an arti-
cle which though adapted to an infringing use is also adapted 
to other and lawful uses, is not enough to make the seller a 
contributory infringer. Such a rule would block the wheels 
of commerce." Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1, 48 
(1912), overruled on other grounds, Motion Picture Patents 
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 517 (1917). 
Although there are substantial differences between the 
patent and copyright laws, there is no reason to grant the 
copyright holder any broader right to bar noninfringing activ-
ities than the patent holder. Indeed, arguably, the copy-
right holder should have a lesser right, for by precluding 
noninfringing uses he may not only block the wheels of com-
merce, but also impose an unjustified tax on the free market-
place of ideas. There should be no finding of contributory 
infringement for the seller of a staple article of commerce 
that is used to infringe, unless the seller directly participates 
in, or directly induces, an act of infringement. An article is a 
staple article of commerce if it is widely used for legitimate, 
unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, if we apply the patent 
law rule, it need merely be capable of significant noninfring-
ing uses. 
IV 
The question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of 
commercially significant noninfringing uses. In order to re-
solve that question, we need not explore all the different po-
tential uses of the machine and determine whether or not 
they would constitute infringement. Rather, we need only 
consider whether on the basis of the facts as found by the dis-
trict court a significant number of them would be non-infring-
ing. Moreover, in order to resolve this case we need not 
give precise content to the question of how much use is com-
mercially significant. For one potential use of the Betamax 
plainly satisfies this standard, however it is understood: pri-
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vate, noncommercial time-shifting in the home. It does so 
both because respondents have no right to prevent other 
copyright holders from authorizing it for their programs, and 
because the district court's factual findings reveal that the re-
spondents failed to prove that even unauthorized home time-
shifting is not legitimate fair use. We therefore need not an-
alyze commercial use, public use, or home library-building, 
all of which would raise additional complicating issues. 
Each of the respondents owns a large inventory of valuable 
copyrights, but in the total spectrum of television program-
ming their combined market share is small. The exact per-
centage is not specified, but it is obviously well below 10 per-
cent. 22 If they prevail, the outcome of this litigation will 
have a significant impact on both the producers and the view-
ers of the remaining 90 percent of the programming in the 
Nation. No doubt, many other producers share respond-
ents' concern about the possible consequences of unrestricted 
copying, but the findings of the District Court make it per-
fectly clear that time-shifting may enlarge the total viewing 
audience and that many producers are perfectly willing to 
allow private time-shifting to continue, at least for an experi-
mental trial period. 
If there are millions of owners of VTR's who make copies of 
televised sports events, and if the proprietors of those pro-
grams find the practice unobjectionable, the business of sup-
plying the equipment that makes such copying feasible is, at 
the very least, presumptively lawful. The respondents are 
not litigating on behalf of a class composed of all copyright 
holders. They do not, for example, represent any of the 
owners of religious television stations, who testified that they 
22 The record suggests that Disney's programs at the time of trial con-
sisted of approximately one hour a week of network television and one syn-
dicated series. Universal's percentage in the Los Angeles market on com-
mercial television stations was under 5 percent. See Record 532-533, 
549-550. 
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had no objection to home use video taping of their copy-
righted programs. 23 Yet the relief authorized by the Court 
of Appeals-whether a judicially-fashioned royalty on the 
sale of Betamax machines or an injunction against sale on the 
open market-would inevitably affect the portion of the audi-
ence for such programs that can only participate by means of 
time-shifting. 
The District Court's findings do not set forth the precise 
percentage of all programming that is available for copying 
without any objection. The findings do make it clear, how-
ever, that the aggregate of educational, religious, sports and 
uncopyrighted programming is sufficiently substantial to 
support a significant market for VTR's, even if it is assumed 
that all other copying may properly be characterized as in-
fringing. Moreover, those findings, as well as other studies, 
plainly demonstrate that time-shifting actually enhances the 
size of most television audiences. 24 Under the test of con-
tributory infringement developed in the patent cases, and 
codified by Congress in the Patent Code, these lawful uses 
are adequate to justify the District Court's finding that the 
VTR is a staple article of commerce. 
With regard to authorized copying, the District Court 
stated: 
"Defendants introduced considerable testimony at 
trial about the potential for such copying of sports, reli-
23 Record cites to be added. 
24 In a special staff study for the Federal Communications Commission 
made in February 1980, the following conclusion was stated unequivocally: 
"Clearly, the principal use of the VCR is for time-shift purposes. Be-
cause both major rating services-A.C. Nielsen and Arbitron-now in-
clude an indication of VCR use, this time-shift phenomenon should actually 
be an asset to the networks and broadcasters. Shows which would have 
been missed can now be recorded for later viewing. Because rating serv-
ices are prepared to report such time-shifting, broadcasters should actually 
be helped by this consumer convenience. An audience that was previously 
unavailable to them is now viewing, and the viewing is properly attributed 
in audience reports." Id ., at 61-62. 
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gious, educational and other programming. This in-
cluded testimony from the representatives of the Offices 
of the Commissioners of the National Football, Basket-
ball, Baseball and Hockey Leagues and Associations, the 
Executive Director of National Religious Broadcasters 
and various educational communications agencies. 
Plaintiffs attack the weight of the testimony offered and 
also contend that an injunction is warranted because in-
fringing uses outweigh noninfringing uses. 
"Whatever the future percentage of legal versus ille-
gal home-use recording might be, an injunction which 
seeks to deprive the public of the very tool or article of 
commerce capable of some noninfringing use would be an 
extremely harsh remedy, as well as one unprecedented 
in copyright law." 480 F. Supp., at 468. 
Of course, the fact that other copyright holders have no ob-
jection to copying that may constitute infringement does not 
mean that respondents are judicially deemed to have granted 
a license to copy their programs. Third party conduct would 
be wholly irrelevant in an action for direct infringement of re-
spondents' copyrights. But in an action for contributory in-
fringement against the seller of copying equipment, a plain-
tiff copyright holder may not prevail unless he speaks for 
virtually all copyright holders with an interest in the out-
come. In this case, although others plainly share the re-
spondents' concerns, the record makes it perfectly clear that 
there are many important producers of national and local 
television programs who find nothing objectionable about the 
enlargement in the size of the television audience that results 
from the practice of time-shifting for private home use. The 
seller of the equipment that expands those producers' audi-
ences cannot be a contributory infringer where, as here, it 
has had no direct involvement with any infringing activity. 
v 
Even unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work are under 
·" 
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some circumstances not infringing. An unlicensed use of the 
copyright is not an infringement unless it conflicts with one of 
the specific exclusive rights conferred by the copyright stat-
ute. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 
151, 154-155. As amended in 1976, the Act grants the 
owner of a copyright five specific exclusive rights. 
Section 106 of the Act provides: 
"Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of 
copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do 
and to authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies 
or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the 
copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the 
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other 
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and 
choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pic-
tures and other audiovisual works, to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly; and 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and 
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural works, including the individ-
ual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual 
work, to display the copyrighted work publicly." 
The types of home time-shifting at issue in this case do not 
in any way threaten the exclusive rights embodied in 
subparagraphs (2) through (5). We are not concerned with 
preparation of derivative works, transfers of copies from one 
person to another, public performance, or public display. 
All that is at issue is the preparation of a single copy in the 
home that is to be erased after a single, noncommercial view-
ing. A simple reading of the statute might suggest that the 
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plain language of subparagraph (1) does not even apply to 
such conduct-the paragraph speaks of "copies," not a single 
copy. The legislative history demonstrates, however, that 
the act of making a single copy is not wholly outside the scope 
of the Act's analysis: "The references to 'copies or phonorec-
ords,' although in the plural, are intended here and through-
out the bill to include the singular." 1975 Senate Report 58; 
1976 House Report 61. 
On the other hand, the fact that home time-shifting falls 
within the scope of subparagraph (1) does not resolve the 
question whether home time shifting constitutes infringe-
ment. For the definition of the exclusive rights in § 106 is 
prefaced by the words "subject to sections 107 through 118." 
Those sections describe a variety of uses of copyrighted ma-
terial that "are not infringements of copyright notwithstand-
ing the provisions of § 106." 25 The most pertinent in this 
25 Thus, for example, § 110 provides in part: 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the following are not in-
fringements of copyright: 
(5) communication of a transmission embodying a performance 
or display of a work by the public reception of the transmission on 
a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private 
homes, unless-
(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or 
(B) the transmission thus received is further transmitted to the 
public;" 
And § 111(a) provides, in part: 
"The secondary transmission of a primary transmission embodying a per-
formance or display of a work is not an infringement of copyright if-
(1) the secondary transmission is not made by a cable system, 
and consists entirely of the relaying, by the management of a ho-
tel, apartment house, or similar establishment, of signals trans-
mitted by a broadcast station licensed by the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, within the local service area of such station, to 
the private lodgings of guests or residents of such establishment, 
and no direct charge is made to see or hear the secondary 
transmission;" 
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case is § 107, the legislative endorsement of the doctrine of 
"fair use." 
The 1909 Act did not have a "fair use" provision. More-
over, that Act's compendium of exclusive rights-"to print, 
reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work" 26-
was plainly broad enough to encompass virtually all potential 
interactions with a copyrighted work. Yet the statute was 
never so construed. The courts simply refused to read the 
statute literally in every situation. When Congress 
amended the statute in 1976, it indicated that it "intended to 
restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to 
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." House Report 
No. 94-1476, 94th Gong., 2d Sess., p. 66. Congress there-
fore codified § 107 in a form that identifies various factors 
that enable a Court to apply a "rule of reason" analysis to 
particular claims of infringement. 'l:l 
17 u. s. c. § 111. 
26 Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075. 
27 The essence of the section is captured in these comments from the 
House Report on the fair use section: 
"Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doc-
trine over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever 
emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no gen-
erally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question 
must be decided on its own facts .... 
"The Committee has amended the first of the criteria to be considered-
'the purpose and character of the use' -to state explicitly that this factor 
includes a consideration of 'whether such use is of a commercial nature or is 
for non-profit educational purposes.' This amendment is not intended to 
be interpreted as any sort of not-for-profit limitation on educational uses of 
copyrighted works. It is an express recognition that, as under the present 
law, the commercial or non-profit character of an activity, while not conclu-
sive with respect to fair use, can and should be weighed along with other 
factors in fair use decisions. . . . 
General intention behind the provision 
'The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers some guid-
ance to users in determining when the principles of the doctrine apply. 
However, the endless variety of situations and combinations of circum-
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Three different factors lead to the conclusion that, under a 
"rule of reason" analysis, the respondents failed to carry 
their burden of proving in this case that home time shifting is 
not fair use. Those factors are (A) their complete failure to 
show that home time shifting would harm the potential mar-
ket for, or the value of, any identifiable copyrighted material, 
(B) the legislative history tending to show that Congress un-
derstood such activity to be fair use, and (C) the profoundly 
disturbing policy implications of a finding that home time 
shifting is not fair use. 
A 
The flexible character of the fair use doctrine "precludes 
the formulation of exact rules." H. Rep. No. 94-1476, pp. 
65-Q6. Nevertheless, in exercising the judgment required 
by this "rule of reason," we must be especially responsive to 
the language of § 107 identifying factors that Congress be-
lieved might be relevant to most fair use analyses. 28 One fac-
stances that can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact 
rules in the statute. The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of 
the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the 
doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological 
change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and 
some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the 
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis." H. Rep. No. 
94-1476, pp. 65-66. 
28 "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, ibncluding such use by reproductin in copies or phonorecords 
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infrigement of copyright. 
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a 
fair use the factor to be considered shall include-
"(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
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tor is particularly important: "the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." The 
purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative ef-
fort. If a use has no demonstrable effect upon the potential 
market for, or value of, the copyrighted work, prohibiting 
such a use would not affect the author's incentive to create 
the work in the first place. It would merely inhibit access to 
ideas without any countervailing benefit. 
Of course, every commercial use of copyrighted material is 
presumptively an exploitation of the monopoly privilege that 
belongs to the owner of the copyright. But noncommercial 
uses are a different matter. Any plaintiff seeking to chal-
lenge the noncommercial use of a copyrighted work should, 
as a threshold matter, prove either that the particular use is 
harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would be 
more likely than not that some non-minimal damage would 
result to the potential market for, or the value of, his particu-
lar copyrighted work. Actual present harm need not be 
shown; such a requirement would leave the copyright holder 
with no defense against predictable damage. Nor is it neces-
sary to show with certainty that future harm will result. 
What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists. 
If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood 
may be presumed. But if it is for purely private purposes, 
however, it must be demonstrated. 
In this case, respondents failed to carry that burden with 
regard to home time-shifting. The district court explicitly 
found to the contrary. See 480 F. Supp., at 466; supra, at 
-- - -- The nature of the evidence was described by 
the court as follows: 
"Plaintiffs' experts admitted at several points in the 
"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work." 17 U. S. C. § 107. 13-14. 
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trial that the time-shifting without libraiying would re-
sult in 'not a great deal of harm.' Plaintiffs' greatest 
concern about time-shifting is with 'a point of important 
philosophy that transcends even commercial judgment.' 
They fear that with any Betamax usage, 'invisible 
boundaries' are passed: 'the copyright owner has lost 
control over his program.' 
"These 'nuances,' 'perceptions,' and 'points of philoso-
phy' are understandable, though not always logical. 
They do not, however, justify an injunction. Harm 
from time-shifting is speculative and, at best, minimal." 
480 F. Supp., at 467 (emphasis added). 
The District Court's findings that respondents "did not estab-
lish even a likelihood of harm" and offered "no concrete evi-
dence to suggest that the Betamax will change the studios' 
financial picture," id., at 469, are amply supported by the 
record. 
B 
The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act does not 
expressly focus on the question whether use of the Betamax 
for home time-shifting is "fair use.'' That history does, how-
ever, contain two clues that strongly support the conclusion 
that Congress assumed that such private use was entirely 
legitimate. 
The first clues came early in the process that constituted 
the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law that re-
sulted in the Sound Recording Amendments of 1971 and ulti-
mately the 1976 Copyright Act. Under the 1909 Act, there 
was no provision covering motion pictures. In 1912, the Act 
was amended to include them within its scope, but the 1909 
Act was not well suited to deal with them. In 1937, the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had responded by de-
claring that the unauthorized projection of a documentary 
motion picture on a movie screen constituted the making of a 
"copy" and was therefore infringing. Patterson v. Century 
·" 
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-
Productions, 93 F. 2d 489 (1937). A study prepared for Con-
gress by Borge Warner warned of the dangers of this analy-
sis. It noted: 
"If the Patterson case, which dealt in fact with the public 
exhibition, is followed to its logical conclusion, any exhi-
bition of a copyrighted motion picture, whether public or 
private, would be an infringement if not authorized by 
the copyright owner. 
"[C]onjectural to some extent is what the courts would 
now do if presented with a case of purely private exhi-
bition, as in a private home or in a library for an individ-
ual scholar. While even such an exhibition would seem 
to be 'copying' under section 1(a) if the theory of the Pat-
terson decision is carried to its logical conclusion, a court 
might hesitate to find an infringement in that situation. 
It is conceivable that a court might resort to the doctrine 
of 'fair use' to hold such a purely private exhibition not 
an infringement." Study No. 16, Limitations on Per-
forming Rights, at 11&-117 (1958). 
That concern was reflected in the Report of the Register of 
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright 
Law in 1961. He proposed that it be made clear that the ex-
hibition of a motion picture was not the making of a copy, and 
instead provided for a limited right of public performance. 
He stated: 
"Motion picture producers and distributors have urged 
that the performance right in motion pictures should ex-
tend to what are clearly private performances, including 
private performances given in private homes. They 
point to Patterson ... to support their position. Motion 
picture films are commonly leased for exhibition at speci-
fied places and dates. Most leases are for commercial 
exhibitions, but many films are also leased for home use. 
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It is argued that in either case private exhibitions be-
yond the terms of the lease should constitute an infringe-
ment of copyright. 
·"This argument may have some theoretical plausibil-
ity, but we would question it for several reasons: 
" *Injury to a copyright owner from private perfor-
mances beyond the terms of a lease would be mini-
mal. He may be entitled to the usual license fee as 
damages for a breach of contract, but the statutory 
damages for copyright infringement would be 
grossly excessive. 
"*As a practical matter, unauthorized private per-
formances could rarely be discovered or. controlled. 
"*New technical devices will probably make it prac-
tical in the future to reproduce televised motion pic-
tures in the home. We do not believe the private use 
of such a reproduction can or should be precluded 
by copyright." Register's Report 29-30 (emphasis 
added). 
Congress adopted the Register's recommendation and cre-
ated a right of public display and performance in motion pic-
tures. § 106(4), (5). Of course, the Register is not the Con-
gress, and his views are of only limited significance. 
Nevertheless, they surely support the conclusion that home 
time shifting is fair use. 
The second clue provided in the legislative history came in 
the course of the passage of the Sound Recording Amend-
ments of 1971. 85 Stat. 391. The development of the audio 
tape recorder made it simple for any individual to make tapes 
of copyrighted songs played on the radio. Under prior 
Copyright Law, the composer of the song was protected-he 
was entitled to claim a so-called "mechanical royalty" from 
any person who made such a tape in a manner that was not 
fair use. But the performer of the song was not protected at 
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all, even from blatant commercial exploitation of his or her 
talent. When the practice known as "record piracy" became 
widespread, the recording industry persuaded Congress to 
enact a special statute extending copyright protection to 
sound recordings. The House Report revealed the legisla-
tive understanding of how the "fair use" doctrine applies to 
home taping: 
"In approving the creation of a limited copyright in 
sound recordings it is the intention of the Committee 
that this limited copyright not grant any broader rights 
than are accorded to other copyright proprietors under 
the existing title 17. Specifically, it is not the intention 
of the Committee to restrain the home recording, from 
broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded perfor-
mances, where the home recording is for private use and 
with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing 
commercially on it. This practice is common and unre-
strained today, and the record producers and performers 
would be in no different position from that of the owners 
of copyright in recorded musical compositions over the 
past 20 years." H. Rep. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 
7, reprinted in [1971] U. S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 
pp. 1566, 1572.29 
29 This subject had been expressly considered during the House Commit-
tee hearings. As the District Court noted in this case, Representative 
Beister of Pennsylvania engaged in the following dialogue about off-the-air 
recording with Ms. Barbara Ringer, then Assistant Register of 
Copyrights: 
"Mr. Beister. I do not know that I can add very much to the questions 
which you have been asked so far. 
"I can tell you I must have a small pirate in my own home. 
"My son has a cassette tape recorder, and as a particular record becomes 
a hit, he will retrieve it onto his little set. 
"Now, he may retrieve in addition something else onto his recording, but 
nonetheless, he does retrieve the basic sound, and this legislation, of 
course, would not point to his activities, would it? 
·" 
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That this was the opinion of the sponsors of the legislation is 
confirmed by the following colloquy when the 1971 amend-
ment was being discussed on the floor of the House of 
Representatives: 
"Mr. Kazen. Am I correct in assuming that the bill 
protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for com-
mercial purposes only? 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Yes. 
"Mr. Kazen. In other words, if your child were to 
record off of a program which comes through the air on 
the radio or television, and then used it for her own per-
sonal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this would not be 
included under the penalties of this bill? 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. This is not included in the bill. I 
am glad the gentleman raises the point. 
"On page 7 of the report, under 'Home Recordings,' 
Members will note that under the bill the same practice 
which prevails today is called for; namely, this is consid-
ered both presently and under the proposed law to be fair 
use. The child does not do this for commercial pur-
poses. This is made clear in the report." 117 Cong. 
Rec. 34, 748 (1971) (emphasis added). 30 
"Miss Ringer. I think the answer is clearly, 'No, it would not.' 
"I have spoken at a couple of seminars on video cassettes lately, and this 
question is usually asked: 'What about the home recorders?' 
"The answer I have given and will give again is that this is something 
you cannot control. You simply cannot control it." Hearings on S. 646 
before the Subcomm. No.3 of the House Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 22 (June 9 and 10, 1971). 
30 Representative Kastenmeier's views of whether the copyright laws 
prohibit home taping do not appear to have changed significantly over the 
past decade. In hearings held in 1982, after the Court of Appeals' decision 
in this case, he engaged in the following colloquy with a representative of 
the National Music Publishers Association: 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Thank you, Mr. Baumgarten. Do I take it as your 
legal opinion as part of this panel that some 30 or 40 million people in their 
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The Court of Appeals declared that these statements are 
"entirely beside the point" because the Amendments were in-
tended to deal with sound recording, not video recording. 
659 F. 2d, at 968. That is an unfortunate overstatement. 
For purposes of fair use analysis, the policy questions raised 
by home time-shifting of video broadcasts are closely related 
to the policy questions raised by home taping of musical per-
formances. Indeed, since it appears that Congress was re-
ferring to home librarying of audio tapes in the 1971 legisla-
tive history, it would seem that the policies favor a finding of 
fair use for home time-shifting of free television broadcasts 
are even more compelling.31 
homes producing billions of works are now and have been infringing copy-
right laws? 
"Mr. Baumgarten. Yes. 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. They are all infringers? 
"Mr. Baumgarten. Yes. • 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Subject in all respects to whatever the law-
"Mr. Baumgarten. Whatever relief the court considers appropriate. I 
think we saw at the ninth circuit that that would be fashioned in an equita-
ble amount. 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. There would be a lot of Americans who I think 
would be chagrined to learn that thiat is the case." Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administation of Justice 
of House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 4783 et al. , 97th Cong., 2d 
Sess., at 540. 
31 One statement in the legislative history should be discussed, since it 
could be read out of context as suggesting a contrary view. The statement · 
appears in the Senate Report on the 1976 Act and reads as follows: 
"The committee's attention has been directed to the special problems in-
volved in the reception of instructional television programs in remote areas 
of the country. In certain areas it is currently impossible to transmit such 
programs by any means other than communications satellites. A particu-
lar difficulty exists when such transmissions extend over several time 
zones within the same state, such as in Alaska. Unless individual schools 
in such states may make an off-air recording of such transmissions, the pro-
grams may not be received by the students during the school's daily sched-
ule. The committee believes that the making by a school located in such a 
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If neither the legislative history nor the words of the stat-
ute unambiguously tell us whether Congress intended to per-
mit or to prohibit the home use of tape recorders to copy tele-
vision programs for later viewing, there are important 
reasons for not interpreting the silence of Congress as a pro-
hibition. Special constitutional values are implicated when-
ever the Government seeks to regulate or prohibit conduct 
that take place entirely within the privacy of the home. 32 Al-
though there is plainly no constitutional bar to a congres-
sional decision to prohibit home time-shifting, the privacy 
values at issue would surely be weighed carefully by Con-
gress before adopting any such prohibition. Any such 
weighing process would unquestionably yield a fairly explicit 
statement on the subject-a statement that is strikingly ab-
remote area of an off-the-air recording of an instructional television trans-
mission for t'he purpose of a delayed viewing of the program by students 
for the same school constitutes a 'fair use.' The committee does not intend 
to suggest, however, that off-the-air recording for convenience would under 
any circumstances, be considered 'fair use.' To meet the requirement of 
temporary use the school may retain the recording for only a limited period 
of time after the broadcast.'' S. Rep. 94-473, pp. 65-66. 
A hasty reading of the italicized sentence-especially the phrase "under 
any circumstances"-might suggest that the committee intended to pro-
hibit any time-shifting. But the sentence preceding the italicized one 
proves that reading impossible, since it expressly authorizes certain time-
shifting for public display. In context, the italicized sentence merely en-
sures that the preceding sentence not be read too broadly. The Commit-
tee wanted to make sure that its approval of one form of time shifting for 
public display not be read as suggesting that all time shifting for public dis-
play is permissible. No question of public display is presented in this case. 
82"Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating ob-
scenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own home. If 
the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no busi-
ness telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read 
or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at 
the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds." 
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 565-566 (1969). 
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sent from the 1976 legislative history. 
That is especially true in the context of a statute that ex-
pressly provides that every act of infringement-even if per-
formed in complete good faith-gives rise to a minimum stat-
utory liability of $100. 38 Even if it is assumed that such a 
penalty could seldom be collected, we cannot ignore the con-
cern that literally millions of Americans might be branded as 
lawbreakers for conduct that seems morally indistinguishable 
from simply watching a free public broadCast at the time it is 
offered to them. It is highly improbable that Congress so 
intended. 
Finally, it must not be forgotten that to the extent time-
shifting expands public access to freely broadcast television 
programs, it yields societal benefits. Earlier this year, in 
Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried, 
-- U. S. --, -----, n. 12 (1983), we acknowledged 
the public interest in making television broadcasting more 
available. Concededly, that interest is not unlimited. But 
it supports an interpretation of the concept of "fair use" that 
requires the copyright holder to demonstrate some likelihood 
of harm before he may condemn a primate act of time-shifting 
as a violation of federal law. 
When these factors are all weighed in the "rule of reason" 
balance, we must conclude that the respondents have not 
demonstrated that home time-shifting is not fair use. Con-
gress is, of course, free to change the law. But in light of the 
conclusions of the District Court regarding the state of the 
empirical data, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred 
in holding that the statute as presently written bars such 
83 Section 504(c)(2) provides, in part: 
"In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the 
court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe 
that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in 
its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not 
less than $100." 
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conduct. 34 
VI 
"The direction of Art. I is that Congress shall have the 
34 The Court of Appeals chose not to engage in a sensitive "rule of rea-
son" analysis in this case. Instead, it assumed that the category of "fair 
use" is rigidly circumscribed by a requirement that every such use must be 
"productive. It therefore concluded copying a television program merely 
to enable the viewer to receive information or entertainment that he would 
otherwise miss because of a personal scheduling conflict could never be fair 
use. That understanding of "fair use" was erroneous. 
Fair use analysis calls for a sensitive balancing of interests. The distinc-
tion between "productive" and "unproductive" uses may be helpful in cali-
brating the balance, but it cannot be wholly determinative. Although 
copying to promote a scholarly endeavor certainly has a stronger claim to 
fair use than copying to avoid interrupting a poker game, the question is 
not simply two-dimensional. For one thing, it is not true that all copy-
rights are fungible. Some copyrights govern material with broad poten-
tial secondary markets. Such material may well have a broader claim to 
protection because of the greater potential for commercial harm. Copying 
a news broadcast may have a stronger claim to fair use than copying a mo-
tion picture. 
And, of course, not all uses are fungible. Copying for commercial gain 
has a much weaker claim to fair use than copying for personal enrichment. 
But the notion of social "productivity'' cannot be a complete answer to this 
analysis. A teacher who copies to prepare lecture notes is clearly produc-
tive. But so is a teacher who copies for the sake of broadening his per-
sonal understanding of his specialty. Or a legislator who copies for the 
sake of broadening his understanding of what his constituents are watch-
ing; or a constituent who copies a news program to help make his decision 
on how to vote. 
Making a copy of a copyrighted work for the convenience of a blind per-
son is expressly identified by the House Committee Report as an example 
of fair use, with no suggestion that anything more than a purpose to enter-
tain or to inform need motivate the copying. In a hospital setting, using a 
VTR to enable a patient to see programs he would otherwise miss has no 
productive purpose other than contributing to the psychological well-being 
of the patient. Virtually any time-shifting that increases viewer access to 
television programming may result in a comparable benefit. The statu-
tory language does not identify any dicohotomy between productive and 
nonproductive time-shifting, but does require consideration of the eco-
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power to promote the progress of science and the useful 
arts. When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the 
sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can come only 
from Congress." Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram 
Corp., 406 U. S. 518, 530 (1972). 
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that 
the elected representatives of the millions of people who 
watch television every day have made it unlawful to copy a 
program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat 
prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copy-
ing possible. We are therefore required in this case to apply 
the judicially formulated doctrines of contributory infringe-
ment and fair use. 
The record and findings of the District Court lead us to two 
conclusions. First, Sony demonstrated a significant likeli-
hood that substantial numbers of copyright holders who li-
cense their works for broadcast on free television would not 
object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by private 
viewers. And second, respondents failed to demonstrate 
that time-shifting would cause any likelihood of non-minimal 
harm to the potential market for, or the value of, their copy-
righted works. We therefore conclude that the respondents 
have failed to demonstrate contributory infringement on the 
part of Sony. 
It may well be that Congress will take a fresh look at this 
new technology, just as it so often has in the past. But it is 
not our job to apply laws that have not yet been written. 
Applying the copyright statute, as it now reads, to the facts 
as they have been developed in this case, the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals must be reversed. 
nomic consequences of copying. 
Addendum 
The following two footnotes are to be inserted on page ~ of the 
Second Draft of the Memorandum of Justice Stevens in 81-1687, 
Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. et 
ux. : 
16 - -
E. g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse 
Racing and Breeding Association, Inc., 554 F.2d 1213 (CAl 
1977) (racetrack retained direct infringer to supply .music to 
paying customers); KECA MUSIC, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. 
Supp. 72 (W. D. Mo. 1977) (cocktail lounge hired musicians to 
supply music to paying customers); Dreamland Ball Room v. 
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (CA7 1929) (dance hall hired 
orchestra to supply music to paying customers). 
These cases are often contrasted with the so-called 
landlord-tenant cases, in which landlords who leased premises to 
a direct infringer for a fixed rental and did not participate 
directly in any infringing activity were found not to be liable 
for contributory infringement. E. g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 
686 (CA2 1938). 
A difficult case was presented in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. 
v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (CA2 1963). The owner of twenty-
three chain stores retained the direct infringer to run his 
record departmen~ The relationship was structured as a 
licensing arrangement, so that the defendant bore none of the 
business risk of running the department. Instead, it received 
10% or 12% of the direct infringer's gross receipts. The Court 
of Appeals concluded: 
"[The dance-hall cases] and this one lie closer on the 
spectrum to the employer-employee model, than to the 
landlord-tenant model. On the particular facts before 
us, .•. Green's relationship to its infringing 
licensee, as well as its strong concern for the 
financial success of the phonograph record concession, 
renders it liable for the unauthorized sales of the 
'bootleg' records. 
"[T]he imposition of vicarious liability in the case 
before us cannot be deemed unduly harsh or unfair. 
Green has the power to police carefully the conduct of 
its concessionaire; our judgment will simply ~ncourage 
it to do so, thus placing responsibility where it can 
and should be effectively exercised." Id., at 308 
(emphasis in original). ---
. . 
[Addendum, p. 2) 
17E. g., Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists 
Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (CA2 1971); Screen Gems-Columbia 
Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 
1966). 
In Gershwin, the direct infringers retained the contributory 
infringer to manage their performances. 443 F.2d, at 1160. The 
contributory infringer would contact each direct infringer, 
obtains the titles of the musical compositions to be performed, 
print the programs, and then sells the programs to its own local 
organizations for distribution at the time of the direct 
infringement. Id., at 1161. The Court of Appeals emphasized 
that the contributory infringer had actual knowledge that the 
artists it was managing were performing copyrighted works, was in 
a position to police the infringing conduct of the artists, and 
derived substantial benefit from the actions of the primary 
infringers. Id., at 1163. 
In Screen-Gems, the direct infringer manufactured and sold 
bootleg records. In denying a motion for summary judgment, the 
District Court held that the infringer's advertising agency, the 
radio stations that advertised the infringer's works, and the 
service agency that boxed and mailed the infringing goods could 
all be held liable, if at trial it could be demonstrated that 
they knew or should have known that they were dealing in illegal 
goods. 
Addendum II 
Instead of present footnote 6, I hope to work some of the 
following material into the ultimate opinion at appropriate 
places: 
Fred Rogers is the president of the corporation that 
produces and owns. the copyright in Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood. He 
is also the show's host. The program is carried by more public 
television stations than any other program. Its audience numbers 
over 3,000,000 families a day. He testified that he had 
absolutely no objection to home taping for noncommercial use: 
"Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, 
program the 'Neighborhood' at hours when some children 
cannot use it. I think that it's a real service to 
families to be able to record such programs and show 
them at appropriate times. I have always felt that 
with the advent of all of this new technology that 
allows people to take the 'Neighborhood' off-the-air, 
and I'm speaking for the 'Neighborhood' because that's 
what I produce, that they then become much more active 
in the programming of their family's television life. 
Very framkly, I am opposed to people being programmed 
by others. My whole approach in broadcasting has 
always been 'You are an important person just the way 
you are. You can make healthy decisions.' Maybe I'm 
going on too long, but I just feel that anything that 
allows a person to be more active in the control of his ' 
or he r 1 i f e , in a he a 1 thy way , i s i mpo r tan t . " T . R . 
2920-2921. See also Def. Exh. PI, p. 85. 
John Kenaston is the station manager of Channel 58, an 
educational station in Los Angeles affiliated with the Public 
Broadcasting Service. The station publishes a guide to its 
programs. For each program, the guide tells whether unlimited 
home taping is authorized, home taping is authorized subject to 
certain restrictions {such as erasure within seven days), or home 
taping is not authorized at all. T.R. 2863-2902. The Spring 
1978 edition of the guide described 107 programs. Sixty-two of 
those programs--or 58 percent--authorize some home taping. 
Twenty-one of them--or almost 20 percent--authorize unrestricted 
home taping. Def. Exh. PI. 
Lawrence Frymire is the executive director and the secretary 
of the New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority. Between 20 and 
30 percent of the Authority's prime time broadcasting is produced 
by the Authority itself. 48.7 percent of all its viewers watch 
one of its programs, the New Jersey News Report, and 38.6 percent 
watch another, New Jersey News: Special Report. ~.R. 2833-2836. 
The Authority is willing to authorize unrestrictea noncommercial 
home taping of its material. Ibia. Mr. Frymire also testified 
that many programs are acquirea by the Authority from other 
sources, such as the Public Broaacasting System, with full 
authorization to make ana retain copies for seven aays. T.R. 
2844. He testifiea further that the Authority could ana aoes 
transfer that authority to it~ viewers. Ibia. 
Julian Gooaman was Chairman of the Board of NBC. He 
testifiea that stuaies preparea by NBC's corporate planning staff 
showea "that the home viaeo recoraing business woula have a 
substantial growth in the future, but that its effect upon 
commercial television ana specifically upon our business would be 
minuscule." T.R. 3011. In May 1978, he gave a speech to the 
Federal Communications Bar Association; in which he maae the 
following statement, clearea with the planning staff: 
"Because of the amount of television programming now 
available, ana the fact that few viewers can watch all 
of the programs they might want to, we feel that viaeo 
recoraing will expana television viewing rather than 
subtract from it." T.R. 3016-3017: Def. Exh. OT. 
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SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA, ET AL., PETI- ~~ 
TIONERS v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, 
INC., ETC., ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[December -, 1983] 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioners manufacture and sell home video tape record-
ers. Repondents own the copyrights on some of the televi-
sion programs that are broadcast on the public airwaves. 
Some members of the general public use video tape recorders 
sold by petitioners to record some of these broadcasts, as 
well as a large number of other broadcasts. The question 
presented is whether the sale of petitioners' copying equip-
ment to the general public violates any of the rights con-
ferred upon respondents by the Copyright Act. 
Respondents commenced this copyright infringment action 
against petitioners in the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California in 1976. Respondents alleged 
that some individuals had used Betamax video tape recorders 
(VTR's) to record some of respondents' copyrighted works 
which had been exhibited on commercially sponsored televi-
sion and contended that these individuals had thereby 
infringed respondents' copyrights. Respondents further 
maintained that petitioners were liable for the copyright 
infringment allegedly committed by Betamax consumers be-
cause of petitioners' marketing of the Betamax VTR's. 1 Re-
' The respondents also asserted causes of action under state law and 
§ 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 441, 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a). 
These claims are not before this Court. 
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spondents sought no relief against any Betamax consumer. 
Instead, they sought money damages and an equitable ac-
counting of profits from petitioners, as well as an injunction 
against the manufacture and marketing of Betamax VTR's. 
After a lengthy trial, the District Court denied respond-
ents all the relief they sought and entered judgment for peti-
tioners. 480 F. Supp. 429 (1979). The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's 
judgment on respondent's copyright claim, holding petition-
ers liable for contributory infringment and ordering the Dis-
trict Court to fashion appropriate relief. 659 F. 2d 963 
(1981). We granted certiorari, 457 U. S. 1116 (1982); since 
we had not completed our study of the case last Term, we or-
dered reargument,-- U. S. -- (1983). We now reverse. 
An explanation of our rejection of respondents' unprece-
dented attempt to impose copyright liability upon the distrib-
utors of copying equipment requires a quite detailed recita-
tion of the findings of the District Court. In summary, those 
findings reveal that the average member of the public uses a 
VTR principally to record a program he cannot view as it is 
being televised and then to watch it once at a later time. 
This practice, known as "time-shifting," enlarges the televi-
sion viewing audience. For that reason, a significant 
amount of television programming may be used in this man-
ner without objection from the owners of the copyrights on 
the programs. For the same reason, even the two respond-
ents in this case, who do assert objections to time-shifting in 
this litigation, were unable to prove that the practice has im-
paired the commercial value of their copyrights or has cre-
ated any likelihood of future harm. Given these findings, 
there is no basis in the Copyright Act upon which respond-
ents can hold petitioners liable for distributing VTR's to the 
general public. The Court of Appeals' holding that respond-
ents are entitled to enjoin the distribution of VTR's, to collect 
royalties on the sale of such equipment, or to obtain other re-
lief, if affirmed, would enlarge the scope of respondents' stat-
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utory monopolies to encompass control over an article of com-
merce that is not the subject of copyright protection. Such 
an expansion of the copyright privilege is beyond the limits of 
the grants authorized by Congress. 
I 
The two respondents in this action, Universal Studios, Inc. 
and Walt Disney Productions, produce and hold the copy-
rights on a substantial number of motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works. In the current marketplace, they can 
exploit their rights in these works in a number of ways: by 
authorizing theatrical exhibitions, by licensing limited 
showings on cable and network television, by selling syndica-
tion rights for repeated airings on local television stations, 
and by marketing programs on prerecorded videotapes or 
videodiscs. Some works are suitable for exploitation 
through all of these avenues, while the market for other 
works is more limited. 
Petitioner Sony manufactures millions of Betamax video 
tape recorders and markets these devices through numerous 
retail establishments, some of which are also petitioners in 
this action. 2 Sony's Betamax VTR is a mechanism consist-
ing of three basic components: (1) a tuner, which receives 
electromagnetic signals transmitted over the television band 
of the public airwaves and separates them into audio and vi-
sual signals; (2) a recorder, which records such signals on a 
magnetic tape; and (3) an adapter, which converts the audio 
and visual signals on the tape into a composite signal that can 
be received by a television set. 
2 The four retailers are Carter, Hawley, Hales, Stores, Inc.; Associated 
Dry Goods Corp.; Federated Department Stores, Inc.; and Henry's Cam-
era Corp. The principal defendants are Sony Corporation, the manufac-
turer of the equipment, and its wholly owned subsidiary, Sony Corporation 
of America. The advertising agency of Doyle, Dane, Burn bock, Inc., also 
involved in marketing the Betamax, is also a petitioner. An individual 
VTR user, Willis Griffiths, was named as a defendant in the District Court, 
but respondent sought no relief against him. Griffiths is not a petitioner. 
For convenience, we shall refer to petitioners collectively as Sony. 
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Several capabilities of the machine are noteworthy. The 
separate tuner in the Betamax enables it to record a broad-
cast off one station while the television set is tuned to" another 
channel, permitting the viewer, for example, to watch two 
simultaneous news broadcasts by watching one "live" and re-
cording the other for later viewing. Tapes may be reused, 
and programs that have been recorded may be erased either 
before or after viewing. A timer in the Betamax can be used 
to activate and deactivate the equipment at predetermined 
times, enabling an intended viewer to record programs that 
are transmitted when he or she is not at home. Thus a per-
son may watch a program at home in the evening even 
though it was broadcast while the viewer was at work during 
the afternoon. The Betamax is also equipped with a pause 
button and a fast-forward control. The pause button, when 
depressed, deactivates the recorder until it is released, thus 
enabling a viewer to omit a commercial advertisement from 
the recording, provided, of course, that the viewer is present 
when the program is recorded. The fast forward control en-
ables the viewer of a previously recorded program to run the 
tape rapidly when a segment he or she does not desire to see 
is being played back on the television screen. 
The respondents and Sony both conducted surveys of the 
way the Betamax machine was used by several hundred own-
ers during a sample period in 1978. Although there were 
some differences in the surveys, they both showed that the 
primary use of the machine for most owners was "time-shift-
ing,"-the practice of recording a program to view it once at 
a later time, and thereafter erasing it. Time-shifting en-
ables viewers to see programs they otherwise would miss be-
cause they are not at home, are occupied with other tasks, or 
are viewing a program on another station at the time of a 
broadcast that they desire to watch. Both surveys also 
showed, however, that a substantial number of interviewees 
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had accumulated libraries of tapes. 3 Sony's survey indi-
cated that over 80% of the interviewees watched at least as 
much regular television as they had before owning a 
Betamax. 4 Respondents offered no evidence of decreased 
television viewing by Betamax owners. 5 
Sony introduced considerable evidence describing televi-
sion programs that could be copied without objection from 
3 As evidence of how a VTR may be used, respondents offered the testi-
mony of William Griffiths. Griffiths, although named as an individual de-
fendant, was a client of plaintiffs' law firm. The District Court summa-
rized his testimony as follows: 
"He owns approximately 100 tapes. When Griffiths bought his Betamax, 
he intended not only to time-shift (record, play-back and then erase) but 
also to build a library of cassettes. Maintaining a library, however, 
proved too expensive, and he is now erasing some earlier tapes and reusing 
them. 
"Griffiths copied about 20 minutes of a Universal motion picture called 
'Never Give An Inch,' and two episodes from Universal television series 
entitled 'Baa Baa Black Sheep' and 'Holmes and Yo Yo.' He would have 
erased each of these but for the request of plaintiffs' counsel that it be kept. 
Griffiths also testified that he had copied but already erased Universal 
films called 'Alpha Caper' (erased before anyone saw it) and 'Amelia Ear-
hart.' At the time of his deposition Griffiths did not intend to keep any 
Universal film in his library. 
"Griffiths has also recorded documentaries, news broadcasts, sporting 
events and political programs such as a rerun of the Nixon/Kennedy de-
bate." 480 F. Supp., at 436-437. 
Four other witnesses testified to having engaged in similar activity. 
4 The District Court summarized some of the findings in these surveys as 
follows: 
"According to plaintiffs' survey, 75.4% of the VTR owners use their 'ma-
chines to record for time-shifting purposes half or most of the time. De-
fendants' survey showed that 96% of the Betamax owners had used the ma-
chine to record programs they otherwise would have missed. 
"When plaintiffs asked interviewees how many cassettes were in their li-
brary, 55.8% said there were 10 or fewer. In defendants' survey, of the 
total programs viewed by interviewees in the past month, 70.4% had been 
viewed only that one time and for 57.9%, there were no plans for further 
viewing." 480 F. Supp., at 438. 
5 "81. 9% of the defendants' interviewees watched the same amount or 
more of regular television as they did before owning a Betamax. 83.2% 
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any copyright holder, with special emphasis on sports, reli-
gious, and educational programming. For example, their 
survey indicated that 7.3% of all Betamax use is to record 
sports events, and representatives of professional baseball, 
football, basketball, and hockey testified that they had no ob-
jection to the recording of their televised events for home 
use. 6 
Respondents offered opinion evidence concerning the fu-
ture impact of the unrestricted sale of VTR's on the commer-
cial value of their copyrights. The District Court found, 
however, that they had failed to prove any likelihood of fu-
ture harm from the use of VTR's for time-shifting. ld., at 
469. 
The District Court's Decision 
The lengthy trial of the case in the District Court con-
cerned the private, home use of VTR's for recording pro-
grams broadcast on the public airwaves without charge to the 
viewer. 7 No issue concerning the transfer of tapes to other 
persons, the use of home-recorded tapes for public perform-
ances, or the copying of programs transmitted on pay orca-
ble television systems was raised. See 480 F. Supp. 429, 
432-433, 442 (1979). 
The District Court concluded that noncommercial home use 
recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves was 
a fair use of copyrighted works and did not constitute copy-
right infringement. It emphasized the fact that the material 
was broadcast free to the public at large, the noncommercial 
reported their frequency of movie going was unaffected by Betamax." 480 
F . Supp. , at 439. 
6 See Def. Exh. OT, Table 20; Tr. 2447-2450, 2480, 2486-2487, 2515-
2516, 2530- 2534. 
7 The trial also briefly touched upon demonstrations of the Betamax by 
the retailer petitioners which were alleged to be infringments by respond-
ents. The District Court held against respondents on this claim, 480 F. 
Supp., at 456-457, the Court of Appeals affirmed this holding, 659 F. 2d, at 
976, and respondents did not cross-petition on this issue. 
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character of the use, and the private character of the activity 
conducted entirely within the home. Moreover, the court 
found that the purpose of this use served the public interest 
in increasing access to television programming, an interest 
that "is consistent with the First Amendment policy of pro-
viding the fullest possible access to information through the 
public airwaves. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 102." 480 F. 
Supp., at 454. 8 Even when an entire copyrighted work was 
recorded, the District Court regarded the copying as fair use 
"because there is no accompanying reduction in the market 
for 'plaintiff's original work."' Ibid. 
As an independent ground of decision, the District Court 
also concluded that Sony could not be held liable as a con-
tributory infringer even if the home use of a VTR was consid-
ered an infringing use. The District Court noted that Sony 
had no direct involvement with any Betamax purchasers who 
recorded copyrighted works off the air. Sony's advertising 
was silent on the subject of possible copyright infringement, 
but its instruction booklet contained the following statement: 
"Television programs, films, videotapes and other ma-
terials may be copyrighted. Unauthorized recording of 
such material may be contrary to the provisions of the 
United States copyright laws." !d., at 436. 
The District Court assumed that Sony had constructive 
knowledge of the probability that the Betamax machine 
would be used to record copyrighted programs, but found 
that Sony merely sold a "product capable of a variety of 
uses, some of them allegedly infringing." !d., at 461. It 
reasoned: 
8 The court also found that this "access is not just a matter of conve-
nience, as plaintiffs have suggested. Access has been limited not simply 
by inconvenience but by the basic need to work. Access to the better pro-
gram has also been limited by the competitive practice of counterprogram-
ming." 480 F. Supp., at 454. 
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"Selling a staple article of commerce e. g., a type-
writer, a recorder, a camera, a photocopying machine 
technically contributes to any infringing use subse-
quently made thereof, but this kind of 'contribution,' if 
deemed sufficient as a basis for liability, would expand 
the theory beyond precedent and arguably beyond judi-
cial management. 
"Commerce would indeed be hampered if manufactur-
ers of staple items were held liable as contributory in-
fringers whenever they 'constructively' knew that some 
purchasers on some occasions would use their product 
for a purpose which a court later deemed, as a matter of 
first impression, to be an infringement." Ibid. 
Finally, the District Court discussed the respondents' 
prayer for injunctive relief, noting that they had asked for an 
injunction either preventing the future sale of Betamax ma-
chines, or requiring that the machines be rendered incapable 
of recording copyrighted works off the air. The court stated 
that it had "found no case in which the manufacturers, dis-
tributors, retailers, and advertisors of the instrument en-
abling the infringement were sued by the copyright holders," 
and that the request for relief in this case "is unique." 480 
F. Supp., at 465. 
It concluded that an injunction was wholly inappropriate 
because any possible harm to respondents was outweighed by 
the fact that "the Betamax could still legally be used to 
record noncopyrighted material or material whose owners 
consented to the copying. An injunction would deprive the 
public of the ability to use the Betamax for this noninfringing 
off-the-air recording." 480 F. Supp., at 468. 
The Court of Appeals' Decision 
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's judg-
ment on respondents' copyright claim. It did not set aside 
any of the District Court's findings of fact. Rather, it con-
cluded as a matter of law that the home use of a VTR was not 
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a fair use because it was not a "productive use." 9 It there-
fore held that it was unnecessary for plaintiffs to prove any 
harm to the potential market for the copyrighted works, but 
then observed that it seemed clear that the cumulative effect 
of mass reproduction made possible by VTR's would tend to 
diminish the potential market for respondents' works. 659 
F. 2d, at 974. 
On the issue of contributory infringement, the Court of Ap-
peals first rejected the analogy to staple articles of commerce 
such as tape recorders or photocopying machines. It noted 
that such machines "may have substantial benefit for some 
purposes" and do not "even remotely raise copyright prob-
lems." Id., at 975. VTR's, however, are sold "for the pri-
mary purpose of reproducing television programming" and 
"virtually all" such programming is copyrighted material. 
Ibid. The Court of Appeals concluded, therefore, that 
VTR's were not suitable for any substantial noninfringing use 
even if some copyright owners elect not to enforce their 
rights. 
The Court of Appeals also rejected the District Court's re-
liance on Sony's lack of knowledge that home use constituted 
infringement. Assuming that the statutory provisions defin-
ing the remedies for infringement applied also to the non-
statutory tort of contributory infringement, the court stated 
that a defendant's good faith would merely reduce his dam-
ages liability but would not excuse the infringing conduct. 
It held that Sony was chargeable with knowledge of the 
homeowner's infringing activity because the reproduction of 
copyrighted materials was either "the most conspicuous use" 
or "the major use" of the Betamax product. Ibid. 
On the matter of relief, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that "statutory damages may be appropriate," that the Dis-
trict Court should reconsider its determination that an in-
9 "Without a 'productive use', i. e. when copyrighted material is repro-
duced for its intrinsic use, the mass copying of the sort involved in this case 
precludes an application of fair use." 659 F. 2d, at 971-972. 
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junction would not be an appropriate remedy; and, referring 
to "the analogous photocopying area," suggested that a con-
tinuing royalty pursuant to a judicially created compulsory li-
cense may very well be an acceptable resolution of the relief 
issue. 659 F. 2d, at 976. 
II 
Article I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that: 
"The Congress shall have Power . . . to Promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are 
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special 
private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by 
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is 
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and in-
ventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the 
public access to the products of their genius after the limited 
period of exclusive control has expired. 
"The copyright law, like the patent statute, makes re-
ward to the owner a secondary consideration. In Fox 
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127, Chief Justice 
Hughes spoke as follows respecting the copyright mo-
nopoly granted by Congress, 'The sole interest of the 
United States and the primary object in conferring the 
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the pub-
lic from the labors of authors.' It is said that reward to 
the author or artist serves to induce release to the public 
of the products of his creative genius." United States v. 
Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 158. 
As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress 
that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the 
limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to in-
ventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their 
work product. Because this task involves a difficult balance 
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between the interests of authors and inventors in the control 
and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one 
hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of 
ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand, our pat-
ent and copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly. 10 
From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in 
response to significant changes in technology. 11 Indeed, it 
was the invention of a new form of copying equipment-the 
10 In its report accompanying the comprehensive revision of the Copy-
right Act in 1909, the Judiciary Committee of the House of Represent-
atives explained this balance: 
"The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of 
the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in 
his writings, .. . but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be 
served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing 
to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings. 
"In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider ... two questions: 
First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit 
the public, and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be detri-
mental to the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under the 
proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that out-
weighs the evils of the temporary monopoly." H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909). 
11 Thus, for example, the development and marketing of player pianos 
and perforated roles of music, see White Smith Music Publishing Co. v. 
Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (1908), preceded the enactment of the Copyright 
Act of 1909; innovations in copying techniques gave rise to the statutory 
exemption for library copying embodied in § 108 of the 1976 revision of the 
Copyright law; the development of the technology that made it possible to 
retransmit television programs by cable or by microwave systems, see 
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390 (1968), and Telepromp-
ter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U. S. 394 (1974), prompted the enactment of the 
complex provisions set forth in 17 U. S. C. § 111 (d)(2)(B) and § 111(d)(5) 
after years of detailed congressional study, see Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. 
Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F. 2d 125, 129 (CA2 1982). 
By enacting the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, 85 Stat. 391, 
Congress also provided the solution to the "record piracy" problems that 
had been created by the development of the audio tape recorder. Sony 
argues that the legislative history of that Act, see especially H. Rep. No. 
487, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 7, indicates that Congress did not intend to 
prohibit the private home use of either audio or video tape recording equip-
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printing press-that gave rise to the original need for copy-
right protection. 12 Repeatedly, as new developments have 
occurred in this country, it has been the Congress that has 
fashioned the new rules that new technology made necessary. 
Thus, long before the enactment of the Copyright Act of 
1909, 35 Stat. 1075, it was settled that the protection given to 
copyrights is wholly statutory. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U. S. 
(8 Peters) 591, 661-662 (1834). The remedies for infringe-
ment "are only those prescribed by Congress." Thompson 
v. Hubbard, 131 U. S. 123, 151 (1889). 
The judiciary's reluctance to expand the protections af-
forded by the copyright without explicit legislative guidance 
is a recurring theme. See, e. g., Teleprompter Corp. v. 
CBS, 415 U. S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Art-
ists, 392 U. S. 390 (1968); Williams and Wilkins v. United 
States, 487 F. 2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affirmed by an equally 
divided court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975); White-Smith Music Pub-
lishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (1908). Sound policy, 
as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Con-
gress when major technological innovations alter the market 
for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional 
authority and the institutional ability to accomodate fully the 
varied permutations of competing interests that are inev-
itably implicated by such new technology. 
In a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly 
marked our course, we must be circumspect in construing the 
ment. In view of our disposition of the contributory infringement issue, 
we express no opinion on that question. 
12 "Copyright protection became necessary with the invention of the 
printing press and had its early beginnings in the British censorship laws. 
The fortunes of the law of copyright have always been closely connected 
with freedom of expression, on the one hand, and with technological im-
provements in means of dissemination, on the other. Successive ages 
have drawn different balances among the interest of the writer in the con-
trol and exploitation of his intellectual property, the related interest of the 
publisher, and the competing interest of society in the untrammeled dis-
semination of ideas." Foreword to B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of 
Copyright vii-viii (1967). 
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scope of rights created by a legislative enactment which 
never contemplated such a calculus of interests. In doing so, 
we are guided by Justice Stewart's exposition of the correct 
approach to ambiguities in the law of copyright: 
"The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory 
monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required 
by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing 
claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be 
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must 
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public 
availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The 
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair 
return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate 
aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity 
for the general public good. 'The sole interest of the 
United States and the primary object in conferring the 
monopoly,' this Court has said, 'lie in the general bene-
fits derived by the public from the labors of authors.' 
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127. See Ken-
dall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 327-328; Grant v. Ray-
mond, 6 Pet. 218, 241-242. When technological change 
has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright 
Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose.'' 
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 
156 (footnotes omitted). 
Copyright protection "subsists . . . in original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 
U. S. C. § 102(a). This protection has never accorded the 
copyright owner complete control over all possible uses of his 
work. 13 Rather, the Copyright Act grants the copyright 
'
3 See, e. g., White Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 
1, 19 (1908); cf. Deep South Packing Co. v. Lathram Corp., 406 U. S. 518, 
530-531 (1972). While the law has never recognized an author's right to 
absolute control of his work, the natural tendency of legal rights to express 
themselves in absolute terms to the exclusion of all else is particularly pro-
nounced in the history of the constitutionally sanctioned monopolies of the 
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holder "exclusive" rights to use and to authorize the use of his 
work in five qualified ways, · including reproduction of the 
copyrighted work in copies. I d., § 106. 14 All reproductions 
of the work, however, are not within the exclusive domain of 
the copyright owner; some are in the public domain. Any in-
dividual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a "fair use;" 
the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right to 
such a use. Compare id., § 106 with id., § 107. 
"Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the 
copyright owner," that is, anyone who trespasses into his ex-
clusive domain by using or authorizing the use of the copy-
righted work in one of the five ways set forth in the statute, 
"is an infringer of the copyright." !d., § 501(a). Con-
versely, anyone who is authorized by the copyright owner to 
use the copyrighted work in a way specified in the statute or 
copyright and the patent. See e. g., United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, 334 U. S. 131, 156-158 (1948) (copyright owners claiming right to tie 
license of one film to license of another under copyright law); Fox Film 
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 106 (1932) (copyright owner claiming copyright 
renders it immune from state taxation of copyright royalties); Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 349-351 (1908) (copyright owner 
claiming that a right to fix resale price of his works within the scope of his 
copyright); International Business Machines v. United States, 298 U. S. 
131 (1936) (patentees claiming right to tie sale of unpatented article to lease 
of patented device). 
1
' Section 106 of the Act provides: 
"'Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this 
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to 
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform 
the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi-
vidual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the 
copyrighted work publicly." 
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who makes a fair use of the work is not an infringer of the 
copyright with respect to such use. 
The Copyright Act provides the owner of a copyright with 
a potent arsenal of remedies against an infringer of his 
work, including an injunction to restrain the infringer from 
violating his rights, the impoundment and destruction of all 
reproductions of his work made in violation of his rights, a 
recovery of his actual damages and any additional profits re-
alized by the infringer or a recovery of statutory damages, 
and attorneys fees. I d., § § 502-505. 15 
The two respondents in this case do not seek relief against 
the Betamax users who have allegedly infringed their copy-
rights. Moreover, this is not a class action on behalf of all 
copyright owners who license their works for television 
broadcast, and respondents have no right to invoke whatever 
rights other copyright holders may have to bring infringe-
ment actions based on Betamax copying of their works. 16 As 
was made clear by their own evidence, the copying of the re-
spondents' programs represents a small portion of the total 
use of VTR's. It is, however, the taping of respondents own 
copyrighted programs that provides them with standing to 
charge Sony with contributory infringement. To prevail, 
they have the burden of proving that users of the Betamax 
15 Moreover, anyone who willfully infringes the copyright to reproduce a 
motion picture for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial 
gain is subject to criminal penalties of one year imprisonment and a $25,000 
fine for the first offense and two years imprisonment and a $50,000 fine for 
each subsequent offense, 17 U. S. C. § 506(a), and the fruits and instru-
mentalities of the crime are forfeited upon conviction, id., § 506(b). 
16 In this regard, we reject respondent's attempt to cast this action as 
comparable to a class action because of the positions taken by amici with 
copyright interests and their attempt to treat the statements made by 
amici as evidence in this case. See Brief for Respondent, at 1, and n. 1, 6, 
52, 53 and n. 116. The stated desires of amici concerning the outcome of 
this or any litigation are no substitute for a class action, are not evidence in 
the case, and do not influence our decision; we examine an amicus curiae 
brief solely for whatever aid it provides in analyzing the legal questions be-
fore us. 
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have infringed their copyrights and that Sony should be held 
responsible for that infringement. · 
III 
The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable 
for infringment committed by another. In contrast, the Pat-
ent Act expressly brands anyone who "actively induces 
infringment of a patent" as an infringer, 35 U. S. C. § 271(b), 
and further imposes liability on certain individuals labeled 
"contributory" infringers, id., §271(c). The absence of such 
express language in the copyright statute does not preclude 
the imposition of liability for copyright infringments on cer-
tain parties who have not themselves engaged in the infring-
ing activity.t7 For vicarious liability is imposed in virtually 
all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringe-
ment is merely a species of the broader problem of identify-
ing the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual 
accountable for the actions of another. 
Such circumstances were plainly present in Kalem Co. v. 
Harper Brothers, 222 U. S. 55 (1911), the copyright decision 
of this Court on which respondents place their principal reli-
ance. In Kalem, the Court held that the producer of an un-
17 As the District Court correctly observed, however, "the lines between 
direct infringement, contributory infringment, and vicarious liability are 
not clearly drawn .... " 480 F. Supp. 457-458. The lack of clarity in this 
area may, in part, be attributable to the fact that an infringer is not merely 
one who uses a work without authorization by the copyright owner, but 
also one who authorizes the use of a copyrighted work without actual au-
thority from the copyright owner. 
We note the parties' statements that the questions of petitioners' liabil-
ity under the "doctrines" of "direct infringement" and "vicarious liability'' 
are not nominally before this Court. Compare Respondents' Brief, at 9, n. 
22, 41, n. 90 with Petitioners' Reply Brief, at 1, n. 2. We also observe, 
however, that reasoned analysis of respondents' unprecedented contribu-
tory infringement claim necessarily entails consideration of arguments and 
case law which may also be forwarded under the other labels, and indeed 
the parties to a large extent rely upon such arguments and authority in 
support of their respective positions on the issue of contributory 
infringement. 
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authorized film dramatization of the copyrighted book Ben 
Hur was liable for his sale of' the motion picture to jobbers, 
who in turn arranged for the commercial exhibition of the 
film. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, explained: 
"The defendant not only expected but invoked by ad-
vertisement the use of its films for dramatic reproduc-
tion of the story. That was the most conspicuous pur-
pose for which they could be used, and the one for which 
especially they were made. If the defendant did not 
contribute to the infringement it is impossible to do so 
except by taking part in the final act. It is liable on 
principles recognized in every part of the law." 222 
U.S., at 63. 
The use for which the item sold in Kalem had been "espe-
cially'' made was, of course, to display the performance that 
had already been recorded upon it. The producer had per-
sonally appropriated the copyright owner's protected work 
and, as the owner of the tangible medium of expression upon 
which the protected work was recorded, authorized that use 
by his sale of the film to jobbers. But that use of the film 
was not his to authorize: the copyright owner possessed the 
exclusive right to authorize public performances of his work. 
Further, the producer personally advertised the unau-
thorized public performances, dispelling any possible doubt 
as to the use of the film which he had authorized. 
Respondents argue that Kalem stands for the proposition 
that supplying the "means" to accomplish an infringing activ-
ity and encouraging that activity through adverstisement are 
sufficient to establish liability for copyright infringement. 
This argument rests on a gross generalization that cannot 
withstand scrutiny. The producer in Kalem did not merely 
provide the "means" to accomplish an infringing activity; the 
producer supplied the work itself, albeit in a new medium of 
expression. Petitioners in the instant case do not supply 
Betamax consumers with respondents' works; respondents 
do. Petitioners supply a piece of equipment that is generally 
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capable of copying the entire range of programs that may be 
televised: those that are uncopyrighted, those that are copy-
righted but may be copied without objection from the copy-
right holder, and those that the copyright holder would pre-
fer not to have copied. The Betamax can be used to make 
authorized or unauthorized uses of copyrighted works, but 
the range of its potential use is much broader than the par-
ticular infringing use of the film Ben Hur involved in Kalem. 
Kalem does not support respondents' novel theory of 
liability. 
Justice Holmes stated that the producer had "contributed" 
to the infringement of the copyright, and the label "contribu-
tory infringement" has been applied in a number of lower 
court copyright cases involving an ongoing relationship be-
tween the direct infringer and the contributory infringer at 
the time the infringing conduct occurred. In such cases, as 
in other situations in which the imposition of vicarious liablity 
is manifestly just, the "contributory" infringer was in a posi-
tion to control the use of copyrighted works by others and 
had authorized the use without permission from the copy-
right owner. 18 This case, however, plainly does not fall in 
18 The so-called "dance hall cases," Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State 
Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Ass'n, 554 F. 2d 1213 (CAl 1977) 
(racetrack retained infringer to supply music to paying customers); KECA 
MUSIC , Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72 (W. D. Mo. 1977) 
(cocktail lounge hired musicians to supply music to paying customers); 
Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F . 2d 354 (CA7 
1929) (dance hall hired orchestra to supply music to paying customers) are 
often contrasted with the so-called landlord-tenant cases, in which land-
lords who leased premises to a direct infringer for a fixed rental and did not 
participate directly in any infringing activity were found not to be liable for 
contributory infringement. E. g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F. 2d 686 (CA2 
1938). 
In Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F . 2d 304 (CA2 
1963) the owner of twenty-three chain stores retained the direct infringer 
to run its record departments. The relationship was structured as a li-
censing arrangement, so that the defendant bore none of the business risk 
of running the department. Instead, it received 10% or 12% of the direct 
infringer's gross receipts. The Court of Appeals concluded: 
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that category. The only contact between Sony and the users 
of the Betamax that is disclosed by this record occurred at 
the moment of sale. The District Court expressly found that 
"no employee of Sony, Sonam or DDBI had either direct in-
volvement with the allegedly infringing activity or direct con-
tact with purchasers of Betamax who recorded copyrighted 
works off-the-air." 480 F. Supp., at 460. And it further 
found that "there was no evidence that any of the copies 
made by Griffiths or the other individual witnesses in this 
suit were influenced or encouraged by [Sony's] advertise- ,... "'1 , Q _ 
ments." Ibid. * ~ -t-~ "" • ' l 
"':l>e\<...\.~ 
"[The dance-hall cases] and this one lie closer on the spectrum to the em-
ployer-employee model, than to the landlord-tenant model. On the par-
ticular facts before us, ... Green's relationship to its infringing licensee, as 
well as its strong concern for the financial success of the phonograph record 
concession, renders it liable for the unauthorized sales of the 'bootleg' 
records. 
"[T]he imposition of vicarious liability in the case before us cannot be 
deemed unduly harsh or unfair. Green has the power to police carefully 
the conduct of its concessionaire; our judgment will simply encourage it to 
do so, thus placing responsibility where it can and should be effectively ex-1 
ercised." I d., at 308 (emphasis in original). 
In Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 
443 F . 2d 1159 (CA2 1971), the direct infringers retained the contributory 
infringer to manage their performances. The contributory infringer 
would contact each direct infringer, obtain the titles of the musical compo-
sitions to be performed, print the programs, and then sell the programs to 
its own local organizations for distribution at the time of the direct infringe-
ment. Id., at 1161. The Court of Appeals emphasized that the contribu-
tory infringer had actual knowledge that the artists it was managing were 
performing copyrighted works, was in a position to police the infringing 
conduct of the artists, and derived substantial benefit from the actions of 
the primary infringers. Id., at 1163. 
In Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc . v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc ., 256 F. 
Supp. 399 (S. D. N. Y. 1966), the direct infringer manufactured and sold 
bootleg records. In denying a motion for summary judgment, the District 
Court held that the infringer's advertising agency, the radio stations that 
advertised the infringer's works, and the service agency that boxed and 
mailed the infringing goods could all be held liable, if at trial it could be 
demonstrated that they knew or should have known that they were dealing 
in illegal goods. 
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If vicarious liability is to be imposed on petitioners in this 
case, it must rest on the fact that they have sold equipment 
with constructive knowledge of the fact that their customers 
may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copy-
righted material. There is no precedent in the law of copy-
right for the imposition of vicarious liability on such a theory. 
The closest analogy is provided by the patent law cases to 
which it is appropriate to refer because of the historic kinship 
between patent law and copyright law. 19 
In the Patent Code both the concept of infringement and 
the concept of contributory infringement are expressly de-
fined by statute. w The prohibition against contributory in-
19 E. g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 158 (1948); 
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 106, 131 (1932); Wheaton and Donald-
son v. Peters and Grigg, 33 U. S. 591, 657-658 (1834). The two areas of 
the law, naturally, are not identical twins, and we exercise the caution 
which we have expressed in the past in applying doctrine formulated in one 
area to the other. See generally, Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 217-218 
(1954); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 345 (1908). 
00 35 U. S. C. § 271 provides: 
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without author-
ity makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States 
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. 
"(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as 
an infringer. 
"(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, 
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing 
a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing 
the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringe-
ment of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce 
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory 
infringer. 
"(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or 
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed 
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his hav-
ing done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which 
if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory 
infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform 
acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory 
infrigement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against 
infringement or contributory infringement." 
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fringement is confined to the knowing sale of a component es-
pecially made for use in connection with a particular patent. 
There is no suggestion in the statute that one patentee may 
object to the sale of a product that might be used in connec-
tion with other patents. Moreover, the Act expressly pro-
vides that the sale of a "staple article or commodity of com-
merce suitable for substantial noninfringing use" is not 
contributory infringement. 
When a charge of contributory infringement is predicated 
entirely on the sale of an article of commerce that is used by 
the purchaser to infringe a patent, the public interest in ac-
cess to that article of commerce is necessarily implicated. A 
finding of contributory infringement does not, of course, re-
move the article from the market altogether; it does, how-
ever, give the patentee effective control over the sale of that 
item. Indeed, a finding of contributory infringement is nor-
mally the functional equivalent of holding that the disputed 
article is within the monopoly granted to the patentee. 21 
For that reason, in contributory infringement cases arising 
under the patent laws the Court has always recognized the 
critical importance of not allowing the patentee to extend his 
monopoly beyond the limits of his specific grant. These 
cases deny the patentee any right to control the distribution 
of unpatented articles unless they are "unsuited for any com-
mercial noninfringing use." Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm 
& Hass Co., 448 U. S. 176, 198 (1980). Unless a commodity 
"has no use except through practice of the patented method," 
21 It seems extraordinary to suggest that the Copyright Act confers upon 
all copyright owners collectively, much less the two respondents in this 
case, the exclusive right to distribute VTR's simply because they may be 
used to infringe copyrights. That, however, is the logical implication of 
their claim. The request for an injunction below indicates that respondents 
seek, in effect, to declare VTR's contraband. Their suggestion in this 
Court that a continuing royalty pursuant to a judicially created compulsory 
license would be an acceptable remedy merely indicates that respondents, 
for their part, would be willing to license their claimed monopoly interest in 
VTR's to petitioners in return for a royalty. 
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ibid, the patentee has no right to claim that its distribution 
constitutes contributory infringment. "To form the basis for 
contributory infringement the item must almost be uniquely 
suited as a component of the patented invention." P. Rosen-
berg, Patent Law Fundamentals§ 17.02[2] (1982). "[A] sale 
of an article which though adapted to an infringing use is also 
adapted to other and lawful uses, is not enough to make the 
seller a contributory infringer. Such a rule would block the 
wheels of commerce." Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 
48 (1912), overruled on other grounds, Motion Picture Pat-
ents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 517 
(1917). 
We recognize there are substantial differences between the 
patent and copyright laws. But in both areas the contribu-
tory infringement doctrine is grounded on the recognition 
that adequate protection of a monopoly may require the 
courts to look beyond actual duplication of a device or publi-
cation to the products or activities that make such duplication 
possible. The staple article of commerce doctrine must 
strike a balance between a copyright holder's legitimate de-
mand for effective-not merely symbolic-protection of the 
statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage 
in substantially unrelated areas of commerce. Accordingly, 
the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of 
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if 
the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable 
purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses. 
IV 
The question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of 
commercially significant noninfringing uses. In order to re-
solve that question, we need not explore all the different po-
tential uses of the machine and determine whether or not 
they would constitute infringement. Rather, we need only 
consider whether on the basis of the facts as found by the dis-
trict court a significant number of them would be non-infring-
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ing. Moreover, in order to resolve this case we need not 
give precise content to the question of how much use is com-
mercially significant. For one potential use of the Betamax 
plainly satisfies this standard, however it is understood: pri-
vate, noncommercial time-shifting in the home. It does so 
both (A) because respondents have no right to prevent other 
copyright holders from authorizing it for their programs, and 
(B) because the District Court's factual findings reveal that 
even the unauthorized home time-shifting of respondents' 
programs is legitimate fair use. 
A. Authorized Time Shifting 
Each of the respondents owns a large inventory of valuable 
copyrights, but in the total spectrum of television program-
ming their combined market share is small. The exact per-
centage is not specified, but it is well below 10%.22 If they 
were to prevail, the outcome of this litigation would have a 
significant impact on both the producers and the viewers of 
the remaining 90% of the programming in the Nation. No 
doubt, many other producers share respondents' concern 
about the possible consequences of unrestricted copying. 
Nevertheless the findings of the District Court make it clear 
that time-shifting may enlarge the total viewing audience and 
that many producers are willing to allow private time-shifting 
to continue, at least for an experimental time period. 23 
22 The record suggests that Disney's programs at the time of trial con-
sisted of approximately one hour a week of network television and one syn-
dicated series. Universal's percentage in the Los Angeles market on com-
mercial television stations was under 5%. See Tr. 532-533, 549-550. 
23 The District Court did not make any explicit findings with regard to 
how much broadcasting is wholly uncopyrighted. The record does include 
testimony that at least one movie-My Man Godfrey-falls within that cat-
egory, Tr. 2300-2301, and certain broadcasts produced by the federal gov-
ernment are also uncopyrighted. See 17 U. S. C. § 105. Cf. Schappner 
v. Foley, 667 F . 2d 102 (CADC 1981) (explaining distinction between work 
produced by the government and work commissioned by the government). 
To the extent such broadcasting is now significant, it further bolsters our 
conclusion. Moreover, since copyright protection is not perpetual, the 
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The District Court found: 
"Even if it were deemed that home-use recording of 
copyrighted material constituted infringement, the Beta-
max could still legally be used to record noncopyrighted 
material or material whose owners consented to the 
copying. An injunction would deprive the public of the 
ability to use the Betamax for this noninfringing off-the-
air recording. 
"Defendants introduced considerable testimony at 
trial about the potential for such copying of sports, reli-
gious, educational and other programming. This in-
cluded testimony from representatives of the Offices of 
the Commissioners of the National Football, Basketball, 
Baseball and Hockey Leagues and Associations, the Ex-
ecutive Director of National Religious Broadcasters and 
various educational communications agencies. Plaintiffs 
attack the weight of the testimony offered and also con-
tend that an injunction is warranted because infringing 
uses outweigh noninfringing uses." 
''Whatever the future percentage of legal versus ille-
gal home-use recording might be, an injunction which 
seeks to deprive the public of the very tool or article of 
commerce capable of some noninfringing use would be an 
extremely harsh remedy, as well as one unprecedented 
in copyright law." 480 F. Supp., at 468. 
Although the District Court made these statements in the 
context of considering the propriety of injunctive relief, the 
statements constitute a finding that the evidence concerning 
"sports, religious, educational, and other programming" was 
sufficient to establish a significant quantity of broadcasting 
whose copying is now authorized, and a significant potential 
for future authorized copying. That finding is amply sup-
ported by the record. In addition to the religious and sports 
number of audiovisual works in the public domain necessarily increases 
each year. 
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officials identified explicitly by the District Court, 24 two items 
in the record deserve specific mention. 
First is the testimony of John Kenaston, the station man-
ager of Channel 58, an educational station in Los Angeles 
affiliated with the Public Broadcasting Service. He ex-
plained and authenticated the station's published guide to its 
programs. 25 For each program, the guide tells whether un-
limited home taping is authorized, home taping is authorized 
subject to certain restrictions (such as erasure within seven 
days), or home taping is not authorized at all. The Spring 
1978 edition of the guide described 107 programs. Sixty-two 
of those programs or 58% authorize some home taping. 
Twenty-one of them or almost 20% authorize unrestricted 
home taping. 26 
Second is the testimony of Fred Rogers, president of the 
corporation that produces and owns the copyright on Mr. 
Rogers' Neighborhood. The program is carried by more 
public television stations than any other program. Its audi-
ence numbers over 3,000,000 families a day. He testified 
that he had absolutely no objection to home taping for non-
commercial use and expressed the opinion that it is a real 
service to families to be able to record children's programs 
and to show them at appropriate times. 27 
24 See Tr. 2447-2450 (Alexander Hadden, Major League Baseball); Tr. 
2480, 2486-2487 (Jay Moyer, National Football League); Tr. 2515-2516 
(David Stern, National Basketball Association); Tr. 2530-2534 (Gilbert 
Stein, National Hockey League); Tr. 254~2552 (Thomas Hansen, National 
Collegiate Athletic Association); Tr. 2565-2572 (Benjamin Armstrong, Na-
tional Religious Broadcasters). Those officials were authorized to be the 
official spokespersons for their respective institutions in this litigation. 
Tr. 2432, 2479, 2509-2510, 2530, 2538, 2563. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 
30(b)(6). 
25 Tr. 28~2902; Def. Exh. PI. 
26 See also Tr. 283~2844 (similar testimony by executive director of New 
Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority). Cf. Tr. 2592-2605 (testimony by 
chief of New York Education Department's Bureau of Mass Communica-
tions approving home taping for educational purposes). 
27 "Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the 
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If there are millions of owners ofVTR's who make copies of 
televised sports events, religious broadcasts, and educational 
programs such as Mister Rogers' Neighborhood, and if the 
proprietors of those programs welcome the practice, the busi-
ness of supplying the equipment that makes such copying fea-
sible should not be stifled simply because the equipment is 
used by some individuals to make unauthorized reproductions 
of respondents' works. The respondents do not represent a 
class composed of all copyright holders. Yet a finding of con-
tributory infringement would inevitably frustrate the inter-
ests of broadcasters in reaching the portion of their audience 
that is available only through time-shifting. 
Of course, the fact that other copyright holders may wel-
come the practice of time-shifting does not mean that re-
spondents should be deemed to have granted a license to copy 
their programs. Third party conduct would be wholly irrele-
vant in an action for direct infringement of respondents' 
copyrights. But in an action for contributory infringement 
against the seller of copying equipment, the copyright holder 
may not prevail unless the relief that he seeks affects only his 
programs, or unless he speaks for virtually all copyright hold-
ers with an interest in the outcome. In this case, the record 
makes it perfectly clear that there are many important pro-
ducers of national and local television programs who find 
nothing objectionable about the enlargement in the size of the 
'Neighborhood' at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that 
it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and show 
them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the advent of all 
of this new technology that allows people to tape the 'Neighborhood' off-
the-air, and I'm speaking for the 'Neighborhood' because that's what I 
produce, that they then become much more active in the programming of 
their family's television life. Very frankly, I am opposed to people being 
programmed by others. My whole approach in broadcasting has always 
been 'You are an important person just the way you are. You can make 
healthy decisions.' Maybe I'm going on too long, but I just feel that any-
thing that allows a person to be more active in the control of his or her life, 
in a healthy way, is important.'' T. R. 2920-2921. See also Def. Exh. PI, 
p. 85. 
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television audience that results from the practice of time-
shifting for private home use. 28 The seller of the equipment 
that expands those producers' audiences cannot be a con-
tributory infringer if, as is true in this case, it has had nodi-
rect involvement with any infringing activity. 
B. Unauthorized Time-Shifting 
Even unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work are not nec-
essarily infringing. An unlicensed use of the copyright is not 
an infringement unless it conflicts with one of the specific ex-
clusive rights conferred by the copyright statute. Twentieth 
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 154-155. 
Moreover, the definition of exclusive rights in § 106 of the 
28 It may be rare for large numbers of copyright owners to authorize 
duplication of their works without demanding a fee from the copier. In 
the context of public broadcasting, however, the user of the copyrighted 
work is not required to pay a fee for access to the underlying work. The 
traditional method by which copyright owners capitalize upon the televi-
sion medium-eommercially sponsored free public broadcast over the pub-
lic airwaves-is predicated upon the assumption that compensation for the 
value of displaying the works will be received in the form of advertising 
revenues. 
In the context of television programming, some producers evidently be-
lieve that permitting home viewers to make copies of their works off the air 
actually enhances the value of their copyrights. Irrespective of their rea-
sons for authorizing the practice, they do so, and in significant enough 
numbers to create a substantial market for a non-infringing use of the Sony 
VTR's. No one could dispute the legitimacy of that market if the produc-
ers had authorized home taping of their programs in exchange for a license 
fee paid directly by the home user. The legitimacy of that market is not 
compromised simply because these producers have authorized home taping 
of their programs without demanding a fee from the home user. The copy-
right law does not require a copyright owner to charge a fee for the use of 
his works, and as this record clearly demonstrates, the owner of a copy-
right may well have economic or noneconomic reasons for permitting cer-
tain kinds of copying to occur without receiving direct compensation from 
the copier. It is not the role of the courts to tell copyright holders the best 
way for them to exploit their copyrights: even if respondents' competitors 
were ill-advised in authorizing home videotaping, that would not change 
the fact that they have created a substantial market for a paradigmatic 
non-infringing use of petitioners' product. 
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present Act is prefaced by the words "subject to sections 107 
through 118." Those sections describe a variety of uses of 
copyrighted material that "are not infringements of copyright 
notwithstanding the provisions of § 106." The most perti-
nent in this case is § 107, the legislative endorsement of the 
doctrine of "fair use." 29 
That section identifies various factors 30 that enable a Court 
to apply an "equitable rule of reason" analysis to particular 
claims of infringement. 31 Although not conclusive, the first 
29 The Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, did not have a "fair use" pro-
vision. Although that Act's compendium of exclusive rights "to print, re-
print, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work" was broad enough to 
encompass virtually all potential interactions with a copyrighted work, the 
statute was never so construed. The courts simply refused to read the 
statute literally in every situation. When Congress amended the statute 
in 1976, it indicated that it "intended to restate the present judicial doc-
trine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." House 
Report No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 66. 
30 Section 107 provides: 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords 
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy-
right. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
"(!) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work." 17 U. S. C. § 107. 
8
' The nature of the section is explained in these comments from the 
House Report on the fair use section: 
"Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doc-
trine over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever 
emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no gen-
erally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question 
must be decided on its own facts .... 
General intention behind the provision 
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factor requires that "the commercial or nonprofit character of 
an activity" be weighed in ~my fair use decision. 32 If the 
Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or 
profit-making purpose, such use would presumptively be un-
fair. The contrary presumption is appropriate here, how-
ever, because the District Court's findings plainly establish 
that time-shifting for private home use must be characterized 
as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity. Moreover, when one 
considers the nature of a televised copyrighted audiovisual 
work, see 17 U. S. C. § 107(2), and that timeshifting merely 
enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been in-
vited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that 
the entire work is reproduced, see id., at § 107(3), does not 
have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair 
use. 
This is not, however, the end of the inquiry because Con-
gress has also directed us to consider "the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
"The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers some guid-
ance to users in determining when the principles of the doctrine apply. 
However, the endless variety of situations and combinations of circum-
stances that can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact 
rules in the statute. The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of 
the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the 
doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological 
change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and 
some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the 
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis. " H. Rep. No. 
94-1476, pp. 6&-66. 
32 "The Committee has amended the first of the criteria to be consid-
ered-'the purpose and character of the use'-to state explicitly that this 
factor includes a consideration of 'whether such use is of a commercial na-
ture or is for non-profit educational purposes.' This amendment is not in-
tended to be interpreted as any sort of not-for-profit limitation on educa-
tional uses of copyrighted works. It is an express recognition that, as 
under the present law, the commercial or non-profit character of an activ-
ity, while not conclusive with respect to fair use, can and should be 
weighed along with other factors in fair use decisions." H. Rep. No. 
94-1476, p. 66. 
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work." I d., at§ 107(4). The purpose of copyright is to cre-
ate incentives for creative effort. Even copying for noncom-
mercial purposes may impair the copyright holder's ability to 
obtain the rewards that Congress intended him to have. 
But a use that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential 
market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work need not 
be prohibited in order to protect the author's incentive to cre-
ate. The prohibition of such noncommercial uses would 
merely inhibit access to ideas without any countervailing 
benefit. 33 
Thus, although every commercial use of copyrighted mate-
rial is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly 
privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright, noncom-
mercial uses are a different matter. A challenge to a non-
commercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either 
that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become 
widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market 
for the copyrighted work. Actual present harm need not be 
shown; such a requirement would leave the copyright holder 
with no defense against predictable damage. Nor is it neces-
sary to show with certainty that future harm will result. 
What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists. 
If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood 
may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, 
the likelihood must be demonstrated. 
In this case, respondents failed to carry their burden with 
regard to home time-shifting. The District Court described 
respondents' evidence as follows: 
33 Cf. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958) , reprinted as Study 
No. 14 in Senate Judiciary Committee, Copyright Law Revision, Studies 
Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 
86th Cong. , 2d Sess. , p. 30 (1960): 
"In certain situations, the copyright owner suffers no substantial harm 
from the use of the work. . . . Here again, is the partial marriage be-
tween the doctrine of fair use and the legal maxim de minimis non curat 
lex." 
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"Plaintiffs' experts a~mitted at several points in the 
trial that the time-shifting without librarying would re-
sult in 'not a great deal of harm.' Plaintiffs' greatest 
concern about time-shifting is with 'a point of important 
philosophy that transcends even commercial judgment.' 
They fear that with any Betamax usage, 'invisible 
boundaries' are passed: 'the copyright owner has lost 
control over his program."' 480 F. Supp., at 467. 
Later in its opinion, the District Court observed: 
"Most of plaintiffs' predictions of harm hinge on specula-
tion about audience viewing patterns and ratings, a 
measurement system which Sidney Sheinberg, MCA's 
president, calls a 'black art' because of the significant 
level of imprecision involved in the calculations." I d., at 
469. 34 
There was no need for the District Court to say much about 
past harm. "Plaintiffs have admitted that no actual harm to 
their copyrights has occurred to date." Id., at 451. 
On the question of potential future harm from time-shift-
ing, the District Court offered a more detailed analysis of the 
evidence. It rejected respondents' "fear that persons 
'watching' the original telecast of a program will not be meas-
ured in the live audience and the ratings and revenues will 
decrease," by observing that current measurement technol-
ogy allows the Betamax audience to be reflected. I d., at 
466. 35 It rejected respondents' prediction "that live televi-
34 See also 480 F. Supp., at 451: 
"It should be noted, however, that plaintiffs' argument is more complicated 
and speculative than was the plaintiff's in Williams & Wilkins. . . . Here, 
plaintiffs ask the court to find harm based on many more assumptions .... 
As is discussed more fully in Part IV, infra, some of these assumptions are 
based on neither fact nor experience, and plaintiffs admit that they are to 
some extent inconsistent and illogical." 
35 "There was testimony at trial, however, that Nielsen Ratings has al-
ready developed the ability to measure when a Betamax in a sample home 
is recording the program. Thus, the Betamax will be measured as a part 
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sion or movie audiences will decrease as more people watch 
Betamax tapes as an alternative," with the observation that 
"[t]here is no factual basis for [the underlying] assumption." 
Ibid. 36 It rejected respondents' "fear that time-shifting will 
reduce audiences for telecast reruns," and concluded instead 
that "given current market practices, this should aid plain-
tiffs rather than harm them." Ibid. 37 And it declared that 
respondents' suggestion "that theater or film rental exhi-
of the live audience. The later diary can augment that measurement with 
information about subsequent viewing." 480 F. Supp., at 466. 
In a separate section, the District Court rejected plaintiffs' suggestion 
that the commercial attractiveness of television broadcasts would be dimin-
ished because Betamax owners would use the pause button or fast-forward 
control to avoid viewing advertisements: 
"It must be remembered, however, that to omit commercials, Betamax 
owners must view the program, including the commercials, while record-
ing. To avoid commercials during playback, the viewer must fast-forward 
and, for the most part, guess as to when the commercial has passed. For 
most recordings, either practice may be too tedious. As defendants' sur-
vey showed, 92% of the programs were recorded with commercials and 
only 25% of the owners fast-forward through them. Advertisers will have 
to make the same kinds of judgments they do now about whether persons 
viewing televised programs actually watch the advertisements which inter-
rupt them." Id., at 468. 
"""Here plaintiffs assume that people will view copies when they would 
otherwise be watching television or going to the movie theater. There is 
no factual basis for this assumption. It seems equally likely that Betamax 
owners will play their tapes when there is nothing on television they wish 
to see and no movie they want to attend. Defendants' survey does not 
show any negative effect of Betamax ownership on television viewing or 
theater attendance." Ibid. 
37 "The underlying assumptions here are particularly difficult to accept. 
Plaintiffs explain that the Betamax increases access to the original tele-
vised material and that the more people there are in this original audience, 
the fewer people the rerun will attract. Yet current marketing practices, 
including the success of syndication, show just the opposite. Today, the 
larger the audience for the original telecast, the higher the price plaintiffs 
can demand from broadcasters from rerun rights. There is no survey 
within the knowledge of this court to show that the rerun audience is com-
prised of persons who have not seen the program. In any event, if ratings 
can reflect Betamax recording, original audiences may increase and, given 
market practices, this should aid plaintiffs rather than harm them." Ibid. 
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bition of a program will suffer because of time-shift recording 
of that program" "lacks merit." 480 F. Supp., at 467.38 
After completing that review, the District Court restated 
its overall conclusion several times, in several different ways. 
"Harm from time-shifting is speculative and, at best, mini-
mal." Ibid. "The audience benefits from the time-shifting 
capability have already been discussed. It is not implausible 
that benefits could also accrue to plaintiffs, broadcasters, and 
advertisers, as the Betamax makes it possible for more per-
sons to view their broadcasts." Ibid. "No likelihood of 
harm was shown at trial, and plaintiffs admitted that there 
had been no actual harm to date." I d., at 468-469. "Testi-
mony at trial suggested that Betamax may require adjust-
ments in marketing strategy, but it did not establish even a 
likelihood of harm." I d., at 469. "Television production by 
plaintiffs today is more profitable than it has ever been, and, 
in five weeks of trial, there was no concrete evidence to sug-
gest that the Betamax will change the studios' financial pic-
ture." Ibid. 
The District Court's conclusions are buttressed by the fact 
that to the extent time-shifting expands public access to 
freely broadcast television programs, it yields societal bene-
fits. Earlier this year, in Community Television of South-
ern California v. Gottfried,-- U.S.--,-----, n. 
12 (1983), we acknowledged the public interest in making 
television broadcasting more available. Concededly, that in-
terest is not unlimited. But it supports an interpretation of 
88 "This suggestion lacks merit. By definition, time-shift recording en-
tails viewing and erasing, so the program will no longer be on tape when 
the later theater run begins. Of course, plaintiffs may fear that the 
Betamax will keep the tapes long enough to satisfy all their interest in the 
program and will, therefore, not patronize later theater exhibitions. To 
the extent this practice involves librarying, it is addressed in section V. C. , 
infra. It should also be noted that there is no evidence to suggest that the 
public interest in later theatrical exhibitions of motion pictures will be re-
duced any more by Betamax recording than it already is by the television 
broadcast of the film." 480 F. Supp., at 467. 
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the concept of "fair use" that requires the copyright holder to 
demonstrate some likelihood of harm before he may condemn 
a private act of time-shifting ·as a violation of federal law. 
When these factors are all weighed in the "equitable rule of 
reason" balance, we must conclude that this record amply 
supports the District Court's conclusion that home time-shift-
ing is fair use. In light of the findings of the District Court 
regarding the state of the empirical data, it is clear that the 
Court of Appeals erred in holding that the statute as pres-
ently written bars such conduct. 39 
39 The Court of Appeals chose not to engage in any "equitable rule of rea-
son" analysis in this case. Instead, it assumed that the category of "fair 
use" is rigidly circumscribed by a requirement that every such use must be 
"productive." It therefore concluded that copying a television program 
merely to enable the viewer to receive information or entertainment that 
he would otherwise miss because of a personal scheduling conflict could 
never be fair use. That understanding of "fair use" was erroneous. 
Congress has plainly instructed us that fair use analysis calls for a sensi-
tive balancing of interests. The distinction between "productive" and "un-
productive" uses may be helpful in calibrating the balance, but it cannot be 
wholly determinative. Although copying to promote a scholarly endeavor 
certainly has a stronger claim to fair use than copying to avoid interrupting 
a poker game, the question is not simply two-dimensional. For one thing, 
it is not true that all copyrights are fungible. Some copyrights govern ma-
terial with broad potential secondary markets. Such material may well 
have a broader claim to protection because of the greater potential for com-
mercial harm. Copying a news broadcast may have a stronger claim to 
fair use than copying a motion picture. And, of course, not all uses are 
fungible. Copying for commercial gain has a much weaker claim to fair 
use than copying for personal enrichment. But the notion of social "pro-
ductivity" cannot be a complete answer to this analysis. A teacher who 
copies to prepare lecture notes is clearly productive. But so is a teacher 
who copies for the sake of broadening his personal understanding of his 
specialty. Or a legislator who copies for the sake of broadening her under-
standing of what her constituents are watching; or a constituent who copies 
a news program to help make a decision on how to vote. 
Making a copy of a copyrighted work for the convenience of a blind per-
son is expressly identified by the House Committee Report as an example 
of fair use, with no suggestion that anything more than a purpose to enter-
tain or to inform need motivate the copying. In a hospital setting, using a 
VTR to enable a patient to see programs he would otherwise miss has no 
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In summary, the record and findings of the District Court 
lead us to two conclusions. First, Sony demonstrated a sig-
nificant likelihood that substantial numbers of copyright hold-
ers who license their works for broadcast on free television 
would not object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by 
private viewers. And second, respondents failed to demon-
strate that time-shifting would cause any likelihood of non-
minimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, 
their copyrighted works. The Betamax is, therefore, capa-
ble of substantial noninfringing uses. Sony's sale of such 
equipment to the general public does not constitute contribu-
tory infringement of respondent's copyrights. 
v 
"The direction of Art. I is that Congress shall have the 
power to promote the progress of science and the useful 
arts. When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the 
sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can come only 
from Congress." Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram 
Corp., 406 U. S. 518, 530 (1972). 
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that 
the elected representatives of the millions of people who 
watch television every day have made it unlawful to copy a 
program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat 
prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copy-
ing possible. 
It may well be that Congress will take a fresh look at this 
new technology, just as it so often has examined other inno-
vations in the past. But it is not our job to apply laws that 
have not yet been written. Applying the copyright statute, 
as it now reads, to the facts as they have been developed in 
productive purpose other than contributing to the psychological well-being 
of the patient. Virtually any time-shifting that increases viewer access to 
television programming may result in a comparable benefit. The statu-
tory language does not identify any dicohotomy between productive and 
nonproductive time-shifting, but does require consideration of the eco-
nomic consequences of copying. 
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this case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be 
reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
s ,·yusTIC CHAI~G£S TH.\0-.~~.-~~J..JI. 
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Memorandum of JUSTICE STEVENS. 
Petitioners (Sony) have manufactured and sold several mil-
lion home video tape recorders to members of the general 
public in recent years. Respondents are owners of copy-
righted motion picture films and television programs. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held 
Sony guilty of the nonstatutory tort of contributory infringe-
ment, and it ordered the District Court to fashion appropri-
ate relief: an injunction against the further sale of the equip-
ment, an award of damages, or a continuing royalty pursuant 
to "a judicially created compulsory license." 659 F. 2d 963, 
976, n. 18 (1981). 
The Court of Appeals' holding raises at least three ques-
tions of copyright law that this Court has never previously 
confronted: (1) whether the act of making a single copy of 
copyrighted work for a private, noncommercial use ever con-
stitutes copyright infringement; (2) whether the manufac-
turer of copying equipment may be held liable for contribu-
tory infringement for advertising and selling the equipment 
to the general public; and (3) whether a judicially imposed 
continuing royalty is a permissible form of relief for contribu-
tory infringment. 
We granted certiorari to address these important ques-
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tions. 457 U. S. 1116 (1982). Because certain ultimate 
facts found by the District Court are dispositive of the con-
tributory infringement issue, we need decide only that ques-
tion. In brief, the critical facts are these: the principal use of 
the video tape recorder is to enable its owner to view a pro-
gram he would otherwise miss; this practice, known as "time-
shifting," enlarges the television viewing audience. For that 
reason, a significant number of producers of television pro-
grams have no objection to the copying of their programs for 
private home viewing. For the same reason, even the two 
respondents in this case, who do object to time shifting, were 
unable to prove that the practice has caused them any actual 
harm or creates any likelihood of future harm. 
Thus, for two independent and sufficient reasons the sale 
of VTR's to the general public does not constitute contribu-
tory infringement of respondents' copyrights. First, re-
spondents have no right to object to the use ofVTR's to make 
legitimate copies of programs produced by others, or to inter-
fere with the sale of equipment that makes such copying pos-
sible. Second, since there is an admitted public interest in 
increasing access to · television programming, and since the 
practice of time-shifting for private home use involves nei-
ther a commercial exploitation of respondents' copyrights nor 
any diminution in the value of the monopolies granted to 
them, it is a non-infringing fair use of copyrighted programs. 
The sale of equipment that is primarily used for that purpose 
is plainly not contributory infringement. 1 
1 The questions of direct infringement are relevant only to the extent 
they bear on the question of contributory infringement. For respondents 
have disavowed the existence of any genuine controversy with the individ-
ual user of the Betamax. In a press release issued by one of the respond-
ents after its victory in the Court of Appeals in this case, it stated, in part: 
"Millions of families in the United States and around the world are now 
involved in videotaping programming in their own homes for their own pri-
vate use. We have no intention, in this or any other litigation, of pursuing 
individuals to interfere with this practice. 
[Footnote 1 is continued on p. 3] 
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Although the two grounds of decision are relatively 
straightforward, the importance of the case makes it appro-
priate to set forth the facts and the relevant legal history in 
some detail. 
I 
Sony manufactures the Betamax video tape recorder 
(VTR), a piece of equipment having three components: (1) a 
tuner, which receives electromagnetic signals transmitted 
over the airwaves and separates them into audio and visual 
signals; (2) a recorder, which records such signals on mag-
netic tapes; and (3) an adapter, which converts the audio and 
visual signals on the tape back into a composite signal that 
can be received by a television set. At the time of trial, the 
Betamax was marketed in four models, at retail prices rang-
ing from about $875 to $1,000. Sony also sold tapes of vari-
ous sizes, the longest being a three-hour tape that sold for 
about $21.00. Tapes may be reused, and programs that 
have been recorded on tape may be erased either before or 
after viewing. The Betamax can be used with different 
kinds of television sets and is capable of recording one show 
while the set is off, or is tuned to another show. Thus, for 
example, a viewer could see two simultaneous news telecasts 
by watching one and recording the second for later viewing. 
The Betamax is equipped with three devices that affect its 
utility-a timer, a pause button, and a fast-forward control. 
The timer can activiate and deactivate the equipment at pre-
determined times and thus makes it possible to record pro-
grams that are broadcast when the owner is not at home. 
''We -first initiated this case in 1976, more than five years ago, when 
there were relatively few tape recorders in homes. Since that time we 
have come to realize that the interests of all concerned can be better ac-
commodated by passage of new laws." Excerpt from statement by E. 
Cardon Walker, Chairman of Walt Disney Productions, on November 2, 
1981, quoted in App. to Br. for Petitioners, p. 2. 
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The pause button allows the owner to deactivate the recorder 
temporarily; thus, if he is watching a program while the ma-
chine is recording, he may omit a commercial advertisement 
by depressing the pause button. The fast-forward control 
enables the viewer of a recorded program to run the tape rap-
idly when a segment he does not desire to see is on the 
screen. 
The trial of the case in the District Court concerned only 
the private, home use of VTR's. 2 See 480 F. Supp. 429, 
432-433 (1979). No issue concerning the transfer of tapes to 
other persons, the use of tapes for public performances, or 
the copying of programs broadcast on cable television sys-
tems was raised. All of the evidence related to programs 
that had been broadcast to the public at large. 
Both plaintiffs and defendants conducted surveys of the 
way the Betamax machine was used by several hundred own-
2 The District Court explained: 
" 'Home-use' recording as used in this opinion is the operation of the 
Betamax in a private home to record a program for subsequent home view-
ing. The programs involved in this lawsuit are broadcast free to the public 
over public airwaves. The court heard extensive testimony from defend-
ant William Griffiths and four non-defendant individuals about this activ-
ity, and the court's declaration of non-infringement is limited to this home 
use-situation. 
"It is important to note the limits of this holding. Neither pay nor cable 
television stations are plaintiffs in this suit and no defendant recorded the 
signals from either. The court is not ruling on tape swapping, organized 
or informal. The court is not ruling on tape duplication within the home or 
outside, by individuals, groups or corporations. Nor is the court ruling on 
off-the-air recording for use outside the home. e. g., by teachers for class-
rooms, corporations for employees, etc. No defendant engaged in any of 
these activities and the facts necessary to determine their legality are not 
before this court. 
"The ramifications of this new technology are greater than the bound-
aries of this lawsuit. A court reviewing the limited claims of specified par-
ties in a particular factual setting cannot and should not undertake the role 
of a government commission or legislative body exploring and evaluating 
all the uses and consequences of the videotape recorder." 480 F. Supp., at 
442. 
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ers during a sample period in 1978. Although there were 
some differences in the surveys, they both showed that the 
primary use of the machine for most owners was for "time-
shifting," i. e., to record programs they otherwise would 
have missed. Both surveys also showed, however, that a 
substantial number of interviewees had accumulated libraries 
of cassettes. 3 Defendants' survey indicated that over 80 
percent of the interviewees watched the same amount or 
more regular television as they had before owning a Beta-
max. 4 Plaintiffs offered no evidence of decreased television 
viewing by Betamax owners. 5 
3 The District Court summarized some of the findings in these surveys 
as follows: 
"Plaintiffs' survey found that the average number of cassettes owned by 
the interviewees was 31. 73. 63.9% of plaintiffs' interviewees had less than 
five cassettes with movies on them and 81.1% had less than five cassettes 
with television programs on them. Defendants' interviewees reported an 
average of 25.21 cassettes with material recorded off-the-air. 
"According to plaintiffs' survey, 75.4% of the VTR owners use their ma-
chines to record for time-shifting purposes half or most of the time. De-
fendants' survey showed that 96% of the Betamax owners had used the ma-
chine to record programs they otherwise would have missed. 
''When plaintiffs asked interviewees how many cassettes were in their li-
brary, 55.8% said there were 10 or fewer. In defendants' survey, of the 
total programs viewed by interviewees in the past month, 70.4% had been 
viewed only that one time and for 57.9%, there were no plans for further 
viewing." 480 F. Supp., at 438. 
• "81. 9% of the defendants' interviewees watched the same amount or 
more of regular television as they did before owning a Betamax. 83.2% 
reported their frequency of movie going was unaffected by Betamax." 480 
F. Supp., at 439. 
5 As evidence of how a VTR may be used, plaintiffs offered the testi-
mony of William Griffiths. Griffiths, although named as an individual de-
fendant, was a client of plaintiffs' law firm. The District Court summa-
rized his testimony as follows: 
"He owns approximately 100 tapes. When Griffiths bought his Betamax, 
he intended not only to time-shift (record, play-back and then erase) 
but also to build a library of cassettes. Maintaining a library, however, 
proved too expensive, and he is now erasing some earlier tapes and reusing 
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Defendants introduced considerable evidence describing 
television programs that could be copied without objection 
from any copyright holder, with special emphasis on sports, 
religious, and educational programming. For example, their 
survey indicated that 7.3 percent of all Betamax use is to 
record sports events, see Def. Exh. OT, Table 20, and repre-
sentatives of professional baseball, football, basketball, and 
hockey testified that they had no objection to the recording of 
their televised events for home use. 6 
Each of the plaintiffs proved that it owns a large inventory 
of copyrighted programs and motion pictures. They also 
proved that even after a motion picture has been exhibited in 
the theater market and over network television, the commer-
cial value of the copyright is not exhausted because many 
programs are later televised over local stations, or sold or 
rented to the public on prerecorded cassettes or discs. Fi-
nally, plaintiffs offered opinion evidence concerning the fu-
ture impact of the unrestricted sale of VTR's on the commer-
cial value of their copyrights. The District Court found, 
however, that they had failed to prove any likelihood of fu-
ture harm from the use of VTR's for time-shifting. I d., at 
469. 1 01"1 !JJ/1,!'/ 
The District Court concluded that noncommercial home use 
recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves was 
them. 
"Griffiths copied about 20 minutes of a Universal motion picture called 
'Never Give An Inch,' and two episodes from Universal television series 
entitled 'Baa Baa Black Sheep' and 'Holmes and Yo Yo.' He would have 
erased each of these but for the request of plaintiffs' counsel that it be kept. 
Griffiths also testified that he had copied but already erased Universal 
films called 'Alpha Caper' (erased before anyone saw it) and 'Amelia Ear-
hart.' At the time of his deposition Griffiths did not intend to keep any 
Universal film in his library. 
"Griffiths has also recorded documentaries, news broadcasts, sporting 
events and political programs such as a rerun of the Nixon/Kennedy de-
bate.'' 480 F. Supp., at 436-437. 
Four other witnesses testified to having engaged in similar activity. 
6 See Tr. 2447-2450, 2480, 248&-2487, 251~2516, 2530-2534. 
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a fair use of copyrighted works and did not constitute copy-
right infringement. It emphasized the fact that the material 
was broadcast free to the public at large, the noncommercial 
character of the use, and the private character of the activity 
conducted entirely within the home. Moreover, the court 
found that the purpose of this use served the public interest 
in increasing access to television programming, an interest 
that "is consistent with the First Amendment policy of pro-
viding the fullest possible access to information through the 
public airwaves. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 102." 7 480 
F. Supp., at 454. Even when an entire copyrighted work 
was recorded, the District Court regarded the copying as fair 
use "because there is no accompanying reduction in the mar-
ket for 'plaintiff's original work."' Ibid. 
As an independent ground of decision, the District Court 
also concluded that Sony could not be held liable as a con-
tributory infringer even if the home use of a VTR was consid-
ered infringement. The District Court noted that Sony had 
no direct involvement with any Betamax purchasers who re-
corded copyrighted works off the air. Sony's advertising 
was silent on the subject of possible copyright infringement, 
but its instruction booklet contained the following statement: 
"Television programs, films, videotapes and other ma-
terials may be copyrighted. Unauthorized recording of 
such material may be contrary to the provisions of the 
United States copyright laws." Id., at 436. 
The District Court assumed that Sony had constructive 
lmowledge of the probability that the Betamax machine 
would be used to record copyrighted programs, but found 
7 480 F. Supp., at 454. The court also found that this "access is not just 
a matter of convenience, as plainitffs have suggested. Access has been 
limited not simply by inconvenience but by the basic need to work. Access 
to the better program has also been limited by the competitive practice of 
counterprogramming." Ibid. 
I OM r SJIII..,v' 
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that Sony merely sold a "product capable of a variety of 
uses, some of them allegedly infringing." ld., at 461. It 
reasoned: 
"Selling a staple article of commerce-e. g., a type-
writer, a recorder, a camera, a photocopying machine-
technically contributes to any infringing use subse-
quently made thereof, but this kind of 'contribution,' if 
deemed sufficient as a basis for liability, would expand 
the theory beyond precedent and arguably beyond judi-
cial management. 
"Commerce would indeed be hampered if manufacturers 
of staple items were held liable as contributory infring-
ers whenever they 'constructively' knew that some pur-
chasers on some occasions would use their product for a 
purpose which a court later deemed, as a matter of first 
impression, to be an infringement." Ibid. 
Finally, the District Court discussed the plaintiffs' prayer 
for injunctive relief, noting that they had asked for an injunc-
tion either preventing the future sale of Betamax machines, 
or requiring that the machines be rendered incapable of re-
cording copyrighted works off the air. The court stated that 
it had "found no case in which the manufacturers, distribu-
tors, retailers, and advertisors of the instrument enabling the 
infringement were sued by the copyright holders," and that 
the request for relief in this case ''is unique." 480 F. Supp., 
at 465. 
It concluded that an injunction was wholly inappropriate I 
because any possible harm was outweighed by the fact that CJI"'tS>''fti 
"the Betamax could still legally be used to record 
noncopyrighted material or material whose owners consented 
to the copying. An injunction would deprive the public of 
the ability to use the Betamax for this noninfringing off-the-
air recording." 480 F. Supp., at 468. 
The Court of Appeals reversed. It did not set aside any of 
the District Court's findings of fact. It concluded as a mat-
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ter of law that the home use of a VTR was not a fair use be-
cause it was not a "productive use.'' 8 It therefore held that 
it was unnecessary for plaintiffs to prove any harm to the po-
tential market for the copyrighted works, but then observed 
that it seemed clear that the cumulative effect of mass re-
production made possible by VTR's would tend to diminish 
the potential market for respondents' works. 659 F. 2d, at 
974. 
On the issue of contributory infringement, the Court of Ap-
peals first rejected the analogy to staple articles of commerce 
such as a tape recorder or a photocopying machine. It noted 
that such machines "may have substantial benefit for some 
purposes" and do not "even remotely raise copyright prob-
lems." !d., at 975. VTR's, however, are sold "for the pri-
mary purpose of reproducing television programming" and 
"virtually all" such programming is copyrighted material. 
Ibid. The Court of Appeals concluded, therefore, that 
VTR's were not suitable for any substantial noninfringing use 
even if some copyright owners elected not to enforce their 
rights. 
The Court of Appeals also rejected the District Court's re-
liance on Sony's lack of lmowledge that home use constituted 
infringement. Assuming that the statutory provisions defin-
ing the remedies for infringement applied also to the non-
statutory tort of contributory infringement, the court stated 
that a defendant's good faith would merely reduce his dam-
ages liability but would not excuse the infringing conduct. 
It held that Sony was chargeable with lmowledge of the 
homeowner's infringing activity because the reproduction of 
copyrighted materials was either "the most conspicuous use" 
or ''the major use" of the Betamax product. Ibid. 
On the matter of relief, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that "statutory damages may be appropriate," that the Dis-
8 ''Without a 'productive use', i. e. when copyrighted material is repro-
duced for its intrinsic use, the mass copying of the sort involved in this case 
precludes an application of fair use." 659 F . 2d, at 971-972. 
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trict Court should reconsider its detennination that an in-
junction would not be an appropriate remedy; and, referring 
to "the analagous photocopying area," suggested that a con-
tinuing royalty pursuant to a judicially created compulsory li-
cense may very well be an acceptable resolution of the relief 
issue. 659 F. 2d, at 976. 
II 
Dean Warren's foreword to a notable series of lectures on 
copyright law provides an equally appropriate background 
for our consideration of whether Sony should be deemed a 
contributory infringer of respondents' copyrights: 
"The protection of property in the products of the mind 
has long presented the challenging problem of balancing 
several important and competing social interests. Al-
though the number of writers and inventors among us 
is small, their contribution to the intellectual and mate-
rial advancement of society is unique and indispensable. 
The importance of that contribution was early recog-
nized in the Constitution, in the grant of power to Con-
gress 'To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.' (U. S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8.) It is 
significant, perhaps, that 'Authors and Inventors' are 
the only callings thus singled out for such special atten-
tion, and it is also significant that the need for balancing 
the interest of the creator and the interests of society is 
emphasized in this constitutional language, which refers 
to the creator's 'exclusive Right' to his creation, but rec-
ognizes the public interest by restricting the duration of 
such rights to 'limited Times.' 
"Copyright protection became necessary with the in-
vention of the printing press and had its early beginnings 
in the British censorship laws. The fortunes of the law 
of copyright have always been closely connected with 
htt5 
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freedom of expression, on the one hand, and with techno-
logical improvements in means of dissemination, on the 
other. Successive ages have drawn different balances 
among the interest of the writer in the control and 
exploitation of his intellectual property, the related in-
terest of the publisher, and the competing interest of so-
ciety in the untrammeled dissemination of ideas." 9 
From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in 
response to significant changes in technology. Repeatedly, 
as such developments have occurred in this country, it has 
been the Congress that fashioned the new rules that new 
technology made necessary. Thus, long before the enact-
ment of the Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, it was set-
tled that the protection given to copyrights in this country is 
wholly statutory. Wheaton v. Peters , 33 U. S. (8 Peters) 
591, 661-662 (1834). The remedies for infringement "are 
only those prescribed by Congress." Thompson v. Hub-
bard, 131 U. S. 123, 151 (1889). 
The development and marketing of player pianos and per-
forated rolls of music at the turn of the century gave rise to 
litigation raising the question whether the use of such rolls 
infringed the copyrights owned by composers and music pub-
lishers. The sale of well over a million rolls in 1902 made it 
evident that the economic issue was significant. Adopting a 
construction of the pre-1909 version of the Copyright Act 
that, as Justice Holmes acknowledged, gave to the music 
"copyright less scope than its rational significance," the 
Court held that the piano rolls were not copies of copyrighted 
songs within the meaning of the Act. White-Smith Music 
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (1908); id., at 19 
(Holmes, J., concurring). Quoting from an English case con-
sidering a similar question, the Court noted that the copy-
• Foreword to B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (1967) [here-
after Kaplan]. 
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right on the sheet music did not involve any .exclusive right 
''to the performance in private of the music indicated by such 
sheets," id., at 13. The Court assumed that Congress was 
aware of the prevailing view, reflected in an international 
convention to which the United States was not a party, that 
''the manufacture and sale of instruments serving to repro-
duce mechanically the [copyrighted music] are not considered 
as constituting musical infringement." Id., at 14-15. It 
held that the policy considerations at stake "properly ad-
dressed themselves to the legislative, and not to the judicial, 
branch of the government." I d., at 18. The following year 
Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1909. 
When the 1909 Act was passed, the Librarian of Congress, 
Dr. Herbert Putnam, was following a practice of allowing sin-
gle copies of copyrighted works to be made at the Library. 10 
Even though the 1909 Act might have been construed liter-
ally to prescribe the practice, the activity went unchallenged 
for decades. The matter did not attract serious attention 
until innovations in copying techniques made it relatively 
easy to reproduce entire articles or to make multiple copies. 
When the National Institute of Health and the National Li-
brary of Medicine adopted the practice of photocopying entire 
articles from medical journals and supplying them to re-
searchers, litigation did ensue. The courts, however, de-
clined to hold that the development of the new technology 
had changed the traditional understanding. Williams and 
Wilkins v. United States, 487 F. 2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), af-
firmed by an equally divided court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975). 
The problem posed by the new technology was resolved by 
Congress when it revised the Copyright Act in the following 
year. In§ 108 of the 1976 revision, Congress enacted a spe-
cial statutory exemption for library copying, distinguishing 
10 See Library of Congress, Rules and Practice 6 (1913). Dr. Putnam 
had been active in the movement that led to the passage of the 1909 Act. 
See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 213 (1954). 
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between the reproduction of multiple copies and the re-
production or distribution of a single copy. . 
A similar sequence of events followed the development of 
technology that made it possible to retransmit television pro-
grams by cable or by microwave systems. In 1960, United 
Artists Television, Inc., the owner of a number of copyrights 
on motion pictures, sought to enjoin the operator of a commu-
nity antenna television system (CATV) from intercepting and 
retransmitting signals carrying its copyrighted productions. 
The Court held that the CATV operator did not "perform" 
the copyrighted works in the "manner envisioned by the Con-
gress that enacted the law in 1909." Fortnightly Corp. v. 
United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 395 (1968). Although the 
Court was sharply divided on the question whether that was 
a fair reading of the statutory language, there was complete 
agreement on the proposition that Congress was far better 
equipped than the Court to fashion a fair resolution of the 
problems presented by the sophisticated technological devel-
opments that had occurred in recent years. 11 
The Fortnightly case was followed by Teleprompter Corp. 
v. CBS, 415 U. S. 394, in which the Court considered the 
11 "We have been invited by the Solicitor General in an amicus curiae 
brief to render a compromise decision in this case that would, it is said, 
accommodate various competing considerations of copyright, communica-
tions, and antitrust policy. We decline the invitation. That job is for 
Congress." [footnotes omitted] 392 U. S., at 401. 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Fortas wrote: 
"Our major object, I suggest, should be to do as little damage as possible to 
traditional copyright principles and to business relationships, until the 
Congress legislates and relieves the embarrassment which we and the in-
terested parties face." Id., at 404. 
At the end of his opinion, he added: . 
"The task of caring for CATV is one for the Congress. Our ax, being a 
rule of law, must cut straight, sharp, and deep; and perhaps this is a situa-
tion that calls for the compromise of theory and for the architectural im-
provisation which only legislation can accomplish." Id., at 408. 
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copyright holders' argument that CATV systems diluted the 
commercial value of the market for licensed television pro-
grams. Recognizing that the retransmissions by CATV sys-
tems would augment the size of the potential audience for a 
broadcast-much as would the video tape recording of pro-
grams for later home viewing-the Court concluded: 
"These shifts in current business and commercial rela-
tionships, while of significance with respect to the orga-
nization and growth of the communications industry, 
simply cannot be controlled by means of litigation based 
on copyright legislation enacted more than half a century 
ago, when neither broadcast television nor CATV was 
yet conceived. Detailed regulation of these relation-
ships, and any ultimate resolution of the many sensitive 
and important problems in this field, must be left to Con-
gress." ld., at 414. 
In due course Congress did enact legislation that regulates 
the complex relationships among copyright holders, commer-
cial television stations, and CATV system operators in a com-
prehensive and detailed way that could not possibly have 
been fashioned by a court. 12 
This history of deference to Congress when major new 
a The statutory provisions themselves, see 17 U. S. C. § 111, are much 
too long to quote in full, but their complexity is indicated in the following 
paragraph from Judge Markey's opinion in Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. 
Doubleday Sports, Inc. , 691 F. 2d 125, 129 (CA2 1982): 
"Under the congressionally mandated scheme, television broadcast sta-
tions like WOR-TV continue to pay license or royalty fees directly to copy-
right owners like Doubleday, while CATV systems pay license fees under 
their compulsory licenses to the United States Copyright Office in accord 
with formulae provided in 17 U. S. C. § 111(d)(2)(B). The fees paid by 
CATV systems are distributed to copyright owners like Doubleday by 
Copyright Royalty Tribunal (Tribunal), as provided for in 17 U. S. C. 
§ 111(d)(5). The Congressional scheme thus provided for compensation 
from CATV systems to copyright owners measured by the number of cable 
viewers or potential viewers, and placed the responsibility for payment of 
that compensation on the CATV systems." (footnotes omitted) 
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technology dramatically changes the market for copyrighted 
material must inform our judgment in this important respect. 
A refusal by this Court to embark on an unprecedented 
course of lawmaking will merely allow Congress to fashion 
the controlling rules for the future. 
III 
Whereas most novel problems of copyright law require a 
reexamination of the delicate compromise between the copy-
right owner's commercial interest in the legitimate exploita-
tion of his statutory monopoly and the public interest in ac-
cess to ideas and information, the contributory infringement 
issue presented by this case implicates a third interest that 
demands separate recognition: the economic interest in the 
manufacture and sale of an article of commerce that is capa-
ble of substantial noninfringing contributions to the public 
good. 
Neither the 1909 Copyright Act nor the 1976 Copyright 
Act mentions the doctrine of contributory infringement. 13 
From the absence of any explicit discussion, we may infer 
that Con ess did not intend any significant chan e in the ·u-
dicially-created doctrine of contributory_in.fri!!geme_nh 
e lower courts have generally applied the doctrine to 
two categories of persons having a relationship with a direct 
infringer at the time of the direct infringement. One group 
includes persons who employ the direct infringer to engage in 
the activity that proves infringing and who fail to exercise 
their power to supervise and control the acts. 14 The other 
11 The doctrine is mentioned briefly in the legislative history of the 1976 
Act: 
"Use of the phrase 'to authorize' [in § 106's list of exclusive rights] is in-
tended to avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory infringers. 
For example, a person who lawfully acquires an authorized copy of a mo-
tion picture would be an infringer if he engages in the business of renting it 
to others for purposes of unauthorized public performance." 1975 Senate 
Report 57; 1976 House Report 61. 
14 E. g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing and 
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includes persons who knowingly participate as agents of the 
direct infringer in the infringing enterprise. 1-5 Sony clearly 
fits neither of these molds; its only contact with the witnesses 
in this case was at the moment of sale. The District Court 
Breeding Association, Inc., 554 F. 2d 1213 (CA11977) (racetrack retained 
direct infringer to supply music to paying customers); KECA MUSIC, Inc. 
v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72 (W. D. Mo. 1977)(cocktaillounge 
hired musicians to supply music to paying customers); Dreamland Ball 
Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F. 2d 354 (CA7 1929) (dance hall 
hired orchestra to supply music to paying customers). 
These cases are often contrasted with the so-called landlord-tenant 
cases, in which landlords who leased premises to a direct infringer for a 
fixed rental and did not participate directly in any infringing activity were 
found not to be liable for contributory infringement. E. g., Deutsch v. Ar-
nold, 98 F. 2d 686 (CA2 1938). 
A difficult case was presented in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green 
Co., 316 F. 2d 304 (CA2 1963). The owner of twenty-three chain stores 
retained the direct infringer to run its record departments. The relation-
ship was structured as a licensing arrangement, so that the defendant bore 
none of the business risk of running the department. Instead, it received 
10% or 12% of the direct infringer's gross receipts. The Court of Appeals 
concluded: 
"[The dance-hall cases] and this one lie closer on the spectrum to the em-
ployer-employee model, than to the landlord-tenant model. On the par-
ticular facts before us, ... Green's relationship to its infringing licensee, as 
well as its strong concern for the financial success of the phonograph record 
concession, renders it liable for the unauthorized sales of the 'bootleg' 
records. 
"[T]he imposition of vicarious liability in the case before us cannot be 
deemed unduly harsh or unfair. Green has the power to police carefully 
the conduct of its concessionaire; our judgment will simply encourage it to 
do so, thus placing responsibility where it can and should be effectively ex-
ercised." Id., at 308 (emphasis in original). 
16 E. g., Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, 
Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159 (CA2 1971); Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. 
Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (S. D. N. Y. 1966). 
In Gershwin, the direct infringers retained the contributory infringer to 
manage their performances. 443 F. 2d, at 1160. The contributory in-
fringer would contact each direct infringer, obtains the titles of the musical 
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expressly found that "no employee of Sony, Sonam or DDBI 
had either direct involvement with the allegedly infringing 
activity or direct contact with purchasers of Betamax who re-
corded copyrighted works off-the-air." 480 F. Supp., at 460. 
And it further found that "there was no evidence that any of 
the copies made by Griffiths or the other individual witnesses 
in this suit were influenced or encouraged by [Sony's] ad-
vertisements." Ibid. 
The only case in which this Court has held anyone liable for 
contributory infringement was Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 
222 U. S. 55 (1911). In that case the holder of the copyright 
in the book Ben Hur sued Kalem, the producer and distribu-
tor of an unauthorized film dramatization of the book. The 
Court upheld a finding that the public exhibition of the film 
by Kalem's customers was a direct infringement of copyright, 
and that the sale of the plagarized film was a contributory in-
fringement. Speaking through Justice Holmes, the Court 
explained: 
"But again it is said that the defendant did not produce 
the representations, but merely sold the films to jobbers, 
and on that ground ought not to be held. In some cases 
where an ordinary article of commerce is sold nice ques-
compositions to be performed, print the programs, and then sells the pro-
grams to its own local organizations for distribution at the time of the di-
rect infringement. ld., at 1161. The Court of Appeals emphasized that 
the contributory infringer had actual lmowledge that the artists it was 
managing were performing copyrighted works, was in a position to police 
the infringing conduct of the artists, and derived substantial benefit from 
the actions of the primary infringers. !d., at 1163. 
In Screen-Gems, the direct infringer manufactured and sold bootleg 
records. In denying a motion for summary judgment, the District Court 
held that the infringer's advertising agency, the radio stations that adver-
tised the infringer's works, and the service agency that boxed and mailed 
the infringing goods could all be held liable, if at trial it could be demon-
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tions may arise as to the point at which the seller be-
comes an accomplice in a subsequent illegal use by the 
buyer. It has been held that mere indifferent supposi-
tion or knowledge on the part of the seller that the buyer 
of spiritous liquor is contemplating such unlawful use is 
not enough to connect him with the possible unlawful 
consequences, Graves v. Johnson, 179 Massachusetts, 
53, but that if the sale was made with a view to the ille-
gal resale the price could not be recovered. Graves v. 
Johnson, 156 Massachusetts, 211. But no such niceties 
are involved here. The defendant not only expected but 
invoked by advertisement the use of its films for dra-
matic reproduction of the story. That was the most con-
spicuous purpose for which they could be used, and the 
one for which especially they were made. If the defend-
ant did not contribute to the infringement it is impossible 
to do so except by taking part in the final act. It is lia-
ble on principles recognized in every part of the law." 
222 U. S., at 62-63. 
The commodity sold in Kalem was the completed copy of a 
particular copyrighted work. The use for which it had been 
"especially'' made was the direct infringement of the plain-
tiff's copyright. In contrast, the Betamax is a piece of equip-
ment that is generally capable of copying any program that 
may be televised-those that are uncopyrighted, those that 
are copyrighted but which may be copied without any objec-
tion from the copyright holder, and those that the copyright 
holder would prefer not to have copied. Like a camera, it 
may make authorized or unauthorized reproductions, but the 
range of its potential use is much broader than the particular 
infringing use of the film Ben Hur involved in Kalem. In 
order to consider whether the unlawful use of a Betamax is 
sufficiently pervasive to justify excluding it from the market, 
it is useful to consider more generally how the balance among 
competing values has been struck in the most closely related 
area of the law-patent law . 
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The Constitutional predicates for the copyright statute and 
the patent statute are one and the same. "To promote the 
Progress of Science and the useful Arts~ by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U. S. Const., 
Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The copyright is designed to provide au-
thors with a sufficient incentive to stimulate their creative 
activity without unnecessarily curtailing the countervailing 
public interest in the free exchange of thought. 16 The mo-
nopoly privilege does not necessarily encompass all possible 
rewards that might logically flow from the grant, 17 particu-
1
• "Copyright law wants to give any necessary support and encourage-
ment to the creation and dissemination of fresh signals or messages to stir 
human intelligence and sensibilities: it recognizes the importance of these 
excitations for the development of individuals and society. Especially is 
copyright directed to those kinds of signals which are in their nature 'frag-
ile' -so easy of replication that incentive to produce would be quashed by 
the prospect of rampant reproduction by freeloaders. To these signals 
copyright affords what I have called 'headstart,' that is, a group of rights 
amounting to a qualified monopoly running for a limited time. 
"The headstart conferred should be moderate in all its dimensions. 
Magnify the headstart and you may conceivably run the risk of attracting 
too much of the nation's energy into the copyright-protected sectors of the 
economy. But more serious is the danger of hobbling unduly the reception 
and enjoyment of the signals by their potential audience, or of clogging the 
utilization of the signals by other authors in the creation of further or im-
proved signals for additional audiences." Kaplan 7 4-75. 
17 See, e. g., White·Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 
U. S., at 19 (Holmes J., concurring). In Deepsouth Packing Co. v. 
Laitram Corp., 406 U. S. 518, 530-531 (1972), we wrote: 
"Moreover, we must consider petitioner's claim in light of this Nation's 
historical antipathy to monopoly and of repeated congressional efforts to 
preserve and foster competition. As this Court recently said without 
dissent: 
'[I]n rewarding useful invention, the "rights and welfare of the com-
munity must be fairly dealt with and effectually guarded." Kendall 
v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 329 (1859). To that end the prerequisites to 
obtaining a patent are strictly observed, and when the patent has is-
sued the limitations of its exercise are equally strictly enforced.' 
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larly if the rewards are more fairly attributable to the expan-
sion of the market brought about by technological advances 
that are unrelated to an author's creativity.'8 - The public in-
terest in allowing these advances to evolve in a free commer-
cial market is strongly implicated when a copyright owner 
seeks to enjoin the distribution of an article of commerce. 
<"' In the Patent Code both the concept of infringement and 
the concept of contributory infringement are expressly de-
fined by statute. 19 The prohibition against contributory in-
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225, 230 (1964). 
"It follows that we should not expand patent rights by overruling or modi-
fying our prior cases construing the patent statutes, unless the argument 
for expansion of privilege is based on more than mere inference from 
ambiguous statutory language. We would require a clear and certain sig-
nal from Congress before approving the position of a litigant who, as re-
spondent here, argues that the beachhead of privilege is wider, and the 
area of public use narrower, than courts had previously thought." 
11 "The general problem for the near future is after all a happy one, that 
of dealing with a rapidly expanding market for copyrighted works-and it 
is not impertinent to remind the contestants that this condition has been 
largely brought about by independent scientific invention owing little to 
any of the copyrighted factions." Kaplan 110. 
1
' 35 U. S. C. § 271 provides: 
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without author-
ity makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States 
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. 
"(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as 
an infringer. 
"(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, 
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing 
a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing 
the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringe-
ment of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce 
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory 
infringer. 
"(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or 
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed 
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his hav-
ing done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which 
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fringement is confined to the knowing sale of a component es-
pecially made for use in connection with a particular patent. 
There is no suggestion in the statute that one patentee may 
object to the sale of a product that might be used in connec-
tion with other patents. 
In contributory infringement cases arising under the pat-
ent laws the Court has recognized the critical importance of 
not allowing the patentee to extend his monopoly beyond the 
limits of his specific grant. These cases deny the patentee 
any right to control the distribution of unpatented articles 
unless they are ''unsuited for any commercial noninfringing 
use." Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co., 448 
U. S. 176, 198 (1950). Unless a commodity "has no use ex-
cept through practice of the patented method," ibid, the pat-
entee has no right to claim that its distribution constitutes 
contributory infringment. "To form the basis for contribu-
tory infringement the item must almost be uniquely suited as 
a component of the patented invention." P. Rosenberg, Pat-
ent Law Fundamentals § 17.02[2] (1982). "[A] sale of an arti-
cle which though adapted to an infringing use is also adapted 
to other and lawful uses, is not enough to make the seller a 
contributory infringer. Such a rule would block the wheels 
of commerce." Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1, 48 
(1912), overruled on other grounds, Motion Picture Patents 
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 517 (1917). 
Although there are substantial differences between the 
patent and copyright laws, there is no reason to grant the 
copyright holder any broader right to bar noninfringing activ-
ities than the patent holder. Indeed, arguably, the copy-
right holder should have a lesser right, for by precluding 
if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory 
infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform 
acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory 
infrigement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against 
infringement or contributory infringement." 
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noninfringing uses he may not only block the .wheels of com-
merce, but also impose an unjustified tax on the free market-
place of ideas. There should be no finding of contributory 
infringement for the seller of a staple article of commerce 
that is used to infringe, unless the seller directly participates 
in, or directly induces, an act of infringement. An article is a 
staple article of commerce if it is widely used for legitimate, 
unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, if we apply the patent 
law rule, it need merely be capable of significant noninfring-
ing uses. 
IV 
The question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of 
commercially significant noninfringing uses. In order to re-
solve that question, we need not explore all the different po-
tential uses of the machine and determine whether or not 
they would constitute infringement. Rather, we need only 
consider whether on the basis of the facts as found by the dis-
trict court a significant number of them would be non-infring-
ing. Moreover, in order to resolve this case we need not 
give precise content to the question of how much use is com-
mercially significant. For one potential use of the Betamax 
plainly satisfies this standard, however it is understood: pri-
vate cial · e-shiftin.r in the home. It doesso 
both because respondents have no right to prevent other 
copyright holders from authorizing it for their programs, and 
because the district court's factual findings reveal that the re-
spondents failed to prove that even unauthorized home time-
shifting is not legitimate fair use. We therefore need not an-
alyze commercial use, public use, or home library-building, 
all of which would raise additional complicating issues. 
Each of the respondents owns a large inventory of valuable 
copyrights, but in the total spectrum of television program-
ming their combined market share is small. The exact per-
centage is not specified, but it is well below 10%.20 If they 
:~~~The record suggests that Disney's programs at the time of trial con-
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prevail, the outcome of this litigation will have a significant 
impact on both the producers and the viewerS of the remain-
ing 90% of the programming in the Nation. No doubt, many 
other producers share respondents' concern about the possi-
ble consequences of unrestricted copying, but the findings of 
the District Court make it perfectly clear that time-shifting 
may enlare the total viewing audience and that many produc-
ers are perfectly willing to allow private time-shifting to con-
tinue, at least for an experimental time period. 21 
The District Court found: 
"Even if it were deemed that home-use recording of 
copyrighted material constituted infringement, the 
Betamax could still legally be used to record 
noncopyrighted material or material whose owners con-
sented to the coying. An injunction would deprive the 
public of the ability to use the Betamax for this 
noninfringing off-the-air recording. 
"Defendants introduced considerable testimony at 
trial about the potential for such copying of sports, reli-
gious, educational and other programming. This in-
cluded testimony from representatives of the Offices of 
the Commissioners of the National Football, Basketball, 
Baseball and Hockey Leagues and Associations, the Ex-
sisted of approximately one hour a week of network television and one syn-
dicated series. Universal's percentage in the Los Angeles market on com-
mercial television stations was under 5 percent. See Tr. 532-533, 
549-550. 
21 The district court did not make any explicit findings with regard to how 
much broadcasting is wholly uncopyrighted. The record does include tes-
timony that at least one movie-My Man Godfrey-falls within that cate-
gory, Tr. 2300-2301, and certain broadcasts produced by the federal gov-
ernment are also uncopyrighted. See 17 U. S. C. § 105. Cf. Schappner 
v. Foley, 667 F. 2d 102 (CADC 1981) (explaining distinction between work 
produced by the government and work commissioned by the government). 




24 SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC. 
ecutive Director of National Religious Broadcasters and 
various educational communications agencies. Plaintiffs 
attack the weight of the testimony offered and also con-
tend that an injunction is warranted because infringing 
uses outweigh noninfringing uses." 
''Whatever the future percentage of legal versus ille-
gal home-use recording might be, an injunction which 
seeks to deprive the public of the very tool or article of 
commerce capable of some noninfringing use would be an 
extremely harsh remedy, as well as one unprecedented 
in copyright law." 480 F. Supp., at 468. 
We interpret these statements as a finding that the evi-
dence offered by the defendant concerning "sports, religious, 
educational, and other programming" was sufficient to estab-
lish a non-minimal quantity of broadcasting whose copying is 
authorized. That finding is amply supported by the record. 
In addition to the religious and sports officials identified ex-
plicitly by the District Court, 22 two items in the record de-
serve specific mention. 
First is the testimony of John Kenaston, the station man-
ager of Channel 58, an educational station in Los Angeles 
affiliated with the Public Broadcasting Service. He ex-
plained and authenticated the station's published guide to its 
programs. Tr. 2863-2902; Def. Exh. Pl. For each pro-
gram, the guide tells whether unlimited home taping is au-
21 See Tr; 2447-2450 (Alexander Hadden, Major League Baseball); Tr. 
2480, ~2487 (Jay Moyer, National Football League); Tr. 2515-2516 
(David Stern, National Basketball Association); Tr. 2530-2534 (Gilbert 
Stein, National Hockey League); Tr. 2543-2552 (Thomas Hansen, National 
Collegiate Athletic Association); Tr. 2565-2572 (Benjamin Annstrong, Na-
tional Religious Broadcasters). Those officials were authorized to be the 
official spokespersons for their respective institutions in this litigation. 
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thorized, home taping is authorized subject to certain restric-
tions (such as erasure within seven days), or home taping is 
not authorized at all. The Spring 1978 edition of the guide 
described 107 programs. Sixty-two of those programs-or 
58o/c-authorize some home taping. Twenty-one of them-
or almost 20%-authorize unrestricted home taping. 23 
Second is the testimony of Fred Rogers, president of the 
corporation that produces and owns the copyright in Mr. 
Rogers' Neighborhood as well as the show's host. The pro-
gram is carried by more public television stations than any 
other program. Its audience numbers over 3,000,000 fam-
ilies a day. He testified that he had absolutely no objection 
to home taping for noncommercial use: 
"Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, 
program the 'Neighborhood' at hours when some chil-
dren cannot use it. I think that it's a real service to 
families to be able to record such programs and show 
them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with 
the advent of all of this new technology that allows peo-
ple to tape the 'Neighborhood' off-the-air, and I'm speak-
ing for the 'Neighborhood' because that's what I 
produce, that they then become much more active in the 
programming of their family's television life. Very 
frankly, I am opposed to people being programmed by 
others. My whole approach in broadcasting has always 
been 'You are an important person just the way you are. 
You can make healthy decisions.' Maybe I'm going on 
too long, but I just feel that anything that allows a per-
son to be more active in the control of his or her life, in a 
healthy way, is important." T. R. 2920-2921. See also 
21 See also Tr. 2833-2844 (similar testimony by executive director of New 
Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority). Cf. Tr. 2592-2605 (testimony by 
chief of New York Education Department's Bureau of Mass Communica-
tions approving home taping for educational purposes) . 
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Def. Exh. PI, p. 85. 
If there are millions of owners of VTR's who make copies of 
televised sports events, religious broadcasts, and educational 
programs such as Mister Rogers' Neighborhood, and if the 
proprietors of those programs welcome the practice, the busi-
ness of supplying the equipment that makes such copying fea-
sible should not be stifled absent proof that the manufacturer 
is inducing or participating directly in infringing activity. 
The respondents do not represent a class composed of all 
copyright holders. Yet a finding of contributory infringe-
ment would inevitably frustrate the interests of broadcasters 
in reaching the portion of their audience that is available only 
through time-shifting. 
Of course, the fact that other copyright holders have no ob-
jection to copying that may constitute infringement does not 
mean that respondents are judicially deemed to have granted 
a license to copy their programs. Third party conduct would 
be wholly irrelevant in an action for direct infringement of re-
spondents' copyrights. But in an action for contributory in-
fringement against the seller of copying equipment, _!..plain-
tiff co i~prevail nnlesL he s eaks for 
Virtually..&! copyright holders with an interest in h out-
Com In this case, although others plainly share the re-
spondents' concerns, the record makes it perfectly clear that 
there are many important producers of national and local 
television programs who find nothing objectionable about the 
enlargement in the size of the television audience that results 
from the practice of time-shifting for private home use. :u 
u In a special staff study for the Federal Communications Commission 
made in February 1980, the following conclusion was stated unequivocally: 
"Clearly, the principal use of the VCR is for time-shift purposes. Be-
cause both major rating services-A.C. Nielsen and Arbitron-now in-
clude an indication of VCR use, this time-shift phenomenon should actually 
be an asset to the networks and broadcasters. Shows which would have 
been missed can now be recorded for later viewing. Because rating serv-
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The seller of the equipment that expands those producers' 
audiences cannot be a contributory infringer if, as is true in 
this case, it has had no direct involvement with any infringing 
activity. 
v 
Even unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work are under 
some circumstances not infringing. An unlicensed use of the 
copyright is not an infringement unless it conflicts with one of 
the specific exclusive rights conferred by the copyright stat-
ute. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 
151, 154-155. As amended in 1976, the Act grants the 
owner of a copyright five specific exclusive rights. 25 Re-
spondents allege that the preparation of a single copy for 
time-shifting violates their exclusive right ''to reproduce the 
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords." § 106(1). 
However, the fact the time-shifting involves the temporary 
reproduction of a copyrighted work does not resolve the 
question whether home time shifting constitutes infringe-
ices are prepared to report such time-shifting, broadcasters should actually 
be helped by this consumer convenience. An audience that was previously 
unavailable to them is now viewing, and the viewing is properly attributed 
in audience reports." Id., at 61~2. 
21 Section 106 of the Act provides: 
"Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this 
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform 
the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi-
vidual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the 
copyrighted work publicly." 
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ment. For the definition of the exclusive rights in § 106 is 
prefaced by the words "subject to sections 107 through 118." 
Those sections describe a variety of uses of copyrighted ma-
terial that "are not infringements of copyright notwithstand-
ing the provisions of § 106." The most pertinent in this case 
is § 107, the legislative endorsement of the doctrine of "fair 
use." 211 
The 1909 Act did not have a "fair use" provision. More-
over, that Act's compendium of exclusive rights-"to print, 
reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work" 'l:T_ 
was plainly broad enough to encompass virtually all potential 
interactions with a copyrighted work. Yet the statute was 
never so construed. The courts simply refused to read the 
statute literally in every situation. When Congress 
amended the statute in 1976, it indicated that it "intended to 
restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to 
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." House Report 
No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 66. Congress there-
fore codified § 107 in a form that identifies various factors 
that enable a Court to apply a "rule of reason" analysis to 
particular claims of infringement. 28 
•"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, ibncluding such use by reproductin in copies or phonorecords 
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infrigement of copyright. 
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a 
fair use the factor to be considered shall include-
"(!) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work." 17 U. S. C. § 107. 
27 Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075. 
111 The essence of the section is captured in these comments from the 
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Three different factors lead to the conclusion that, under a 
''rule of reason" analysis, the respondents failed to carry 
their burden of proving in this case that home _time shifting is 
not fair use. Those factors are (A) their complete failure to 
show that home time shifting would harm the potential mar-
ket for, or the value of, any identifiable copyrighted material, 
(B) the legislative history tending to show that Congress un-
derstood such activity to be fair use, and (C) the profoundly 
disturbing policy implications of a finding that home time 
shifting is not fair use. 
A 
House Report on the fair use section: 
"Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doc-
trine over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever 
emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no gen-
erally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question 
must be decided on its own facts. . . . 
"The Committee has amended the first of the criteria to be considered-
'the purpose and character of the use'-to state explicitly that this factor 
includes a consideration of 'whether such use is of a commercial nature or is 
for non-profit educational purposes.' This amendment is not intended to 
be interpreted as any sort of not-for-profit limitation on educational uses of 
copyrighted works. It is an express recognition that, as under the present 
law, the commercial or non-profit character of an activity, while not conclu-
sive with respect to fair use, can and should be weighed along with other 
factors in fair use decisions. . . . 
General intention behind the provision 
'The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers some guid-
ance to users in determining when the principles of the doctrine apply. 
However, the endless variety of situations and combinations of circum-
stances that can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact 
rules in the statute. The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of 
the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the 
doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological 
change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and 
some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the 
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis." H. Rep. No. 
94-1476, pp. S{H36, 
81-1687-MEMORANDUM 
30 SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC. 
The flexible character of the fair use doctrine "precludes 
the fonnulation of exact rules." H. Rep. No. 94-1476, pp. 
65-66. Nevertheless, in exercising the judgment required 
by this "rule of reason," we must be especially responsive to 
the language of § 107 identifying factors that Congress be-
lieved might be relevant to most fair use analyses. One fac-
tor is particularly important: "the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." 
§ 107(4). The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for 
creative effort. If a use has no demonstrable effect upon the 
potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work, 
prohibiting such a use would not affect the author's incentive 
to create the work in the first place. It would merely inhibit 
access to ideas without any countervailing benefit. 29 · 
Of course, every commercial use of copyrighted material is 
presumptively an exploitation of the monopoly privilege that 
belongs to the owner of the copyright. But noncommercial 
uses are a different matter. Any plaintiff seeking to chal-
lenge the noncommercial use of a copyrighted work should, 
as a threshold matter, prove either that the particular use is 
harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would be 
more likely than not that some non-minimal damage would 
result to the potential market for, or the value of, his particu-
lar copyrighted work. Actual present harm need not be 
shown; such a requirement would leave the copyright holder 
with no defense against predictable damage. Nor is it neces-
sary to show with certainty that future harm will result. 
What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evi-
21 Cf. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted as Study 
No. 14 in Senate Judiciary Committee, Copyright Law Revision, Studies 
Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 
86th Cong., 2d Sess. , p. 30 (1960): 
"In certain situations, the copyright owner suffers no substantial harm 
from the use of the work. . . . Here again, is the partial marriage between 
the doctrine of fair use and the legal maxim de minimis non curat lex." 
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dence that some meaningful likelihood of future hann exists. 
If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood 
may be presumed. But if it is for purely private purposes, 
the likelihood, it must be demonstrated. 
In this case, respondents failed to carry their burden with 
regard to home time-shifting. The District Court described 
respondents' evidence as follows: 
"Plaintiffs' experts admitted at several points in the trial 
that the time-shifting without librarying would result in 
'not a great deal of hann.' Plaintiffs' greatest concern 
about time-shiftipg is with 'a point of important philoso-
phy that transcends even commercial judgment.' They 
fear that with any Betamax usage, 'invisible boundaries' 
are passed: 'the copyright owner has lost control over his 
program.'" 480 F. Supp., at 467. 
Later in its opinion, the District Court observed: 
"Most of plaintiffs' predictions of hann hinge on specula-
tion about audience viewing patterns and ratings, a 
measurement system which Sidney Sheinberg, MCA's 
president, calls a 'black art' because of the significant 
level of imprecision involved in the calculations." I d., at 
469. 30 
There was no need for the District Court to say much about 
past hann. "Plaintiffs have admitted that no actual hann to 
their copyrights has occurred to date." Id., at 451. 
On the question of potential future harm from time-shift-
ing, the District Court offered a more detailed analysis of the 
30 See also 480 F. Supp., at 451: 
"It should be noted, however, that plaintiffs' argument is more complicated 
and speculative than was the plaintiff's in Williams & Wilkins . ... Here, 
plaintiffs ask the court to find harm based on many more assumptions. . . . 
As is discussed more fully in Part IV, infra, some of these assumptions are 
based on neither fact nor experience, and plaintiffs admit that they are to 
some extent inconsistent and illogical." 
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evidence. It rejected respondents' . "fe~ that persons 
'watching' the original telecast of a program will not be mea-
sured in the live audience and the ratings and revenues will 
decrease," by observing that current measurement technol-
ogy allows the Betamax audience to be reflected. I d., at 
466. 31 It rejected respondents' prediction "that live televi-
sion or movie audiences will decrease as more people watch 
Betamax tapes as an alternative," with the observation that 
"[t]here is no factual basis for [the underlying] assumption." 
Ibid. 32 It rejected respondents' "fear that time-shifting will 
reduce audiences for telecast reruns," and concluded instead 
that "given current market practices, this should aid plain-
51 "There was testimony at trial, however, that Nielsen Ratings has al-
ready developed the ability to measure when a Betamax in a sample home 
is recording the program. Thus, the Betamax will be measured as a part 
of the live audience. The later diary can augment that measurement with 
information about subsequent viewing." 480 F. Supp., at 466. 
In a separate section, the District Court rejected plaintiffs' suggestion 
that the commercial attractiveness of television broadcasts would be dimin-
ished because Betamax owners would use the pause button or fast-forward 
control to avoid viewing advertisements: 
"It must be remembered, however, that to omit commercials, Betamax 
owners must view the program, including the commercials, while record-
ing. To avoid commercials during playback, the viewer must fast-forward 
and, for the most part, guess as to when the commercial has passed. For 
most recordings, either practice may be too tedious. As defendantss' sur-
vey showed, 92% of the programs were recorded with commercials and 
only 25% of the owners fast-forward through them. Advertisers will have 
to make the same kinds of judgments they do now about whether persons 
viewing televised programs actually watch the advertisements which inter-
rupt them." ld., at 468. 
31 "Here plaintiffs assume that people will view copies when they would 
otherwise be watching television or going to the movie theater. There is 
no factual basis for this assumption. It seems equally likely that Betamax 
owners will play their tapes when there is nothing on television they wish 
to see and no movie they want to attend. Defendants' survey does not 
show any negative effect of Betamax ownership on television viewing or 
theater attendance." Ibid. 
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tiffs rather than harm them." Ibid. 33 And it declared that 
respondents' suggestion "that theater or film rental exhi-
bition of a program will suffer because of time-shift recording 
of that program" "lacks merit." 480 F. Supp., at 467.34 
Mter completing that review, the District Court restated 
its overall conclusion several times, in several different ways. 
"Harm from time-shifting is speculative and, at best, mini-
mal." Ibid. "The audience benefits from the time-shifting 
capability have already been discussed. It is not implausible 
that benefits could also accrue to plaintiffs, broadcasters, and 
advertisers, as the Betamax makes it possible for more per-
sons to view their broadcasts." Ibid. 36 "No likelihood of 
31 "The underlying assumptions here are particularly difficult to accept. 
Plaintiffs explain that the Betamax increases access to the original tele-
vised material and that the more people there are in this original audience, 
the fewer people the rerun will attract. Yet current marketing practices, 
including the success of syndication, show just the opposite. Today, the 
larger the audience for the original telecast, the higher the price plaintiffs 
can demand from broadcasters from rerun rights. There is no survey 
within the lmowledge of this court to show that the rerun audience is com-
prised of persons who have not seen the program. In any event, if ratings 
can reflect Betamax recording, original audiences may increase and, given 
market practices, this should aid plaintiffs rather than harm them." Ibid. 
lW "This suggestion lacks merit. By definition, time-shift recording en-
tails viewing and erasing, so the program will no longer be on tape when 
the later theater run begins. Of course, plaintiffs may fear that the 
Betamax will keep the tapes long enough to satisfy all their interest in the 
program and will, therefore, not patronize later theater exhibitions. To 
the extent this practice involves librarying, it is addressed in section V.C., 
infra. It should also be noted that there is no evidence to suggest that the 
public interest in later theatrical exhibitions of motion pictures will be re-
duced any more by Betamax recording than it already is by the television 
broadcast of the film." 480 F. Supp., at 467. 
36 Some of the evidence in support of this conclusion by the District Court 
is striking. Julian Goodman, Chairman of the Board of NBC, testified 
that in May 1978 he had given a speech to the Federal Communications Bar 
Association. After conferring with NBC's corporate planning staff, he ex-
plained to his audience: 
... 
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harm was shown at trial, and plaintiffs admitted that there 
had been no actual harm to date." 480 F. Supp., at 468-469. 
"Testimony at trial suggested that Betamax may require ad-
justments in marketing strategy, but it did not establish even 
a likelihood of harm." I d., at 469. "Television production 
by plaintiffs today is more profitable than it has ever been, 
and, in five weeks of trial, there was no concrete evidence to 
suggest that the Betamax will change the studios' financial 
picture." Ibid. 
B 
The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act does not 
expressly focus on the question whether use of the Betamax 
for home time-shifting is "fair use." That history does, how-
ever, contain two clues that strongly support the conclusion 
that Congress assumed that such private use was entirely 
legitimate. 
The first clue came early in the process that constituted the 
General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law that resulted in 
the Sound Recording Amendments of 1971 and ultimately the 
1976 Copyright Act. Under the 1909 Act, there was no pro-
vision covering motion pictures. In 1912, the Act was 
amended to include them within its scope, but the 1909 Act 
was not well suited to deal with them. In 1937, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit had responded by declaring 
that the unauthorized projection of a documentary motion 
"Because of the amount of television programming now available, and the 
fact that few viewers can watch all of the programs they might want to, we 
feel that video recording will expand television viewing rather than sub-
tract from it." Tr. 3017; Def. Exh. OT. 
And Benjamin Armstrong, executive director of National Religious 
Broadcasters, testified that he had surveyed the 25 member religious tele-
vision stations and they had all favored home taping "because it does give 
an opportunity for greater exposure of their programming." Tr. 2571. 
Moreover, "in terms of Betamax, or similar devices, it tends to give a 
greater impact to the message which is being conveyed or portrayed on the 
television program. In this event we feel it's beneficial." Ibid . 
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picture on a movie screen constituted the making of a "copy'' 
and was therefore infringing. Patterson v. Century Produc-
tions, 93 F. 2d 489 (1937). A study prepared for Congress 
by Borge Varmer warned of the dangers of this analysis. It 
noted: 
"If the Patterson case, which dealt in fact with the public 
exhibition, is followed to its logical conclusion, any exhi-
bition of a copyrighted motion picture, whether public or 
private, would be an infringement if not authorized by 
the copyright owner. 
"[C]onjectural to some extent is what the courts would 
now do if presented with a case of purely private exhi-
bition, as in a private home or in a library for an individ-
ual scholar. While even such an exhibition would seem 
to be 'copying' under section 1(a) if the theory of the Pat-
terson decision is carried to its logical conclusion, a court 
might hesitate to find an infringement in that situation. 
It is conceivable that a court might resort to the doctrine 
of 'fair use' to hold such a purely private exhibition not 
an infringement." 36 
That concern was reflected in the Report of the Register of 
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright 
Law in 1961. He proposed that it be made clear that the ex-
hibition of a motion picture was not the making of a copy, and 
instead provided for a limited right of public performance. 
He stated: 
"Motion picture producers and distributors have urged 
that the performance right in motion pictures should ex-
tend to what are clearly private performances, including 
•varmer, Limitations on Perfonning Rights (1958), reprinted as Study 
No. 16 in Senate Judiciary Committee, Copyright Law Revision, Studies 
Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 
86th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 116-117 (1960). 
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private perfonnances given in private homes. They 
point to Patterson ... to support their position. Motion 
picture films are commonly leased for exhibition at speci-
fied places and dates. Most leases are for commercial 
exhibitions, but many films are also leased for home use. 
It is argued that in either case private exhibitions be-
yond the tenns of the lease should constitute an infringe-
ment of copyright. 
"This argument may have some theoretical plausibil-
ity, but we would question it for several reasons: 
"*Injury to a copyright owner from private perfor-
mances beyond the tenns of a lease would be minimal. 
He may be entitled to the usual license fee as damages 
for a breach of contract, but the statutory damages for 
copyright infringement would be grossly excessive. 
"*As a practical matter, unauthorized private perfor-
mances could rarely be discovered or controlled. 
"*New technical devices will probably make it practical 
in the future to reproduce televised motion pictures in 
the home. We do not believe the private use of such a 
reproduction can or should be precluded by copyright." 
Register's Report 29-30 (emphasis added). 
Congress adopted the Register's recommendation and cre-
ated a right of public display and perfonnance in motion 
pictures. § 106(4), (5). Of course, the Register is not the 
Congress, and his views are of only limited significance. 
Nevertheless, they surely support the conclusion that home 
time shifting is fair use. 
The second clue provided in the legislative history came in 
the course of the passage of the Sound Recording Amend-
ments of 1971. 85 Stat. 391. The development of the audio 
tape recorder made it simple for any individual to make tapes 
of copyrighted songs played on the radio. Under prior 
Copyright Law, the composer of the song was protected-he 
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was entitled to claim a so-called "mechanical royalty'' from 
any person who made such a tape in a manner that was not 
fair use. But the performer of the song was not protected at 
all, even from blatant commercial exploitation of his or her 
talent. When the practice known as "record piracy'' became 
widespread, the recording industry persuaded Congress to 
enact a special statute extending copyright protection to 
sound recordings. The House Report revealed the legisla-
tive understanding of how the "fair use" doctrine applies to 
home taping: 
"In approving the creation of a limited copyright in 
sound recordings it is the intention of the Committee 
that this limited copyright not grant any broader rights 
than are accorded to other copyright proprietors under 
the existing title 17. Specifically, it is not the intention 
of the Committee to restrain the home recording, from 
broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded perfor-
mances, where the home recording is for private use and 
with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing 
commercially on it. This practice is common and unre-
strained today, and the record producers and performers 
would be in no different position from that of the owners 
of copyright in recorded musical compositions over the 
past 20 years." H. Rep. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 
7, reprinted in [1971] U. S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 
pp. 1566, 1572.37 
31 This subject had been expressly considered during the House Commit-
tee hearings. As the District Court noted in this case, Representative 
Beister of Pennsylvania engaged in the following dialogue about off-the-air 
recording with Ms. Barbara Ringer, then Assistant Register of 
Copyrights: 
"Mr. Beister. I do not !mow that I can add very much to the questions 
which you have been asked so far. 
"I can tell you I must have a small pirate in my own home. 
"My son has a cassette tape recorder, and as a particular record becomes 
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That this was the opinion of the sponsors of the legislation is 
confirmed by the following colloquy when the 1971 amend-
ment was being discussed on the floor of the House of 
Representatives: 
"Mr. Kazen. Am I correct in assuming that the bill 
protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for com-
mercial purposes only? 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Yes. 
"Mr. Kazen. In other words, if your child were to 
record off of a program which comes through the air on 
the radio or television, and then used it for her own per-
sonal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this would not be 
included under the penalties of this bill? 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. This is not included in the bill. I 
am glad the gentleman raises the point. 
"On page 7 of the report, under 'Home Recordings,' 
Members will note that under the bill the same practice 
which prevails today is called for; namely, this is consid-
ered both presently and under the proposed law to be fair 
use. The child does not do this for commercial pur-
poses. This is made clear in the report." 117 Cong. 
Rec. 34, 748 (1971) (emphasis added). 38 
"Now, he may retrieve in addition something else onto his recording, but 
nonetheless, he does retrieve the basic sound, and this legislation, of 
course, would not point to his activities, would it? 
"Miss Ringer. I think the answer is clearly, 'No, it would not.' 
"I have spoken at a couple of seminars on video cassettes lately, and this 
question is usually asked: 'What about the home recorders?' 
"The answer I have given and will give again is that this is something 
you cannot control. You simply cannot control it.'' Hearings on S. 646 
before the Subcomm. No.3 of the House Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 22 (June 9 and 10, 1971). 
38 Representative Kastenmeier's views of whether the copyright laws 
prohibit home taping do not appear to have changed significantly over the 
past decade. In hearings held in 1982, after the Court of Appeals' decision 
in this case, he engaged in the following colloquy with a representative of 
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The Court of Appeals declared that these statements are 
"entirely beside the point" because the Amendments were in-
tended to deal with sound recording, not video recording. 
659 F. 2d, at 968. That is an unfortunate overstatement. 
For purposes of fair use analysis, the policy questions raised 
by home time-shifting of video broadcasts are closely related 
to the policy questions raised by home taping of musical per-
formances. Indeed, since it appears that Congress was re-
ferring to home librarying of audio tapes in the 1971 legisla-
tive history, it would seem that the policies favor a finding of 
fair use for home time-shifting of free television broadcasts 
are even more compelling. 39 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Thank you, Mr. Baumgarten. Do I take it as your 
legal opinion as part of this panel that some 30 or 40 million people in their 
homes producing billions of works are now and have been infringing copy-
right laws? 
"Mr. Baumgarten. Yes. 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. They are all infringers? 
"Mr. Baumgarten. Yes. 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Subject in all respects to whatever the law-
"Mr. Baumgarten. Whatever relief the court considers appropriate. I 
think we saw at the ninth circuit that that would be fashioned in an equita-
ble amount. 
"Mr. Kastenmeier. There would be a lot of Americans who I think 
would be chagrined to learn that thiat is the case." Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administation of Justice 
of House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 4783 et al., 97th Cong., 2d 
Sess. , at 540. 
• One statement in the legislative history should be discussed, since it 
could be read out of context as suggesting a contrary view. The statement J 
appears in the Senate Report on the 1976 Act and reads as follows: 
"The committee's attention has been directed to the special problems in-
volved in the reception of instructional television programs in remote areas 
of the country. In certain areas it is currently impossible to transmit such 
programs by any means other than communications satellites. A particu-
lar difficulty exists when such transmissions extend over several time 
zones within the same state, such as in Alaska. Unless individual schools 
in such states may make an off-air recording of such transmissions, the pro-
grams may not be received by the students during the school's daily sched-
·" 
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c 
If neither the legislative history nor the words of the stat-
ute unambiguously tell us whether Congress intended to per-
mit or to prohibit the home use of tape recorders to copy tele-
vision programs for later viewing, there are important 
reasons for not interpreting the silence of Congress as a pro-
hibition. Special constitutional values are implicated when-
ever the Government seeks to regulate or prohibit conduct 
that take place entirely within the privacy of the home. 40 Al-
though there is plainly no constitutional bar to a congres-
sional decision to prohibit home time-shifting, the privacy 
values at issue would surely be weighed carefully by Con-
gress before adopting any such prohibition. Any such 
weighing process would unquestionably yield a fairly explicit 
ule. The committee believes that the making by a school located in such a 
remote area of an off-the-air recording of an instructional television trans-
mission for the purpose of a delayed viewing of the program by students 
for the same school constitutes a 'fair use.' The committee does not intend 
to suggest, however, that off-the-air recording for convenience would under 
any circumstances, be considered 'fair use.' To meet the requirement of 
temporary use the school may retain the recording for only a limited period 
of time after the broadcast." S. Rep. 94-473, pp. 65-66. 
A hasty reading of the italicized sentence-especially the phrase ''under 
any circumstances"-might suggest that the committee intended to pro-
hibit any time-shifting. But the sentence preceding the italicized one 
proves that reading impossible, since it expressly authorizes certain time-
shifting for public display. In context, the italicized sentence merely en-
sures that the preceding sentence not be read too broadly. The Commit-
tee wanted to make sure that its approval of one form of time shifting for 
public display not be read as suggesting that all time shifting for public dis-
play is permissible. No question of public display is presented in this case. 
-whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating ob-
scenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own home. If 
the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no busi-
ness telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read 
or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at 
the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds." 
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 565-566 (1969). 
e,t.a141t'll€ 
close 11 · 
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statement on the subject-a statement that is strikingly ab-
sent from the 1976 legislative history. 
That is especially true in the context of a statute that ex-
pressly provides that every act of infringement-even if per-
formed in complete good faith-gives rise to a minimum stat-
utory liability of $100.41 Even if it is assumed that such a 
penalty could seldom be collected, we cannot ignore the con-
cern that literally millions of Americans might be branded as 
lawbreakers for conduct that seems morally indistinguishable 
from simply watching a free public broadcast at the time it is 
offered to them. It is highly improbable that Congress so 
intended. 
Finally, it must not be forgotten that to the extent time-
shifting expands public access to freely broadcast television 
programs, it yields societal benefits. Earlier this year, in 
Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried, 
-- U. S. --, --- --, n. 12 (1983), we acknowledged 
the public interest in making television broadcasting more 
available. Concededly, that interest is not unlimited. But 
it supports an interpretation of the concept of "fair use" that 
requires the copyright holder to demonstrate some likelihood 
of harm before he may condemn a private act of time-shifting 
as a violation of federal law. 
When these factors are all weighed in the "rule of reason" 
balance, we must conclude that the respondents have not 
demonstrated that home time-shifting is not fair use. In 
light of the findings of the District Court regarding the state 
of the empirical data, it is clear that the Court of Appeals 
erred in holding that the statute as presently written bars 
•• Section 504(c)(2) provides, in part: 
"In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the 
court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe 
that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in 
its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not 
less than $100." 
--
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such conduct. 42 
VI 
"The direction of Art. I is that Congress shall have the 
41 The Court of Appeals chose not to engage in a sensitive ''rule of rea-
son" analysis in this case. Instead, it assumed that the category of "fair 
use" is rigidly circumscribed by a requirement that every such use must be 
''productive. It therefore concluded copying a television program merely 
to enable the viewer to receive information or entertainment that he would 
otherwise miss because of a personal scheduling conflict could never be fair 
use. That understanding of "fair use" was erroneous. 
Fair use analysis calls for a sensitive balancing of interests. The distinc-
tion between ''productive" and ''unproductive" uses may be helpful in cali-
brating the balance, but it cannot be wholly determinative. Although 
copying to promote a scholarly endeavor certainly has a stronger claim to 
fair use than copying to avoid interrupting a poker game, the question is 
not simply two-dimensional. For one thing, it is not true that all copy-
rights are fungible. Some copyrights govern material with broad poten-
tial secondary markets. Such material may well have a broader claim to 
protection because of the greater potential for commercial harm. Copying 
a news broadcast may have a stronger claim to fair use than copying a mo-
tion picture. 
And, of course, not all uses are fungible. Copying for commercial gain 
has a much weaker claim to fair use than copying for personal enrichment. 
But the notion of social ''productivity'' cannot be a complete answer to this 
analysis. A teacher who copies to prepare lecture notes is clearly produc-
tive. But so is a teacher who copies for the sake of broadening his per-
sonal understanding of his specialty. Or a legislator who copies for the 
sake of broadening his understanding of what his constituents are watch-
ing; or a constituent who copies a news program to help make his decision 
on how to vote. 
Making a copy of a copyrighted work for the convenience of a blind per-
son is expressly identified by the House Committee Report as an example 
of fair use, with no suggestion that anything more than a purpose to enter-
tain or to inform need motivate the copying. In a hospital setting, using a 
VTR to enable a patient to see programs he would otherwise miss has no 
productive purpose other than contributing to the psychological well-being 
of the patient. Virtually any time-shifting that increases viewer access to 
television programming may result in a comparable benefit. The statu-
tory language does not identify any dicohotomy between productive and 
nonproductive time-shifting, but does require consideration of the eco-
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power to promote the progress of science and the useful 
arts. When, as here, the Constitution is ·permissive, the 
sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can come only 
from Congress." Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram 
Corp., 406 U. S. 518, 530 (1972). 
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that 
the elected representatives of the millions of people who 
watch television every day have made it unlawful to copy a 
program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat 
prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copy-
ing possible. We are therefore required in this case to apply 
the judicially formulated doctrines of contributory infringe-
ment and fair use. 
The record and findings of the District Court lead us to two 
conclusions. First, Sony demonstrated a significant likeli-
hood that substantial numbers of copyright holders who li-
cense their works for broadcast on free television would not 
object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by private 
viewers. And second, respondents failed to demonstrate 
that time-shifting would cause any likelihood of non-minimal 
harm to the potential market for, or the value of, their copy-
righted works. We therefore conclude that the respondents 
have failed to demonstrate contributory infringement on the 
part of Sony. 
It may well be that Congress will take a fresh look at this 
new technology, just as it so often has in the past. But it is 
not our job to apply laws that have not yet been written. 
Applying the copyright statute, as it now reads, to the facts 
as they have been developed in this case, the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals must be reversed. 
nomic consequences of copying. 
3rd DRAFT 
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INC., ETC., ET AL. 
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[January-, 1984] 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioners manufacture and sell home video tape record-
ers. Respondents own the copyrights on some of the televi-
sion programs that are broadcast on the public airwaves. 
Some members of the general public use video tape recorders 
sold by petitioners to record some of these broadcasts, as 
well as a large number of other broadcasts. The question 
presented is whether the sale of petitioners' copying equip-
ment to the general public violates any of the rights con-
ferred upon respondents by the Copyright Act. 
Respondent commenced this copyright infringement action 
against petitioners in the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California in 1976. Respondents alleged 
that some individuals had used Betamax video tape recorders 
(VTR's) to record some of respondents' copyrighted works 
which had been exhibited on commercially sponsored televi-
sion and contended that these individuals had thereby 
infringed respondents' copyrights. Respondents further 
maintained that petitioners were liable for the copyright 
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infringment allegedly committed by Betamax consumers be-
cause of petitioners' marketing of the Betamax VTR's. 1 Re-
spondents sought no relief against any Betamax consumer. 
Instead, they sought money damages and an equitable ac-
counting of profits from petitioners, as well as an injunction 
against the manufacture and marketing of Betamax VTR's. 
After a lengthy trial, the District Court denied respond-
ents all the relief they sought and entered judgment for peti-
tioners. 480 F. Supp. 429 (1979). The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's 
judgment on respondent's copyright claim, holding petition-
ers liable for contributory infringment and ordering the Dis-
trict Court to fashion appropriate relief. 659 F. 2d 963 
(1981). We granted certiorari, 457 U. S. 1116 (1982); since 
we had not completed our study of the case last Term, we or-
dered reargument, -- U. S. -- (1983). We now reverse. 
An explanation of our rejection of respondents' unprece-
dented attempt to impose copyright liability upon the distrib-
utors of copying equipment requires a quite detailed recita-
tion of the findings of the District Court. In summary, those 
findings reveal that the average member of the public uses a 
VTR principally to record a program he cannot view as it is 
being televised and then to watch it once at a later time. 
This practice, known as "time-shifting," enlarges the televi-
sion viewing audience. For that reason, a significant 
amount of television programming may be used in this man-
ner without objection from the owners of the copyrights on 
the programs. For the same reason, even the two respond-
ents in this case, who do assert objections to time-shifting in 
this litigation, were unable to prove that the practice has im-
paired the commercial value of their copyrights or has cre-
ated any likelihood of future harm. Given these findings, 
there is no basis in the Copyright Act upon which respond-
' The respondents also asserted causes of action under state law and 
§ 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 441, 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a). 
These claims are not before this Court. 
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ents can hold petitioners liable for distributing VTR's to the 
general public. The Court of Appeals' holding that respond-
ents are entitled to enjoin the distribution of VTR's, to collect 
royalties on the sale of such equipment, or to obtain other re-
lief, if affirmed, would enlarge the scope of respondents' stat-
utory monopolies to encompass control over an article of com-
merce that is not the subject of copyright protection. Such 
an expansion of the copyright privilege is beyond the limits of 
the grants authorized by Congress. 
I 
The two respondents in this action, Universal Studios, Inc. 
and Walt Disney Productions, produce and hold the copy-
rights on a substantial number of motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works. In the current marketplace, they can 
exploit their rights in these works in a number of ways: by 
authorizing theatrical exhibitions, by licensing limited 
showings on cable and network television, by selling syndica-
tion rights for repeated airings on local television stations, 
and by marketing programs on prerecorded videotapes or 
videodiscs. Some works are suitable for exploitation 
through all of these avenues, while the market for other 
works is more limited. 
Petitioner Sony manufactures millions of Betamax video 
tape recorders and markets these devices through numerous 
retail establishments, some of which are also petitioners in 
this action. 2 Sony's Betamax VTR is a mechanism consist-
ing of three basic components: (1) a tuner, which receives 
2 The four retailers are Carter, Hawley, Hales, Stores, Inc.; Associated 
Dry Goods Corp.; Federated Department Stores, Inc.; and Henry's Cam-
era Corp. The principal defendants are Sony Corporation, the manufac-
turer of the equipment, and its wholly owned subsidiary, Sony Corporation 
of America. The advertising agency of Doyle, Dane, Burnbock, Inc., also 
involved in marketing the Betamax, is also a petitioner. An individual 
VTR user, Willis Griffiths, was named as a defendant in the District Court, 
but respondent sought no relief against him. Griffiths is not a petitioner. 
For convenience, we shall refer to petitioners collectively as Sony. 
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electromagnetic signals transmitted over the television band 
of the public airwaves and separates them into audio and vi-
sual signals; (2) a recorder, which records such signals on a 
magnetic tape; and (3) an adapter, which converts the audio 
and visual signals on the tape into a composite signal that can 
be received by a television set. 
Several capabilities of the machine are noteworthy. The 
separate tuner in the Betamax enables it to record a broad-
cast off one station while the television set is tuned to another 
channel, permitting the viewer, for example, to watch two 
simultaneous news broadcasts by watching one "live" and re-
cording the other for later viewing. Tapes may be reused, 
and programs that have been recorded may be erased either 
before or after viewing. A timer in the Betamax can be used 
to activate and deactivate the equipment at predetermined 
times, enabling an intended viewer to record programs that 
are transmitted when he or she is not at home. Thus a per-
son may watch a program at home in the evening even 
though it was broadcast while the viewer was at work during 
the afternoon. The Betamax is also equipped with a pause 
button and a fast-forward control. The pause button, when 
depressed, deactivates the recorder until it is released, thus 
enabling a viewer to omit a commercial advertisement from 
the recording, provided, of course, that the viewer is present 
when the program is recorded. The fast forward control en-
ables the viewer of a previously recorded program to run the 
tape rapidly when a segment he or she does not desire to see 
is being played back on the television screen. 
The respondents and Sony both conducted surveys of the 
way the Betamax machine was used by several hundred own-
ers during a sample period in 1978. Although there were 
some differences in the surveys, they both showed that the 
primary use of the machine for most owners was "time-shift-
ing,"-the practice of recording a program to view it once at 
a later time, and thereafter erasing it. Time-shifting en-
ables viewers to see programs they otherwise would miss be-
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cause they are not at home, are occupied with other tasks, or 
are viewing a program on another station at the time of a 
broadcast that they desire to watch. Both surveys also 
showed, however, that a substantial number of interviewees 
had accumulated libraries of tapes. 3 Sony's survey indi-
cated that over 80% of the interviewees watched at least as 
much regular television as they had before owning a 
Betamax. 4 Respondents offered no evidence of decreased 
8 As evidence of how a VTR may be used, respondents offered the testi-
mony of William Griffiths. Griffiths, although named as an individual de-
fendant, was a client of plaintiffs' law firm. The District Court summa-
rized his testimony as follows: 
"He owns approximately 100 tapes. When Griffiths bought his Betamax, 
he intended not only to time-shift (record, play-back and then erase) but 
also to build a library of cassettes. Maintaining a library, however, 
proved too expensive, and he is now erasing some earlier tapes and reusing 
them. · 
"Griffiths copied about 20 minutes of a Universal motion picture called 
'Never Give An Inch,' and two episodes from Universal television series 
entitled 'Baa Baa Black Sheep' and 'Holmes and Yo Yo.' He would have 
erased each of these but for the request of plaintiffs' counsel that it be kept. 
Griffiths also testified that he had copied but already erased Universal 
films called 'Alpha Caper' (erased before anyone saw it) and 'Amelia Ear-
hart.' At the time of his deposition Griffiths did not intend to keep any 
Universal film in his library. 
"Griffiths has also recorded documentaries, news broadcasts, sporting 
events and political programs such as a rerun of the Nixon/Kennedy de-
bate." 480 F. Supp., at 436-437. 
Four other witnesses testified to having engaged in similar activity. 
• The District Court summarized some of the findings in these surveys as 
follows: 
"According to plaintiffs' survey, 75.4% of the VTR owners use their ma-
chines to record for time-shifting purposes half or most of the time. De-
fendants' survey showed that 96% of the Betamax owners had used the ma-
chine to record programs they otherwise would have missed. 
"When plaintiffs asked interviewees how many cassettes were in their li-
brary, 55.8% said there were 10 or fewer. In defendants' survey, of the 
total programs viewed by interviewees in the past month, 70.4% had been 
viewed only that one time and for 57.9%, there were no plans for further 
viewing." 480 F. Supp., at 438. 
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television viewing by Betamax owners. 5 
Sony introduced considerable evidence describing televi-
sion programs that could be copied without objection from 
any copyright holder, with special emphasis on sports, reli-
gious, and educational programming. For example, their 
survey indicated that 7.3% of all Betamax use is to record 
sports events, and representatives of professional baseball, 
football, basketball, and hockey testified that they had no ob-
jection to the recording of their televised events for home 
use. 6 
Respondents offered opinion evidence concerning the fu-
ture impact of the unrestricted sale of VTR's on the commer-
cial value of their copyrights. The District Court found, 
however, that they had failed to prove any likelihood of fu-
ture harm from the use of VTR's for time-shifting. !d., at 
469. 
The District Court's Decision 
The lengthy trial of the case in the District Court con-
cerned the private, home use of VTR's for recording pro-
grams broadcast on the public airwaves without charge to the 
viewer. 7 No issue concerning the transfer of tapes to other 
persons, the use of home-recorded tapes for public perform-
ances, or the copying of programs transmitted on pay orca-
ble television systems was raised. See 480 F. Supp. 429, 
432--433, 442 (1979). 
5 "81.9% of the defendants' interviewees watched the same amount or 
more of regular television as they did before owning a Betamax. 83.2% 
reported their frequency of movie going was unaffected by Betamax." 480 
F . Supp. , at 439. 
6 See Def. Exh. OT, Table 20; Tr. 2447-2450, 2480, 2486-2487, 2515--
2516, 2530-2534. 
7 The trial also briefly touched upon demonstrations of the Betamax by 
the retailer petitioners which were alleged to be infringments by respond-
ents. The District Court held against respondents on this claim, 480 F. 
Supp., at 456-457, the Court of Appeals affirmed this holding, 659 F. 2d, at 
976, and respondents did not cross-petition on this issue. 
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The District Court concluded that noncommercial home use 
recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves was 
a fair use of copyrighted works and did not constitute copy-
right infringement. It emphasized the fact that the material 
was broadcast free to the public at large, the noncommercial 
character of the use, and the private character of the activity 
conducted entirely within the home. Moreover, the court 
found that the purpose of this use served the public interest 
in increasing access to television programming, an interest 
that "is consistent with the First Amendment policy of pro-
viding the fullest possible access to information through the 
public airwaves. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 102." 480 F. 
Supp., at 454.8 Even when an entire copyrighted work was 
recorded, the District Court regarded the copying as fair use 
"because there is no accompanying reduction in the market 
for 'plaintiff's original work.~" Ibid. 
As an independent ground of decision, the District Court 
also concluded that Sony could not be held liable as a con-
tributory infringer even if the home use of a VTR was consid-
ered an infringing use. The District Court noted that Sony 
had no direct involvement with any Betamax purchasers who 
recorded copyrighted works off the air. Sony's advertising 
was silent on the subject of possible copyright infringement, 
but its instruction booklet contained the following statement: 
"Television programs, films, videotapes and other ma-
terials may be copyrighted. Unauthorized recording of 
such material may be contrary to the provisions of the 
United States copyright laws." Id., at 436. 
The District Court assumed that Sony had constructive 
knowledge of the probability that the Betamax machine 
8 The court also found that this "access is not just a matter of conve-
nience, as plaintiffs have suggested. Access has been limited not simply 
by inconvenience but by the basic need to work. Access to the better pro-
gram has also been limited by the competitive practice of counterprogram-
ming." 480 F. Supp., at 454. 
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would be used to record copyrighted programs, but found 
that Sony merely sold a "product capable of a variety of 
uses, some of them allegedly infringing." ld., at 461. It 
reasoned: 
"Selling a staple article of commerce e. g., a type-
writer, a recorder, a camera, a photocopying machine 
technically contributes to any infringing use subse-
quently made thereof, but this kind of 'contribution,' if 
deemed sufficient as a basis for liability, would expand 
the theory beyond precedent and arguably beyond judi-
cial management. 
"Commerce would indeed be hampered if manufactur-
ers of staple items were held liable as contributory in-
fringers whenever they 'constructively' knew that some 
purchasers on some occasions would use their product 
ior a purpose which a court later deemed, as a matter of 
first impression, to be an infringement." Ibid. 
Finally, the District Court discussed the respondents' 
prayer for injunctive relief, noting that they had asked for an 
injunction either preventing the future sale of Betamax ma-
chines, or requiring that the machines be rendered incapable 
of recording copyrighted works off the air. The court stated 
that it had "found no case in which the manufacturers, dis-
tributors, retailers, and advertisors of the instrument en-
abling the infringement were sued by the copyright holders," 
and that the request for relief in this case "is unique." 480 
F. Supp., at 465. 
It concluded that an injunction was wholly inappropriate 
because any possible harm to respondents was outweighed by 
the fact that "the Betamax could still legally be used to 
record noncopyrighted material or material whose owners 
consented to the copying. An injunction would deprive the 
public of the ability to use the Betamax for this noninfringing 
off-the-air recording." 480 F. Supp., at 468. 
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The Court of Appeals' Decision 
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's judg-
ment on respondents' copyright claim. It did not set aside 
any of the District Court's findings of fact. Rather, it con-
cluded as a matter of law that the home use of a VTR was not 
a fair use because it was not a "productive use." 9 It there-
fore held that it was unnecessary for plaintiffs to prove any 
harm to the potential market for the copyrighted works, but 
then observed that it seemed clear that the cumulative effect 
of mass reproduction made possible by VTR's would tend to 
diminish the potential market for respondents' works. 659 
F. 2d, at 974. 
On the issue of contributory infringement, the Court of Ap-
peals first rejected the analogy to staple articles of commerce 
such as tape recorders or photocopying machines. It noted 
that such machines "may have substantial benefit for some 
purposes" and do not "even remotely raise copyright prob-
lems." Id. , at 975. VTR's, however, are sold "for the pri-
mary purpose of reproducing television programming" and 
"virtually all" such programming is copyrighted material. 
Ibid. The Court of Appeals concluded, therefore, that 
VTR's were not suitable for any substantial noninfringing use 
even if some copyright owners elect not to enforce their 
rights. 
The Court of Appeals also rejected the District Court's re-
liance on Sony's lack of knowledge that home use constituted 
infringement. Assuming that the statutory provisions defin-
ing the remedies for infringement applied also to the non-
statutory tort of contributory infringement, the court stated 
that a defendant's good faith would merely reduce his dam-
ages liability but would not excuse the infringing conduct. 
It held that Sony was chargeable with knowledge of the 
homeowner's infringing activity because the reproduction of 
9 ''Without a 'productive use', i . e. when copyrighted material is repro-
duced for its intrinsic use, the mass copying of the sort involved in this case 
precludes an application of fair use." 659 F. 2d, at 971-972. 
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copyrighted materials was either "the most conspicuous use" 
or "the major use" of the Betamax product. Ibid. 
On the matter of relief, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that "statutory damages may be appropriate," that the Dis-
trict Court should reconsider its determination that an in-
junction would not be an appropriate remedy; and, referring 
to "the analogous photocopying area," suggested that a con-
tinuing royalty pursuant to a judicially created compulsory li-
cense may very well be an acceptable resolution of the relief 
issue. 659 F. 2d, at 976. 
II 
Article I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that: 
"The Congress shall have Power . . . to Promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are 
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special 
private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by 
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is 
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and in-
ventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the 
public access to the products of their genius after the limited 
period of exclusive control has expired. 
"The copyright law, like the patent statute, makes re-
ward to the owner a secondary consideration. In Fox 
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127, Chief Justice 
Hughes spoke as follows respecting the copyright mo-
nopoly granted by Congress, 'The sole interest of the 
United States and the primary object in conferring the 
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the pub-
lic from the labors of authors.' It is said that reward to 
the author or artist serves to induce release to the public 
of the products of his creative genius." United States v. 
Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 158. 
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As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress 
that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the 
limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to in-
ventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their 
work product. Because this task involves a difficult balance 
between the interests of authors and inventors in the control 
and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one 
hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of 
ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand, our pat-
ent and copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly. 10 
From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in 
response to significant changes in technology. 11 Indeed, it 
10 In its report accompanying the comprehensive revision of the Copy-
right Act in 1909, the Judiciary Committee of the House of Represent-
atives explained this balance: 
"The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of 
the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in 
his writings, ... but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be 
served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing 
to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings. 
"In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider ... two questions: 
First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit 
the public, and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be detri-
mental to the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under the 
proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that out-
weighs the evils of the temporary monopoly." H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909). 
11 Thus, for example, the development and marketing of player pianos 
and perforated roles of music, see White Smith Music Publishing Co. v. 
Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (1908), preceded the enactment of the Copyright 
Act of 1909; innovations in copying techniques gave rise to the statutory 
exemption for library copying embodied in § 108 of the 1976 revision of the 
Copyright law; the development of the technology that made it possible to 
retransmit television programs by cable or by microwave systems, see 
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390 (1968), and Telepromp-
ter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U. S. 394 (1974), prompted the enactment of the 
complex provisions set forth in 17 U. S. C. § 111 (d)(2)(B) and § 111(d)(5) 
after years of detailed congressional study, see Eastern MicrO'Wave, Inc. v. 
Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F. 2d 125, 129 (CA2 1982). 
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was the invention of a new form of copying equipment-the 
printing press-that gave rise to the original need for copy-
right protection. 12 Repeatedly, as new developments have 
occurred in this country, it has been the Congress that has 
fashioned the new rules that new technology made necessary. 
Thus, long before the enactment of the Copyright Act of 
1909, 35 Stat. 1075, it was settled that the protection given to 
copyrights is wholly statutory. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U. S. 
(8 Peters) 591, 661--662 (1834). The remedies for infringe-
ment "are only those prescribed by Congress." Thompson 
v. Hubbard, 131 U. S. 123, 151 (1889). 
The judiciary's reluctance to expand the protections af-
forded by the copyright without explicit legislative guidance 
is a recurring theme. See, e. g., Teleprompter Corp. v. 
CBS, 415 U. S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Art-
ists, 392 U. S. 390 (1968); White-Smith Music Publishing Co. 
v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (1908); Williams and Wilkins v. 
United States, 487 F. 2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affirmed by an 
equally divided court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975). Sound policy, as 
well as history, supports our consistent deference to Con-
By enacting the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, 85 Stat. 391, 
Congress also provided the solution to the "record piracy'' problems that 
had been created by the development of the audio tape recorder. Sony 
argues that the legislative history of that Act, see especially H. Rep. No. 
487, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 7, indicates that Congress did not intend to 
prohibit the private home use of either audio or video tape recording equip-
ment. In view of our disposition of the contributory infringement issue, 
we express no opinion on that question. 
12 "Copyright protection became necessary with the invention of the 
printing press and had its early beginnings in the British censorship laws. 
The fortunes of the law of copyright have always been closely connected 
with freedom of expression, on the one hand, and with technological im-
provements in means of dissemination, on the other. Successive ages 
have drawn different balances among the interest of the writer in the con-
trol and exploitation of his intellectual property, the related interest of the 
publisher, and the competing interest of society in the untrammeled dis-
semination of ideas." Foreword to B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of 
Copyright vii-viii (1967). 
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gress when major technological innovations alter the market 
for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional 
authority and the institutional ability to accomodate fully the 
varied permutations of competing interests that are inev-
itably implicated by such new technology. 
In a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly 
marked our course, we must be circumspect in construing the 
scope of rights created by a legislative enactment which 
never contemplated such a calculus of interests. In doing so, 
we are guided by Justice Stewart's exposition of the correct 
approach to ambiguities in the law of copyright: 
"The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory 
monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required 
by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing 
claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be 
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must 
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public 
availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The 
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair 
return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate 
aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity 
for the general public good. 'The sole interest of the 
United States and the primary object in conferring the 
monopoly,' this Court has said, 'lie in the general bene-
fits derived by the public from the labors of authors.' 
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127. See Ken-
dall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 327-328; Grant v. Ray-
mond, 6 Pet. 218, 241-242. When technological change 
has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright 
Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose." 
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 
156 (footnotes omitted). 
Copyright protection "subsists ... in original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 
U. S. C. § 102(a). This protection has never accorded the 
copyright owner complete control over all possible uses of his 
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work.'8 Rather, the Copyright Act grants the copyright 
holder "exclusive" rights to use and to authorize the use of his 
work in five qualified ways, including reproduction of the 
copyrighted work in copies. I d., § 106. 14 All reproductions 
of the work, however, are not within the exclusive domain of 
the copyright owner; some are in the public domain. Any in-
dividual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a "fair use;" 
the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right to 
such a use. Compare id., § 106 with id., § 107. 
18 See, e. g., White Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 
1, 19 (1908); cf. Deep South Packing Co. v. Lathram Corp., 406 U. S. 518, 
530-531 (1972). While the law has never recognized an author's right to 
absolute control of his work, the natural tendency of legal rights to express 
themselves in absolute tenns to the exclusion of all else is particularly pro-
nounced in the history of the constitutionally sanctioned monopolies of the 
copyright and the patent. See e. g., United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, 334 U. S. 131, 156-158 (1948) (copyright owners claiming right to tie 
license of one film to license of another under copyright law); Fox Film 
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 106 (1932) (copyright owner claiming copyright 
renders it immune from state taxation of copyright royalties); Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 349-351 (1908) (copyright owner 
claiming that a right to fix resale price of his works within the scope of his 
copyright); International Business Machines v. United States, 298 U. S. 
131 (1936) (patentees claiming right to tie sale of unpatented article to lease 
of patented device). 
1
' Section 106 of the Act provides: 
"'Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this 
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to 
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perfonn 
the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi-
vidual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the 
copyrighted work publicly." 
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"Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the 
copyright owner," that is, anyone who trespasses into his ex-
clusive domain by using or authorizing the use of the copy-
righted work in one of the five ways set forth in the statute, 
"is an infringer of the copyright." I d., § 501(a). Con-
versely, anyone who is authorized by the copyright owner to 
use the copyrighted work in a way specified in the statute or 
who makes a fair use of the work is not an infringer of the 
copyright with respect to such use. 
The Copyright Act provides the owner of a copyright with 
a potent arsenal of remedies against an infringer of his 
work, including an injunction to restrain the infringer from 
violating his rights, the impoundment and destruction of all 
reproductions of his work made in violation of his rights, a 
recovery of his actual damages and any additional profits re-
alized by the infringer or a recovery of statutory damages, 
and attorneys fees. I d., § § 502-505. 15 
The two respondents in this case do not seek relief against 
the Betamax users who have allegedly infringed their copy-
rights. Moreover, this is not a class action on behalf of all 
copyright owners who license their works for television 
broadcast, and respondents have no right to invoke whatever 
rights other copyright holders may have to bring infringe-
ment actions based on Betamax copying of their works. 16 As 
16 Moreover, anyone who willfully infringes the copyright to reproduce a 
motion picture for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial 
gain is subject to criminal penalties of one year imprisonment and a $25,000 
fine for the first offense and two years imprisonment and a $50,000 fine for 
each subsequent offense, 17 U. S. C. § 506(a), and the fruits and instru-
mentalities of the crime are forfeited upon conviction, id., § 506(b). 
16 In this regard, we reject respondent's attempt to cast this action as 
comparable to a class action because of the positions taken by amici with 
copyright interests and their attempt to treat the statements made by 
amici as evidence in this case. See Brief for Respondent, at 1, and n. 1, 6, 
52, 53 and n. 116. The stated desires of amici concerning the outcome of 
this or any litigation are no substitute for a class action, are not evidence in 
the case, and do not influence our decision; we examine an amicus curiae 
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was made clear by their own evidence, the copying of the re-
spondents' programs represents a small portion of the total 
use of VTR's. It is, however, the taping of respondents own 
copyrighted programs that provides them with standing to 
charge Sony with contributory infringement. To prevail, 
they have the burden of proving that users of the Betamax 
have infringed their copyrights and that Sony should be held 
responsible for that infringement. 
III 
The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable 
for infringment committed by another. In contrast, the Pat-
ent Act expressly brands anyone who "actively induces 
infringment of a patent" as an infringer, 35 U. S. C. § 271(b), 
and further imposes liability on certain individuals labeled 
"contributory" infringers, id., §271(c). The absence of such 
express language in the copyright statute does not preclude 
the imposition of liability for copyright infringments on cer-
tain parties who have not themselves engaged in the infring-
ing activity. 17 For vicarious liability is imposed in virtually 
brief solely for whatever aid it provides in analyzing the legal questions be-
fore us. 
17 As the District Court correctly observed, however, "the lines between 
direct infringement, contributory infringment, and vicarious liability are 
not clearly drawn .... " 480 F. Supp. 457-458. The lack of clarity in this 
area may, in part, be attributable to the fact that an infringer is not merely 
one who uses a work without authorization by the copyright owner, but 
also one who authorizes the use of a copyrighted work without actual au-
thority from the copyright owner. 
We note the parties' statements that the questions of petitioners' liabil-
ity under the "doctrines" of "direct infringement" and "vicarious liability'' 
are not nominally before this Court. Compare Respondents' Brief, at 9, n. 
22, 41, n. 90 with Petitioners' Reply Brief, at 1, n. 2. We also observe, 
however, that reasoned analysis of respondents' unprecedented contribu-
tory infringement claim necessarily entails consideration of arguments and 
case law which may also be forwarded under the other labels, and indeed 
the parties to a large extent rely upon such arguments and authority in 
support of their respective positions on the issue of contributory 
infringement. 
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all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringe-
ment is merely a species of the broader problem of identify-
ing the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual 
accountable for the actions of another. 
Such circumstances were plainly present in Kalem Co. v. 
Harper Brothers, 222 U. S. 55 (1911), the copyright decision 
of this Court on which respondents place their principal reli-
ance. In Kalem, the Court held that the producer of an un-
authorized film dramatization of the copyrighted book Ben 
Hur was liable for his sale of the motion picture to jobbers, 
who in turn arranged for the commercial exhibition of the 
film. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, explained: 
"The defendant not only expected but invoked by ad-
vertisement the use of its films for dramatic reproduc-
tion of the story. That was the most conspicuous pur-
pose for which they could be used, and the one for which 
especially they were made. If the defendant did not 
contribute to the infringement it is impossible to do so 
except by taking part in the final act. It is liable on 
principles recognized in every part of the law." 222 
U.S., at 63. 
The use for which the item sold in Kalem had been "espe-
cially'' made was, of course, to display the performance that 
had already been recorded upon it. The producer had per-
sonally appropriated the copyright owner's protected work 
and, as the owner of the tangible medium of expression upon 
which the protected work was recorded, authorized that use 
by his sale of the film to jobbers. But that use of the film 
was not his to authorize: the copyright owner possessed the 
exclusive right to authorize public performances of his work. 
Further, the producer personally advertised the unau-
thorized public performances, dispelling any possible doubt 
as to the use of the film which he had authorized. 
Respondents argue that Kalem stands for the proposition 
that supplying the "means" to accomplish an infringing activ-
ity and encouraging that activity through adverstisement are 
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sufficient to establish liability for copyright infringement. 
This argument rests on a gross generalization that cannot 
withstand scrutiny. The producer in Kalem did not merely 
provide the "means" to accomplish an infringing activity; the 
producer supplied the work itself, albeit in a new medium of 
expression. Petitioners in the instant case do not supply 
Betamax consumers with respondents' works; respondents 
do. Petitioners supply a piece of equipment that is generally 
capable of copying the entire range of programs that may be 
televised: those that are uncopyrighted, those that are copy-
righted but may be copied without objection from the copy-
right holder, and those that the copyright holder would pre-
fer not to have copied. The Betamax can be used to make 
authorized or unauthorized uses of copyrighted works, but 
the range of its potential use is much broader than the par-
ticular infringing use of the film Ben Hur involved in Kalem. 
Kalem does not support respondents' novel theory of 
liability. 
Justice Holmes stated that the producer had "contributed" 
to the infringement of the copyright, and the label "contribu-
tory infringement" has been applied in a number of lower 
court copyright cases involving an ongoing relationship be-
tween the direct infringer and the contributory infringer at 
the time the infringing conduct occurred. In such cases, as 
in other situations in which the imposition of vicarious liablity 
is manifestly just, the "contributory" infringer was in a posi-
tion to control the use of copyrighted works by others and 
had authorized the use without permission from the copy-
right owner. 18 This case, however, plainly does not fall in 
18 The so-called "dance hall cases," Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State 
Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Ass'n, 554 F . 2d 1213 (CAl 1977) 
(racetrack retained infringer to supply music to paying customers); KECA 
MUSIC , Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co. , 432 F . Supp. 72 (W. D. Mo. 1977) 
(cocktail lounge hired musicians to supply music to paying customers); 
Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F . 2d 354 (CA7 
1929) (dance hall hired orchestra to supply music to paying customers) are 
often contrasted with the so-called landlord-tenant cases, in which land-
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that category. The only contact between Sony and the users 
of the Betamax that is disclosed by this record occurred at 
the moment of sale. The District Court expressly found that 
lords who leased premises to a direct infringer for a fixed rental and did not 
participate directly in any infringing activity were found not to be liable for 
contributory infringement. E. g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F. 2d 686 (CA2 
1938). 
In Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F. 2d 304 (CA2 
1963) the owner of twenty-three chain stores retained the direct infringer 
to run its record departments. The relationship was structured as a li-
censing arrangement, so that the defendant bore none of the business risk 
of running the department. Instead, it received 10% or 12% of the direct 
infringer's gross receipts. The Court of Appeals concluded: 
"[The dance-hall cases] and this one lie closer on the spectrum to the em-
ployer-employee model, than to the landlord-tenant model. On the par-
ticular facts before us, ... Green's relationship to its infringing licensee, as 
well as its strong concern for the financial success of the phonograph record 
concession, renders it liable for the unauthorized sales of the 'bootleg' 
records. 
"[T]he imposition of vicarious liability in the case before us cannot be 
deemed unduly harsh or unfair. Green has the power to police carefully 
the conduct of its concessionaire; our judgment will simply encourage it to 
do so, thus placing responsibility where it can and should be effectively ex-
ercised." Id., at 308 (emphasis in original). 
In Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 
443 F. 2d 1159 (CA2 1971), the direct infringers retained the contributory 
infringer to manage their performances. The contributory infringer 
would contact each direct infringer, obtain the titles of the musical compo-
sitions to be performed, print the programs, and then sell the programs to 
its own local organizations for distribution at the time of the direct infringe-
ment. Id., at 1161. The Court of Appeals emphasized that the contribu-
tory infringer had actual knowledge that the artists it was managing were 
performing copyrighted works, was in a position to police the infringing 
conduct of the artists, and derived substantial benefit from the actions of 
the primary infringers. Id., at 1163. 
In Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. 
Supp. 399 (SDNY 1966), the direct infringer manufactured and sold boot-
leg records. In denying a motion for summary judgment, the District 
Court held that the infringer's advertising agency, the radio stations that 
advertised the infringer's works, and the service agency that boxed and 
mailed the infringing goods could all be held liable, if at trial it could be 
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"no employee of Sony, Sonam or DDBI had either direct in-
volvement with the allegedly infringing activity or direct con-
tact with purchasers of Betamax who recorded copyrighted 
works off-the-air." 480 F. Supp., at 460. And it further 
found that "there was no evidence that any of the copies 
made by Griffiths or the other individual witnesses in this 
suit were influenced or encouraged by [Sony's] advertise-
ments." Ibid. 
If vicarious liability is to be imposed on petitioners in this 
case, it must rest on the fact that they have sold equipment 
with constructive knowledge of the fact that their customers 
may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copy-
righted material. There is no precedent in the law of copy-
right for the imposition of vicarious liability on such a theory. 
The closest analogy is provided by the patent law cases to 
which it is appropriate to refer because of the historic kinship 
between patent law and copyright law. 19 
demonstrated that they knew or should have known that they were dealing 
in illegal goods. 
11 E. g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 158 (1948); 
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 106, 131 (1932); Wheaton and Donald-
son v. Peters and Grigg, 33 U. S. 591, 657-658 (1834). The two areas of 
the law, naturally, are not identical twins, and we exercise the caution 
which we have expressed in the past in applying doctrine formulated in one 
area to the other. See generally, Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 217-218 
(1954); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 345 (1908). 
We have consistently rejected the proposition that a similar kinship ex-
ists between copyright law and trademark law, and in the process of doing 
so have recognized the basic similarities between copyrights and patents. 
The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 91-92 (1879); see also, United Drug 
Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U. S. 90, 97 (1918)(trademark right "has little or 
no analogy'' to copyright or patent); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245, 254 
(1877); Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311, 322 (1871). Given the funda-
mental differences between copyright law and trademark law, in this copy-
right case we do not look to the standard for contributory infringement set 
forth in Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U. S. 844, 854-855 
(1982), which was crafted for application in trademark cases. There we 
observed that a manufacturer or distributor could be held liable to the 
owner of a trademark if it intentionally induced a merchant down the chain 
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In the Patent Code both the concept of infringement and 
the concept of contributory infringement are expressly de-
fined by statute. 20 The prohibition against contributory in-
fringement is confined to the knowing sale of a component es-
pecially made for use in connection with a particular patent. 
There is no suggestion in the statute that one patentee may 
object to the sale of a product that might be used in connec-
tion with other patents. Moreover, the Act expressly pro-
of distribution to pass off its product as that of the trademark owner's or if 
it continued to supply a product which could readily be passed off to a par-
ticular merchant whom it knew was mislabeling the product with the trade-
mark owner's mark. If Inwood's narrow standard for contributory 
trademark infringement governed here, respondents' claim of contributory 
infringement would merit little discussion. Sony certainly does not ''inten-
tionally induce[ ]" its customers to make infringing uses of respondents' 
copyrights, nor does it supply its products to identified individuals known 
by it to be engaging in continuing infringement of respondents' copyrights, 
see id., at 855. 
"'35 U. S. C. § 271 provides: 
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without author-
ity makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States 
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. 
"(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as 
an infringer. 
"(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, 
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing 
a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing 
the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringe-
ment of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce 
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory 
infringer. 
"(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or 
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed 
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his hav-
ing done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which 
if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory 
infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform 
acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory 
infrigement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against 
infringement or contributory infringement." 
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vides that the sale of a "staple article or commodity of com-
merce suitable for substantial noninfringing use" is not 
contributory infringement. 
When a charge of contributory infringement is predicated 
entirely on the sale of an article of commerce that is used by 
the purchaser to infringe a patent, the public interest in ac-
cess to that article of commerce is necessarily implicated. A 
finding of contributory infringement does not, of course, re-
move the article from the market altogether; it does, how-
ever, give the patentee effective control over the sale of that 
item. Indeed, a finding of contributory infringement is nor-
mally the functional equivalent of holding that the disputed 
article is within the monopoly granted to the patentee. 21 
For that reason, in contributory infringement cases arising 
under the patent laws the Court has always recognized the 
critical importance of not allowing the patentee to extend his 
monopoly beyond the limits of his specific grant. These 
cases deny the patentee any right to control the distribution 
of unpatented articles unless they are "unsuited for any com-
mercial noninfringing use." Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm 
& Hass Co., 448 U. S. 176, 198 (1980). Unless a commodity 
"has no use except through practice of the patented method," 
ibid, the patentee has no right to claim that its distribution 
constitutes contributory infringment. "To form the basis for 
contributory infringement the item must almost be uniquely 
suited as a component of the patented invention." P. Rosen-
berg, Patent Law Fundamentals § 17.02[2] (1982). "[A] sale 
21 It seems extraordinary to suggest that the Copyright Act confers upon 
all copyright owners collectively, much less the two respondents in this 
case, the exclusive right to distribute VTR's simply because they may be 
used to infringe copyrights. That, however, is the logical implication of 
their claim. The request for an injunction below indicates that respondents 
seek, in effect, to declare VTR's contraband. Their suggestion in this 
Court that a continuing royalty pursuant to a judicially created compulsory 
license would be an acceptable remedy merely indicates that respondents, 
for their part, would be willing to license their claimed monopoly interest in 
VTR's to petitioners in return for a royalty. 
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of an article which though adapted to an infringing use is also 
adapted to other and lawful uses, is not enough to make the 
seller a contributory infringer. Such a rule would block the 
wheels of commerce." Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1, 
48 (1912), overruled on other grounds, Motion Picture Pat-
ents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 517 
(1917). 
We recognize there are substantial differences between the 
patent and copyright laws. But in both areas the contribu-
tory infringement doctrine is grounded on the recognition 
that adequate protection of a monopoly may require the 
courts to look beyond actual duplication of a device or publi-
cation to the products or activities that make such duplication 
possible. The staple article of commerce doctrine must 
strike a balance between a copyright holder's legitimate de-
mand for effective-not merely symbolic-protection of the 
statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage 
in substantially unrelated areas of commerce. Accordingly, 
the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of 
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if 
the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable 
purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses. 
IV 
The question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of 
commercially significant noninfringing uses. In order to re-
solve that question, we need not explore all the different po-
tential uses of the machine and determine whether or not 
they would constitute infringement. Rather, we need only 
consider whether on the basis of the facts as found by the dis-
trict court a significant number of them would be non-infring-
ing. Moreover, in order to resolve this case we need not 
give precise content to the question of how much use is com-
mercially significant. For one potential use of the Betamax 
plainly satisfies this standard, however it is understood: pri-
vate, noncommercial time-shifting in the home. It does so 
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both (A) because respondents have no right to prevent other 
copyright holders from authorizing it for their programs, and 
(B) because the District Court's factual findings reveal that 
even the unauthorized home time-shifting of respondents' 
programs is legitimate fair use. 
A. Authorized Time Shifting 
Each of the respondents owns a large inventory of valuable 
copyrights, but in the total spectrum of television program-
ming their combined market share is small. The exact per-
centage is not specified, but it is well below 10%.22 If they 
were to prevail, the outcome of this litigation would have a 
significant impact on both the producers and the viewers of 
the remaining 90% of the programming in the Nation. No 
doubt, many other producers share respondents' concern 
about the possible consequences of unrestricted copying. 
Nevertheless the findings of the District Court make it clear 
that time-shifting may enlarge the total viewing audience and 
that many producers are willing to allow private time-shifting 
to continue, at least for an experimental time period. 23 
The District Court found: 
"Even if it were deemed that home-use recording of 
copyrighted material constituted infringement, the Beta-
22 The record suggests that Disney's programs at the time of trial con-
sisted of approximately one hour a week of network television and one syn-
dicated series. Universal's percentage in the Los Angeles market on com-
mercial television stations was under 5%. See Tr. 532-533, 549-550. 
28 The District Court did not make any explicit findings with regard to 
how much broadcasting is wholly uncopyrighted. The record does include 
testimony that at least one movie-My Man Godfrey-falls within that cat-
egory, Tr. 2300-2301, and certain broadcasts produced by the federal gov-
ernment are also uncopyrighted. See 17 U. S. C. § 105. Cf. Schappner 
v. Foley, 667 F. 2d 102 (CADC 1981) (explaining distinction between work 
produced by the government and work commissioned by the government). 
To the extent such broadcasting is now significant, it further bolsters our 
conclusion. Moreover, since copyright protection is not perpetual, the 
number of audiovisual works in the public domain necessarily increases 
each year. 
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max could still legally be used to record noncopyrighted 
material or material whose owners consented to the 
copying. An injunction would deprive the public of the 
ability to use the Betamax for this noninfringing off-the-
air recording. 
"Defendants introduced considerable testimony at 
trial about the potential for such copying of sports, reli-
gious, educational and other programming. This in-
cluded testimony from representatives of the Offices of 
the Commissioners of the National Football, Basketball, 
Baseball and Hockey Leagues and Associations, the Ex-
ecutive Director of National Religious Broadcasters and 
various educational communications agencies. Plaintiffs 
attack the weight of the testimony offered and also con-
tend that an injunction is warranted because infringing 
uses outweigh noninfringing uses." 
"Whatever the future percentage of legal versus ille-
gal home-use recording might be, an injunction which 
seeks to deprive the public of the very tool or article of 
commerce capable of some noninfringing use would be an 
extremely harsh remedy, as well as one unprecedented 
in copyright law." 480 F. Supp., at 468. 
Although the District Court made these statements in the 
context of considering the propriety of injunctive relief, the 
statements constitute a finding that the evidence concerning 
"sports, religious, educational, and other programming" was 
sufficient to establish a significant quantity of broadcasting 
whose copying is now authorized, and a significant potential 
for future authorized copying. That finding is amply sup-
ported by the record. In addition to the religious and sports 
officials identified explicitly by the District Court, 24 two items 
in the record deserve specific mention. 
24 See Tr. 2447-2450 (Alexander Hadden, Major League Baseball); Tr. 
2480, 2486-2487 (Jay Moyer, National Football League); Tr. 2515-2516 
(David Stern, National Basketball Association); Tr. 2530-2534 (Gilbert 
Stein, National Hockey League); Tr. 2543-2552 (Thomas Hansen, National 
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First is the testimony of John Kenaston, the station man-
ager of Channel 58, an educational station in Los Angeles 
affiliated with the Public Broadcasting Service. He ex-
plained and authenticated the station's published guide to its 
programs. 26 For each program, the guide tells whether un-
limited home taping is authorized, home taping is authorized 
subject to certain restrictions (such as erasure within seven 
days), or home taping is not authorized at all. The Spring 
1978 edition of the guide described 107 programs. Sixty-two 
of those programs or 58% authorize some home taping. 
Twenty-one of them or almost 20% authorize unrestricted 
home taping. 26 
Second is the testimony of Fred Rogers, president of the 
corporation that produces and owns the copyright on Mr. 
Rogers' Neighborhood. The program is carried by more 
public television stations than any other program. Its audi-
ence numbers over 3,000,000. families a day. He testified 
that he had absolutely no objection to home taping for non-
commercial use and expressed the opinion that it is a real 
service to families to be able to record children's programs 
and to show them at appropriate times. <n 
Collegiate Athletic Association); Tr. 2565-2572 (Benjamin Armstrong, Na-
tional Religious Broadcasters). Those officials were authorized to be the 
official spokespersons for their respective institutions in this litigation. 
Tr. 2432, 2479, 25W-2510, 2530, 2538, 2563. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 
30(b)(6). 
26 Tr. 2863-2902; Def. Exh. PI. 
211 See also Tr. 2833-2844 (similar testimony by executive director of New 
Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority). Cf. Tr. 2592-2605 (testimony by 
chief of New York Education Department's Bureau of Mass Communica-
tions approving home taping for educational purposes). 
21 "Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the 
'Neighborhood' at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that 
it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and show 
them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the advent of all 
of this new technology that allows people to tape the 'Neighborhood' off-
the-air, and I'm speaking for the 'Neighborhood' because that's what I 
produce, that they then become much more active in the programming of 
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If there are millions of owners of VTR's who make copies of 
televised sports events, religious broadcasts, and educational 
programs such as Mister Rogers' Neighborhood, and if the 
proprietors of those programs welcome the practice, the busi-
ness of supplying the equipment that makes such copying fea-
sible should not be stifled simply because the equipment is 
used by some individuals to make unauthorized reproductions 
of respondents' works. The respondents do not represent a 
class composed of all copyright holders. Yet a finding of con-
tributory infringement would inevitably frustrate the inter-
ests of broadcasters in reaching the portion of their audience 
that is available only through time-shifting. 
Of course, the fact that other copyright holders may wel-
come the practice of time-shifting does not mean that re-
spondents should be deemed to have granted a license to copy 
their programs. Third party conduct would be wholly irrele-
vant. in an action for direct infringement of respondents' 
copyrights. But in an action for contrilnttory infringement 
against the seller of copying equipment, the copyright holder 
may not prevail unless the relief that he seeks affects only his 
programs, or unless he speaks for virtually all copyright hold-
ers with an interest in the outcome. In this case, the record 
makes it perfectly clear that there are many important pro-
ducers of national and local television programs who find 
nothing objectionable about the enlargement in the size of the 
television audience that results from the practice of time-
shifting for private home use. 28 The seller of the equipment 
their family's television life. Very frankly, I am opposed to people being 
programmed by others. My whole approach in broadcasting has always 
been 'You are an important person just the way you are. You can make 
healthy decisions.' Maybe I'm going on too long, but I just feel that any-
thing that allows a person to be more active in the control of his or her life, 
in a healthy way, is important." T. R. 2920-2921. See also Def. Exh. PI, 
p. 85. 
28 It may be rare for large numbers of copyright owners to authorize 
duplication of their works without demanding a fee from the copier. In 
the context of public broadcasting, however, the user of the copyrighted 
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that expands those producers' audiences cannot be a con-
tributory infringer if, as is true in this case, it has had nodi-
rect involvement with any infringing activity. 
B. Unauthorized Time-Shifting 
Even unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work are not nec-
essarily infringing. An unlicensed use of the copyright is not 
an infringement unless it conflicts with one of the specific ex-
clusive rights conferred by the copyright statute. Twentieth 
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 154-155. 
Moreover, the definition of exclusive rights in § 106 of the 
present Act is prefaced by the words "subject to sections 107 
through 118." Those sections describe a variety of uses of 
copyrighted material that "are not infringements of copyright 
work is not required to pay a fee for access to the underlying work. The 
traditional method by which copyright owners capitalize upon the televi-
sion medium-eommercially sponsored free public broadcast over the pub-
lic airwaves-is predicated upon the assumption that compensation for the 
value of displaying the works will be received in the form of advertising 
revenues. 
In the context of television programming, some producers evidently be-
lieve that permitting home viewers to make copies of their works off the air 
actually enhances the value of their copyrights. Irrespective of their rea-
sons for authorizing the practice, they do so, and in significant enough 
numbers to create a substantial market for a non-infringing use of the Sony 
VTR's. No one could dispute the legitimacy of that market if the produc-
ers had authorized home taping of their programs in exchange for a license 
fee paid directly by the home user. The legitimacy of that market is not 
compromised simply because these producers have authorized home taping 
of their programs without demanding a fee from the home user. The copy-
right law does not require a copyright owner to charge a fee for the use of 
his works, and as this record clearly demonstrates, the owner of a copy-
right may well have economic or noneconomic reasons for permitting cer-
tain kinds of copying to occur without receiving direct compensation from 
the copier. It is not the role of the courts to tell copyright holders the best 
way for them to exploit their copyrights: even if respondents' competitors 
were ill-advised in authorizing home videotaping, that would not change 
the fact that they have created a substantial market for a paradigmatic 
non-infringing use of petitioners' product. 
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notwithstanding the provisions of § 106." The most perti-
nent in this case is §'107, the legislative endorsement of the 
doctrine of "fair use." 29 
That section identifies various factors 30 that enable a Court 
to apply an "equitable rule of reason" analysis to particular 
claims of infringement. 31 Although not conclusive, the first 
21 The Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, did not have a "fair use" pro-
vision. Although that Act's compendium of exclusive rights ''to print, re-
print, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work" was broad enough to 
encompass virtually all potential interactions with a copyrighted work, the 
statute was never so construed. The courts simply refused to read the 
statute literally in every situation. When Congress amended the statute 
in 1976, it indicated that it "intended to restate the present judicial doc-
trine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." House 
Report No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 66. 
110 Section 107 provides: 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords 
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy-
right. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
"(!) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work." 17 U. S. C. § 107. 
31 The House Report expressly stated that the fair use doctrine is an "eq- } 
uitable reason of reason" in its explanation of the fair use section: 
"Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doc-
trine over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever 
emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no gen-
erally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question 
must be decided on its own facts. . . . 
General intention behind the provision 
"The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers some guid-
ance to users in determining when the principles of the doctrine apply. 
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factor requires that "the commercial or nonprofit character of 
an activity" be weighed in any fair use decision. 32 If the 
Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or 
profit-making purpose, such use would presumptively be un-
fair. The contrary presumption is appropriate here, how-
ever, because the District Court's findings plainly establish 
that time-shifting for private home use must be characterized 
as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity. Moreover, when one 
considers the nature of a televised copyrighted audiovisual 
work, see 17 U. S. C. § 107(2), and that timeshifting merely 
enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been in-
However, the endless variety of situations and combinations of circum-
stances that can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact 
rules in the statute. The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of 
the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the 
doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological 
change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and 
some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the 
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis." H. Rep. No. 
94-1476, pp. 65-66. 
The Senate Committee similarly eschewed a rigid, bright line approach 
to fair use. The Senate Report endorsed the view "that off-the-air record-
ing for convenience" could be considered "fair use" under some circum-
stances, although it then made it clear that it did not intend to suggest that 
off-the-air recording for convenience should be deemed fair use under any 
circumstances imaginable. Senate Report 94-473, pp. 65-66. The latter 
qualifying statement is quoted by the dissent, post, at 25, and if read in 
isolation, would indicate that the Committee intended to condemn all off-
the-air recording for convenience. Read in context, however, it is quite 
clear that that was the farthest thing from the Committee's intention. 
82 "The Committee has amended the first of the criteria to be consid-
ered-'the purpose and character of the use' -to state explicitly that this 
factor includes a consideration of 'whether such use is of a commercial na-
ture or is for non-profit educational purposes.' This amendment is not in-
tended to be interpreted as any sort of not-for-profit limitation on educa-
tional uses of copyrighted works. It is an express recognition that, as 
under the present law, the commercial or non-profit character of an activ-
ity, whil~ not conclusive with respect to fair use, can and should be 
weighed along with other factors in fair use decisions." H. Rep. No. 
94-1476, p. 66. 
'. 
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vited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that 
the entire work is reproduced, see id., at § 107(3), does not 
have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair 
use. 83 
This is not, however, the end of the inquiry because Con-
gress has also directed us to consider "the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work." !d., at§ 107(4). The purpose of copyright is to cre-
ate incentives for creative effort. Even copying for noncom-
mercial purposes may impair the copyright holder's ability to 
obtain the rewards that Congress intended him to have. 
But a use that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential 
market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work need not 
be prohibited in order to protect the author's incentive to cre-
ate. The prohibition of such noncommercial uses would 
88 It has been suggested that "consumptive uses of copyrights by home 
VTR users are commercial even if the consumer does not sell the home-
made tape because the consumer will not buy tapes separately sold by the 
copyrightholder." Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing be-
fore Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Adminstration of 
Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Congress, 2d Ses-
sion, pt. 2, p. 1250 (1982) (memorandum of Prof. Laurence H. Tribe). 
Furthermore, "[t]he error in ~cusing such theft as noncommerical," we 
are told, "can be seen by simplJ\analogy: jewel theft is not converted into a 
noncommercial veniality if stolen jewels are simply worn rather than sold." 
Ibid. The premise and the analogy are indeed simple, but they add noth-
ing to the argument. The use to which stolen jewlery is put is quite irrele-
vant in determining whether ~epriving its true owner of his present 
possessory interest in it is venial; because of the nature of the item and the 
true owner's interests in physical possession of it, the law finds the taking 
objectionable even if the thief does not use the item at all. Theft of a par-
ticular item of personal property of course may have commercial signifi-
cance, for the thief deprives the owner of his right to sell that particular 
item to any individual. Timeshifting does not even remotely entail com-
parable consequences to the copyright owner. Moreover, the timeshifter 
no more steals the program by watching it once than does the live viewer, 
and the live viewer is no more likely to buy pre-recorded videotapes than is 
the timeshifter. Indeed, no live viewer would buy a pre-recorded video-
tape if he did not have access to a VTR. 
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merely inhibit access to ideas without any countervailing 
benefit. 34 
Thus, although every commercial use of copyrighted mate-
rial is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly 
privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright, noncom-
mercial uses are a different matter. A challenge to a non-
commercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either 
that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become 
widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market 
for the copyrighted work. Actual present harm need not be 
shown; such a requirement would leave the copyright holder 
with no defense against predictable damage. Nor is it neces-
sary to show with certainty that future harm will result. 
What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists. 
If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood 
may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, 
the likelihood must be demonstrated. 
In this case, respondents failed to carry their burden with 
regard to home time-shifting. The District Court described 
respondents' evidence as follows: 
"Plaintiffs' experts admitted at several points in the 
trial that the time-shifting without librarying would re-
sult in 'not a great deal of harm.' Plaintiffs' greatest 
concern about time-shifting is with 'a point of important 
philosophy that transcends even commercial judgment.' 
They fear that with any Betamax usage, 'invisible 
84 Cf. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted as Study 
No. 14 in Senate Judiciary Committee, Copyright Law Revision, Studies 
Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 
86th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 30 (1960): 
"In certain situations, the copyright owner suffers no substantial harm 
from the use of the work. . . . Here again, is the partial marriage be-
tween the doctrine of fair use and the legal maxim de minimis non curat 
lex." 
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boundaries' are passed: 'the copyright owner has lost 
control over his program."' 480 F. Supp., at 467. 
Later in its opinion, the District Court observed: 
"Most of plaintiffs' predictions of hann hinge on specula-
tion about audience viewing patterns and ratings, a 
measurement system which Sidney Sheinberg, MCA's 
president, calls a 'black art' because of the significant 
level of imprecision involved in the calculations." I d., at 
469.36 
There was no need for the District Court to say much about 
past hann. "Plaintiffs have admitted that no actual hann to 
their copyrights has occurred to date." ld., at 451. 
On the question of potential future harm from time-shift-
ing, the District Court offered a more detailed analysis of the 
evidence. It rejected respondents' "fear that persons 
'watching' the original telecast of a program will not be meas-
ured in the live audience and the ratings and revenues will 
decrease," by observing that current measurement technol-
ogy allows the Betamax audience to be reflected. I d., at 
466. 36 It rejected respondents' prediction "that live televi-
a& See also 480 F. Supp., at 451: 
"It should be noted, however, that plaintiffs' argument is more complicated 
and speculative than was the plaintiff's in Williams & Wilkins. . . . Here, 
plaintiffs ask the court to find harm based on many more assumptions. . . . 
As is discussed more fully in Part IV, infra, some of these assumptions are 
based on neither fact nor experience, and plaintiffs admit that they are to 
some extent inconsistent and illogical." 
"""There was testimony at trial, however, that Nielsen Ratings has al-
ready developed the ability to measure when a Betamax in a sample home 
is recording the program. Thus, the Betamax will be measured as a part 
of the live audience. The later diary can augment that measurement with 
information about subsequent viewing." 480 F. Supp., at 466. 
In a separate section, the District Court rejected plaintiffs' suggestion 
that the commercial attractiveness of television broadcasts would be dimin-
ished because Betamax owners would use the pause button or fast-forward 
control to avoid viewing advertisements: 
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sion or movie audiences will decrease as more people watch 
Betamax tapes as an alternative," with the observation that 
"[t]here is no factual basis for [the underlying] assumption." 
Ibid. 37 It rejected respondents' "fear that time-shifting will 
reduce audiences for telecast reruns," and concluded instead 
that "given current market practices, this should aid plain-
tiffs rather than harm them." Ibid. 38 And it declared that 
respondents' suggestion "that theater or film rental exhi-
bition of a program will suffer because of time-shift recording 
of that program" "lacks merit." 480 F. Supp., at 467.39 
"It must be remembered, however, that to omit commercials, Betamax 
owners must view the program, including the commercials, while record-
ing. To avoid commercials during playback, the viewer must fast-forward 
and, for the most part, guess as to when the commercial has passed. For 
most recordings, either practice may be too tedious. As defendants' sur-
vey showed, 92% of the programs were recorded with commercials and 
only 25% of the owners fast-forward through them. Advertisers will have 
to make the same kinds of judgments they do now about whether persons 
viewing televised programs actually watch the advertisements which inter-
rupt them." I d., at 468. 
87 "Here plaintiffs assume that people will view copies when they would 
otherwise be watching television or going to the movie theater. There is 
no factual basis for this assumption. It seems equally likely that Betamax 
owners will play their tapes when there is nothing on television they wish 
to see and no movie they want to attend. Defendants' survey does not 
show any negative effect of Betamax ownership on television viewing or 
theater attendance." Ibid. 
38 "The underlying assumptions here are particularly difficult to accept. 
Plaintiffs explain that the Betamax increases access to the original tele-
vised material and that the more people there are in this original audience, 
the fewer people the rerun will attract. Yet current marketing practices, 
including the success of syndication, show just the opposite. Today, the 
larger the audience for the original telecast, the higher the price plaintiffs 
can demand from broadcasters from rerun rights. There is no survey 
within the knowledge of this court to show that the rerun audience is com-
prised of persons who have not seen the program. In any event, if ratings 
can reflect Betamax recording, original audiences may increase and, given 
market practices, this should aid plaintiffs rather than harm them." Ibid. 
31 "This suggestion lacks merit. By definition, time-shift recording en-
tails viewing and erasing, so the program will no longer be on tape when 
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Mter completing that review, the District Court restated 
its overall conclusion several times, in several different ways. 
"Harm from time-shifting is speculative and, at best, mini-
mal." Ibid. "The audience benefits from the time-shifting 
capability have already been discussed. It is not implausible 
that benefits could also accrue to plaintiffs, broadcasters, and 
advertisers, as the Betamax makes it possible for more per-
sons to view their broadcasts." Ibid. "No likelihood of 
harm was shown at trial, and plaintiffs admitted that there 
had been no actual harm to date." I d., at 468-469. "Testi-
mony at trial suggested that Betamax may require adjust-
ments in marketing strategy, but it did not establish even a 
likelihood of harm." I d., at 469. "Television production by 
plaintiffs today is more profitable than it has ever been, and, 
in five weeks of trial, there was no concrete evidence to sug-
gest that the Betamax will change the studios' financial pic-
ture." Ibid. 
The District Court's conclusions are buttressed by the fact 
that to the extent time-shifting expands public access to 
freely broadcast television programs, it yields societal bene-
fits. Earlier this year, in Community Television of South-
ern California v. Gottfried, -- U. S. --, -----, n. 
12 (1983), we acknowledged the public interest in making 
television broadcasting more available. Concededly, that in-
terest is not unlimited. But it supports an interpretation of 
the concept of "fair use" that requires the copyright holder to 
demonstrate some likelihood of harm before he may condemn 
a private act of time-shifting as a violation of federal law. 
the later theater run begins. Of course, plaintiffs may fear that the 
Betamax will keep the tapes long enough to satisfy all their interest in the 
program and will, therefore, not patronize later theater exhibitions. To 
the extent this practice involves librarying, it is addressed in section V.C., 
infra. It should also be noted that there is no evidence to suggest that the 
public interest in later theatrical exhibitions of motion pictures will be re-
duced any more by Betamax recording than it already is by the television 
broadcast of the film." 480 F. Supp., at 467. ' 
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When these factors are all weighed in the "equitable rule of 
reason" balance, we must conclude that this record amply 
supports the District Court's conclusion that home time-shift-
ing is fair use. In light of the findings of the District Court 
regarding the state of the empirical data, it is clear that the 
Court of Appeals erred in holding that the statute as pres-
ently written bars such conduct. 40 
40 The Court of Appeals chose not to engage in any "equitable rule of rea-
son" analysis in this case. Instead, it assumed that the category of "fair 
use" is rigidly circumscribed by a requirement that every such use must be 
"productive." It therefore concluded that copying a television program 
merely to enable the viewer to receive information or entertainment that 
he would otherwise miss because of a personal scheduling conflict could 
never be fair use. That understanding of "fair use" was erroneous. 
Congress has plainly instructed us that fair use analysis calls for a sensi-
tive balancing of interests. The distinction between "productive" and ''un-
productive" uses may be helpful in calibrating the balance, but it cannot be 
wholly determinative. Although copying to promote a scholarly endeavor 
certainly has a stronger claim to fair use than copying to avoid interrupting 
a poker game, the question is not simply two-dimensional. For one thing, 
it is not true that all copyrights are fungible. Some copyrights govern ma-
terial with broad potential secondary markets. Such material may well 
have a broader claim to protection because of the greater potential for com-
mercial harm. Copying a news broadcast may have a stronger claim to 
fair use than copying a motion picture. And, of course, not all uses are 
fungible. Copying for commercial gain has a much weaker claim to fair 
use than copying for personal enrichment. But the notion of social "pro-
ductivity'' cannot be a complete answer to this analysis. A teacher who 
copies to prepare lecture notes is clearly productive. But so is a teacher 
who copies for the sake of broadening his personal understanding of his 
specialty. Or a legislator who copies for the sake of broadening her under-
standing of what her constituents are watching; or a constituent who copies 
a news program to help make a decision on how to vote. 
Making a copy of a copyrighted work for the convenience of a blind per-
son is expressly identified by the House Committee Report as an example 
of fair use, with no suggestion that anything more than a purpose to enter-
tain or to inform need motivate the copying. In a hospital setting, using a 
VTR to enable a patient to see programs he would otherwise miss has no 
productive purpose other than contributing to the psychological well-being 
of the patient. Virtually any time-shifting that increases viewer access to 
television programming may result in a comparable benefit. The statu-
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In summary, the record and findings of the District Court 
lead us to two conclusions. First, Sony demonstrated a sig-
nificant likelihood that substantial numbers of copyright hold-
ers who license their works for broadcast on free television 
would not object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by 
private viewers. And second, respondents failed to demon-
strate that time-shifting would cause any likelihood of non-
minimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, 
their copyrighted works. The Betamax is, therefore, capa-
ble of substantial noninfringing uses. Sony's sale of such 
equipment to the general public does not constitute contribu-
tory infringement of respondent's copyrights. 
v 
"The direction of Art. I is that Congress shall have the 
power to promote the progress of science and the useful 
arts. When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the 
sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can come only 
from Congress." Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram 
Corp., 406 U. S. 518, 530 (1972). 
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that 
the elected representatives of the millions of people who 
. watch television every day have made it unlawful to copy a 
program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat 
prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copy-
ing possible. 
It may well be that Congress will take a fresh look at this 
new technology, just as it so often has examined other inno-
vations in the past. But it is not our job to apply laws that 
have not yet been written. Applying the copyright statute, 
as it now reads, to the facts as they have been developed in 
this case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be 
reversed. 
tory language does not identify any dicohotomy between productive and 
nonproductive time-shifting, but does require consideration of the eco-
nomic consequences of copying. 
